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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART 28.

JAN.-JUNE 1931.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXVIII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1931

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXVIII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 42/2/25]

No. 1.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 2, 1931.

IF the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq were made on the understanding and with the object mentioned in Bagdad telegram No. 609, it would fit in satisfactorily with the result of the discussion here recorded in my telegram No. 112. I have no reason to suppose that Ibn Saud's attitude has modified, though I have had no opportunity of taking further soundings since my return. Fuad pressed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires several times during my absence for information as to the present position of the matter. I must, however, attach two qualifications to my agreement in present proposal, viz. (a) that Nuri must be prepared at the outset to show some readiness, in negotiations concerning extradition treaty, to meet Hejazi Government over the question of tribal offenders, e.g., by offering to accept as basis of discussion proposal put forward in letter of the 25th July from Fuad Hamza to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs; (b) that Nuri must be in a position to secure that the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement, when signed, is speedily ratified.

As regards (a) Ibn Saud would probably revert to his earlier attitude of refusing to disassociate the two agreements, if Nuri adopted uncompromising or even altogether non-committal position at the start. Although technically there may be a difference between the present position and that of 1928, it would seem to be equally reasonable in the present circumstances to make some concession of the kind which Iraq then contemplated, and to which His Majesty's Government agreed. In any case such action is essential if good relations are to be established. When Nuri proposes his visit it would be well that he should refer to this question or the Hejazi Government's complaint that Fuad's letter has been ignored will be justified. It is all the more necessary to show as much goodwill as possible on this point owing to dangerous repercussion of fiasco regarding Ibn Mashhur. As regards (b), signature is less important than ratification, and, until Iraq Parliament has passed treaty, Ibn Saud will not ratify it.

In my view claims question need not worry us at this stage. In the event of Nuri Pasha's coming to Jedda, the matter can be left to the two parties to thrash out, subject to your views as to line to be taken on question of Nejd claims for damage caused by Royal Air Force.

There is another matter which may affect whole situation, namely, statement made to Bagdad press in October by Nuri that he proposed to promote some kind of combination of Arabian States, including the Hejaz and Nejd, Iraq and Transjordan, and that he intended to pay visits during the winter to the capitals for the

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purpose of broaching the subject. I know very little of this and have no information as to (a) what attitude of His Majesty's Government may be to so far-reaching and important a scheme; or (b) what Ibn Saud, who must have seen announcement in press, feels about it.

If Nuri's visit is really proposed with a view to reconnoitre the ground for a federation or triple alliance, some diplomatic preparation would seem to be needed. My own view is that scheme is at present incapable of realisation, so far as it involves the inclusion of the Hejaz-Nejd. Even if it has approval of His Majesty's Government from standpoint of their own interest, Ibn Saud's gravest suspicion might be awakened by any attempt to spring it on him. I should be very grateful to learn your views for my guidance if necessary.

Whilst commending no preceding paragraphs to your serious notice, I think "Bon-Voisinage" and Extradition Agreements should be put in train with least possible delay. I trust, therefore, that Nuri will reply as soon as possible, and preferably by telegram to letters of last July, providing always that due attention is given to points referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this telegram. Presumably, some communication will simultaneously be addressed to Ibn Saud by Feisal, if only for courtesy's sake.

(Repeated to Bagdad No. 2.)

[E 81/81/25]

No. 2.

Mr. Hope Gill to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 5, 1931.)

(No. 368.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 18, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for the months of September, October and November. I much regret that, under the heavy pressure of other work on myself and a reduced staff, I have found it impossible to render these reports monthly.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the senior naval officer in Red Sea sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Jedda Report for September, October and November 1930.

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I.—Internal Affairs.

1. Local Government.

IBN SAUD visited Jedda on the 1st September, ostensibly to open a customs warehouse, in reality to see the Polish munitions landed by the steamship "Cracow" (August report, section 15). He also witnessed a closely guarded exhibition shoot with a Polish gun adapted to camel transport. Overcome by the damp heat of the place, he hurried away from Jedda the same day, and remained in the pleasant climate of Taif and its neighbourhood until the 25th October, when his Court and Government removed to Mecca for the winter.

At the end of September His Majesty enjoyed another week's gazelle shooting in the Rukba plain, but for the rest of the time he has been hard at work. A picturesque account of the personal side of his rule was published in the Mecca "Umm-al-Qura" of the 5th September. His subjects were there assured that their every petition, whether from high or low, rich or poor, received their Sovereign's personal attention, in pleasing contrast to the general run of kings and potentates—which would be all the more pleasing were it quite true.

As a result of the deliberations mentioned in the August report (section 1), a number of new appointments were announced at the beginning of September. Khalid Bey-al-Qarqani, an intelligent political exile from Tripoli, was named first assistant to the Amir Feisal, Viceroy of Mecca, but later resigned the post and was replaced by Sheikh Ibrahim Abdurrahman-al-Fadhl (see section 3 (c) below). Sheikh Yasin-ar-Rawaf, late Hejaz-Nejd agent in Syria, was appointed as second assistant to the Viceroy, his brother, Mohammed Id-ar-Rawaf, being named to replace him at Damascus. Nahih Bey-al-Adhma, another of the numerous political refugees in this country, was appointed first Director of Military Organisation (see section 26 below).

A new Haj Committee of eight members has been formed to make preparations for the coming pilgrimage. The Majlis-at-Tujjar, a kind of mixed chamber of commerce and commercial court, has been revived, and is now composed of six members, to whom is added an Alem of the Sharia Court to advise on points of law. A Projects Committee has also been formed to study questions of electric light and water supply and mineral exploitation. The fruits of their labours have not yet matured, if any fruits there be.

As a result of German enterprise, however, fifty automatic telephones have been imported for Ibn Saud's and the Amir Feisal's palaces in Mecca.

2. Religion.

The intransigence of the Wahabis was recently experienced by some poor Patni pilgrims from India, who were seen wearing their traditional head-dress in Mecca, while performing their seven rounds of Tawaf. They were hauled before a grandson of the great Abdul Wahhab, who compelled them to complete their performance bareheaded. The only possible consolation was to be found in the supposition that, had the Turks been there, the Patnis would have had to wear bowler hats.

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3. Finance.

(a) The already bad situation as regards both public and private finance has steadily deteriorated during the past three months. An increasing number of important Government debts are outstanding, and Ibn Saud's cash reserve, which, at the beginning of the year, was said to amount to £100,000, is now believed to be practically exhausted.

(b) The Government of India are still owed something over £30,000 for arms and ammunition supplied to enable Ibn Saud to suppress the 1929 rebellion in Nejd. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed in November to press for a firm undertaking to liquidate the debt by the end of next February.

The Eastern Telegraph Company's monthly account with the Hejaz-Nejd Government is six months, and over £4,000, in arrear, semi-official representations having as yet failed of other effect than a reference of the matter to the Deity: "To-morrow, if Allah will."

Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. have now for some months received the same answer to their requests for the long overdue repayment by the Government of a loan of £5,000. They are also owed £1,100 for cars supplied to the Government, and £500 for aviation spirit, and they hold drafts on the customs and quarantine to the value of £16,000 in respect of their benzine contract. These drafts are theoretically payable at sight, but in practice months go by before they can be met.

(c) The important Hejazi firm of "E. A. Alfazal," with its head office in Bombay, has gone out of business owing £30,000 to a leading bank there. The bank is advised that a criminal action for false declaration of value lies against the firm, but its partners have retired to influential positions in the Government at Mecca (e.g., see section 1 above). The matter has, therefore, been taken up semi-officially, in the first instance, with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, but with little prospect of success. The Nejd firm of Qusaibi is also said to be in difficulties. Ibn Saud's private bankers, in fact, seem to be in as bad a way as their patron. The Kaïmakam of Jedda, Haji Abdullah Ali Ridha, one of the few wealthy men left in the country, is keeping out of reach by a prolonged absence in Egypt.

(d) The outlook is, moreover, decidedly gloomy. The coming pilgrimage has been anxiously looked to by this Hejazi nation of lodging-house keepers, of touts and guides and parasites, to replenish its empty coffers, but there is now every indication that it will be an exceptionally poor one. The heart of Islam is now beginning to feel the reflex actions of world conditions. The most important section of the pilgrimage, that from the Dutch East Indies, has already started, but advices from Java put it at 18,000 at most this year, as against 30,000 last year. It is still too early to estimate the Egyptian and Indian pilgrimages, which last year numbered 17,000 and 12,000 respectively, but the conditions prevailing in both countries are calculated to reduce those figures considerably.

Ibn Saud is faced with the prospect of a very lean year. There are some who foresee his complete bankruptcy.

4. Commerce.

Efforts are being made to open up and organise the Hasa coast to trade through the Persian Gulf, and probably to pilgrim traffic also. A strong committee, under Mohammed-at-Tawil, left for the Hasa on the 26th September to study the possibilities on the spot. Its recommendations will no doubt aim at a short-circuiting of Bahrein and its transit dues.

5. Wireless.

The Hejaz-Nejd Government signed with the Marconi Company at the beginning of October a contract worth £37,000, payment to be made by instalments extending over three and a half years. The company have undertaken to supply and erect within eighteen months eleven land stations and four mobile sets. The former are to comprise two principal six-kilowatt stations at Mecca and Riadh, and nine subsidiary stations at Tabuk, Qaryat (Kaf), Hail, Qasim (Ayun), Sha'ra (Shagra), Hufuf, Jubail, Qatif, and Uqair. The half-kilowatt mobile sets are to be mounted on Ford one-ton trucks. The contract marked the successful conclusion of Mr. Philby's negotiations of the past year on behalf of the Marconi Company (June report, paragraph 30).

A wireless school has been opened in Jedda, and four of its most promising pupils have been sent to the Marconi Company's works in England to complete their training.

6. Aeronautics.

See air matters (sections 21 and 22 below).

7. Hejaz Railway.

A petition, presented in 1929 to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations by the Amir Shakib Arslan, the noted Syrian Nationalist, who is in close touch with Ibn Saud and Ihsan-al-Jabri, was considered by the commission on the 9th September. The petitioners complained, amongst other things, that in spite of its Waqf character, the Hejaz Railway had been taken out of the hands of the Moslem peoples to whom, as a religious property, it belonged, and they asked that it be handed back to a commission elected by Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, which would control it in concert with the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

The Mandates Commission, however, maintained a previous decision to the effect that the railway, as property of the Ottoman Government, fell to be dealt with under article 5 of the Treaty of Lausanne; that the steps taken by the mandatory Powers for its control and exploitation were not of a nature to conflict with the religious aspirations of the Moslem populations; that they, in fact, tended to create a situation as analogous to pre-war conditions as was now possible; and that the petition must therefore be non-suited. The commission added that the interested Moslem populations would do well to associate themselves with the efforts made by the mandatory Powers to solve the problem to the best interests of all. The commission's conclusions were approved by the Council of the League. No reaction has yet been noted in this country.

8. Roads.

The "Umm-al-Qura" is doing its best to educate its public to take an interest in the development of internal communications. The distances over what are called motor roads are published from time to time. They are indifferently given in miles or kilometres, an indication that they are the records of pioneer journeys measured by the speedometer of the particular car used.

9. Land Registration.

The Ministry of Finance published an order on the 12th September instituting a system of land registration in the immediate vicinities of the towns of Mecca and Jedda. This is the first step to be taken in this connexion by the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

The ownership of land in the Hejaz is confined to Hejazi subjects, while in Nejd it is open to all.

II.—Frontier Questions.

10. Transjordan.

(a) Although Mr. MacDonnell had arrived at Amman at the beginning of July to prepare for his investigation (August report, section 7), and telegraphed on the 14th July that he was ready for the Hejaz-Nejd agent and tribal representatives, the latter did not arrive at Amman until the 1st September. The investigator spent the 3rd to the 13th September examining the Hejaz-Nejd claims with the agent, who found that he had to make no less than 259 amendments to the 226 Hejaz-Nejd claims, amendments which affected place, date, raiders, raided, loot and casualties. Eleven claims moreover were found not to lie against Transjordan tribes at all. These facts are mentioned to illustrate the care with which the Hejaz Government had investigated every detail of every claim, as they insisted in June, an investigation which they considered rendered any further investigation on the spot by Mr. MacDonnell a work of supererogation.

The opening meeting was held at Amman on the 15th September. Trouble and discord soon arose. The Hejaz-Nejd agent suggested on the 19th that he

was only there to prepare Hejaz-Nejd claims and not to answer those of Transjordan. The investigator refused to accept such an idiotic idea. On the 22nd the agent demurred to his tribal representatives being forced to give evidence on oath, although it was to be administered strictly after the Bedouin fashion. He referred both matters to his Government. On the 24th September a wordy brawl took place before Mr. MacDonnell's arrival for the morning session. Arab amenities were freely exchanged, in the course of which Hamd-bin-Jazi, sheikh of the Transjordan Howaitat, was said to have cursed the Hejaz-Nejd agent, his father and his Government. Again the agent referred the matter to his Government, while the investigation continued on its course, after a day's adjournment, until the 29th. On the afternoon of that day a second incident occurred, another Transjordan sheikh, Mutlaq-bin-Zaal, making a childish display of temper when required by the investigator to give evidence. He was severely reprimanded by Mr. MacDonnell, but the Hejaz-Nejd agent duly reported the matter to his Government as another insult to them. From the 30th September to the 5th October the meetings were adjourned, the Hejaz-Nejd agent having decided to withdraw his delegates to await instructions about cross-examination and the oath. Resumed on the 6th October they were again adjourned the following day, and again owing to the withdrawal of the Hejaz-Nejd representatives, this time under instructions from their Government, which demanded heavy reparation for the "insults." A coffee party quarrel on about the 13th ended in a promise by the Transjordan Howaitat to kill the Shararat and Billi of Nejd if and when the investigation reopened. Fortunately the matter was allowed to slide.

These goings-on threw a great deal of work upon His Majesty's Government and the Legation at Jedda. Although the Hejaz-Nejd Government did not cavil at the decision of His Majesty's Government to allow their investigator full discretion in interpreting the "reasonable" delay permissible for past notifications of raids (August report, section 7), they were obdurate in the matter of the proposed voluntary tribal settlements (*ibid.*), their subjects having submitted their claims to their Government, they said, the latter had verified them and requested the British Government to arbitrate, the claimants themselves had therefore nothing more to say in the matter. At bottom, Ibn Saud was probably unwilling that his tribes should compound and fraternise with those of the Amir Abdullah. In the same note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representations made by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in regard to the use of the oath were met by a "non possumus" on the grounds that such use would entail the loss of the established rights of the subjects of the Hejaz-Nejd. This curious statement was explained by Fuad Bey, who visited Jedda on the 29th September to mean that, having successfully resisted the imposition of the oath at the abortive Maan and Jericho tribunals (and thereby, incidentally, contributed to their abortiveness) the Hejaz-Nejd Government could not now accept the use of the oath at Amman.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to represent to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the gravity of the situation created by his Government's attempt thus to fetter the free hand given by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government to conduct the arbitration as they thought fit. He was also authorised, should his representations fail of decisive effect within forty-eight hours, to convey to Ibn Saud himself a strongly-worded message from His Majesty's Government. Two long interviews took place between Mr. Hope-Gill and Fuad Bey on the 29th and 30th September. As a result, the latter curtailed his visit, left early on the 1st October for Taif, and on the next morning telephoned to say that instructions had been sent to the Hejaz-Nejd agent at Amman to conform to Mr. MacDonnell's procedure in the matter of the oath and to answer all properly notified Transjordan claims (except those relating to Ibn Mashhur), but not to countenance voluntary settlements. The last point, not being clearly in the nature of interference with His Majesty's Government's discretionary powers, was allowed to drop. The Hejaz-Nejd Government's climb-down over the first two points, however, allowed the investigation to proceed and joint sittings were resumed on the 6th October.

But only for a day. The Ibn Jazi brawl was now the obstacle, reinforced a little later and for a time by the Zaal incident. On the 4th October the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that Ibn Saud had just received news of an insult levelled by Ibn Jazi at the Hejaz-

Nejd agent and Government and was considering making official representations to His Majesty's Government. It was unfortunate that Mr. Hope-Gill had not been placed in full possession of the facts, the information at his disposal being hardly calculated to answer Fuad Bey's arguments or to satisfy the King. He therefore impressed upon the former the desirability of confining the effects of any wordy strife that had taken place between Bedouin at Amman to local appeasement by Mr. MacDonnell and/or the Amir Abdullah, rather than enlarge them into the international sphere. He also telegraphed for more adequate information in order to prevent this new obstacle from taking concrete form, but all to no purpose. In a note dated the 5th October the Hejaz-Nejd Government officially demanded a written apology from the Transjordan Government, to be publicly read in session at Amman and thereupon conveyed to them through His Majesty's Government and the diplomatic channel; also the exemplary punishment of Ibn Jazi. On the 7th October the Hejaz-Nejd agent withdrew from the investigation pending receipt of that satisfaction.

The rest of the month was devoted to an exchange of views as to the nature and amount of the satisfaction to be given. The Transjordan Government considered that the Ibn Jazi incident was closed, the Amir himself having conveyed his regrets at once to the Hejaz-Nejd agent and caused him and Ibn Jazi to shake hands, and also having taken the latter severely to task for his behaviour towards a guest of the country. The Hejaz-Nejd Government agreed with His Majesty's Government that the incident should be separated from the investigation proper, and they therefore instructed their agent to continue to afford Mr. MacDonnell every assistance—a phrase which by much vain repetition had come to lose all meaning; but they could not pocket such an insult; it had become a point of prestige to exact full reparation; their tribesmen could not possibly attend joint sittings until this were given. It was happily found possible to convince them that the Zaal incident was no concern of theirs, but it was not until His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, under instructions from the Foreign Office, delivered to Ibn Saud a message of regret from the Amir Abdullah and the information that he had bound over his sheikhs to good behaviour, together with a message from His Majesty's Government to the effect that this action was such as any Government might accept as affording honourable satisfaction and that the time had now come to close the door upon the past, that the Ibn Jazi incident was at last disposed of. The Hejaz-Nejd Government's acceptance was notified to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 30th October, and on the 2nd November Mr. MacDonnell resumed his investigation with joint sittings and oaths.

Two further points remained at issue: the treatment of claims for Ibn Mashhur's raids into Transjordan, and for Beni Atiya raids into the Hejaz-Nejd. To His Majesty's Government's contention that the Hejaz-Nejd Government was responsible for aggressions by their subjects, that Ibn Mashhur was not a rebel when he made his first and second raids, and that on his third he was accompanied by many tribesmen who did not accompany him into refuge in Iraq, the Hejaz-Nejd Government riposted that by article 5 of the Hadda Agreement only the chief of the tribe was to be held responsible, and that they could not accept responsibility for a chief who remained, with his property, in territory to which His Majesty's Government had undertaken to forbid him entry. There this matter was allowed to rest until such a time as Ibn Mashhur should be handed back by King Faisal to Ibn Saud (see section 11 (*d*) below). In the matter of the Beni Atiya, the Transjordan agent demanded that claims against them be struck from Mr. MacDonnell's list, since their leaders had already returned to their allegiance to Ibn Saud. The Hejaz-Nejd Government objected that, even if some of them had returned, they had left their property behind in Transjordan. The question as to whether they are to be denied re-entry to that country, and, if so, in what terms, is still under consideration by the Transjordan Government.

Once restarted, Mr. MacDonnell worked with hardly a break until the 16th November and left on the 17th for London. Between the opening meeting on the 14th September and the final session of the 16th November lay fifty-seven working days. Of these, two were lost owing to the Hejaz-Nejd agent's illness, thirty-two owing to his withdrawals, and only twenty-three were occupied by joint sittings of both sides. A wearing period for all concerned, it is well over.

(b) So much for the raids of the past. Those of the present—that is, since the 1st August—remain to be liquidated, the Hejaz-Nejd Government having

agreed on the 27th October with His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government that the arbitration should be regarded as covering all raids made prior to the 1st August and that no claims should thereafter be made concerning them. Since the 1st August the Transjordan Government have registered protests against four raids by Hejaz-Nejd tribesmen, one on the 17th September (which caused the Ibn Jazi incident of the 24th), two on the 26th October and one on the 30th October, involving a total of some 1,100 camels. In the same period the Hejaz-Nejd Government have protested against twelve raids by Transjordan tribesmen, two in August, three in September (the 1st, 2nd and 23rd), four in October (the 10th, 11th, 28th and 31st), and three in November (the 1st, 8th and 18th), involving five men and one woman killed and about 1,180 camels, taking a herd to average fifty.

(c) The results of His Majesty's Government's enquiry into the frontier situation, with particular reference to raiding (August report, section 7 (c)), were considered at an inter-departmental meeting held at the Colonial Office on the 26th August. The following recommendations were submitted on the 12th September for Treasury sanction:—

- (i) The Bedouin Control Board to be retained.
- (ii) A Secret Service Fund of £2,000 per annum to be placed at the disposal of the officer commanding the Arab Legion;
- (iii) A British intelligence officer to be appointed to the Arab Legion;
- (iv) The mobile reserve to be mechanised; and
- (v) Three small intelligence posts to be established on the frontier at Mudawwara, Azrak and Imshash.

These decisions having been taken, a memorandum was drawn up by His Majesty's Government in reply to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's note of the 28th July and to portions of Ibn Saud's letters of the 23rd July and the 13th August to Sir A. Ryan (August report, section 7 (c)). The frontier situation was reviewed in detail. The Hejaz-Nejd Government were reminded that it was the firm conviction of His Majesty's Government that it was only by the fullest co-operation, exchange of information, and consultation on the part of the authorities of Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd that any real improvement in the control of raiding could be achieved. In order to remove any misunderstanding as to the extent of the efforts made on the Transjordan side to effect such an improvement, His Majesty's Government made a comprehensive and up-to-date statement regarding the control measures taken and contemplated in Transjordan. These measures included—

- (1) The Bedouin Control Board;
- (2) The mechanisation of one company of the Transjordan Frontier Force;
- (3) The closing to Bedouin of an area lying between the eastern and southern frontiers of Transjordan and Bair, Jaffar and Tell Shahem;
- (4) The stationing of armoured-car detachments and aircraft at the few water-points in the southern desert of Transjordan and intensive reconnaissance work by aircraft;
- (5) A declaration by the Amir Abdullah as to the punishment of tribes who raided or instigated raiding or withheld information about raids;
- (6) Powers of arrest given to British detachments patrolling the frontier area and stationed at the water-points;
- (7) The appointment of a British intelligence officer on the establishment of the Arab Legion with powers to ensure respect for the decisions of the Bedouin Control Board, of which he would be a member; and
- (8) The establishment of two advance intelligence posts at Azrak and Imshash (Bir Nam), the stationing of an intelligence detachment in the old Turkish fort near Mudawwara, and their provision with wireless apparatus.

Turning to another aspect of the obligations resting on both neighbours, the punishment of offenders and the return of loot, His Majesty's Government were unaware what punishments, if any, had been inflicted on the chiefs and tribesmen of the Hejaz-Nejd; a list of twenty-one punishments inflicted by the Transjordan Government was given. As to loot, only one case was known in which loot had been returned by the Hejaz-Nejd authorities; a list of twenty-three

occasions on which loot had been restored by the Transjordan authorities was given. With regard to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's charge that the raids into its territories were outside the category of mere raids intended for plundering, but were a series of hostile attacks conducted on a large scale, with a view to aggression, His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government had made careful investigations, but could admit no justification for such a charge. In reply to the Hejaz-Nejd Government's disclaimer of responsibility for the future if the then frontier situation were to continue, His Majesty's Government drew their attention to the extreme gravity of any such refusal of responsibility. Such an attitude would not only constitute a denial of obligations clearly recognised by international law and custom, but would be entirely at variance with the undertakings entered into by Ibn Saud in the Hadda Agreement. His Majesty's Government were unable to admit any such disclaimer of responsibility. Finally, Ibn Saud's attention was once more drawn to the importance of bringing into operation article 3 of the Hadda Agreement, whereby he had undertaken that constant communication should be maintained between the local authorities on both sides of the frontier. The Transjordan authorities had consistently done their best to establish contact, but Ibn Saud, on his side, had not only done nothing, but had actually discouraged frontier collaboration. A necessary condition of any improvement of the frontier situation must be that the Hejaz-Nejd Government should lend their whole-hearted co-operation.

This memorandum was delivered by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 23rd October. Only a rather inconsequent interim reply has as yet been received, in which bitter complaint was made that, of two reports on a frontier incident, His Majesty's Government invariably accepted the one emanating from the British-controlled source in preference to that of the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, confidently vouched for by Fuad Bey himself.

A solitary attempt at co-operation followed and failed. On the 27th October His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires received and passed on at once to Amman a telegram from Mecca stating that a raiding party had started in the direction of Transjordan, and inviting the co-operation of the authorities there to deal with it. As a matter of fact, the party had made two large raids on the 26th October, and were already safe home again with the loot.

In a note, dated the 19th October, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitted a message from Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government which dealt chiefly with the MacDonnell investigation, but also made a somewhat pointed reference to the dangers which he expected would arise from the meeting of Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd Bedouin when they went eastward and mingled in search of autumn pasture.

11. Iraq.

(a) A reply is still awaited by the Hejaz-Nejd Government to its note of the 27th July to the Iraq Government inviting them to send a plenipotentiary to sign the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty, and negotiate an extradition agreement. His Majesty's Government asked the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, on the 9th September, for a report on the Iraq Government's attitude, but his enquiries of the 11th September and the 30th October have apparently not yet disclosed the reasons for the untoward delay.

(b) On the initiative of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, notes have been exchanged with the Iraq Government providing for the collaboration and periodic meetings of their frontier officials in order to deal with camel thefts and other incidents not to be dignified by the name of raids. The director of police in the Iraq Southern Desert has been authorised to meet for this purpose with the mamur of the Nejd Desert. Ibn Arfaj is at present at Riyadh, probably to be relieved of that post, to which another appointment is expected.

The Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of the 29th August to Bagdad on the matter of claims for past raids (August report, section 8 (b)) had mentioned the payment to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda of £10,000 on this account (*ibid.*). For fear that the Iraqi Government should therefore claim the whole of the sum, which really was paid in pursuance of Ibn Saud's letter to Colonel Biscoe of the 27th June, and fell to be divided between Iraqi and Koweit sufferers, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed in September to obtain a confirmation to this effect from the Hejaz-Nejd Government, and a

corresponding rectification of the relevant passage in their note of the 29th August. Fuad Bey wrote a personal letter to Mr. Hope Gill on the 9th September, unequivocally stating that this sum was that promised by Ibn Saud in January, but it proved impossible to induce him to write to Bagdad in the same sense. Personally, he seemed willing enough to correct his first misleading statement, but the King or Yusuf Yasin overrode him. The only likely explanation was thought to be that the matter of Ibn Mashhur still stuck in their gizzards (June report, paragraph 13, and (d) below).

In comment on the Hejaz-Nejd claim for £4,000 in respect of damages by aircraft (August report, section 8 (b)), the Air Council opined that the claim should be emphatically repudiated, there being verification of only two of the claims, in both of which cases the casualties were inflicted in Iraq or Koweit territory on hostile parties engaged in raiding Iraq tribes, and after fire had been opened on the aircraft.

(c) A further reply was received from the Hejaz-Nejd Government and transmitted to Bagdad about the alleged activities of Ibn Saud's agents on the frontier marches of Iraq (August report, section 8 (d)). No comment on either answer has been received.

(d) The Ibn Mashhur affair is still unsettled (August report, section 8 (d)). The certain hope held in June that it would be disposed of in the near future has now been quite belied. At the end of August it was uncertain whether King Feisal would accept Ibn Saud's letter of pardon, but by the beginning of September this difficulty was tided over and news was received on the 3rd September that arrangements for Ibn Mashhur's journey via Damascus were nearing completion. His Majesty's Government, however, at once pointed out that Ibn Saud must be consulted before the arrangements were completed, and that these should include proper steps to ensure that Ibn Mashhur would, in fact, reach the Hejaz. Thereupon Nuri Pasha telegraphed on the 10th September to Fuad Bey that Ibn Mashhur had been guaranteed absolute pardon in respect of his life, property and personal freedom and would travel to the Hejaz via Damascus. He asked for telegraphic confirmation.

This communication drew from Fuad Bey the reply that Ibn Saud's promise to King Feisal to grant "Aman" to Ibn Mashhur needed no further confirmation and that it was impossible to agree to Ibn Mashhur coming by the Damascus route. Fuad Bey at once came to Jedda to talk the matter over with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. He explained that it was Ibn Saud's intention neither to imprison nor to dispossess Ibn Mashhur. His life was assured, and he would not be held to account for the crimes of *lèse-majesté* and rebellion against the State, but would have to answer any civil claims for damages caused by his raids. Fuad Bey insisted, moreover, that the proposed method of his return offered no guarantee that he would leave Syria and reach the Hejaz or would, indeed, be allowed by the French to leave.

In transmitting these observations on the 14th September, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that earlier in the year His Majesty's Government had stated that they could not agree to Ibn Mashhur's return to Syria except by consent of the French Government, in view of his past history and close association with Syrian rebels. He enquired whether it would not be possible to deliver the man by air to the Hejaz authorities at Wejh or the Hejaz-Nejd agent at Amman, where his presence might be opportune to the investigation of his raids by Mr. MacDonnell. His Majesty's Government found that Fuad Bey's attitude was not unreasonable, and expressed to Bagdad the hope that agreement would be reached with the Hejaz-Nejd for Ibn Mashhur's return by one or other of the more direct routes that had been mentioned or else by the authorities in the Iraq Southern Desert, but it was learned on the 19th September that King Feisal and ex-King Ali regarded it as essential to their honour that Ibn Mashhur should go to Ibn Saud of his own free will. Various described as an untutored Bedouin youth and a tall, intelligent fellow of 40, he refused to travel either by sea or by way of Nejd.

Ibn Saud at length, on the 7th October, received a telegram from King Feisal simply saying that Ibn Mashhur was proceeding. It was learned, however, on the 10th that he had not left, but that the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq had advised King Feisal that he should communicate with Ibn Saud about the proposed arrangements for his journey. His Majesty's Government had meanwhile suggested that Ibn Mashhur be flown to Suez and shipped thence to

Jedda, or to Amman, and motored thence to Qaryat, but apparently Transjordan was considered too hot for him, and, in any case, he refused to fly. Both King Feisal and his Prime Minister were strongly in favour of his travelling by Damascus, and the Iraq Government took full responsibility for his arrival at Jedda and said they would send one of their own men with him.

On the 15th October His Majesty's Government telegraphed strongly deprecating the proposal to send Ibn Mashhur through Syria unless Ibn Saud had definitely stated that he had no objection. The risk of his escape in Syria was very great and could not fail to have most serious consequences. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires expressed the fear, however, that it would be a waste of time and also impolitic to press Ibn Saud further to agree to the Syrian route, for any such agreement on his part could not fail to engage his own as well as the Iraq Government's responsibility in circumstances over which neither of them would have full control.

King Feisal was reported to be much upset at what he termed the unnecessary interference of His Majesty's Government in a matter which concerned himself and Ibn Saud alone. He had pledged his honour that Ibn Mashhur would reach Jedda and held his family and dependants as hostages. The route he took was no concern of Ibn Saud's. If the French did not interfere with him, King Feisal was confident of getting him safely through Syria. After an exchange of views between London, Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem and Cairo, the Syria-Palestine-Egypt route was eventually decided upon, the French authorities in Syria having said that they had nothing against Ibn Mashhur; on the other hand, they could not make any arrangements to prevent his escape there, for on entering Syrian territory he would be free to remain or leave as he saw fit. His Majesty's Government added that arrangements must be made to provide an adequate and reliable Iraqi escort for the entire journey to Suez. Ibn Mashhur, accompanied by King Feisal's envoy, Sheikh Saada, accordingly left Bagdad on the 6th November for Syria, and there he went to ground.

King Feisal expressed himself as very angry and ashamed at the trick Ibn Mashhur had played him. He sent his aide-de-camp to Damascus to explain to Nuri Shalan, with whom Ibn Mashhur was reported to be consorting, that he would regard him as an enemy unless he induced the man to proceed to Jedda as arranged. If, King Feisal said, Ibn Mashhur broke faith, his relatives and dependants held in Iraq as hostages would be made over to Ibn Saud, and he himself would make other amends acceptable to Ibn Saud. His honour was involved towards both His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, but he was confident that he would be able to fulfil his responsibility. The aide-de-camp returned from Damascus and reported that the French police had abducted Ibn Mashhur in his presence and had refused to reveal his whereabouts.

King Feisal thereupon asked, on the 21st November, that Ibn Saud be informed that he was filled with distress and shame at the occurrence; that he was prepared to surrender forthwith to Ibn Saud Ibn Mashhur's family and followers then in Iraq; and that he was writing a letter of personal apology to Ibn Saud, but desired that in the meantime he should be assured of his good intentions and the sincerity of his friendship. As no specific mention was made of Ibn Mashhur's property, however, His Majesty's Government enquired as to its disposal before instructing His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to deliver King Feisal's message. At the close of the month the point was still unsettled.

The latest news from Syria is to the effect that a Captain de Leuze, of the Bedouin Control Board, had taken Ibn Mashhur away from the Rualla camp at Adra to Damascus, where he had subsequently disappeared. The French acting secretary-general stated in comment that he saw nothing unusual in Captain de Leuze giving a man whom he knew a lift into Damascus; in any case, Ibn Mashhur on arriving there had probably definitely made up his mind to remain.

There, too, rests, for the moment, this unfortunate affair, which began on the 24th December, 1929, with Ibn Mashhur's escape into Iraq as a rebel from Ibn Saud, and has since done more than anything else to poison the friendly relations between Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd.

(e) The appointment in October of Dr. Damluji as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs was not liked in Mecca. He was for many years Ibn Saud's Foreign Minister and left the Hejaz under a cloud in 1928. The Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that, while his

Government cannot, of course, interfere in what is primarily a domestic concern of the Iraq Government, they cannot, nevertheless, correspond with the new Minister. Matters of mutual concern are therefore still being dealt with by the Hejaz-Nejd Government through the Iraqi Prime Minister.

(f) The subject of the Hashimite family property in the Hejaz was again raised in September, when the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq forwarded to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires letters from ex-King Ali and his sister to their agents in Jedda and Mecca with a request for their delivery. As the contents of the letters involved the use of His Majesty's Legation as an intermediary for the receipt of Hashimite revenues, the matter was referred to His Majesty's Government, who were of the opinion that, were the question of the return of Ibn Mashhur satisfactorily disposed of and the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty signed, the situation might be easier, but that meanwhile much harm might be done by the intervention of His Majesty's Legation in the delicate question of Hashimite properties under the Saudian régime. Fresh letters were therefore sent from Bagdad instructing the agents to pay the revenues into a local bank, and delivery of the letters was duly effected by His Majesty's Legation.

12. *Koweit.*

(a) The question of conducting negotiations on the Persian Gulf side of Arabia on the subject of the commercial blockade of Koweit and other Persian Gulf matters (August report, section 9 (a)) has been further studied but a decision has not yet been reached. A draft agreement on Nejd-Koweit affairs for presentation to Ibn Saud has also been under consideration.

(b) The activities of Ibn Arfaj (August report, section 9 (b)) have now been curbed by Ibn Saud himself, and an agreeable exchange of letters took place in October with the Sheikh of Koweit, who expressed himself as pleased and gratified at the turn of events.

13. *Bahrein.*

A strong commission under Mohammed-at-Tawil was despatched to the Hasa coast in September to study the commercial situation on the spot and to report on the possibilities of Nejd ports on the Persian Gulf. It is hoped to attract pilgrim traffic and eventually trade to those ports, and the commission's recommendations will in all probability aim at a short-circuiting of Bahrein and its transit dues, while creating new customs revenue for the Hejaz-Nejd.

14. *Yemen.*

For years past it has been consistently rumoured that Ibn Saud was on the point of attacking the Imam Yahia. In November the tables were said to be turned and the Imam was to chastise Ibn Saud for meddling too deeply in Idrisi affairs (see 15 below). The latter did indeed despatch a thousand or two of his tribesmen into Asir, but probably only as a precautionary measure in connexion with his assumption of the administration of Idrisi Province.

15. *Asir.*

As a result of the groundwork done since last May by two Royal Commissions appointed by Ibn Saud to study the affairs of Asir, and following upon an encouraging letter from Ibn Saud, Sayyid-al-Hasan-al-Idrisi telegraphed to him on the 9th October entrusting him with the administration and finances of the Idrisi Province. The province had, of course, been declared a Saudian Protectorate in the Mecca Agreement of 1926, but its article 6 had expressly reserved the administration of the territory to Sayyid-al-Hasan. Ibn Saud replied accepting the new charge and an Idrisi deputation left for Mecca bearing two formal letters of request from the Sayyid and his Legislative Council, couched in the most servile terms. The outstanding feature of the Sayyid's letter was his concern for his personal rights and honour and the regard due to his personal friends and relatives.

The Idrisi deputation and Saudian Council of Ministers sat in November in Mecca under the presidency of the Amir Feisal to elaborate the details of the

new administration. They submitted a report to Ibn Saud on the 16th November recommending that—

- (i) The Sayyid should remain as head of the Idrisi Government, all orders being issued in his name on behalf of Ibn Saud;
- (ii) Ibn Saud should appoint an Amir as chief executive officer;
- (iii) A legislative council should assist the Amir with advice;
- (iv) Ibn Saud should appoint a director of finance;
- (v) Due regard should be paid to the Sayyid and his family in all respects; and
- (vi) All decisions of the council should be submitted for the Sayyid's approval, any subject of dissent between them being referred to Ibn Saud.

Ibn Saud thereupon issued a Royal Order dated the 20th November approving the above report and defining the composition and functions of the council and the powers of the Amir. The former are to foster the interests of the province, its commerce, agriculture, and education, provided that these do not clash with the interests of neighbouring countries; they are deprived of any control in foreign and Bedouin affairs. The Amir is responsible for security and for enforcing the system of Bedouin control in vigour in the Hejaz-Nejd. The council are entitled to submit any complaints about the Amir or the Director of Finance to Ibn Saud, provided they be true, relating to actual facts, and countersigned by the Sayyid. The Amir Feisal as Viceroy is charged with the execution of the order. Hamad-ash-Shuwair has been appointed Amir of Asir.

III.—*International Relations.*

16. *British Commonwealth.*

(a) On the occasion of the "R. 101" disaster, messages of condolence were telegraphed by Ibn Saud to His Majesty the King and by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Government through the Legation.

(b) On the 10th November Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was received in audience by the King at Buckingham Palace and presented his letters of credence as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies.

(c) On the 14th September the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs requested His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to inform His Majesty's Government of the Hejaz-Nejd Government's desire to appoint consuls at Bombay and Singapore for commercial and pilgrimage purposes. Mr Hope-Gill accordingly sought the views of His Majesty's Government. The initial reactions of the Governments of Bombay and Singapore were unfavourable to the proposal, but the matter is still under discussion.

(d) The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown an increased disposition to minimise the difficulties of conducting business between his Ministry in Taif and Mecca and His Majesty's Legation at Jedda. He has made almost daily use of the primitive telephone system, and himself visited Jedda from the 30th August to the 2nd September, the 29th September to the 1st October, and the 10th to the 12th November, when he accompanied the Amir Feisal. On the latter occasion His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was assured that the latter's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs with Fuad Bey as his Under-Secretary at Jedda was imminent. It still is.

17. *Italy.*

Much the same impression in regard to Italy's waned interest in the Yemen as was noted in the Jedda report for August (section 13 (b)) has been gathered in Egypt. Italy now sees the Soviets advancing towards the commercial position in the Imam's dominions which she coveted for herself.

18. *Germany.*

(a) The treaty of friendship between Germany and the Hejaz-Nejd of the 26th April, 1929, ratified by Ibn Saud on the 7th June, 1929, and approved by the German law of the 28th July, 1930, came into force on the 6th November with

the exchange of ratifications on that date at Cairo. The text of the treaty was enclosed in the Jedda report for August 1929.

(b) Herr Heinrich de Haas, son of the head of the Western Department of the German Foreign Office, arrived in Jedda on the 5th October. A man of about 35, born in Australia and speaking fluent English, he is studying the commercial possibilities of the Hejaz-Nejd. If he determines to remain he will probably represent Germany as consul. German interests are at present unofficially in Dutch hands.

19. Egypt.

The Egyptian consul visited Mecca several times during October and November to discuss with Ibn Saud and his Ministers an improved *modus vivendi* between the two countries. It appears that sufficient advance was made to warrant the special visit which Ashmuni Bey made to Cairo at the end of November.

20. Palestine.

The English text of the Money Order Agreement with the Hejaz, signed by the Postmaster-General of Palestine, was remitted on the 14th November to the Hejaz-Nejd Government for their signature and communication of the Arabic text.

IV.—Air Matters.

21. Hejaz Air Force.

The four Wapiti machines, after an overhaul and refit at the Royal Air Force Depot, left Hinaidi on the 5th September, piloted by Chief Pilot Morris, Mr. North, Mr. Lowe, and Flight-Lieutenant Pearson, who was lent by the Royal Air Force. They reached Amman on the 9th, and arrived at Wejh on the 10th. There they were held up by a delayed delivery of proper fuel, but left on the 13th for Yanbo, and reached Jedda on the following day, where they were met by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. Their route, distance, and times were as follows:—

Darin-Shaibah, 310 miles: 3 hours 50 minutes.
 Shaibah-Hinaidi, 290 miles: 3 hours 35 minutes.
 Hinaidi-Rutba, 240 miles: 3 hours.
 Rutba-Amman, 292 miles: 3 hours 35 minutes.
 Amman-Maan, 125 miles: 1 hour 45 minutes.
 Ma'an-Wejh, 280 miles: 3 hours 30 minutes.
 Wejh-Yenbo, 178 miles: 2 hours 10 minutes.
 Yenbo-Jedda, 197 miles: 2 hours 35 minutes.

On the 18th September the three Hejaz Air Force pilots were summoned to Taif by Ibn Saud, and were very cordially received, only a few of the more fanatical of the Nejd Bedouin withdrawing from the King's side as he greeted the pilots. The flight returned to Jedda on the 20th, Mr. Morris having succeeded in convincing Ibn Saud that the Taif aerodrome was quite unsuitable to serve as headquarters of the force. October and November have been spent in organising the aerodrome and decrepit hangars at Jedda, binning the stores and material received by sea from Darin, and working on three D.H. 9 machines, relics of King Hussein's days. A school of aeronautics was also organised by Mr. Morris under instructions from the Hejaz-Nejd Government to train six Arab pilots, twelve riggers, and twelve fitters. So far, only one embryo pilot has presented himself, and has proved to be most unpromising material.

The Hejaz-Nejd Government approached His Majesty's Government in October for the selection and purchase of two instructional machines and the supply of Vickers and Lewis guns and spare parts for the Wapitis.

22. Arab Aeronautical Society.

The formation of this society in November marked a step forward, which at present is a veritable step into space. Its avowed objects are to encourage aviation in Ibn Saud's dominions and morally and materially to help the Hejaz-Nejd army by presenting machines and equipment for training the youth of

Arabia to fly. There probably never was a country less scientifically inclined or a youth more completely lacking in essential qualifications. The jest sounds all the more hollow against its backing of empty coffers, private as well as public.

23. Royal Air Force.

A Southampton flying boat was forced down by engine trouble in the Persian Gulf on the 19th September, and taxied into Nejd territorial waters to shelter behind Abu Ali Island. A second boat having brought spares, they both left for Basra the next morning. This technical infringement of a jealously guarded sovereignty was duly communicated with the necessary explanation to the Hejaz-Nejd Government. The only relevant comment of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was that to deny shelter would be inhuman.

V.—Military Intelligence.

24. Yemen "Front."

About 1,800 Ataiba tribesmen are reported to have been moved southward into Asir, probably as a precautionary measure against any movement on the part of the Imam hostile to the new Idrisi régime (see 14 above).

25. Transjordan "Front."

The late August rumours of tribal concentrations at Mail and Tabuk (August report, section 26) were to some extent confirmed by information which reached the Transjordan authorities in September. No further reports, however, have been received to indicate that anything unusual is brewing. The tribal concentrations, which seem undoubtedly to have taken place, may have been in the nature of a census of fighting men in connexion with the military organisation of the country.

26. General.

The arms and ammunition landed from the "Cracow" in August were removed, first, to the Jabal Hindi Arsenal in Mecca, thence to Shaira to the north-east, and, later, to Muwaih, where, as far as can be ascertained, a central depot has now been made for military stores of all kinds. It is conveniently situated between Mecca and Riyadh, and centrally placed for operations to north or south. It is also off the pilgrim routes.

A Syrian refugee, Nabih-al-Adhma, who saw service for some time in the Turkish army, was appointed Director of Military Organisation in September and has since carried out a tour of inspection as far north as Khuraiba on the Hejaz coast. There was talk of placing the Hejaz Air Force under his command, but, in view of its special nature, it has been reserved to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

VI.—Naval Visits.

27. None of His Majesty's ships visited Jedda during the period under review. The French despatch vessel "Montmirail" entered on the 6th September to return the French Chargé d'Affaires from his visit to the Yemen, and left on the 8th.

VII.—Pilgrimage.

28. "Asia."

The report of the court of enquiry held at Marseilles on the burning of the "Asia" has now been communicated through His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris. It is as uncritical a document as that which embodied the findings of the local Hejazi committee (August report, section 29). The captain and crew are stated to have upheld the best traditions of the French mercantile marine; one interesting page of the report showing the reaction of French logic to the breach of the custom which would have a captain be the last to leave his ship.

The wreck is in the hands of the underwriters, who are represented in Jedda by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. The local authorities made an attempt to

intervene in October, stating that, having taken charge of the hulk, they wanted a receipt for one of its boats which the firm holds, but on being asked for a receipt for the "Asia" they quickly let the matter drop.

29. Forged Rupee Notes.

The Government of India decided to take no action themselves with a view to having the forgers and dealers entrapped through the agency of the Indian vice-consul, who had discovered them during his leave in Syria (August report, section 32). They preferred that the matter be entrusted to the French authorities, but declared themselves to be vitally interested and ready liberally to recognise any good work done by officials or private persons. His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, therefore, placed the case and the evidence collected by Munshi Ihsanullah in the hands of the *Sûreté générale*, and a plan elaborated by the munshi was agreed upon. Unfortunately, it was badly handled by the French inspector in charge and failed. His leave having expired, Ihsanullah returned disconsolate to Jedda, but letters followed him from Syria which showed that the gang were still bent on profitable business during the coming pilgrimage season. At the end of November, therefore, he was applying his undoubted talents to another Machiavellian plan to entice the gang's chief broker once more into the hands of the police.

30. 1931 Pilgrimage.

The first pilgrim ship from the Dutch East Indies arrived on the 11th November; nine ships had arrived by the end of the month, bringing just over 3,000 pilgrims, chiefly Javanese, but including a few Malays. Last year the first ship arrived on the 19th November, and the first nine ships brought nearly 8,000 pilgrims. The fall is symptomatic of world conditions, and foretells an extremely lean year for the Hejaz, the great majority of whose population lives and used to batten upon the devout of Islam.

In spite of the supposed preparatory work of the Haj Commission and the Viceroy's visit of the 10th November to Jedda to put the finishing touches, there was much unpreparedness and the usual alarms and excursions. Pilgrims who had landed in the morning were still penned in the customs late at night. The rice they had brought—and being daintily stomached the Javanese bring large quantities of their own—was subjected without warning to an import duty, a hitherto unheard-of imposition. A few days later the tax had to be repealed, but was replaced by a new poll-tax of 5 piastres exacted from the pilgrims indirectly through the mutawifs, or pilgrim brokers. Shortly afterwards the brokers banded together to defeat the virtual monopoly in motor transport which the Government has this year secured to itself and sent all their pilgrims to Mecca by camel. They were immediately disbanded and suspended from their professions by a Royal decree, which was only annulled to be replaced by another ordaining that all pilgrims must hereafter visit the Holy Places by motor car. A sop of 5 per cent., however, has since been cast to the camel drivers, who are now making common cause with the carpenters, the traditional hirers of camel litters, to induce the Government to meet the debts which they have contracted by their preparations for normal pilgrimage custom.

The position as to the dues and taxes payable by this year's pilgrims is still officially obscured. The Hejaz-Nejd Government have been pressed for the tariff, but have not yet thought fit to communicate it. The truth of course is that it is still in a state of flux. Opportunist measures are being taken at the eleventh hour to minimise as much as possible the effects of what is now foreseen to be a disastrously poor pilgrimage, and a fixed tariff is unlikely to be published until the extra burden which can be placed on such pilgrims, as do come, has been calculated by trial and error.

VIII.—Slavery.

31. During the period under review four slaves were manumitted by the Legation and repatriated to the Sudan, and two were manumitted locally. With a view to preventing runaway slaves from reaching Jedda, orders have been issued in the interior requiring all negroes to carry travel permits from a recognised authority whenever they wish to move.

IX.—Miscellaneous.

32. Bibliography.

The "Umm-al-Qura" has been interesting itself in the history of Nejd and published on the 5th September a list of old Arabic historians and historical documents. It also stated that one Abdullah-al-Anqari has been commissioned by Ibn Saud to write a modern history of Nejd. The paper has also been publishing Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's journal of the 1929 rebellion in weekly instalments.

Mr. Philby's "Arabia," published in September in Benn's "Modern World" series edited by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, is not so much a history of Arabia as a detailed and biased account of Wahhabism; as such it is excellent.

33. Reuter.

Reuter's agents in Jedda, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., have been examining the possibility of introducing a daily news-service for the Hejaz. News from the outside world at present drifts in with the mails at irregular weekly or ten-day intervals.

34. Legation Personnel.

Captain Thacker, archivist to the Legation for three years, left Jedda on the 21st September on the termination of his engagement. The Indian vice-consul, Munshi Ihsanullah, returned from leave on the 5th November, and the British pro-consul, Mr. Seager, on the 9th November. The Malay pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Majid, arrived on the 28th November for his pilgrimage season.

35. Meteorological.

Observations taken within doors at the Legation show the following averages of office temperature and atmospheric humidity for the six months ended the 30th November:—

Month, 1930.	Humidity. Average of Saturation.	Temperature.			
		Highest.	Average Maximum by Day.	Average Minimum at Night.	Lowest.
	Percentage.				
June	73	107	92	82	79
July	72	96	92	82	80
August	70	99	93	87	82
September	75	95	92	83	80
October	70	92	90	80	75
November	65	91	84	78	73

There were four short "simoom" spells in June, four in July, five in August, one in October, and two in November, when a hot desert wind blew for a few hours and humidity dropped to between 50 per cent. and 25 per cent.

The first rain fell in a thunderstorm of the 23rd (about 3 inches). Rain fell again on the 29th November (about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch).

Wind was 90 per cent. constant and 90 per cent. W.N.W.

[E 283/283/25]

No. 3.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 19, 1931.)

(No. 373.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 23, 1930.

IN my telegram No. 240 of the 19th December I had the honour to report that I had arrived at Jedda on that day on my return from leave. It may be worth while to record the additional fact that Fuad Bey Hamza, now Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, came down from Mecca specially to receive me on behalf of the King and to present his personal greetings. He met me at the custom-house and

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delivered cordial messages from Ibn Saud, accompanied by an expression of regret that he had been compelled to time his departure for Riyadh so that it coincided with my arrival. Fuad Bey, who will certainly continue to play the leading rôle in foreign affairs, especially as regards the maintenance of relations with foreign representatives, was most effusive in his personal welcome to my wife and myself.

2. Fuad Bey had to return to Mecca the same afternoon as the King was due to leave for Nejd that evening and actually started on the morning of the 20th. I have, consequently, had no opportunity of discussing any business with the Under-Secretary and am unlikely to see the King himself for at least two months, possibly a good deal longer.

3. The cordiality of my reception shows that Ibn Saud desires to stand well with His Majesty's Government. Any optimism that I might be tempted to feel is discounted by the prospect of having to deal with various contentious questions and more especially by the blackness of the financial outlook, which is worse than when I left in August. It is now such that I shall inevitably have to bring strong pressure to bear to procure the settlement of outstanding debts, like that due to the Government of India for arms and ammunition supplied last year, arrears due to the Eastern Telegraph Company in respect of telegrams despatched by the Port Sudan cable and the considerable amounts due to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Limited).

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 287/287/25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 19, 1931.)

(No. 374.)
Sir,

Jedda, December 30, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a Green Book issued by the Hejaz-Nejd Government containing the text of the treaty between the Hejaz-Nejd and Turkey, which was signed by Fuad Bey Hamza and Abdul Ghani Seni Bey, the Turkish representative here, at Mecca on the 3rd August, 1929.⁽¹⁾ I enclose a translation of the preliminary portion of the treaty, which is followed by the text of the articles as given in translation in the enclosure in Mr. Edmond's despatch from Constantinople, No. 161 of the 21st May last.

2. The Green Book also contains the following texts, viz. :—

A decree of Ibn Saud, dated the 21st November, 1930, approving the treaty. Notes exchanged between Seni Bey and Fuad Bey Hamza on the 9th December, 1930, recording the promulgation of the Turkish law of the 15th May, 1930, sanctioning the treaty, and a subsequent agreement that the ratifications should be exchanged at Jedda instead of Angora. The protocol of exchange of ratifications signed by Fuad Bey Hamza and Seni Bey on the 10th December, 1930.

3. I enclose a translation of the last of the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

PREAMBLE.

IN the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.
Praise be to God alone. Prayers and peace be upon the last Prophet.
We, Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdurrahman-al-Faisal-Al-Saud, King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies.

Whereas a Treaty of Friendship has been concluded between us and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic, with a view to establishing and strengthening the relations between our countries, and signed by a

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

plenipotentiary on behalf of his Excellency and a plenipotentiary on our behalf, both being fully and mutually authorised, at Mecca Mukarrama on the twenty-seventh day of Safar, in the year one thousand three hundred and forty-eight Hejri (corresponding to the 3rd August, 1930).

It is as follows :—

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.

The Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies on the one part, and the Turkish Republic on the other,

Being desirous of strengthening, of firmly establishing and of placing on a basis of mutual good understanding the sincere friendly relations existing between them,

Have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding.

For this purpose His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies appointed his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic appointed his Excellency Abdul Ghani Seni Bey, the representative of the Turkish Republic in the Hejaz, as plenipotentiaries on their behalf.

After their credentials had been exchanged and found valid, they agreed on the following articles.

(Text as given in enclosure to Mr. Edmond's despatch No. 161 of the 21st May, 1930, to Foreign Office.)^(*)

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

PROTOCOL.

Exchange of Ratification Decrees of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding concluded between the Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic.

THE undersigned, who are authorised by their Governments to exchange the ratification decrees of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Understanding signed at Mecca Mukarrama on the 27th Safar, 1348 (corresponding to the 3rd August, 1929), between the Kingdom of Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic, have met on the date undermentioned.

After checking the two documents and finding them true copies, they have drawn up this protocol to signify that the said exchange has taken place officially.

Written at Jedda this 20th day of Rajab, 1349 (corresponding to the 10th December, 1930).

FUAD HAMZA,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.—

A. SENI,

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires.

^(*) Enclosure in Section 3, May 26, 1930.

[E 6815/3094/91]

No. 5.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 32.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1931.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 198 of the 16th September, 1929, to Mr. Bond, I transmit to you, for your information and guidance, the accompanying copy of a revised memorandum of instructions on the question of the channels for communication with King Ibn Saud and the Hejaz-Nejd Government, to be used by the British authorities in neighbouring countries.

2. The memorandum has been drawn up in the light of your conversations on the subject with members of my Department, and as a result of consultation with the other Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. It is being

issued as an instruction to the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and other British officials in the Near and Middle East concerned.

3. The instructions therein should be regarded as superseding those contained in the memorandum enclosed in the Foreign Office despatch referred to above.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Memorandum respecting Communications with Ibn Saud and the Hejaz-Nejd Government.

THE creation of a British Legation at Jedda and the establishment of more normal diplomatic relations with King Ibn Saud have necessitated a revision of the arrangements embodied in the Foreign Office memorandum of the 16th September, 1929 (enclosed in the despatch No. 198 of the same date to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jedda), which is superseded in its entirety by the present memorandum.

2. It is desired in future to conduct relations with King Ibn Saud and his Government as far as possible in accordance with the usual diplomatic procedure. Matters which appear to the British authorities in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere to require representations to King Ibn Saud or his Government will, therefore, normally be referred by the High Commissioners, the Political Resident, &c., to the respective Government Departments in London, if they involve questions of policy, or direct to His Majesty's Legation at Jedda, if of lesser importance. Copies of despatches sent to London should, save in exceptional circumstances, be sent direct to Jedda, and telegrams repeated to that post. Similarly, in the case of despatches and telegrams addressed direct to Jedda, copies and repetitions should be sent to London.

3. When reports are addressed to His Majesty's Government, the Foreign Office will issue any necessary instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda. When they are addressed to Jedda, His Majesty's Minister will use his discretion as to the form of any representations which he considers he can properly make to the Hejazi authorities without seeking or awaiting instructions from His Majesty's Government.

4. The British authorities in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Persian Gulf, &c., may use their discretion as to drafting any proposed representations in the form of a memorandum suitable for transmission verbatim to the Hejaz-Nejd authorities. This procedure may conveniently be followed when the subject matter consists mainly of a recital of facts. In all cases, however, His Majesty's Minister will have discretion to use the memorandum as he thinks fit. He will also have discretion, if he elects to forward the memorandum, to introduce minor alterations of language not affecting the sense of the document.

5. It is realised that, when King Ibn Saud is in parts of Arabia remote from Jedda, and within easier reach of Bagdad, Amman, or the Persian Gulf, cases may arise of such importance and urgency as to make it desirable that the views of His Majesty's Government or the British authorities concerned should be conveyed to him by the quickest available means. In such cases, the British authorities concerned should report to His Majesty's Government by telegram, indicating the reasons for and the nature of the proposed representations, and repeating their telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda. They should not, however, actually despatch such communications to King Ibn Saud until they receive the approval of His Majesty's Government, save in some exceptional emergency, when circumstances render it essential, in their opinion, that they should act without awaiting sanction. Should this be done, their action and the reasons for it should simultaneously be reported by telegram to His Majesty's Government, and the telegram repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

6. In certain cases, *e.g.*, when King Ibn Saud has been in personal relations with British authorities in Iraq, Transjordan or the Persian Gulf, he may possibly address letters direct to such authorities. In such cases the officer

addressed should, unless the subject of the letter is of minor importance, obtain, before replying, the instructions of the senior British representative in the territory concerned, or, in the case of the territories bordering on the Persian Gulf, of the Political Resident, and in all cases, even if he replies without doing this, copies of the correspondence should be sent through the usual channels to His Majesty's Government and to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda. It is not desired to encourage communications of this kind; but they may on certain occasions serve a useful purpose, especially if they arise out of personal friendly relations with King Ibn Saud, provided (a) that the matters dealt with are, in the main, of local interest, and (b) that the necessary steps are taken to keep His Majesty's Government and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda fully informed.

7. His Majesty's Minister at Jedda will continue to keep the British authorities in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, the Persian Gulf, &c., fully informed by despatch or telegram, as the case may be, of all matters affecting those authorities, regarding which he is in communication with the Foreign Office or the Hejaz-Nejd authorities. He will normally leave it to the authorities concerned, more especially the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to supply the Government of India with information, where this may be necessary; but, in cases immediately affecting that Government or having an important bearing on their interests or policy, or requiring decision by them, or having important Moslem reactions, he will communicate direct with the Political and Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

Foreign Office, January 15, 1931.

[E 418/2/25]

No. 6.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, January 25.)*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, January 23, 1931.

AS regards condition (a) in Jedda telegram No. 1 to Foreign Office, Prime Minister states that having signed "Bon Voisinage" Agreement he would, of course, get it ratified as soon as possible, but that unless he can go to Jedda during present session of Iraq Parliament, ratification will have to be left over till next session, which opens on 1st November.

As regards condition (b), Prime Minister says he has no intention of taking up a *non possumus* attitude, but is quite ready to consider any proposal put forward by Hejaz-Nejd Government as soon as "Bon Voisinage" Agreement is signed. I am requesting him to send a letter in this sense superseding letter No. 4178 of 11th December, and I will discuss with him question raised in penultimate paragraph of Jedda telegram under reference as soon as I receive views of His Majesty's Government thereon. If Prime Minister's proposed visit is approved in principle King Feisal will doubtless communicate with Ibn Saud as suggested, but I can scarcely ask him to do so until His Majesty's Government have concurred in the proposal.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 3.)

[E 408/408/25]

No. 7.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 6, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the usual confidential report on the heads of the other foreign missions at this post.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

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*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Jedda.**Egypt.*

THE Egyptian representative, M. Hassan (or Hassan Bey) El-Achmouni, has no definite status owing to the non-existence of normal relations between Egypt and Ibn Saud, but calls himself consul. He is an intelligent young man of perhaps not more than 30, and is a good example of a modern-minded Egyptian. He speaks French well, and is readier to frequent European society than the other Moslem colleagues are, but he seems to keep in pretty close touch with the latter and with local circles. He shows every sign of desiring to stand well with the British Legation. He is always pleasant and sometimes quite interesting in conversation. Altogether he sustains a difficult position very happily. He is unmarried.

France.

M. Roger Maigret, who occupies the peculiar position of being Chargé d'Affaires at the head of what is still a consulate, is a man of perhaps 60. He has had a long career in the French Near East service, and was employed for some twenty years in Morocco, including Tangier, where, I believe, he was employed up to 1921. He was subsequently employed in Iraq, whence he came to his post here. I have heard it vaguely suggested that he was not well regarded in Morocco, but cannot vouch for this. He is intelligent and witty, and has a considerable knowledge of Arab countries. In his lighter moments he claims also to know a great deal of the Parisian underworld, having cultivated *apaches* in his conscript days. As we have both been in Morocco, though at different periods, I have many interests and acquaintances in common with him. I find him, however, rather too "smarmy" on the personal side and rather too reticent about the affairs which now interests us both officially. He has little social value of a general kind, for, though he has a passion for Arabian travel, he sticks very tight in his house when in Jedda. I have not heard him speak English, but he appears to have considerable book knowledge of this language, and has already completed a French translation of Mr. Philby's recent work on "Arabia."

He is married, but appears to be permanently separated from his Spanish or half-Spanish wife. She has never come to Jedda. A venerable mother has recently come to live with M. Maigret instead.

Italy.

The Italian representative, M. Sollazzo, calls himself consul, although Italy has not yet established normal relations with Ibn Saud. He is a youngish man of about 35, but not aggressively Fascist. He speaks French reasonably well. He is a man of good average intelligence and definite views. He finds himself, I think, rather overshadowed by the Italian administrators in Eritrea. He does not seem to care much for society; but I find him an agreeable and useful colleague, very ready to exchange information on matters of interest.

M. Sollazzo married not long ago an attractive and pleasant but not very interesting Italian wife. She shares all his vicissitudes, but they both dislike Jedda.

Netherlands.

M. D. van der Meulen, formerly consul and now Chargé d'Affaires, is a member of the Dutch East Indian service, in accordance with an elaborate system designed to make the Dutch representative here a trained specialist in Moslem affairs and pilgrimage matters. He is a man of about 35. He speaks English and French very well, and lives up to the traditional intimacy between the British and Dutch communities in Jedda, being himself sociable and extremely keen on sport. He is a thoroughly good colleague and always ready to exchange views on matters of common interest in the most friendly spirit. He will soon make way for his successor M. Adriaanse, who has already arrived in accordance with the system mentioned above.

M. van der Meulen is married, but he has six young children, and his wife stays in Holland to look after them.

Persia.

M. Habibulla (or Habibulla Khan) Hoveida, bore in the days of Persian titles that of Ain-ul-Mulk. He was "diplomatic representative" when I arrived and is now Chargé d'Affaires. He is a Persian Moslem, but his special habitat appears to be in Syria. He is an elderly man. He was recommended to my favourable attention by Sir R. Clive, but I fear that I find him unattractive, in spite of his great desire to please and his ability to speak English passably. I have heard him accused of making so much per head out of his pilgrims, but have no reason to believe a charge so easy to invent in connexion with the representative of a country like Persia in a country like this. He left Jedda some six months ago. Shortly afterwards, the junior whom he left in charge went away also, telling us that his wife was ill and asking us to forward correspondence to his chief at Beirut. Little seems to have been heard of either since then, and the Persian Legation is not effectively occupied. I much doubt whether M. Hoveida will return. His health suffered here, and I rather think that he covets the post of Persian representative at Cairo.

Soviet Russia.

M. Nezir (sometimes called Nezir Bey) Touracoulov, the only Minister besides myself, presented letters before me, and is therefore doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He comes from Turkestan, and is a round-headed young man with distinctly Tartar features. He seems fairly intelligent, and has learnt enough French and Arabic since he came here a couple of years ago to carry on conversation in those languages. He usually talks Turkish, which he knows better, on the comparatively rare occasions when we meet. He has a sound, simple sense of humour and is an agreeable companion, but he goes little into European society. I have never attempted to talk politics with him. On the one occasion on which I had occasion to seek information from him on a non-political matter connected with public health he was very helpful. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash. He strikes me as a nice, straightforward person, rather more interested in commercial and economic subjects than in others, and as being a genuine Moslem. If I am wrong and he is deep, then he must be very deep indeed. M. Touracoulov is married to a Russian lady from Samara. She is a professional doctor or nurse, and left Jedda before I arrived in May to take charge of some sort of institution in Moscow. She has not returned.

Turkey.

Abdul-Ghani Seni Bey, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, is an elderly official of a type common in the old Sublime Porte days, easy-going, pleasant and philosophical. He has seen much service, partly, I believe, in Macedonia, mostly in what were the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including the Yemen. He seems to have few strong interests, and speaks French only indifferently. As, however, we can converse in Turkish and have Turkish memories in common, we get on together very well indeed. Although a fairly typical old Turk of the better class, he is sufficient modern-minded to rejoice in his only daughter's being brought up to be a bacteriologist in Beirut.

Mme. Seni Bey is a Turkish lady from Salonica, much younger than her husband. She is a very agreeable, unaffected woman. She dresses and comports herself in an entirely European way, and last June she produced the best of the few dinners that I have had outside my own house in Jedda.

[E 487/487/25]

No. 8.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 29, 1931.

MY despatch No. 462 of 27th November: Relations between Ibn Saud and the Yemen.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires states that alarmist reports from Governor of Eritrea regarding situation on Asir-Yemen frontier have reached Italian

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Government, who are willing to urge counsels of moderation on the Imam and are anxious that His Majesty's Government should give corresponding advice to Ibn Saud in the hope of preventing a conflict.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires was informed that I had no reason to view situation with special anxiety. If, however, definite information should at any time reach you indicating danger of outbreak of hostilities, and, in your opinion, representations would be justified and likely to lead to useful result, you may, at your discretion, urge Ibn Saud or his Government to refrain from embarking on policy of adventure which could only injure best interests of Arabia as a whole.

[E 507/487/25]

No. 9.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 31, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 14.

Information here, not valuable in itself, supports generally Aden intelligence reports of 20th and 27th December regarding Imam's preparations.

Other local reports, which I have no means of verifying, indicate that Ibn Saud has been sending to Asir forces important in aggregate though despatched in small parties. Informant suggests total of several thousand men, but I am slow to accept figure so large. Action of this kind may be due to desire for effective occupation of Asir, and I have no recent indication of intention on the King's part to initiate hostilities against Yemen. I consider representations at present time would be premature, though I might mention the subject generally to Ibn Saud when I see him personally.

Cardinal factor seems to me to be reaction of Imam himself to practical annexation of Asir. Can Italian Government or Aden throw further light on this?

My knowledge of past history is imperfect. It would assist me to know (a) whether any definite representations have been made to this Government since note of 9th September, 1927 (Jedda despatch No. 102 of 16th September), and (b) how far His Majesty's Government have gone since that date in statements such as those recorded in Clayton's despatch to Colonial Office of 16th July, 1928, regarding non-interference by His Majesty's Government in internal affairs of Arabia.

It would also help if Italian consul here were instructed to exchange views and information with me.

[E 524/524/25]

No. 10.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 12, 1931.

WITH reference to Mr. Bond's despatch No. 25 of the 20th January, 1930, I have the honour to state that the anniversary of King Ibn Saud's accession was celebrated for the second time on the 8th and 9th of this month in accordance with a programme generally similar to that of last year and with equal pomp. On this occasion there was no delegation of the Egyptian press, but there was a sufficiency of journalists to provide for publicity and innumerable photographs were taken by all sorts of people. The most active press representative present was one Mahri Bey, an Arab of Mosul origin, who seems to have his headquarters at The Hague at present and whose main line appears to be the supply of European news to the papers of the Arab countries.

2. I had received your permission to attend the banquet, which I understood would be given by the Emir Feisal in Jedda on the evening of the 8th January, if I considered it politically desirable to be present, notwithstanding the mourning ordered by His Majesty the King for the Princess Royal. I learnt later that

there were to be four principal functions to which foreign representatives were invited. As the head of the only mission of first-class political importance here, I felt that any abstention on my part would be seriously misinterpreted in Jedda and Mecca, especially as I had had no previous opportunity of meeting the Emir Feisal, who now combines the functions of Minister for Foreign Affairs with those of Viceroy of the Hejaz. I therefore accepted the various invitations. One of the social functions projected, a tea-party at Kandara on the afternoon of the 8th, was in the event countermanded. Although no express reason was given, I was told privately by Fuad Bey Hamza that this change in the programme was intended as a mark of respect to the memory of the Princess Royal. I felt it all the more incumbent on me to attend the other functions. In my private letter thanking Fuad Bey and expressing satisfaction, I added that the gesture of the local authorities would be greatly appreciated in England, and explained that I was interrupting a period of mourning for an event deeply felt at home in order to be present at the various celebrations.

3. On the morning of the 8th January, my colleagues and I called on the Acting Governor of Jedda. Early in the afternoon the Emir Feisal gave me a special interview, which had been arranged by Fuad Bey. His Royal Highness was very civil and very nervous. I cannot say that my first impression of him was favourable. He has the fine features of his family and he does not show in his face the signs of dissipation which I expected. He lacks, however, both the charm and the physique of his father and his elder brother, the Emir Saud. In repose he wears a look of jaded melancholy and listlessness, and his smiles, though agreeable, are sickly. In my own slight intercourse with him on the 8th and 9th January, he gave little evidence of keenness or intelligence, though I noticed that with his own entourage he seemed confident and quick in decision. The interpreter whom he employed at my private interview was incapable. I had not intended to talk much business on such an occasion and, owing to the difficulty of getting anything of importance translated, I limited myself still further. I enquired as to whether my letters to Fuad Hamza and the King in connexion with the proposed visit of Colonel Biscoe had been forwarded to Riyadh and when they might be expected to arrive. The Prince said that he had forwarded the letters, but his reply to my second question was hopelessly vague. My only other attempt at business was to appeal to the Prince on behalf of two prisoners, one a British Indian, who has been detained too long on a doubtful charge, the other, a Hadrami, who may be guilty of a serious offence, but who appears to have been barbarously treated. I evoked the custom of using clemency on royal anniversaries and the Prince promised to look into the two cases.

4. The review held by the Emir Feisal at Kandara on the afternoon of the 8th January, presented features of interest. King Ibn Saud not long ago appointed a certain Nabi Bey el-Adhma to be Director of Military Organisation. This gentleman resigned after a very short time and was replaced by one Faudhi Bey al-Kawokji, a Syrian officer, who formerly served in the Turkish army and took part, apparently with some distinction, in the Palestinian campaign. He would appear to have been German trained, judging by his excellent knowledge of German. During the last Syrian revolt he went over to the rebels and came to this country as a fugitive from the French. The review afforded an opportunity for displaying the meagre results so far achieved in the direction of creating a regular army. The march past was headed by two detachments of infantry, about 500 men in all, rather ragged in formation but workmanlike and to some extent disciplined. Then followed a string of pack animals with various equipment and about 100 men in charge. Then came two armoured cars, which were followed by the "cavalry," consisting of less than forty horsemen, ill-mounted and variously equipped, nothing more, in fact, than a disorderly rout of tribesmen, who indulged in wild shouts as they passed. The camelry, who came after them, were distinctly more impressive and numbered at least 320, perhaps more. This force, though also wild and composed of heterogeneous types, had a certain air of efficiency. Towards the end of the review three aeroplanes of the Hejaz Air Force swept round in great circles, while the "cavalry" again appeared to display their prowess in galloping, firing comic pistols and emitting war cries. The aeroplanes did not venture to come low for fear of stampeding the camels. It had been intended that they should approach when the camelry went back to barracks, but the arrangements for this miscarried and as no signalling had been arranged the aerial display was rather tame.

5. The first day ended with a dinner of about 120 covers at Kandara. The Emir, who was to have presided, excused himself at the last moment on grounds of slight indisposition. Otherwise, the arrangements were excellent. Only two speeches were allowed. The first and more important consisted of a lengthy review of Ibn Saud's efforts in various directions. International relations were touched on and reference was made to the rapprochement with Iraq resulting from the meeting of the two Kings on board H.M.S. "Lupin." It was remarked that no mention was made of Egypt, an omission the more striking as it is understood that recent negotiations, though their scope and prospects of success have been exaggerated, have afforded promise of a better understanding between Egypt and the Hejaz. The Soviet Minister said a few words in Arabic at the end of dinner in reply to the references which had been made to the diplomatic representatives.

6. Mr. Hope-Gill and I started early on the 10th January for Wady Fatma to attend the celebration organised there by the municipality of Mecca. The programme was a heavy one. There were some twenty-four speeches, poems and set pieces recited by schoolboys, before and after luncheon. The Emir Feisal presided with hardly concealed boredom, though he was himself the object of the most eloquent eulogies. He was at his best with some children of the Royal family, including his own son, who flitted in and out of the reception tent. One of the items was a set piece welcoming the Prince and the foreign representatives, delivered in English by a Mecca schoolboy. His nervousness contrasted strongly with the aplomb of his comrades, who produced their Arabic effusions from lungs of bronze, and he boggled sadly, poor child, over the hard word "representatives." Another interesting school item was a case heard before the Cadi between advocates of pen and sword. The sword was very large and the pen very little. The Cadi, in a nicely-balanced judgment, declared them both to be servants, of equal utility as such, and reconciled the advocates in a handshake. One poet gracefully compared the Emir and the diplomatic representatives to the moon surrounded by stars. His comparison was apter than he knew, for our Minister for Foreign Affairs is a great but pallid and elusive luminary and we, the stars, are very fixed in Jedda. The proceedings were punctuated by choral performances. Singing does not appear to rank as forbidden music, and one of the chants was introduced as the "Song of the Fatherland." At least 200 guests sat down to an excellent luncheon served at one long table in a marquee. The day ended with a fantastic war dance by Nejdi tribesmen, a barbaric pantomime full of life and colour. At the outset the dance centred on a gigantic Royal Standard, but before long standard and standard-bearer were dancing with the most active.

7. Not only had Egypt been ignored in the speech of the evening, but the Egyptian consul had been given a comparatively poor place at table. These circumstances may account for his absence from the Wady Fatma party. Some other diplomatic abstentions were due to indisposition and were less noticeable.

8. I apologise for the length at which I have described these proceedings. They are worthy of attention for various reasons. It was suggested last year that such a celebration was un-Islamic. The contrary view has triumphed. Secondly, no one present could fail to be struck by the element of Saudian propaganda and the strong insistence on his successes as being great Arab achievements. Lastly, the element of compromise between Wahabi strictness and European ideas, which Mr. Bond noticed last year, was again definitely present. The intervals for prayer were duly observed, but during the Prince's absence many members of his entourage strolled with us under the palms and smoked freely in our company. Although the music at the Wady Fatma party was all sung, the inhabitants of the district used musical instruments undisturbed within earshot of us, nor was there any lack of drums in the war dance.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 525/50/25]

No. 11.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 14.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 14, 1931.

WITH reference to my printed despatch No. 363 of the 10th December last, I have the honour to state that the Mecca paper "Umm-al-Qura" published in its issue of the 19th December the proposed regulations of the "Arab Aeronautical Society" together with an eloquent appeal for support addressed by the committee "to every Hejazi and Nedji in whose veins the blood of Islamic and Arab zeal flows; to every Arab who wishes his nation to be powerful and respected; to every Moslem whose heart is touched by his Holy Land."

2. I enclose a summary of the regulations.⁽¹⁾ The accompanying appeal is full of religious fervour. The writers call for union and co-operation in the attainment of the society's objects, namely, "the establishment of an air force in this country and the training of the people of the country in work of a kind which has become part of the power and trade of the world." They invoke less the example of other countries than the great traditions enshrined in Arabian and Islamic history from the time of the Prophet. After promising to call a great meeting to consider the regulations and to enable everyone to lend a hand, they end with a verse from the Koran enjoining on the faithful to prepare power and horses wherewith to strike fear into God's enemies and their own and promising full recompense to those that give for the purposes of God.

3. You will observe that while the project is commended more particularly to Hejazis and Nejdis the appeal is not confined to them and the Islamic character of the society is stressed no less than its national character. It may be assumed that a considerable drive will be made to ensure liberal financial support on the part of persons amenable to Government influence like the townspeople of Jedda and the Holy Cities. The Government, in their present impoverished condition, doubtless see in the creation of the society a means of throwing on to the public the cost of an enterprise which it would be difficult to finance directly from official sources.

4. It appears from subsequent numbers of the "Umm-al-Qura" that the public meeting contemplated by the promoters of the society was held in Mecca on the 25th December. I have seen no detailed account of the proceedings.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Bushire and Khartum.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 528/81/25]

No. 12.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 19. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 17, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for December. This report owes much to the assistance of Mr. Hope-Gill, who was in charge of the Legation during the first eighteen days of the period under review.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the senior naval officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

(Confidential.)

*Jedda Report for December 1930.**I.—Internal Affairs.*

1. Local Government—
 - (a) King Ibn Saud.
 - (b) Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
2. Finance.
3. Commerce.
4. General—
 - (a) Nejd influence in Hejaz.
 - (b) Tribal situation.
- II.—Frontier Questions.*
5. Transjordan.
 - (a) MacDonnell investigation.
 - (b) Current raiding.
 - (c) Frontier situation.
 - (d) Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zaid.
6. Iraq—
 - (a) *Bon-Voisinage*.
 - (b) Claims and extradition.
 - (c) Ibn Mashhur.
7. Koweit—
 - (a) Proposed negotiations.
 - (b) Proposed courtesy visit.
8. Bahrein.
9. Yemen and Asir.

III.—International Relations.

10. Great Britain—
 - (a) His Majesty's Minister.
 - (b) Hejaz consuls.
11. France.
12. Egypt.
13. Turkey.
14. Other countries.

IV.—Air Matters.

15. Hejaz Air Force.
16. Arab Aeronautical Society.

V.—Military Intelligence.

17. Importation of arms.

VI.—Naval Visits.

18. Nil.

VII.—Pilgrimage.

19. Forged rupee notes.
20. 1931 Pilgrimage.
21. Nigerian Pilgrimage.

VIII.—Slavery.

22. Manumissions.

IX.—Miscellaneous.

23. Reuter.
24. Legation personnel.
25. Meteorological.

*I.—Internal Affairs.**1. Local Government.*

(a) KING IBN SAUD visited Jedda from the 6th to 10th December. The visit was regarded as a strictly private one and there were no official functions of any kind. His Majesty took the opportunity to inspect the quarantine islands and received all the leading inhabitants of Jedda at the Green Palace with his customary Arab urbanity. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had a friendly half-hour's conversation with him on the 7th December, but no business was discussed. On his return Ibn Saud remained in residence at Mecca until the 20th December, when he left for Riyadh. This visit had been long anticipated and need be ascribed to no other cause than his desire to maintain touch with Nejd. His stay there was to be short and he was expected to return to the Hejaz in time to spend the fasting month of Ramadhan at Medina.

(b) A circular to the foreign representatives dated the 16th December announced that it had been decided to raise the Department for Foreign Affairs from a Directorate to a Ministry, and that the King's second son, the Amir Feisal, had been appointed Minister with Fuad Bey Hamza as Under-Secretary of State. The Amir retained his position as Viceroy of the Hejaz. These arrangements had been in contemplation for many months. They were understood to have the double object of enabling the King to reduce his personal burdens by delegating authority to the Amir and of paving the way for the establishment of a branch office of the Ministry at Jedda to maintain more continuous relations with the foreign representatives. It was expected that Fuad Bey would be placed in charge of the Jedda office, and he himself explained to Sir A. Ryan last July that his position would not be materially altered by his change of status from that of Acting Minister to Under-Secretary. Up to the end of December the

change had produced no obvious effect, owing to the fact that Fuad Bey fell somewhat seriously ill in Mecca about the 21st December. The new Minister remained in Mecca; no business could be transacted by telephone; and the isolation of the foreign representatives, unable to communicate otherwise than by notes, of which there is no end, became more pronounced than ever. It remains to be seen whether the King will, in fact, delegate authority to the Amir, whether the latter will accept the position of figurehead, whether Fuad Bey will settle in Jedda, and whether his position has been really diminished or not.

2. Finance.

There has been no improvement in the financial situation. It was stated in December that the King's own plans for his visit to Nejd had been delayed by the difficulty in finding money for the excursion. Money is, indeed, found for immediate requirements, but the difficulty of obtaining the settlement of outstanding Government debts remained as great as ever. Salaries were said to be as much as eleven months in arrear. In addition to the important cases mentioned in section (5) (c) of the previous report, His Majesty's Legation has had to consider the grievances of Sudanese chauffeurs who cannot get their wages. It is alleged that, in order to provide ready money, the first arrivals of pilgrims, mostly Javanese, have been hurried through to Medina in order to secure payment of the tax levied on pilgrims, who include Medina in their programme, amounting to at least £8 a head. All the efforts of the British Legation to obtain information as to the scale of fees and other dues payable by pilgrims for the 1931 season have failed, a fact which seems to indicate that the authorities are unwilling to commit themselves until they see how much the pilgrims can stand. The present financial policy is reducing the Treasury to a state of bankruptcy and the prospect of a lean pilgrimage made the outlook in December even gloomier than before.

3. Commerce (see section 5 of the report for July and August).

At the instance of the Calcutta Marine Insurance Association further representations were made to the Hejaz-Nejd Government in December in regard to the stranding of lighters in the shallow approaches to the Customs quay. No reaction or improvement has yet been noted.

4. General.

(a) A tendency was remarked to increase Nejd influence in the Hejaz. The use of the Nejd headdress has now been imposed by Government order on Hejaz officials. On the other hand, there has been no further attempt of late to enforce strict Wahabi principles. If anything the tendency to compromise has been a little more in the ascendant. On his return after several months' absence, Sir A. Ryan found the gramophone as much a feature of life as before and choral music, bearing a singular resemblance to Christian hymn tunes, raged relentlessly in the school close to the Legation House, apparently in preparation of the celebration of the King's Accession Day on the 8th January. Mecca also has its school choirs.

(b) No news of interest was received in December in connexion with the tribes in the interior.

*II.—Frontier Questions.**5. Transjordan.*

(a) The centre of interest as regards the MacDonnell investigation (see section 10 (a) of previous report) had shifted to London by the beginning of December. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister there attempted, in conversations with Mr. MacDonnell and at the Foreign Office, to reinforce the position previously taken up by his Government in regard to various matters, notably these: (a) Their refusal to recognise the validity of any proceedings before Mr. MacDonnell in the case of raids committed by Ibn Mashhur; and (b) their refusal to regard raids into Nejd by the Beni Atiya tribe, certain of whose leaders had moved back to Nejd, as being for that reason excluded from the scope of the investigation, unless an undertaking were given that the persons responsible for the raids would be denied readmission to Transjordan. In the latter case the Hejaz Government have persistently tried to obtain more than they originally

asked for. Not only have they wished, not unreasonably, that the proposed undertaking should be defined to provide for expulsion from Transjordan, if measures taken to prevent re-entry should fail, but they have sought to make the undertaking applicable to groups of unnamed members of the Beni Atiya. These demands were reaffirmed in a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Legation in Jedda, dated the 24th December, and the matter was still under consideration at the end of December.

(b) During the month the Hejaz-Nejd Government only protested against one raid, alleged to have been made by Transjordan subjects on the 2nd December and involving the loot of seventy camels. There was no counter-protest by the Transjordan Government against any raid from the Hejaz-Nejd.

(c) The month passed without any further reply having been returned by the Hejaz-Nejd Government to the comprehensive British memorandum on the present and future of the frontier situation, which His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires forwarded on the 23rd October (section 10 (b) of the previous report). When replying on the 29th November to a note from Mr. Hope Gill, asking that measures should be taken to forestall a raid into Transjordan which His Majesty's High Commissioner believed to be impending, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs professed inability to identify the section of the Aniza tribe believed to be implicated, and went on to suggest openly that raids from Nejd were legitimate retaliation, and that his Government could not definitely condemn them until raids from Transjordan had been completely stopped. Mr. Hope Gill took exception to this attitude in a reasoned note dated the 2nd December. His Majesty's Government decided to leave it to Sir A. Ryan, who had been fully acquainted with their views at home, to attempt to deal orally with the questions raised in this unsatisfactory correspondence, with special reference to the somewhat inconsequent interim reply made by the Hejaz-Nejd Government in November to His Majesty's Government's memorandum (see section 10 (c) of the last report). Instructions to this effect were telegraphed to Jedda on the 15th December, but Sir A. Ryan had no opportunity up to the end of December of taking the question up with the Hejaz Government.

(d) It was reported in December that Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zaid, formerly Assistant Governor of Jedda, who acted as Hejaz Agent during the MacDonnell investigation, had been appointed Governor of Jauif.

6. Iraq.

(a) No development in connexion with the proposed *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement came to the notice of the Legation from Hejaz sources during December. The question has, however, come to life again at the Bagdad end. On the 18th December Sir Francis Humphrys repeated to Jedda a telegram to London reporting that the Iraq Prime Minister was prepared to proceed to Jedda in order to sign the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement and negotiate an extradition treaty, provided that the Hejaz Government would agree to sign the former first and not make their signature dependent on the extradition negotiations. Nuri Pasha proposed also to discuss other matters, including the Ibn Mashhur imbroglio and the general question of Iraq-Nejd claims and counter-claims. On the 30th December the Foreign Office telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister for his views. His observations (which were not actually telegraphed until the 1st January, but may conveniently be summarised here) were to the general effect that he viewed with favour Nuri Pasha's proposal, which squared with the outcome of his own conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer, provided the Iraq Government could promise early ratification of the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement once signed, and that they would be ready to take up at the outset an accommodating attitude on the question of the definition of political offenders in any extradition treaty. He suggested that the Iraq Government might reasonably be expected to agree in principle to the Hejaz-Nejd contention that tribal offenders should be excluded from this definition. He thought that the question of claims might be left for the negotiators to thresh out when they met. While expressing those views on Nuri Pasha's proposed action, as described by him to Sir F. Humphrys, Sir A. Ryan drew attention to the possible bearing of a statement said to have been made by the Pasha to the press in October, to the effect that he intended to promote some sort of alliance or combine of Arab States, including Iraq, Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd, and contemplated visiting the other capitals this winter with that object.

(b) As regards the other points mentioned in the last paragraph, it appears (though it was not known to the Legation in December) that the Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th December regarding claims and another at or about the same time on extradition. The first made it clear that the £30,000, which King Feisal had expressed readiness several months ago to accept (see section 8 (b) of Report for July and August) in settlement of claims against Nejd, represented the amount which he considered due on balance and not an assessment of Iraq claims to be followed by a separate assessment of Nejd claims against Iraq. The text of the letter on extradition had not reached the Legation up to the time of writing this report, but it is understood to be uncompromising on the question of political offenders.

(c) The Ibn Mashhur affair (see section 11 (d) of previous report) continued to be the subject of active correspondence during December. It included a letter from King Feisal to Ibn Saud of the 14th December apologising for his failure to return Ibn Mashhur, according to plan, owing to the latter's faithlessness and promising by way of amends to place the family and property of Ibn Mashhur at Ibn Saud's disposal. The Legation took no parallel action as His Majesty's Government preferred that any communication as from them to the Hejaz Government should be delayed pending elucidation of the Iraq Government's exact intention in regard to the property of Ibn Mashhur, part of which had in fact been already seized by them in satisfaction of Iraq claims in respect of past raids by Ibn Mashhur from Nejd into Iraq.

7. Koweit (see section 12 (a) of previous report).

(a) Following on earlier correspondence His Majesty's Minister was authorised soon after his return to Jedda on the 19th December to make a fresh attempt to further a complete reconciliation between Ibn Saud and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, with whom the King is still angry because of the circumstances surrounding his visit to Bahrein on his return from the Lupin Conference last January. The King had replied fairly satisfactorily to a personal letter addressed to him by Sir A. Ryan at the end of August, but the incident was known to be still rankling in his mind. The matter is important owing to the wish of His Majesty's Government to employ the Political Resident on any negotiations of Koweit questions, which, if embarked on, would probably have to be of more general scope as regards the Persian Gulf. Arising out of various discussions in London, it was suggested that Colonel Biscoe might visit the King at some convenient place in Nejd during Ibn Saud's stay there. Sir A. Ryan broached this proposal to Fuad Bey Hamza in a personal letter of the 28th December, with which he also sent a letter to be forwarded to Ibn Saud, consisting mainly of courtesies but referring discreetly to the proposal regarding the visit.

(b) The view finally agreed upon among the British authorities concerned was that, if the proposal were accepted, Colonel Biscoe's visit should be primarily one of courtesy and that it should be left to Ibn Saud to touch on outstanding Persian Gulf questions, if he wished. It was hoped that, if the visit took place, he would be unable to refrain from mentioning questions which he himself is anxious to discuss, that this would enable Colonel Biscoe to broach similarly, if only in general terms, the questions affecting Koweit which His Majesty's Government have at heart, and that the interview might thus pave the way for eventual formal negotiations. Unfortunately, for these hopes, it seemed more than likely that, even if Ibn Saud were otherwise agreeable, the shortness of his stay in Nejd and the slowness of communication with Riyadh might make it impossible to arrange the visit in time.

8. Bahrein (see section 13 of previous report).

No further information has been received regarding the proposals to develop a trade and pilgrim route overland from the Hasa Coast to the Hedjaz. As stated in the previous report (section 13), the realisation of this project might affect the position of Bahrein as a transit port, but its success would probably depend on its utilisation by pilgrims as well as traders. The "Muslim Outlook," of Lahore, in its issue of the 8th December, published an extract from "Al-Siyassat" of Cairo (date not given) which may be mentioned here as bearing on

this subject, though it relates more directly to pilgrimage matters. The extract reproduces a Tehran message to the effect that the Persian representative in Jedda had stated while on leave in Tehran that a treaty of friendship and commerce would shortly be concluded between Persia and the Hejaz. "He referred," the passage goes on, "to the new route for pilgrims crossing the Nejd territories and affirmed that it was the exclusive monopoly of transport and communications held by the Syrian and Iraqi companies, which led the Persian Government to decide that the pilgrims from Persia should be carried through the harbours of the Persian Gulf, whence they would travel by automobiles direct to the Hejaz by the new road opened by the Government of His Majesty Sultan Ibn-us-Saud." It will be noted that the date of Habibulla Khan's alleged interview is not given. As stated in section 21 of the report for July and August a Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Hejaz-Nejd was ratified on the 16th June last, some weeks before the Persian Chargé d'Affaires went on his long, long leave.

9. Yemen and Asir.

No information has reached the Legation regarding any developments in Asir following on its practical annexation by Ibn Saud (see section 15 of previous report), or the Imam Yahya's reaction to this event.

10. Great Britain.

III.—International Relations.

(a) His Majesty's Minister returned to Jedda on the 19th December. Fuad Bey Hamza came to Jedda to meet him, and brought cordial messages from Ibn Saud. As Fuad Bey had to return to Mecca the same day owing to the King's imminent departure for Nejd and fell ill two days later, no opportunity arose during the rest of December for the oral discussion of business.

(b) The question of the proposed appointment of Hejaz-Nejd consuls at Bombay and Singapore (see section 16 (d) of previous report) continued to engage attention during the month. The position at the end of it was that the Government of India had agreed in principle to the appointment of a consul at Bombay, subjects to efforts being made to reduce to a minimum the danger of pilgrims being subjected to inconvenience and extortion under passport regulations, while the Government of the Straits Settlements were still reluctant to have a consul at Singapore. His Majesty's Minister was instructed, on the 24th December, to endeavour to settle the matter as regards Bombay on the lines desired by the Government of India. In a telegram of the 29th December, he suggested that he should await Fuad Bey Hamza's next visit to Jedda to discuss the matter orally, and enquired whether the conclusions reached in London regarding Singapore were similar to those of the Government of India. He proposed, subject to legal opinion, to contest the view expressed at an earlier stage by Fuad Bey that His Majesty's Government need be consulted as a matter of courtesy only; to maintain that the appointment of consuls was a matter for international agreement, and to add by way of makeweight that His Majesty's Government would expect reciprocity if they wished to appoint consuls in Hejaz-Nejd ports. He threw out more tentatively a suggestion that the occasion might be used to pave the way for some sort of convention dealing with the non-religious aspects of the pilgrimage, and providing also for consuls, adding that if this idea commended itself to His Majesty's Government, their assent to the appointment at Bombay and Singapore might be made provisional, *e.g.*, for two years.

11. France.

In a conversation with Sir A. Ryan, shortly after Sir A. Ryan's return, the French Chargé d'Affaires made an interesting disclosure regarding the deadlock in the treaty negotiations between France and Hejaz-Nejd (see report for July and August, section 12 (a)). M. Maigret brushed aside the question of slavery, and said that the only important matter was the operation of the Hejaz Law on Nationality in the case of Algerians. There had formerly, he said, been a large Algerian colony at Medina, and, though dislocated by war conditions, it was still sufficiently important to make the French Government unwilling to admit the pretension of the Hejaz Government to regard them as Hejazis.

12. Egypt.

M. Al-Achmouni, the Egyptian consul, returned to Jedda on the 25th December, after an absence of a few weeks. It had been supposed that his visit to Egypt marked a favourable turn in the negotiations between that country and Hejaz-Nejd, with a view to Ibn Saud's recognition by Egypt, and the settlement of other questions, like that of the Sacred Caravan and medical arrangements for Egyptian pilgrims. M. Al-Achmouni was very guarded after his return. He let it be understood that the scope of his negotiations had been exaggerated, but disclosed little else. The general impression at the end of December was that the negotiations, whatever their scope, had not really produced much up to date.

13. Turkey.

An official green book was published by the Hejaz-Nejd Government in December containing the text of the treaty with Turkey, signed at Mecca in 1929, of Ibn Saud's decree of the 21st November, 1930, approving the treaty, and of the protocol of the exchange of ratifications at Jedda, signed by the Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish diplomatic representative on the 10th December.

14. Other Countries.

The return of various heads of missions in December brought the Jedda Diplomatic Body up to its full strength, except that the Persian Legation remains without either a head or a chancery (see report for July and August, section 21 (b)). Its work is still presumably carried on in Syria, where Habibulla Khan has his principal residence. But it may be inferred from the press extract quoted in section 8 above that Habibulla Khan, wherever he is, is serving his country like a man and a Persian.

IV.—Air Matters.

15. Hejaz Air Force.

The transfer of the Hejaz Air Force to Jedda (see section 21 of previous report) has not produced the improvement that was hoped for in the moral and discipline of the force. The three remaining pilots have come to be divided definitely into two camps of two and one. Towards the end of December two of the six mechanics tendered their resignation. The Hejaz Government, on their side, have shown no disposition to utilise the force in any intelligent way. Even their plans for employing it mainly as an instructional unit had produced nothing up to the end of the year.

16. Arab Aeronautical Society (see section 22 of the previous report).

(a) The Mecca paper "Umm-al-Qura" published in its issue of the 19th December the proposed regulations of this society with an appeal for support addressed to "every Hejazi and Nejd in whose veins the blood of Islamic and Arab zeal flows; to every Arab who wishes his nation to be powerful and reputed; to every Moslem whose heart is touched by his Holy Lands." The appeal was made in anticipation of a great public meeting to further the objects in view. The draft regulations enable all subjects of Ibn Saud to become members by payment of an entrance fee and annual subscriptions, and other persons may be admitted on the same terms by the Administrative Council. The preliminary arrangements for the constitution of the society had been approved by the Government before the date of the publications described above. One may suppose without undue cynicism that the object of the creation of the society is to promote the acquisition of aerial material and the development of airmanship without adding to the burdens of a depleted Treasury.

(b) The projected public meeting was held in Mecca on the 25th December, but no detailed report of the proceedings has reached the Legation. The society would have a great prospect of success if, instead of thinking only of aeroplanes, it devoted its attention to dirigibles, and if the gas of Arabian oratory could be used for floating castles in the air.

V.—Military Intelligence.

17. There is little to report under this head. Some interesting confidential information was received at the Legation in December regarding a company formed some time ago for the importation of arms. The partners are said to have been Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, who has nursed his own finances more successfully than his master's, and a servant of his; a former Director of Customs, who prospered in that office; and an Iraq Jew with German connexions. Some arms appear to have been purchased before the partners fell out, with bills unsettled. It was the Iraqi and his brother in Hamburg who burnt their fingers.

VI.—Naval Visits.

18. Nil.

VII.—Pilgrimage.

19. *Forged Rupee Notes* (see section 29 of previous report).

The further plan to entrap the person in Syria principally concerned in the marketing of these notes failed. Various incriminating letters were despatched to Beirut on the 30th December, but it was then considered advisable to cease activity in Jedda and to leave to the French authorities in Syria, with, it was hoped, the co-operation in case of need of the Egyptian police, the task of laying the forgers' broker by the heels.

20. *1931 Pilgrimage* (see section 30 of previous report).

(a) Pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies continued to arrive during December, the numbers being approximately 7,000, carried in eleven ships.

(b) See section 2 above as regards the efforts of the Hejaz authorities to anticipate taxes on pilgrims already in the country by hurrying them through to Medina, and section 8 as regards plans for a new overland route.

(c) There was little improvement in the prospect in regard to the total number of pilgrims to be expected during the coming season. The probable number of Indian pilgrims, however, was estimated tentatively at about the same as last year.

21. *Nigerian Pilgrimage.*

The comments of the Sudan Government and of this Legation on the modified scheme, proposed by the Nigerian Government, were submitted to His Majesty's Government in December. Although made without previous consultation between Khartum and Jedda, they were found to agree in the main on the practical issues involved.

VIII.—Slavery.

22. No slaves took refuge at this Legation during December (see section 31 of the last report).

IX.—Miscellaneous.

23. *Reuter News Service.*

The Foreign Office agreed in a despatch, dated the 16th November, that, if the proposed service materialised, the Legation might subscribe up to an amount not exceeding £2 10s. per month. The prospects of the service being organised do not appear bright, but the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London has also been giving attention to the matter. This led, some time ago, to an enquiry by the Eastern Telegraph Company as to whether the Hejaz-Nejd Government would be prepared to waive their percentage per word on telegrams sent under the proposed scheme. It was pointed out that rates which would be quoted to the Hejaz-Nejd Minister would depend on the attitude of his Government in this respect. After experiencing great difficulty in obtaining a clear answer, the Eastern Telegraph Company understood that the Hejaz Government would insist on the full percentage for press telegrams despatched by the ordinary public.

24. *Legation Personnel.*

Mr. Wikeley, probationer vice-consul attached to this Legation, was granted a month's sick leave on the 6th December.

Captain C. C. Lewis arrived from England on the 15th December and shares with Mr. F. V. Jones, who arrived last June, the clerical duties of the Chancery formerly performed by Captain Thacker, but now greatly increased.

25. *Meteorological.*

The climate in December was unusually hot for the time of the year owing to prolonged south wind. The figures corresponding to those given in section 35 of the previous report were—

72° — 84° — 82° — 74° — 68° F.

[E 520/282/25]

No. 13.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 2, 1931.

I SHALL frequently mention Yussuf Yasin in various reports. Fuad Hamza went to Egypt on 31st January owing to continued illness. Yussuf Yasin appears to have taken his place as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He and Amir Feisal, who is titular Minister for Foreign Affairs, came here on 29th January to dispose of outstanding business, but the Prince has broken down and is returning to Mecca to-day.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 36; Transjordan, No. 37; Bushire, No. 38; and Government of India, No. 11.)

[E 540/2/25]

No. 14.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 3.)*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, January 30, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 609 of the 18th December. Your telegram No. 51 of the 23rd January. Prime Minister's proposal to visit Jedda to sign "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and initiate negotiations for conclusion of extradition treaty, approved generally by His Majesty's Government. The assurances given by Prime Minister as to two points mentioned in second paragraph of Jedda telegram of the 2nd January are gladly noted by them.

It is presumed, with reference to penultimate paragraph of Jedda telegram, that the statement to the Bagdad press by the Prime Minister regarding an Arab alliance is that reported in the "Az-Zaman" of Sunday, the 19th October, 1930, a copy of which was enclosed with your despatch No. 1043 of the 22nd October. Having regard to traditional hostility and suspicion between ruling families and, more particularly, to present bad state of relations between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd, any close alliance between Iraq, Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, at present outside scope of practical politics. I should therefore be glad if you would endeavour discreetly to ascertain what is the exact scope of his project and report to me. You should, if he does, in fact, intend to mention this matter during his visit to the Hejaz, warn him that, while any move tending to improve relations between the three Arab States would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government, they fear that, for the reasons which have been furnished by Sir A. Ryan, too precipitate action would probably have unfortunate results.

The Prime Minister would, I note, also propose to discuss general questions of claims, and a separate communication is being addressed to you on this subject. (Repeated to Jedda, No. 15.)

[E 418/2/25]

No. 15.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 3, 1931.

PARAGRAPHS 5 and 6 of your telegram No. 1 of the 2nd January: Proposed visit of Iraqi Prime Minister to Hejaz.

The Colonial Office telegram to Bagdad, No. 51 of the 30th January, will show you that His Majesty's Government are in general agreement with views expressed by you on the subject of Arab federation or similar scheme. More detailed consideration of attitude which His Majesty's Government might adopt in future appears, however, unnecessary, since project seems quite unrealisable in present circumstances.

[E 595/2/25]

No. 16.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, February 4, 1931.

TELEGRAM No. 51 from Bagdad to Colonial Office.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter of the 13th December regarding extradition was communicated to me on the 29th January by the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with his own reply. My copy of latter is undated, but reply was despatched some days since. It is firm, though polite, as regards necessity that tribesmen should be excluded from the clause concerning political offenders.

As Minister expressed wish to discuss question, Yussuf Yasin and I had long conversation on the 2nd February. With the idea of finding out present position, I stated what I understood to have been agreed orally in July with Fuad, viz., that if Iraqi representatives came here to sign "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and had powers to negotiate treaty of extradition, Ibn Saud would complete the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.

While not demurring, Yussuf Yasin laid stress on importance of treaty of extradition on lines which King desired.

I pointed out what advantages the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement in itself would have. I added that active consideration was now again being given to the matter, and expressed hope that it would be found possible to arrange for Iraqi representatives to come here. As to extradition, I personally felt strongly that it was necessary that the treaty should take account of the special frontier conditions. Supposing, as was probable, that I was invited to assist the parties directly interested, my aim would be to help to find a formula adapted to that end. In my own view, suggestions put forward when Clayton Mission was here, even though owing to breakdown of negotiations at that time they had lapsed, might be of assistance.

It would, however, be useless to try to find formula beforehand; it would only be established in the course of the negotiations now suggested. I intimated that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs' recent communication could be looked upon as merely a statement of extreme views of the type usual when a difficult matter was about to be discussed by Powers who were not on terms of complete friendship.

While endeavouring to create favourable atmosphere, I took care to confine myself, so far as possible, to personal expression of views and to avoid revealing too much. It might produce good results if I were authorised on next suitable occasion (possibly in writing personal letter summing up what I had said) to say that my language had your approval. In my opinion, likelihood of achieving successful result would be much increased if Nuri Pasha, without awaiting the reply of the Hejazi Government to his earlier letter, offered evidence of conciliatory attitude regarding extradition on lines suggested in telegram No. 3 from High Commissioner, Bagdad. I still feel sure that, if Nuri Pasha comes

here unprepared to go reasonable distance to meet Ibn Saud on point of tribal offenders, all our efforts will be of no avail. Supposing after completion of "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement lack of conciliatory spirit on Iraq side caused extradition negotiations to fail, situation would be, if anything, worse. As Ibn Saud only yielded to the extent he did last July under strong pressure, he would feel His Majesty's Government had tricked him into concluding "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.

Communication by post between Mecca and Bagdad wastes much time. Would it not be possible to persuade Nuri Pasha to telegraph about his proposed visit, indicating, at the same time, that he is prepared to adopt accommodating attitude on question of political offenders? If his visit can be arranged, the sooner it takes place after Ramazan the better.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether Nuri Pasha can take steps to ensure that letters referred to in my telegram No. 23 and herein are delivered to himself. Owing to mistake they were addressed to Naji Suweidi as Prime Minister of Iraq.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40.)

[E 572/337/25]

No. 17.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 4, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 215.

I discussed the whole situation with Yussuf on 3rd February. I think I disposed of Fuad's interim reply of 28th October to British memorandum. I emphasised importance of dealing seriously with points stated in last paragraph of memorandum.

Yussuf was studiously conciliatory. Most important point in his reply that Hejaz Government were preparing statement of their measures and that King was taking active steps to bring article 3 of Hedda Agreement into operation.

As regards latter, Yussuf said that Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid had been appointed inspector of Bedouin with headquarters at Jauif, and that Neshmi was being replaced by another Governor there. He asked for suggestions as to how communication contemplated in article 3 could be best effected. I promised to go into this, and I should welcome early intimation of views of the British authorities in Transjordan.

Full report follows by bag.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 42.)

[E 615/387/25]

No. 18.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(Nos. 20, 21 and 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 6, 1931.

(R.) REPORTS received from British officer recently appointed to Bedouin Control Board (see paragraph 6 (a) of memorandum in my despatch No. 360 of 2nd October last) show that situation in frontier districts of Transjordan has become exceedingly grave.

As a result of raids from Hejaz-Nejd culminating in serious attacks in September and October, important sections of Howeitat tribe of Transjordan, having lost most of their camels, are in state of acute distress and in many cases are on verge of starvation. About 800 Transjordan camels have been taken since 1st August, most of which are, or at any rate were until recently, known to be grazing in Nejd territory in vicinity of frontier, but increasingly effective measures introduced by His Majesty's Government to prevent raiding from Transjordan into Nejd preclude Howeitat from recovering them.

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Meanwhile, situation has been much aggravated by following facts:—

- (a) By all Arab standards raiding should have ceased while Mr. MacDonnell's tribunal was actually in session. Large Nejd raid of 17th September, three days after opening session, is therefore regarded in Transjordan as particularly flagrant act of treachery.
- (b) As a result of effective preventive measures taken by His Majesty's Government, such Transjordan counter-raids against Hejaz-Nejd as have taken place since 1st August have been of very minor character, but raids from Nejd have become of increasing importance, with result that tribes under British protection are now threatened with ruin and starvation.
- (c) It is now generally known on both sides of the frontier that Governor of Jauf is openly encouraging Nejd to raid and is taking a share of the loot. Latter fact was openly admitted by Hejaz-Nejd representatives to Mr. MacDonnell during investigation, and percentage of looted camels retained by Ibn Saud's officials was more than once quoted as evidence of amount of loot actually taken. Governor has also publicly stated that Ibn Saud has now permitted raiding into Transjordan.
- (d) His Majesty's Government have recently obtained definite evidence that at least one important raid was carried out on direct instructions from Ibn Saud himself. (End of R.)

Provided statement is kept in this form, and actual raid and source of information are not divulged, I have no objection to your making this statement, which is of great importance, to Hejaz Government, notwithstanding instruction to the contrary in my despatch No. 497 of 29th December.

(R.) His Majesty's Government take most serious view of above situation. They had hoped that holding of MacDonnell enquiry and institution of measures to check raiding from Transjordan and renewed appeal for institution of corresponding measures and for co-operation on part of Hejazi Government contained in memorandum in my despatch No. 360 of 2nd October would produce favourable response. There has been no response from Hejazi Government. On the contrary, they have now publicly encouraged attacks on Transjordan tribes. Grave danger to prosperity of Transjordan tribes makes it essential that situation should be remedied without delay.

Appointment of Captain Glubb as British Intelligence Officer on Tribal Control Board renders it possible to deal with situation in accordance with spirit of article 3 of Hadda Agreement, and His Majesty's Government must call on Ibn Saud to fulfil his obligations under that article. They therefore propose that Captain Glubb should proceed forthwith to Wadi Sirhan, in order that immediate arrangements may be made by him for restitution of loot taken from Transjordan tribes since 1st August with the Governor of Jauf or other official fully empowered by Ibn Saud for the purpose. Captain Glubb will also be authorised to deal with claims of Hejazi and Nejd tribes in respect of loot proved to have been taken by Transjordan tribes during the same period. His Majesty's Government can no longer acquiesce in the failure of Ibn Saud to meet his obligations under the Hadda Agreement and must press him strongly to issue necessary orders to Hejazi frontier authorities, in fulfilment of article 3 of Hadda Agreement, to co-operate with Glubb and would be glad to learn as soon as possible that this has been done. They must, however, make it clear that they demand the immediate restitution to Howeitat of all camels stolen from Howeitat in course of Nejd raids since 1st August and public withdrawal and repudiation of orders issued to Nejd officials of Jauf condoning or encouraging raids.

You should at once address communication in strong terms on above lines to Hejazi Government or to King Ibn Saud himself, explaining that matter is one of urgency, to which His Majesty's Government attach great importance.

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 12, 13 and 14.)

[E 643/387/25]

No. 19.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 9.)

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

February 5, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 7:—

"It is reliably rumoured that Nejd tribesmen, under the leadership of Neshmi, ex-Governor of Jauf, contemplate carrying out strong raid against Transjordan Howeitat at end of Ramazan.

"Please inform Ibn Saud and request him to prevent any such raid if contemplated."

[E 690/387/25]

No. 20.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 10.)

(Nos. 27 and 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 9, 1931.

(R.) YOUR telegrams Nos. 20, 21 and 22.

In the absence of reference I am uncertain whether you had received my telegram No. 24 and my despatch No. 25 before despatching telegrams under reference.

In view of more favourable turn taken by discussions here, I fear any attempt to force the pace to the extent contemplated in your instructions may do more harm than good. I venture to draw attention to the following considerations:—

- (a) Hejaz Government took prompt action regarding raid of 17th September, and eighty odd camels were restored, remainder being claimed as property of Nejd. I understand this was the same raid regarding which Resident, Amman, expressed satisfaction in report to High Commissioner of 30th September. In subsequent report of 5th November he stated that balance of 117 camels was still outstanding, but I have not yet received detailed criticism of statements in Minister for Foreign Affairs' note enclosed in my despatch No. 289.
- (b) Analysis of protests shows that Transjordanians complained of four raids, including above, as having occurred from August to December, and Hejaz Government complained, rightly or wrongly, of fourteen for the same period. Transjordanians complained of none in November and December; Hejaz of only one in December. Unless there has been serious recrudescence since 1st January, gravity of situation would appear not to consist in the present raid but in sufferings of Howeitat in consequence of October raids.
- (c) If person described as Governor of Jauf is Neshmi he seems to have been dismissed, judging by what Yussuf told me and High Commissioner's telegram to me No. 7, repeated to Colonial Office No. 9. I should be glad of any further information from Amman regarding his present position.

Contents of your telegram No. 22 seem to be affected by my telegram No. 24 and by action which I have already taken regarding October raids on Howeitat as recorded in my despatch No. 25. I do not quite see on what one can base statement that Hejaz Government have now publicly encouraged attack on Transjordanian tribes unless—

- (1) There has been some recent public incitement of which I am unaware; or
- (2) The Hejaz agent was party to admission by "Hejaz representatives" during MacDonnell enquiry and His Majesty's Government regard such admission in the course of proceedings, which are still *sub judice*, as constituting public encouragement.

The fact that His Majesty's Government themselves occupy judicial position seems to me to make it undesirable that they should use evidence given at investigation in this way.

[6131]

D 4

I suggest that sufficient immediate action would be to write further note with reference to recent conversation, again urging importance of restitution of loot taken from Howeitat and proposing early meeting between Captain Glubb and Abdul Aziz. (End of R.)

Now that Ibn Saud appears to be more amenable, personal accusation against him, which we could not substantiate without disclosing nature of our information, could in my opinion only envenom the situation.

In any case, it would be difficult not to reveal by inference actual raids we have in mind, as they could only be those which occurred in September and October, unless there have been further raids this year regarding which you have similar information.

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 47 and 48.)

[E 702/2/91]

No. 21.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 11.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 5, 1931.

IRAQ Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca, dated 1st February, referring to the former's letter of 13th December about extradition, and stating that, whereas that letter stated the views of Iraq Government regarding principles on which agreement should be based, the Iraq Government were ready in order to cement friendship and expedite conclusion of agreements to come to an understanding regarding any proposal made by Hejaz and that they were awaiting observations of Hejaz Government in order to proceed with negotiation of an extradition agreement.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 33.)

[E 702/2/91]

No. 22.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 11.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, February 8, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda:—

"My telegram to Colonial Office, No. 81.

"King Feisal is telegraphing to King Ibn Saud in terms of my immediately following telegram. Nuri Pasha proposes to discuss in addition to "Bon-Voisinage," Extradition and Claims, general questions of pilgrim traffic and trade facilities. He also proposes to show copy of Iraq-Transjordan Agreement to Hejaz-Nejd Government, and to explain that it is in no way directed against Ibn Saud. Also to discuss case of Ibn Mashhur."

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 85.)

[E 702/2/91]

No. 23.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 11.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, February 8, 1931

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 9 S:—

"In view of our strong desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two Governments, we are ready at any time to reach an understanding on any proposals that your Majesty's Government may wish to put forward, including Extradition Agreement. I feel strongly that a

personal exchange of views would be of great advantage, and an opportunity presents itself now, as the Iraq Parliament has been adjourned for some time. I am ready to send my Prime Minister immediately to sign "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and to discuss with your Majesty's Government all points of common interest. If he reached Jedda immediately after Ramazan any agreement that might be signed could be ratified by the Iraq Parliament during the present session. I request your Majesty to reply by telegraph whether this proposal is acceptable."

[E 701/2/25]

No. 24.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, February 10, 1931.

WITH reference to Bagdad telegram of the 8th February to Colonial Office, I have received officially from Minister for Foreign Affairs copies of telegram from King Feisal to King Ibn Saud, and of latter's reply welcoming the proposal to send a mission and suggestions relating thereto. Ibn Saud hopes that Arab nations in general, as well as both countries, will benefit from the mission, and states that he is ready to discuss questions enumerated by King Feisal, and that is confident of settlement of outstanding questions. It is evident that Hejazi Government are much gratified, for copies of telegrams have been sent under a covering note from Yussuf Yasin, who expresses belief that his pleasure at prospect of reaching union and accord between the two countries will be shared by me.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 723/723/25]

No. 25.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 11, 1931

MY despatch No. 180.

Do you wish me to reopen question of use of Hasa coast by aircraft? If so should action be directed to securing (a) consent to pearling flights this year by service aircraft; (b) similar permission for Imperial Airways; or (c) consent in principle to flying over of aeroplanes employed in projected service to India? If action is contemplated it should be undertaken as soon as possible. I was expecting King to come here any time after 21st February, but there is now possibility of his visiting Jedda during next few days.

You will remember that after date of my despatch under reference chief pilot of Air Force surveyed islands for possible landing grounds, and recommended Jinnah, to use of which Ibn Saud might agree, though he was believed to be strongly against any landing grounds on the mainland.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52, and Bushire, No. 53.)

[E 724/387/25]

No. 26.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 12, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Transjordan, No. 54:—

"Hejaz Government protest against raid on four persons from Teima at Alkhabu, four hours distant from that place, by party of Shararat under Smeihan Alshahari, who looted 620 dollars, one rifle and two camels. I am enquiring as to date, which is not given.

"Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that this marks new start after short lull of raiding and asks that special attention be drawn to this. I have taken the opportunity to express agreement as to desirability of continued effort to prevent raids, drawing attention to report in your telegram No. 7; and again asking for return to Howeitat of camels looted in October. This will not preclude stronger action contemplated in recent correspondence with Foreign Office if His Majesty's Government decide on it."

[E 690/387/25]

No. 27.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 13, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 27 and 28 of the 10th February: Proposed protest to Hejazi Government on raiding situation.

Although my telegrams Nos. 20, 21 and 22 were drafted before receipt of your telegram No. 24 and of your despatch No. 25 these did not appear to necessitate any modification in policy already decided on.

Recent detailed reports contained in Transjordan despatch No. 4640 of the 3rd January (copy to you by bag of 5th February) show necessity of obtaining immediate restoration to Howeitat of loot taken since 1st August, and this is unlikely to be achieved except by strong representations on lines proposed. I had not overlooked points which you raise in paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of your telegram. As regards (b), raids of September and October are main subject of complaint, which is directed more to particularly disgraceful features of these raids referred to in paragraph 3 (a), (c) and (d) of my telegram No. 20 than merely to their size or fact of their occurrence. His Majesty's Government have only recently been informed of seriousness of these raids and of gravity of consequent situation in Transjordan.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your telegram. There seems no reason to refrain from complaining of acts of Neshmi, because he has since ceased to be Governor of Jauf.

Paragraph 3 (1) of your telegram. Transjordan authorities state categorically that it is common knowledge on both sides of frontier that Neshmi publicly encouraged raiding and Nejd raiders made no attempt to conceal fact. This statement is reinforced by our knowledge that at least one raid was directly ordered by Ibn Saud himself.

Paragraph 3 (2). Hejazi agent himself made admission to MacDonnell, and I see no reason why it should not be quoted.

As regards personal accusation against King, knowledge that His Majesty's Government are aware of his instructions to raid should surely have salutary effect on His Majesty, who, while no doubt denying statement, will realise its truth and may hesitate to repeat proceedings.

I appreciate your arguments, but more vigorous measures than polite protest seem essential if immediate return of loot taken from Howeitat is to be secured.

My own inclination, then, is still to address note to Hejazi Government or to King himself substantially as outlined in my telegrams Nos. 20, 21 and 22, while leaving you discretion to defer action pending receipt of details in Transjordan despatch of 3rd January, and to make such minor changes as may be necessary to bring your representations into harmony with recent developments, especially with your recent conversation with Yusuf Yasin regarding article 3 of Hadda Agreement.

If, however, after weighing above considerations, you adhere to opinion that situation would be aggravated by such vigorous protest as originally drafted, shall not take amiss further representations by you, before giving you final instructions.

(Repeated to Transjordan.)

[E 816/387/25]

No. 28.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. — (Communicated to Foreign Office, February 18.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

February 16, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 12:—

"Reliable informant reports that new Governor of Jauf with nineteen caravans recently arrived there. Money was distributed to men, who were ordered to purchase sound camels immediately. Tribesmen have been ordered to assemble at Eloula with war banners. Persons enquiring as to reasons of this are informed that they will learn after feast. It is also reported that 150 camelmén are assembled at Zal Elhaj station. May reasons of these preparations be explained?"

[E 844/387/25]

No. 29.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received February 19.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jedda, February 18, 1931.

I HAVE considered your telegram No. 26 in conjunction with new communication from Yussuf Yasin, summarised in part 1 of my immediately succeeding telegram, and with telegram No. 12 to me from High Commissioner for Transjordan, repeated to Colonial Office, No. 12.

I agree with serious nature of raids which took place last autumn, subject to what I said in my telegram No. 27 under (a).

I also agree in regard to continued importance of Neshmi, but Ibn Saud can say that his dismissal shows that he has been disavowed and punished.

My objection to using argument regarding public knowledge of incitement to raid is partly removed by your further statement on this point. I had in mind that the value of all evidence given at investigation had still to be appraised by His Majesty's Government in judicial capacity and that it might therefore be better that they should not commit themselves explicitly to accept it now.

I still hold very definite opinion that it would do more harm than good to make direct accusation against Ibn Saud, however completely our secret information may justify it. I narrowly avoided acute quarrel with him, as you will remember, in July, when I addressed him on this frontier question. He is quite clever enough to deny accusation of personal complicity and demand reasons for it, even though he may have a guilty conscience.

I doubt whether it will prove effective to couch our demands in extreme terms (having regard to counter-accusation of Hejazi Government and their similar demands for return of loot) unless you are prepared in the event of delay or refusal to take strong punitive measures. You will no doubt also have in mind danger that atmosphere for contemplated Iraq negotiations will be rendered unfavourable.

For these reasons I am awaiting your further instructions before making official representations. I felt, however, on the 17th February that it was necessary, in view of further papers mentioned in paragraph 1 above, to take some kind of action before the Mahometan festival, which begins on the 19th February. In these circumstances I addressed to Yussuf Yasin personal letter which, with the omission of polite phrases which only weakened it slightly, is fully summarised in part 2 of my immediately preceding telegram.

It is pretty strong letter. It may seem to you that it would now be enough for me to send in official note to effect that you approve my letter and have instructed me to speak to the King on the whole matter. King is due to arrive here within a day or two of festival. In conversation I could enforce all points and refer also to facts that Neshmi's past activities are public knowledge and that Transjordan tribes think these activities had King's sanction. I could, in addition, express your strong resentment at insinuations made about Glubb. Ibn Saud has, I fear,

taken Glubb's appointment worse than we anticipated. I venture to suggest that, if you still consider it essential to take stronger and more immediate action, you should telegraph in Government telegraph code actual text of a memorandum to be communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 55.)

[E 845/387/25]

No. 30.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 19.)
(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Jedda, February 18, 1931.*
FOLLOWING are summaries mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Part 1. Yusuf Yasin's note to me of 15th February:

"Raid recently complained of by Hejaz Government probably took place between 3rd and 7th February.

"I have read with surprise report of Neshmi's projected raid. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on 25th January, and I have since spoken to you about falsity of similar previous rumour. I can assure you that new rumour is equally false. Neshmi has been dismissed and has no further connexion with Governor of Jauf.

"I remind you of what I said about attitude of officer imported from Iraq. He evidently wishes to create state of disturbance on Transjordanian frontier similar to that produced by his earlier activities in Iraq. First consequences are these false rumours and reports received by my Government that on arrival he started collecting camels looted from our tribes and using them in his work instead of returning them. We cannot admit such action and believe your Government will not allow it. Please ask authorities concerned to do the necessary to avoid crisis, to put a stop to false rumours, and to ensure return of camels belonging to our tribesmen which have been collected in Transjordania."

Part 2. My personal letter to Yusuf Yasin of 17th February:

"I prefer to reply privately to your note, which raises two immediate important points:—

"1. Report to which I drew attention on 12th February was new and could not be disposed of by answer regarding similar earlier report. I realised that Neshmi was no longer Governor. His dismissal, of which I heard with satisfaction, does not end his activities. It would be a great boon to remove him from the frontier region.

"2. I see no foundation for accusation against Glubb. My Government will strongly resent such accusations based on mere [? supposition] directed against a specially selected officer.

"I have now received even more serious report. (Here follows paraphrase of Transjordan telegram No. 12.)

"I cannot conceal the perturbation of my Government, though I prefer to say this by private letter pending instructions. Howeitat are in great misery owing to non-return of camels taken in October raids, of which Hejaz and Nejd Governments had advance knowledge though they were too late to prevent them. In my personal opinion situation can only be prevented from becoming dangerous by (1) immediate return of those camels, (2) immediate bringing into operation of article 3 of Hadda Agreement, (3) very strong measures by King to prevent preparations for further raids into Transjordan.

"Our recent conversation filled me with hope of better things. I consider still that closer co-operation on frontier and direct exchange of information would result in less danger of further raids and less difference of opinion as to value of reports received by both sides."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 56.)

[E 880/2/25]

No. 31.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 21.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, February 18, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 13 S:—

"With reference to my telegram of the 2nd February, I have been requested by the Prime Minister to inform the High Commissioners at Cairo and Jerusalem and to ask you to inform the Government of Hejaz that he much regrets that he is compelled to postpone his visit to Transjordan, Egypt and the Hejaz owing to the delay in conclusion of the oil negotiations, which he hoped would have been completed before. He will later suggest another date to the Hejaz Government."

"(Repeated to Cairo and Jerusalem, No. 13 S.)"

[E 919/387/25]

No. 32.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 24, 1931.

MY telegram No. 36.

I received, on 22nd February, emphatic personal reply, dated 18th February, to my personal letter to Yusuf Yasin. Following is summary:—

"Your severe indictment of Neshmi, based on rumours, of falsity of which I have assured you, causes astonishment. Neshmi never did anything but try to maintain security in area for which he was responsible. At the same time you resent, and say that your Government will resent, accusations against Glubb, who immediately on arrival filled the area with confused and untrue rumours. Minister for Foreign Affairs assured you in note to which I referred of falsity of first rumour, and I assured you in my subsequent note of baselessness of report regarding raid expected at the end of Ramazan.

"I once more assure you that fresh information received by High Commissioner is groundless. No money was distributed; no tribesmen assembled at Alula, with or without standards; no prospect was held out of a raid on Transjordan after 27th February. All such reports false.

"If you and your Government grasp the fact that all this information is baseless and designed to cause disturbance similar to that known to have resulted before from Glubb's action, matter will be easy, and your Government will have no occasion to resent formulation of accusations against that officer, who has filled Transjordan with fear and alarm.

"As regards measures suggested by you for improvement of the situation, my views are these:—

"(a) You request return of camels looted from Howeitat in October. If you had said in this connexion that camels captured by Transjordanian tribes since the beginning of the MacDonnell enquiry, most of which are at Glubb's disposal, would be returned simultaneously, request would be just and equitable, and you would find us ready to comply.

"(b) I have already informed you orally that we are prepared to consider suggestions you think best for bringing article 3 of Hadda Agreement into operation.

"(c) If you will refer to the early portion of this letter and realise falsity of reports, you will see there is no need for preventive measures, because there are no preparations for raids requiring them.

"In our recent conversation I shared your views that co-operation would prevent discord and dispute. I am sure that you will agree on your side that acceptance of false information as being incontestable will do more to disturb

minds on frontier than to calm them. I mention this so that you may draw attention of your Government to it in order that they may restrain their officials from disturbing and useless actions."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 62.)

[E 939/387/25]

No. 33.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 24, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I think we can ignore the tone of Yusuf Yasin's reply, as it is merely a tactless echo of my own very categorical language and Hejaz Government are being studiously polite in other directions.

My letter has probably served its immediate purpose of imposing caution on Ibn Saud in the immediate future. It is clear, however, that he will not give way as regards camel-looting in October except under the strongest pressure, and he may easily again postpone bringing into operation of article 3 if he is told that direct communication must be with Glubb, and especially if it is added, as suggested in Transjordan telegram No. 15, that all meetings after the first should take place in Hejaz territory.

It would be futile to continue personal correspondence. In my opinion the choice lies between action suggested in penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 35 and communication of a strong memorandum drawn up by His Majesty's Government themselves. I still prefer the former course. If the latter is adopted it seems necessary (a) that we should be absolutely certain of our ground and clear in our minds that the King has no counter-case worth considering, and (b) that His Majesty's Government should have clear view of their further action in the almost certain event of Hejaz Government failing to give full and immediate satisfaction. In that case I consider that the only effective means of pressure would be to take punitive action or to withdraw me temporarily, both of which would be very drastic remedies. Attitude of Hejaz Government is further illustrated by note summarised in my telegram No. 43, which, though much more polite in form, in effect revives the old suggestion that, if His Majesty's Government cannot put an end to raids from Transjordan, Ibn Saud and his tribes should have a free hand.

King is expected here on 26th February.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 63.)

[E 940/387/25]

No. 34.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 25, 1931.

I HAVE received note from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 22nd February beginning with polite reference to my enquiries during his recent illness and expressing regret that his first business on resumption of work should be to complain of fresh raids.

He then complains of two raids by Transjordan tribes on 10th and 13th February. In the first case party believed to be Beni Atiya captured forty camels, whereupon one of the raided party went to seek help of his relations in pursuing raiders. In second case party of Transjordanians looted thirty-four camels and people raided went with their partisans in pursuit with results unknown. I am telegraphing full details to Transjordan, which will doubtless be forwarded to them in usual way.

Note ends with reference to raid mentioned in Transjordan telegram No. 11, which is being investigated, and with general observations of which following is summary:—

"If matters remain in this state situation will take greater extension. Important thing is to know whether this will not inconvenience His Majesty's Government themselves and cause [? group omitted] between them and us. Otherwise the matter is simple, as we know Transjordan Bedouins and they know us and we can settle with them sooner or later. If, however, your Government are concerned to stop raids owing to inconvenience to themselves please state what mutual measures should be taken to prevent them completely. Failing this, interposition of British between parties constitutes troublesome problem, because it is difficult for us either to see our tribes entangled with British forces or to refuse them our protection. I impatiently await suggestions of your Government, because measures hitherto taken have not produced the slightest effects and immunity of raiders encourages them in evil actions."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 64.)

[E 814/2/25]

No. 35.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 4th February: Proposed Iraq-Hejaz-Nejd Extradition Treaty.

I approve your language generally as expression of your personal views, but His Majesty's Government do not wish to intervene in Extradition Agreement negotiations, at any rate at present, when Iraq Prime Minister is about to discuss matter direct with Hejazi Government, and still awaits latter's further views (see Bagdad telegram to Colonial Office, No. 78, repeated to you, No. 33). I prefer, therefore, not to endorse to Hejazi Government your suggestion regarding proposals made at time of Clayton's mission, since this might give Hejazi Government erroneous impression that they could rely on support of His Majesty's Government, and thus possibly hamper Nuri Pasha's negotiations.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 85.)

[E 939/387/25]

No. 36.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 35 and 36 of 18th February, Nos. 41 and 42 of 24th February and No. 43 of 25th February: Raiding situation on the Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

In view of recommendation in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 42 of 24th February, I agree to your discussing whole question orally with the King as suggested in your telegram No. 35 of 18th February. My immediately following telegram contains text of memorandum, which should form basis of your representations, giving detailed views and proposals of His Majesty's Government. High Commissioner for Transjordan has been asked to telegraph his observations immediately on detailed proposals, put forward in paragraphs 2 and 3 of memorandum, for meeting between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid, repeating to you. You should await his telegram, which it is hoped will reach you very shortly, before acting on these instructions.

If High Commissioner suggests minor amendments only in proposals you may adopt them without further reference to me. But if he desires serious modifications you should await further instructions which will be sent to you as soon as possible.

As soon as you are in a position to do so you should at once take up matter with King, following memorandum as closely as possible. Your oral representations should in no circumstance be weaker in tone, and you are authorised to leave copy of memorandum with King if you think this desirable.

You will see that, in deference to your views, question of co-operation has been put in forefront and that communication is somewhat less peremptory than that originally proposed. It is, however, essential to know King's reaction at earliest possible moment, in order that policy to be pursued, if his reply should be unsatisfactory, may be further considered without delay. You should therefore impress on the King with all the force at your command gravity of situation, and endeavour if possible to obtain definite reply during your conversation. Failing this, you should make every effort to obtain reply within two or three days, and in any case you should report reaction of King by telegram not later than four days after your representations have been made. Should you decide to leave copy of memorandum with King, you may make such minor purely formal alterations as may be required, as well as any minor amendments suggested by High Commissioner for Transjordan. If you think it desirable, you may make it clear that His Majesty's Government expect definite reply within four days.

Proposals of His Majesty's Government for co-operation on frontier, together with steps already taken for improved control of frontier districts, will, in opinion of His Majesty's Government, offer best guarantee for future improvement referred to in Hejaz Government's note of 22nd February summarised in your telegram No. 43 of 25th February.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 33. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 23.)

[E 939/387/25]

No. 37.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931.

HIS Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have learnt with satisfaction that King Ibn Saud is now prepared to take steps to bring article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation; the more so as recent reports from the Transjordan authorities have shown that the establishment of immediate co-operation between the authorities on the two sides of the frontier has become urgently necessary.

2. In conversation with His Majesty's Minister at Jedda on the 3rd February, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin asked for suggestions as to the method of initiating such co-operation. The appointment of Captain Glubb as British Intelligence officer attached to the Transjordan Bedouin Control Board and of Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid as Inspector of Bedouin has much simplified matters, and His Majesty's Government now propose that Captain Glubb should proceed forthwith to the Wadi Sirhan to meet Ibn Zeid. They suggest that at this meeting (1) all representations and claims regarding the raids since 1st August last should be examined; (2) arrangements should be made for immediate restitution of loot on both sides; (3) arrangements should be made for inter-communication of information in future.

3. For (1) and (2) His Majesty's Government propose that Captain Glubb and Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid should be respectively accompanied by representative sheikhs of the Transjordan and of the Hejaz-Nejd tribes concerned, who could put forward the claims of their tribesmen, identify loot, answer accusations, &c., in respect of raids which have occurred since 1st August.

4. His Majesty's Government are convinced that such early meeting for disposal of claims since 1st August and exchange of information regarding the present state of affairs is only means of removing grievances and suspicions on both sides, and bringing about improvement of present dangerous situation.

5. As Yusuf Yasin has recognised, there has recently been a short lull in raiding. As regards raiding from Transjordan, this lull was due to the increased effectiveness of the new measures for the control of the Transjordan tribes, of which information has already been given to the Hejazi Government. The Transjordan authorities cannot, however, guarantee to maintain this situation unless immediate steps as proposed above are taken to arrange for return to

Transjordan of the large number of camels (about 800) which have been taken in raids by Hejazi or Nedji tribes since 1st August, and most of which are, or at any rate were until recently, known to be grazing in the immediate vicinity of the frontier. The fact that this loot has not been returned and that measures of Transjordan Government prevent Transjordan tribesmen from recovering it by force is naturally greatly resented by latter.

6. Their resentment is aggravated by the following facts connected with these raids which have been brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government and have made a deplorable impression on them:—

(a) By all Arab standards raiding should have ceased while Mr. MacDonnell's tribunal was in session. Large Nejd raid of 17th September, three days after opening session, is therefore regarded in Transjordan as a particularly flagrant act of treachery.

(b) As a result of preventive measures taken by His Majesty's Government, such Transjordan frontier raids against Hejaz-Nejd as have taken place since 1st August have been of minor character, but the raids from Nejd in September and October were of large dimensions, with the result that the tribes under British protection are now threatened with ruin and starvation.

(c) It is generally known on both sides of the frontier that El Neshmi, while Governor of Jauf, openly encouraged the Nejd tribes to raid and took a share in the loot. Latter fact was admitted by Hejaz-Nejd agent during Mr. MacDonnell's investigation, percentage of looted camels retained by Hejaz-Nejd officials being more than once quoted as evidence of amount of loot actually captured. El Neshmi also stated publicly that King Ibn Saud permitted raiding into Transjordan. Latter statement has found wide credence and has not been effectively disproved. His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that El Neshmi has been removed from Governorate of Jauf and to receive denial contained in Yusuf Yasin's letter to Sir A. Ryan of 18th February respecting truth of recent reports regarding preparations for a raid by El Neshmi at end of Ramazan. The evidence referred to above of El Neshmi's activities before his removal from the Governorate of Jauf is of a different character from these recent reports, and so circumstantial and definite that His Majesty's Government have no choice but to accept it as true, that during a considerable period when he was the chief official in the neighbourhood he was inciting the tribes to raid and sharing in the loot. This constitutes a flagrant infraction of Hadda Agreement, and it is deplorable that such action should have been taken by an official of the Hejazi Government when that Government had before them a detailed memorandum from His Majesty's Government urging the closest co-operation between the local authorities on the two sides of the frontier. His Majesty's Government must press that, if this has not already been done, the strongest measures should be taken to counteract the effect of El Neshmi's action in giving countenance to raiding, and to make it publicly known that King Ibn Saud expressly disavows and condemns it. His Majesty's Government have now been informed that El Neshmi has been appointed to command tribal forces with headquarters at Jauf. In view of his previous record they trust that this report will prove unfounded.

7. His Majesty's Government request that Hejazi Government will inform them at an early date that they agree to proposal for meeting between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid and that they will invest the latter with full powers to deal with the matters proposed, including the immediate restitution of the camels and other loot taken from Transjordan tribes since 1st August. Captain Glubb will also be authorised to arrange for the restitution of loot identified as having been taken from Hejazi or Nejd tribes.

8. Having regard, however, to the urgent necessity and evident justice of restoring to the Transjordan tribes the large number of camels looted during September and October in the exceptionally unjustifiable circumstances referred

to above, His Majesty's Government are prepared, should the Hejaz Government find themselves faced with any practical difficulty in the immediate restitution of this loot, to offer the co-operation of British assistance in the Wadi Sirhan to secure a speedy settlement.

9. His Majesty's Government will be glad if the Hejazi Government will communicate to Sir Andrew Ryan without delay, for the information of the Transjordan authorities, their proposals as to the date and exact place of the meeting.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 34. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 24.)

[E 939/387/25]

No. 38.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931.

MY telegrams Nos. 33 and 34.

Please address independent communication to Hejazi Government conveying strong resentment of His Majesty's Government at their accusations against Captain Glubb and their allegations as to his attitude both at present time and when in Iraq. Representations in a similar sense may be made to the King.

You should explain that Captain Glubb is officer specially selected by His Majesty's Government for his present post and one in whom they place confidence. It is Captain Glubb's duty to bring to the notice of Transjordan authorities reports which may reach him of possibility of raiding from Hejaz-Nejd, and it is far best that these reports should be brought to notice of Hejazi Government in order that, if they are untrue, Transjordan authorities may be reassured, and, if true, that Hejazi Government may take steps to prevent the raids. Transjordan authorities are ready in the same spirit of co-operation to receive and reply to reports regarding impending raids which may be referred to Captain Glubb by Ibn Zeid or to Transjordan Government through Sir A. Ryan. It is, however, inadmissible that Hejazi Government should make accusations against good faith of trusted British official, based on unconfirmed and tendentious reports and unsupported by concrete evidence.

You should add that Captain Glubb is official chosen by His Majesty's Government for co-operation with Hejazi officials on frontier and has instructions to carry out the spirit and letter of article 3 of Hadda Agreement. Co-operation will be rendered impossible if Hejazi Government persist in doubting his good faith, an attitude on their part which would reflect upon good faith of His Majesty's Government, who have selected him.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 35. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 25.)

[E 956/387/25]

No. 39.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931.

IF King raises subject with you before you are in a position to take action on my telegram No. 33 of 26th February: Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier, you should confine yourself to informing him that you know that instructions to discuss with him new detailed proposals regarding the whole question are on the point of reaching you and explain that in circumstances you cannot discuss matter further until they arrive.

If King is about to leave Jedda before Transjordan observations are received you should express earnest hope that he may be able to delay his departure a few days pending receipt by you of necessary instructions.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 36. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 26.)

[E 832/723/25]

No. 40.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 31 of 11th February: Facilities for British aircraft along the Hasa coast.

In view of Transjordan frontier crisis and tone of communications which you have been instructed to make to Ibn Saud on that subject, moment may not appear opportune to ask His Majesty for concessions in connexion with proposed Arabian air route. Air Ministry are, however, anxious to press on with matter without unnecessary delay, and if, notwithstanding foregoing consideration, moment is not unfavourable, you may at your discretion discuss it on following lines:—

Project for pearling flights to Bahrein has been dropped. Air Ministry therefore desire that request should be for facilities in connexion with use of Persian Gulf air route by British aircraft, civil or military. It can be explained to Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government do not request general permission to fly over Nejd territory, but merely desire assurance that, if British aircraft on Persian Gulf route are compelled by untoward circumstances to enter and alight on Nejd territory, they will be treated in accordance with usual rules of international courtesy. This implies merely (a) such general assistance and good treatment as considerations of humanitarianism and hospitality naturally dictate; and (b) that no objection will be raised to immediate despatch of assistance by air, if necessary.

Air Ministry add that it is desirable that location of landing grounds between Koweit and Bahrein should be known to pilots in case of emergency. Three landing grounds on Hasa coast at approximately 60 miles' interval would be desirable, and, if possible, it would be well that Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, should be consulted in their selection.

Above represents His Majesty's Government's desiderata, but I leave you discretion as to how much of them to put forward at first, and also as to manner and moment of representations.

[E 1003/2/25]

No. 41.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, February 27, 1931.

MY telegram No. 59 to Bagdad.

Yusuf Yasin came to see me on 26th February. He brought a note written on behalf of Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing regret of Hejaz Government at the delay in connexion with Iraq Prime Minister's visit and fear that it might increase difficulties in the way of settlement of outstanding questions. Note continued that Hejaz Government were still prepared to negotiate in spite of delay so frequently noticed and promised further explanation in conversation.

Yusuf Yasin said that the King had instructed him to speak to me very frankly. He then made a long statement on the following lines:—

- (1) Hejaz Government welcomed further and more conciliatory letter from Iraq about extradition and ascribed it to my efforts.
- (2) They, however, took strong exception to account of the situation given in Bagdad newspaper "Al Iraq" of 6th February, which he showed me. In addition to prominent headings and leading article on Arab alliance, paper reproduced statement by the Prime Minister in Parliament to the effect that Ibn Saud had invited him to Jedda in connexion with that alliance and had promised to pay £30,000 as compensation to Iraq. Hejaz Government did not object to latter statement, but former was a complete perversion of the true facts. Nuri Pasha was not coming by invitation, but at the suggestion of his own Government. There was no question of any Arab alliance.

[6131]

E 2

What could be the object of such an alliance and against whom was it to be directed? Yusuf Yasin insisted that Arabic word "hilf" which was used implied alliance for common action against other parties. He said the statement repeating Nuri's utterance and copies of telegrams exchanged would be published in Mecca paper on 27th February.

- (3) Hejaz Government could never trust Iraq, which always gave false turn to things, but they had confidence in His Majesty's Government and had wished to fall in with their views.
- (4) Hejaz Government had been willing to postpone Ibn Mashhur question until Nuri came and had kept silence regarding it. Iraq had recently published its own version and denied any undertaking to surrender Ibn Mashhur. If Nuri was not coming Hejaz Government would be compelled to make facts public.

As regards the last point, I demurred to statement that Hejaz Government had kept silence. I referred to Philby's letter in "Near East" of 25th December. I said its author was so closely and notoriously associated with the King and Government that he could only be considered to reflect their views. He could certainly not have obtained his information except from them, and so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned he had made an accusation graver than that of the Government themselves. He had said that His Majesty's Government had not merely failed in an obligation, but had done so after admitting it.

Yusuf Yasin made some attempt to deny that Philby's version was inspired. I suggested that the King might, in that case, send me disavowal for transmission to you. I enquired as to the nature of publication by Iraq Government which was complained of in this connexion. I gathered that reference was to the leading article in "Near East" of 5th February. I pointed out that this could not be regarded as a statement by the Iraq Government.

I then dealt with other points. As regards (1), I spoke on the same general lines as in earlier conversations. As regards (2), I suggested that we should all stick to the purpose of the real business in hand, to the solid basis established by conversations of last July, and should not let newspaper publications or bazaar gossip give wrong turn to straightforward negotiation. I deprecated Hejaz Government rushing into print until more was known of Nuri Pasha's movements. As regards (3), I said there was too much mistrust on both sides between principals and that object of His Majesty's Government was to establish greater confidence and promote understanding which would provide basis for it. I urged that reason given for postponement of Prime Minister's visit was perfectly reasonable. I pointed out that it had delayed other visits besides that to Jedda, and begged Hejaz Government not to imagine that delay was due to ulterior political motives.

I made it clear throughout that I was expressing purely personal views.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 69.)

[E 1004/2/25]

No. 42.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 27, 1931.

DISCUSSION, which I should have preferred to await at this stage, was forced on me. I was greatly taken aback by contents of newspapers which Yusuf Yasin produced. I could only admit that they misrepresented facts of the situation. I felt it was necessary to make immediate efforts to sooth outraged feelings of Ibn Saud, who is clearly much incensed by attempts to involve him in Arab alliance project. I tried to minimise its importance in present circumstances without expressing any view as to its merits. I suggested that allowance should be made for difficulties of Nuri Pasha in a country which, unlike this, had parliamentary institutions and an active press. Whilst I deprecated proposed publication in Mecca newspapers, I did not press the point on learning it had already gone forward. Yusuf Yasin said it would restore

things to their true proportion and I said I did not think it would do any particular harm although I should have personally preferred it to be postponed.

Later in the day I received your telegram No. 32. I will endeavour to keep off the whole subject as far as possible during remainder of the King's visit. I appreciate your reason for not wishing to express any views of your own at present, but I feel that prospect of successful negotiations between principals is already much impaired and that they will fail unless His Majesty's Government eventually take a hand in composing differences.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 70.)

[E 990/387/25]

No. 43.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 27, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 33, 35 and 36.

I expect to have business audience with the King early on 1st March. If Transjordan observations reach me in time, is there any objection to my sending memorandum beforehand as official communication to the Hejaz Government? I think this would be most effective course, as basis of representations is to be memorandum in set terms. My present judgment is affected by character of letter summarised in my telegram No. 41 and my perusal of Glubb's report, which reached me on 25th February. It would help me greatly if such papers could be sent to me direct from Jerusalem in future, if only for my own information, pending your instructions.

I am making separate communication about Glubb to-day in accordance with your telegram No. 35. Before I had time to study your telegram as a whole, I had conversation with Yusuf Yasin mainly on this subject. I prepared him for strongest possible representations regarding Glubb and general situation.

I trust that Transjordan observations on memorandum may reach me to-morrow. It would be most difficult to suggest to Ibn Saud that he should prolong stay in Jedda. He becomes more "royal" every time and I detect slight tendency to set up Yusuf Yasin as a screen, although, of course, he is merely the King's jackal.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 71.)

[E 1010/387/25]

No. 44.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, February 28.)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

February 27, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 24.

I agree with proposals in second paragraph of your telegram subject to following modifications:—

1. Glubb should meet Ibn Zeid at any place which is agreed upon as most convenient, and not necessarily in Wadi Sirhan.
2. Add to third suggestion in second paragraph "and for mutual restoration of loot in future."
3. The first meeting should be of preliminary nature, and I do not consider it advisable that either Glubb or Ibn Zeid should be accompanied by sheikhs on that occasion. Presence of sheikhs at so early a stage might lead to risk of unpleasant incidents, such as occurred during sitting of MacDonnell Commission, and I consider it desirable that friendly personal relations should be established between Glubb and Zeid before sheikhs are summoned.

It is important that both Glubb and Zeid should be vested with executive powers by their respective Governments.

[6131]

E 3

As regards Jedda telegram No. 42 to Foreign Office, my telegram No. 15 did not suggest future meetings should take place in Nejd-Hejaz territory. The intention is that they should take place wherever might be agreed by both parties. (Repeated to Jedda, No. 17.)

[E 1010/387/25]

No. 45.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 28, 1931.

MY telegrams Nos. 33 and 34 of 26th February: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier situation.

You may adopt modifications proposed in Transjordan telegram No. 18 to Colonial Office repeated to you as No. 17.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 39. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 29.)

[E 1011/387/25]

No. 46.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 1, 1931.

I SENT memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs late on evening of 28th February with covering note formally requesting audience, and intimating that I am instructed to obtain definite reply as soon as possible. I will, if necessary, make it clear to the King that this means within four days from delivery of memorandum. Audience has now been fixed early on 2nd March.

I modified paragraph 2 in accordance with High Commissioner's suggestion. I redrafted paragraph 3 in form given in my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 73.)

[E 1012/387/25]

No. 47.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 1, 1931.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"It is important, in opinion of His Majesty's Government, that Sheikh Abdul Aziz should be invested by Hejaz Government with full executive powers, and that he and Captain Glubb should be in a position, whenever necessary, to call upon respective sheikhs to put forward claims of their tribesmen, to identify loot, and to answer accusations, &c., in respect of raids subsequent to 1st August."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 74.)

[E 1023/4/25]

No. 48.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 2.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, February 28, 1931.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 10th February, I am directed by Lord Passfield to transmit to you for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of a despatch from the Political Resident in

the Persian Gulf regarding possible Persian Gulf negotiations, and to state that the whole question of future negotiations with Ibn Saud will no doubt be considered on the receipt of the despatch foreshadowed in Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 12 of the 23rd January, a copy of which formed the enclosure to the letter to this Department of the 26th February.

I am, &c.

J. E. W. FLOOD.

Enclosure in No. 48.

Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe to Lord Passfield.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bushire, January 31, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram No. 12 of the 23rd January, 1931, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he said that he intended to review the position, as seen by him, in regard to the Persian Gulf negotiations.

2. As Ibn Saud has now left Nejd, there is no likelihood of a meeting between him and myself taking place in the near future, and I would, therefore, also venture to put my views regarding the Persian Gulf negotiations before His Majesty's Government; they may perhaps be of interest to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and assist him in any discussions that may take place with King Ibn Saud.

3. During the Akhwan rebellion, His Majesty's Government informed the Sheikh of Koweit that, if he acted in accordance with their wishes as regards the cutting off of supplies to the rebels, &c., they would, when peace was restored, endeavour to bring about a cessation of the blockade which had been imposed for some nine years by Ibn Saud on Koweit.

4. The Sheikh of Koweit did act in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government; some supplies did reach the rebels, but they were certainly very limited in amount, and I believe that a considerable proportion came from Basra and other ports. I have frequently endeavoured to obtain accurate information as to what actually did bring about the final collapse of the Mutair and Ajman. They had arms, and they had men, and no encounter on a large scale took place between them and Ibn Saud's forces. All my information is to the effect that their final collapse was almost entirely due to the fact that they had run out of supplies of every kind, both of food and of ammunition, and that they knew that they could look for no support either from His Majesty's Government or the Sheikh of Koweit. They could obtain no shelter in Iraq or Koweit, and had, therefore, been obliged to march considerable distances, and were at the end of their resources. This state of affairs was brought about very largely by the measures enforced by the Sheikh of Koweit, acting on the advice of His Majesty's Government, which he loyally followed, despite his own strong personal inclinations. I believe that His Majesty's Government recognise that this is so, and have every desire to implement their undertakings to the sheikh to bring about a cessation of the blockade and a restoration of the former prosperity of Koweit.

5. I discussed a few days ago with the sheikh the effect of this blockade on his territory, and asked him what the estimated loss caused to him by it had been. Sheikh Sir Ahmad told me that before the blockade the revenue of Koweit amounted to between 7 and 8 lakhs of rupees. Koweit is the largest Arab town in Mesopotamia or Arabia after Bagdad—a fact which possibly may not be realised. The sheikh told me that, despite the fact that taxation was exceedingly light, 4 per cent. on imports and 2 per cent. on exports, before the blockade Koweit was one of the most prosperous cities in Arabia, and the State paid all its expenses comfortably, and generally had a balance to devote towards improvements, &c. Nowadays, the revenue was below 2 lakhs, and, despite the most stringent economy, the State had last year been unable to balance its budget, and the deficit had been made good by contributions from the private estates of the ruling family.

[6131]

E 4

6. I asked the sheikh to what he actually attributed the blockade, and he said "entirely to the influence of the Quasaibi family." I do not think this statement is wholly correct, though I think it is very largely so. I believe Ibn Saud, in the past at any rate, was actuated partly by personal ambition to round off his territories by reducing Koweit to the status of a feudatory. On the other hand, I do not think there is the least doubt but that the blockade was originally imposed owing to the influence of the Quasaibis, and that nowadays it is maintained owing to them.

7. The Quasaibis, as His Majesty's Government are aware, are Ibn Saud's bankers. They are of humble origin and entirely self-made men, and, I believe, in former years were twice made bankrupt. Subsequently, however, they got in touch with merchants on the Hasa Coast, Hoffuf, &c., and gradually amassed a considerable fortune by lucky deals in pearls and other means, and ultimately started financing Ibn Saud. For some years they farmed the Hasa customs, and then prevailed on Ibn Saud to divert trade with Nejd from Koweit to Bahrein, Ujair and Hoffuf, supported in this by the influence of the Hasa merchants. They are said to receive a salary of 5,000 rupees a month from Ibn Saud, and to make enormous profits on goods ordered by him from India. It is currently reported that they are owed 7 to 8 lakhs by Ibn Saud at the present time, and I think there is no doubt that they wield much influence with the King.

8. To turn now to Ibn Saud's desiderata. He has stated (*vide* Mr. Bond's despatch No. 150, dated the 19th June, 1929, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that there are three questions which he wishes to raise in connexion with the Persian Gulf:—

- (1) Customs and transit dues collected in Bahrein on goods imported into Nejd.
- (2) Certain points relating to the nationality and passports of Hejaz-Nejd subjects in the Persian Gulf.
- (3) The position of Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrein and Koweit.

As regards (2) and (3), I see no particular difficulty in discussing these matters with Ibn Saud. I do not know what he wishes to discuss regarding passports, &c., but the matter will probably be capable of settlement without much difficulty. As regards the status of his agents at Bahrein and Koweit, I think if it were pointed out to him that the grant of consular status to his agents in Bahrein and Koweit would inevitably lead to similar requests from Persia and Iraq, he would not press the matter. Moreover, there is no doubt that the Syrian entourage of Ibn Saud are not on good terms with the Quasaibis; Abdur Rahman Quasaibi told me this himself in Bahrein, and probably they would not welcome any increase in the Quasaibi prestige in Bahrein, and, therefore, their influence would be utilised against the proposal.

9. The most important question, however, is that of Bahrein transit dues. As regards them, I think it might be pointed out to Ibn Saud that these dues are very definitely levied for services rendered. The Bahrein Government have provided, at Bahrein, wharves, warehouses, lighting, a crane, and, in fact, all the facilities that are provided in a civilised port, so far as their finances permit. They are even now contemplating an extension of the pier which will cost a large sum of money, and will enable lighters to come alongside at all states of the tide. Further, the transit of goods—and Ibn Saud's imports are frequently on a very large scale—involves clerical labour, and the provision of guards, watchmen, &c.

10. The Hejaz Government benefit by all these facilities, and it is not much to ask that, in return, they should pay the very modest rate of 2 per cent. customs duty, and the request that these transit dues should be waived is, in the circumstances, wholly unreasonable.

11. If Ibn Saud chooses to tranship his goods on the high seas, then obviously he can avoid payment, but so long as he utilises the facilities provided by the Bahrein Government, he has no reasonable ground for protest if he is asked to pay something towards their cost. It is not a tax levied by the Bahrein Government on his goods, but a charge made for definite services rendered.

12. I do not think, therefore, that there should be any particular difficulty in discussing the demands of Ibn Saud in connexion with the Persian Gulf. We are on very strong ground in maintaining the present position. The question

now arises as to whether any pressure can be brought to bear on him to relax the Koweit blockade. Possibly, Ibn Saud may have abandoned his personal ambition to include Koweit in his territories; he has many other preoccupations and his attitude towards Koweit has been markedly more friendly of late; some Bedouin have been allowed to purchase goods in Koweit, though the caravan traffic is still entirely prohibited.

13. There is still, however, left the influence of the Quasaibis, which will certainly be exerted for the maintenance of the blockade. If I was discussing matters with Ibn Saud I should, in the first instance, make an appeal to his better nature. Ibn Saud knows perfectly well that he owes practically everything to Koweit. Koweit gave him and his family shelter when they were refugees. It was with the help of the Koweit tribes and the support of Sheikh Mubarak that he set out on the conquest of Arabia, which has led him ultimately to his present high position. So intimate were the relations between Koweit and Ibn Saud that, when Ibn Saud was quarrelling with the Turks, he used to send to Sheikh Mubarak letters received from the Turkish authorities, and Sheikh Mubarak used to write the replies and seal them with Ibn Saud's own seal, which was in his possession, for Sheikh Mubarak had the reputation of being a skilled and forcible writer. Ibn Saud is undoubtedly impulsive, and is capable occasionally of a "grand geste." It is possible—though perhaps not probable—that if an appeal was made to him on behalf of Koweit, pointing out the ruin that his present policy was bringing on this small principality, to which he owed so much and how unworthy his attitude was, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he might respond. I believe that he would if he were entirely free in the matter. He is, however, apparently almost at the end of his financial resources. He owes already a considerable sum to his bankers, the Quasaibis, and may have need of further assistance from them and they are doubtless capable of bringing much pressure to bear on him. If then, this method of approach fails, there would seem nothing for it but to adopt a sterner line and to hint to Ibn Saud the possibility of retaliation.

14. Ibn Saud clearly realises that it is in our power to retaliate. When I met him last year, he said to me: "I am not friendly with the British because I particularly love them, but because I realise that they have got me by the throat." The best retaliation that I can think of would be the raising of the Bahrein transit dues to 5 per cent. We imposed a reduction of the dues on the Sheikh of Bahrein forcibly and against his wishes. They are a constant grievance to the sheikh, and moreover the Bahrein State is at present passing through a period of acute financial stringency. I doubt whether it would be necessary to put the threat into execution. The intimation would, of course, have to be tactfully conveyed, but I believe that, if Ibn Saud saw that His Majesty's Government intended to get their way in this matter, he would yield, and this view I may mention is shared by Colonel Dickson, who knows Ibn Saud intimately. The cessation of the blockade would certainly please the merchants of Nejd; it might be supported by Fuad Hamza as a blow to the Quasaibis, and possibly Hafiz Wahba would use his influence on the same side. There would, therefore, be some counterpoise to the Quasaibi influence which might induce Ibn Saud to agree to a restoration of the previous caravan traffic between Nejd and Koweit, and a restoration of the prosperity of this city.

15. To sum up:—

- (i) The blockade is slowly ruining Koweit at the present time.
- (ii) It is, therefore, most important that His Majesty's Government should implement their undertaking to the sheikh to try and bring about a cessation of the blockade with as little delay as possible.
- (iii) I would myself in the first instance make an appeal to Ibn Saud's better nature, pointing out all he owes to Koweit and the harm that his present policy is causing. It is probable, however, that his present financial straits and the influence in consequence exercised over him by his bankers, the Quasaibis, would prevent his modifying this policy. In this event the only course to adopt would seem to be to hint at retaliation, *e.g.*, the raising of the Bahrein transit dues. There may be other means of bringing pressure which may suggest themselves to His Majesty's Minister.

- (iv) Ibn Saud has mentioned three matters which he on his side wishes to discuss with me. I do not think there is any need to avoid a discussion of these questions, as one of them is probably capable of friendly settlement, and as regards the other two we are on very strong ground.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. V. BISCOE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

[E 1082/387/25]

No. 49.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 3, 1931.

MY telegram No. 50.

I had long conversation with the King on 2nd March. I dwelt strongly on gravity of the situation and need for explicit reply.

I have just received counter-memorandum. It confesses readiness to bring article 3 into operation, but asks for agreement on various principles before proposed meeting takes place in order that representatives concerned may be guided thereby. It contemplates restitution of loot taken in recent raids on strictly mutual basis and in effect refuses to return 800 camels claimed by Transjordan unless steps are taken to meet large Nejd counter-claims. Transjordan is accused of initiating raids during MacDonnell investigation and thus incurring sole guilt of treachery. The King defends Neshmi, whom he dismissed only to avoid controversy. Offer of assistance in Wady Sirhan is rejected.

My immediately following telegram will give details of audience, note concerning Glubb and counter-memorandum, but in the meantime I should like to know whether you wish me to make further attempt to obtain more satisfactory reply before to-morrow evening. Prospect of achieving this by purely diplomatic action is practically nil. If I were summoned home to confer with His Majesty's Government great impression would be created, but effect in other directions would be far-reaching.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 75.)

[E 1103/387/25]

No. 50.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 4, 1931.

FOLLOWING are details referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

1. Main point of audience: I strongly emphasised your views regarding Glubb. I said that your memorandum regarding general situation was statement of position of His Majesty's Government in their own language and that matter was out of my hands, but that I was instructed to add communication regarding (a) extreme gravity of situation, (b) wish of His Majesty's Government for definite reply before the evening of 4th March, and (c) universal belief on frontier that large raids from Nejd were carried out under King's authority. I indicated as from myself facts which lent colour to this belief. King accused Glubb of starting false allegations, but qualified this by half-admission that he might not have originated them and disclaimed intention of attacking Glubb. He denied that Neshmi now had any official employment, but intimated that he had only been dismissed because he was in bad odour in Transjordan. He asked that His Majesty's Government should treat both sides equally and expressed readiness to inflict punishment on his own subjects if criminals in Transjordan were punished.

He resented suggestion that he was personally responsible for raids. As a King he was entitled to explanation, and, failing proof, to satisfaction.

I said that I was not making accusations but stating facts as to belief on the frontier. I again referred to colourable reasons for the belief, beginning with Fuad's note of 20th November refusing to condemn raiders from Nejd until raids from Transjordan had entirely ceased. The King asked if that view was right or wrong. I said it was wrong. The King said he could not see his subjects robbed and plundered. I reproached him with the failure to answer British memorandum of October. He quoted Fuad's interim reply, which I refused to take seriously and with which I had in any case dealt in conversation of 3rd February with Yusuf Yasin. Discussion became more and more diffuse. At intervals I reverted to the gravity of the situation and need for explicit reply to the last memorandum. The King promised one, but put forward his own suggestions, viz., (1) steps should be taken to ascertain which side started the raid after 1st August and that side should bear the guilt of treachery; (2) no raids to take place during proposed meeting and stringent measures to be taken by both sides to restrain tribes; (3) mutual restoration of loot at some stage of meeting, which he seemed to think might last some time. I promised to put forward any suggestions made in writing, but again urged the necessity of explicit reply to your desiderata under four distinct headings accompanied by offer of assistance in Wady Sirhan. The King politely refused the offer. I specially stressed the importance of restoring 800 camels to starving Howeitat. The King expressed (1) desire for good relations; (2) ability to control his subjects and readiness to inflict merited punishment; and (3) inability to accept that his subjects should be treated inequitably. I then brought the discussion to an end.

2. Summary of reply of 3rd March regarding Glubb: Confidence of His Majesty's Government in Glubb and his appointment to any post whatsoever concern only His Majesty's Government. Rumours of impending raids from Nejd are untrue, whatever their origin. This denial does not reflect on His Majesty's Government. Best proof of falsity of reports is that Ramazan and feast have passed without raids taking place. His Majesty's Government have complained about Neshmi and Hejaz Government have complained about Glubb. This does not constitute illegitimate attack and is to be attributed to the interest friends have in avoiding causes of dispute.

3. Summary of Hejaz counter-memorandum 3rd March: (1) King declares his desire to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into force as stated by Yusuf Yasin on 3rd February. (2) King sees no practical advantage in proposed meeting until two Governments have agreed on (a) way to clear up past raids since the start of MacDonnell enquiry and (b) principles to be followed by representatives in order that no dispute may arise between them. (3) As regards liquidation of claims, when His Majesty's Government declare their readiness to satisfy claims of Hejaz subjects as from 26th July to present date, viz., 1,198 camels, compensation for seven deaths, 620 dollars and one rifle as notified to the British Minister, the King will order proved claims of Transjordanian tribes to be met.

4. As regards principles to be observed by representatives, the King suggests following: (a) Meeting to take place at or near frontier as agreed upon from time to time. (b) Telegraphic communication be maintained by means of Jauf wireless. (c) Representatives to exchange information regarding all raids. (d) Raids in the nature of theft to be immediately reported and criminals pursued by Government in whose territory the crime took place and stolen property to be returned against receipt. (e) Representatives to exchange information regarding big raids and to meet, if necessary, with a view to settlement. Each representative to submit proposed settlement to his Government for sanction in order to ensure its effectiveness. (f) Representatives to confine themselves to matters relating to raids and to deal with nothing else. (g) Representatives to treat each other with courtesy and meet as equals. On receiving assent of His Majesty's Government to the above it will be possible to instruct Ibn Zeid accordingly.

5. Paragraph 5 of British memorandum speaks of inability of Transjordan to guarantee maintenance of improved situation unless camels captured from their tribes are restored. When similar language was used in a note from Hejaz Ministry for Foreign Affairs His Majesty's Government did not agree, and British Minister also insisted during his recent audience that this theory was wrong (this is a specious attempt to pervert my criticism of note of 20th

November). King thinks it surprising that what on his side is wrong is accounted acceptable on the other side.

6. King agrees that by Arab standards raids should have ceased during MacDonnell enquiry, but it was Transjordan that failed to respect this principle. Their tribes began to raid as soon as MacDonnell embarked on his mission, as is proved by raids of 26th July, 21st August, 1st September and 2nd September. Their raids have since gone on. Transjordanian tribes began and Nejd raid (of September, presumably) came later.

Although it was a matter of reciprocity, investigation was made; number of camels looted proved to be only 120; 86 of these which belonged to Transjordanian tribes were restored, the rest being returned to Nejd owners. This proves that treachery was not on Nejd side but on that of Transjordan.

7. The King cannot admit accusation against Neshmi, who merely worked for security of those for whom he was responsible. He was removed from his post only to avoid controversy with His Majesty's Government.

He did his best for peace, but Transjordanian tribes have always been the beginners of evil conduct, and Nejd has sometimes had to defend themselves.

8. King is prepared to instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Glubb when he receives reply of His Majesty's Government.

As for restitution of loot to Transjordanian tribes, it cannot be undertaken until start is made with restoration of property belonging to King's subjects.

9. The King informs His Majesty's Government, with thanks for their offer of assistance in Wadi Sirhan, that he has power, thank God, over all his subjects.

If he needs any help it is the promise of His Majesty's Government to hand over criminals if they flee from punishment into Transjordan.

King awaits reply in order that he may send necessary instructions to Ibn Zeid.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 76.)

[E 1092/387/25]

No. 51.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 52 of 3rd March: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier situation, last paragraph.

Your telegram No. 53 has not yet been received, but it would, I fear, in any case have been impossible to send you further instructions in time to enable you to take further action to-day.

Meanwhile please telegraph briefly your estimate of (a) probable effectiveness in connexion with present issue and (b) disadvantages of your possible recall for consultation with His Majesty's Government, indicating particularly directions in which you consider effects of such step would be far-reaching.

(Repeated to Transjordan.)

[E 1137/387/25]

No. 52.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 5, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 42.

(a.) Ibn Saud treats diplomatic notes as moves in the game. My recall for consultation would impress him with gravity of situation more than anything that can be said or written. This alone would probably not compel compliance with all your demands, some of which are almost impossible of acceptance from his point of view, e.g., giving of full powers to subordinates and public disavowal of Neshmi. His Majesty's Government have on their side gone too far to recede without putting the King in a position to say he has called their bluff. My departure, if represented as being for consultation, would show they were serious without committing them finally to more drastic action (e.g., occupation of Wady

Sirhan), which would still be almost certainly necessary to enforce complete submission. Its effectiveness would be greater or less according to whether I left by sloop or steamer; the facts were published or not; my wife left or stayed behind; and vice-consul were appointed Chargé d'Affaires or left merely for routine business.

(b.) Question cannot be isolated. Recall even for consultation would present the appearance of rupture of relations. No one here will believe that sole reason for this is the latest turn in the situation, which has lasted for a year, and present attitude of His Majesty's Government towards [group omitted], which is based mainly on appreciation by a single expert known to be repugnant to Ibn Saud. Inference would be that His Majesty's Government had changed former friendly policy all along the line and wished to diminish or perhaps destroy King's [? group omitted]. Appointment of a British Minister crowned his success. Appearance of rupture would be his first serious set-back in thirty years. Detailed effect cannot be analysed briefly, but comes under the following heads:—

1. Atmosphere for Iraq negotiations would be hopeless even if Nuri still came. At best they cannot, in my opinion, succeed without your mediation at crucial moment.
2. [Group undecipherable] pilgrimage and local exchange situation, which is now very precarious, might easily be affected and the King's position in his dominions might be shaken.
3. All negotiations on air matters and minor questions like claims, &c., would have to stand over. Atmosphere in which they were eventually resumed would depend on outcome of crisis and might be either more or less favourable than now.
4. All orientals over-estimate personal factor. Ibn Saud quite possibly thinks that I have worked up this crisis. In the interest of future good relations you might have to consider replacing me. If you could do this without loss of face it would not be a bad thing, especially if my successor spoke Arabic.

Possible course as regards Nos. 3 and 4 would be to remove me now as for consultation; either let Transjordanian frontier situation develop on its own lines or deal with it by force; refuse to send me back pending settlement by special mission, not including myself, of all outstanding questions; and eventually to appoint new Minister.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 78.)

[E 1003/2/25]

No. 53.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 6, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 46 and 47 of 27th February: Iraq-Nejd relations.

I approve your language on all points.

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 1146/387/25]

No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 7.)

Sir,

India Office, March 6, 1931.)

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram sent to the Government of India respecting the situation on the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd.

I am, &c.

S. F. STEWART.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Secretary of State for India to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, March 5, 1931.

THERE is some danger of a serious situation arising as between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud in connexion with latter's failure to meet demands of His Majesty's Government arising out of Hejaz-Nejd raids into Transjordan (see Foreign Office telegram) to Jeddah Nos. 20, 21 and 22 of 6th February, copy by mail of 12th February and connected correspondence). No effort is being spared to secure friendly settlement, but danger that this may prove impossible, though not immediate, cannot be overlooked.

Steps to be taken in that event have been under consideration and it has been tentatively proposed that failing satisfactory settlement we should take either:—

- (a) Diplomatic action such as withdrawing Minister from Jeddah, either indefinitely or for consultation with His Majesty's Government; or
- (b) Active coercive measures in one of the following alternative forms:—
 - (i) Armoured cars to cross Hejaz frontier supported by aircraft reconnaissance, round up tribes and drive off camels to numbers of those looted, latter to be held as hostages by Transjordan Administration.
 - (ii) If Nejd tribes have withdrawn from frontier during period of strained relations, Kaf to be occupied by force of armoured cars and Transjordan Frontier Force.

In case these proposals have to be considered further, please telegraph as early as possible any observations you may wish to offer, with special reference to any probable effects on political situation and Indian Moslem opinion

[E 1155/723/25]

No. 55.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 7, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 37.

I concur moment is unpropitious. If present crisis ends happily, I propose, after short suitable interval, to address written communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to correspondence exchanged last year in connexion with transfer of Air Force following your instructions up to "by air if necessary."

As regards location and number of landing grounds, it will be remembered chief pilot advised in favour of establishing one at Jinnah Island. If this would suffice, matter might be much easier. In any case I think it will be better to elicit King's views on general question before making any statement on my side regarding that aspect of it.

[E 1149/387/25]

No. 56.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jeddah).

(Nos. 44 and 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 52, 53, 54 and 56 of 3rd, 4th and 5th March: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier crisis.

His Majesty's Government consider that essential object should now be to bring about immediate meeting of frontier authorities, and thus to secure that question be dealt with (at any rate during next stage) on local and tribal rather than on international basis. Hejazi reply, though in many ways evasive and unsatisfactory, appears not to exclude such method of settlement. Unless, therefore, Ibn Saud prevents meeting from taking place or from leading to early and satisfactory result, or unless there is sudden deterioration in frontier situation, question of resort to drastic measures, such as your withdrawal, need

not now be further considered, though possibility of such necessity arising must not be excluded. As soon as you receive the telegraphic concurrence of the High Commissioner for Transjordan, to whom this telegram is being repeated, you should address communication to the Hejazi Government on following lines:—

(R.) 2. "His Majesty's Government note (1) that King declares his desire to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into force; (2) that he agrees to immediate meeting of Captain Glubb and Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid, subject to prior understanding on certain general principles; and (3) that he agrees to mutual restoration of loot being arranged for during meeting."

3. "Provided meeting takes place in immediate future His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to its being governed by all the principles suggested (i.e., those enumerated in section 4 of your telegram No. 53). They note, however, that King desires that each representative should submit proposed settlement to his Government for sanction. His Majesty's Government would greatly prefer that local representatives should be given full power to dispose finally of all questions regarding raid claims, and they are prepared to give full powers to Captain Glubb if King will give equally full powers to Ibn Zeid. If, however, His Majesty feels unable (see your telegram No. 54) to give the latter such authority, they are prepared reluctantly to acquiesce in any settlement reached by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid being referred by these officials to their Governments for sanction. In that case, however, it should be clearly understood that the necessary sanction shall be given without undue delay."

4. "In reply to the King's request for proposals as to the liquidation of past raids since the opening of Mr. MacDonnell's enquiry (your telegram No. 56), His Majesty's Government propose that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should be empowered personally—

- "(a) To examine claims respecting all raids which have occurred since the agreed date of 1st August.
- "(b) To summon representative leading sheikhs of the tribes involved on either side.
- "(c) To supervise the arrangements for the immediate restoration of loot on either side, in the light of the result of their joint investigation, as soon as requisite sanction has been received."

5. "As regards (b), the Transjordan Government are prepared immediately to arrange for the Transjordan sheikhs concerned to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to the meeting place, and His Majesty's Government rely on Ibn Saud to make corresponding arrangements in regard to representative leading sheikhs from the Hejaz-Nejd."

6. "It has always been the intention of His Majesty's Government that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should also discuss measures for regular co-operation on the frontier in future in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Hadda Agreement."

7. "His Majesty's Government note that King proposes mutual undertaking that no raids should take place during proposed meeting (last paragraph of section 1 of your telegram No. 53). They consider that immediate effect should be given to this proposal by means of simultaneous public announcement by both sides categorically forbidding and disavowing all forms of raiding, and intimating that offenders will receive exemplary punishment. As soon as His Majesty's Government are informed that Ibn Saud is issuing this announcement, they will arrange for simultaneous issue of similar announcement in Transjordan."

8. "His Majesty's Government request to be informed in the immediate future of the place and date which the Hejazi Government propose for the meeting, and they will be glad to learn that the necessary instructions covering all the above points have been issued to Ibn Zeid (see section 8 and last paragraph of your telegram No. 53) in order that they may issue corresponding instructions to Captain Glubb." (End of R.)

(Addressed to Jeddah, Nos. 44 and 45. Repeated to Transjordan.)

[E 1214/387/25]

No. 57.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

India Office, March 10, 1931.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India on the subject of situation on the frontier between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd.

I am, &c.
S. F. STEWART.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Government of India to Secretary of State for India.

(No. 707 S.)

(Telegraphic.)

Delhi, March 9, 1931.

YOUR telegram of the 5th instant, No. 806.

Present temper of Indian Moslems is uneasy and uncertain, their chief perturbation being over alleged failure of their own leaders and of Government to defend their interests against what is widely represented as attempt of Congress to establish virtual Hindu rule in India under new Constitution. Moslem representatives returned from Round Table Conference have also been freely voicing their fear that His Majesty's Government will not give them the protection they consider necessary in the event of final failure of Hindu-Moslem negotiations. Concurrent with apprehensions regarding the future, there is strong feeling of resentment over the action taken by North-West Frontier Province Administration to suppress recent disorders in Peshawar district, which is contrasted unfavourably with what is represented as greater lenience shown to agitation in Hindu India. Real, though more remote, concern is also felt at the latest statement of His Majesty's Government's Palestine policy, which is represented as a surrender of the Moslems to Jewish interests.

Emergence of major friction with Ibn Saud is likely, at this time, to still further excite Moslem opinion, and effect in the present delicate political situation in India might be serious. We strongly trust, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will succeed in their efforts to secure friendly settlement without recourse to overt action, particularly in the form of active coercive measures referred to in your telegram.

[E 1233/387/25]

No. 58.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 14, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 45.

I addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th March further memorandum with note requesting earliest possible reply. Memorandum began with formal introduction, and, except for verbal alterations, reproduced your telegram under reference in paragraphs numbered 2 to 8 as in that telegram.

Following is full summary of Hejaz Government's counter-memorandum enclosed in note of 12th March, which, like mine, requests earliest possible reply:—

"The King has carefully considered further memorandum of 10th March.

"2. The Hejaz Government note acceptance by His Majesty's Government of principles suggested in paragraph 4 of their memorandum of 3rd March. They cannot agree to suggestion that Ibn Zeid should be given full powers to settle all questions of raids definitely in view of distance which separates him from Central Government and fact that latter have no means of rapid communication with frontier area such as to enable Ibn Zeid to receive all necessary information in good time. For this and other internal reasons

Hejaz Government would prefer that His Majesty's Government should accept all points indicated in paragraph 4 of memorandum of 3rd March. They agree that both Governments should, within shortest possible time, and without undue delay, make their observations and accept or criticise decisions arrived at by the two representatives after they have been received.

"3. The Hejaz Government agree that Ibn Zeid and Glubb should examine raids from date on which MacDonnell started work up to present time by oral exchange of information. They see no practical advantage in their forming themselves into a tribunal entitled to investigate and interrogate. They see much ground for apprehension in this, and more particularly if it is intended to summon sheikhs in order to obtain information from them during the meeting. Experience has shown that a meeting in one place of sheikhs when raids and attacks have produced spirit of hostility leads to quarrels, and such disputes in isolated frontier places may cause dangerous incidents. The Hejaz Government consider practical course to be the following:—

- "(a) Each representative to take with him all necessary information regarding previous raids.
- "(b) Claims in respect of those raids to be examined during meeting; decisions to be taken in cases where representatives are satisfied of the truth thereof; these decisions to be submitted to their Governments by quickest means; and restitution to be effected immediately on sanction being given.
- "(c) As regards claims about which representatives are at variance, each shall forward to his Government summary of conversations and shall indicate proof tendered, so that the Governments may communicate with each other with a view to agreeing on best manner of settlement.
- "(d) Each representative to be entitled to request prolongation of meeting in order to obtain further information which he may find necessary in the course of discussion.
- "(e) Representative of each Government will thus act as agent for respective tribes, and it will be for him to defend their rights. In this way many difficulties and dangers can be avoided which would be likely to arise in the neighbourhood of the frontier, if tribal chiefs should meet in remote places.

"4. The Hejaz Government see no objection to Ibn Zeid and Glubb exchanging information about raids, and they will instruct Ibn Zeid in accordance with provisions of Hadda Agreement.

"5. The Hejaz Government are prepared to act in accordance with proposal made by the King in his conversation with Sir A. Ryan as regards definite prevention of raids on both sides during meeting of representatives to discuss raids, and they are prepared definitely to prevent raids by their subjects when meeting is announced.

"6. The Hejaz Government, though strongly desirous that meeting should take place as soon as possible, regret inability to fix exact date because of recent damage to wireless at Jau. Instrument which had been damaged was despatched some days ago by car from Jedda. At the earliest moment at which communication can be restored His Majesty's Government will be informed of time at which meeting will be possible. Hejaz Government cannot fix place either before consulting Ibn Zeid. If His Majesty's Government like to suggest place, Hejaz Government will enquire of Governorate of Jau whether it will be convenient or whether Governorate has alternative suggestion to make.

"7. The Hejaz Government note amongst points left unanswered in their memorandum omission to reply to paragraph 9 thereof."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 82.)

[E 1284/1098/25]

No. 59.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 14.)

(Nos. 62 and 63.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 14, 1931.

(R.) YOUR despatch No. 68.

In note dated 11th March Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that, as Sadiya and Jizan are not affected by agreement between Hejaz Government and Eastern Telegraph Company, I shall communicate with Aden Government with a view to agreement for establishment of wireless telegraphic communication between Aden and Jizan for commercial purposes connected with Idriisi Province; and with authorities in Kamaran with a view to creation of postal service between that island and Jizan in order to economise facilities. (End of R.)

This request assumes acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in new status of Asir. There may also be some idea of diminishing dependence of Hejaz for external telegraph communication on Eastern Telegraph Company, whose claim I have been pushing very strongly. I am not acknowledging note pending your instructions.

May this and immediately preceding telegram be repeated from London to Aden, which does not hold "R" code?

[E 1337/387/25]

No. 60.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for the Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 17.)

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, March 16, 1931.

JEDDA telegram to Foreign Office No. 61 repeated to you, frontier raids. Please telegraph (1) whether you consider attendance of sheikhs essential in order to arrive at truth and obtain satisfactory and speedy settlement of claims; (2) whether there is, in your opinion, substance in Ibn Saud's objections to their attendance; (3) if answer to (1) is in affirmative, any suggestions you can make as to method of preventing quarrels and dangerous incidents arising from meeting of sheikhs of two sides such as Ibn Saud anticipates. Also telegraph your observations on Hejazi Government's request for return of criminals who may flee from punishment into Transjordan, and any suggestions as to place and date of meeting. I am aware of objections to certain of proposals made in paragraph 3, but shall be glad of comments on any other points which you may wish to make.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 48.)

[E 1473/82/25]

No. 61.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 23, 1931.

I HAVE received note from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 21st March complaining of fresh raid from Transjordan into Hejaz-Nejd early in March involving capture of 100 camels in Tei[?ma] district. Note refers also to another raid in February, but report is meagre and is not vouched for.

Action said to have been taken by Glubb in latter case is criticised, but in moderate language.

Details are being sent to Jerusalem in separate telegram with request that they should be forwarded to London by bag.

[E 1555/387/25]

No. 62.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 27.)

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

March 25, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 40.

I do not consider that attendance of sheikhs is essential for the settlement of the majority of the claims, but in cases where Glubb and Hejaz representatives cannot agree as to facts, they must, in my opinion, be authorised to summon sheikhs to give evidence on oath of such cases. Reference to Governments concerned as suggested by the Hejaz Government would be ineffective.

2. To minimise danger of incidents when sheikhs are summoned for this purpose, I suggest that both Governments should take guarantees from sheikhs concerned binding them over to good behaviour on pain of heavy punishment, as was done after Hamid-bin-Jazi incident (see my telegram No. 112 of 25th October, 1930).

3. As regards surrender of criminals in my telegram No. 5, I have suggested form of undertaking to be given by Transjordan Government in respect of five Beni Atiya chiefs concerned in raids dealt with by MacDonnell. I consider it more satisfactory that surrender should be based on a formal extradition agreement complementary to Hadda Agreement to be concluded between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud.

4. It is desirable that 1st August should be clearly specified as the date from which claims would be considered by representatives.

5. Three or four raids have recently been carried out by Transjordan tribes, and I strongly recommend that, in view of deterioration of frontier situation, a meeting should take place between Glubb and Ibn Zeid as early as possible.

6. As details of procedure are still under discussion, I consider first meeting should be confined to arranging means for joint policing of frontier and exchange of information to prevent further deterioration.

7. I suggest first meeting should take place on 1st April at Al Meisiri, in Wadi Sirhan, or at any other place near frontier which Hejaz Government may select. Representatives should bring not more than twenty men each, and each party should make their own arrangements for tentage and supplies, neither being formal host or guest of other.

[J 1569/2/25]

No. 63.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 27, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Shortness of Nuri Pasha's stay here will make it difficult to refer to you on points arising during visit. I take it that you would prefer me to remain [sic: ? refrain] as far as possible from intervening. My ability to do so usefully may in any case be affected by recent deterioration of relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud.

I should nevertheless like to have your guidance as to whether, in the case of acute difference, I should attempt mediation either personally or on your behalf. If so I suggest following lines for consideration:—

1. Desert posts have not been mentioned in recent correspondence. I presume that His Majesty's Government wish for their own reasons to maintain their previous attitude. If question arises and again proves insoluble arrangements made at "Lupin" conference might be renewed with provision that the six months will run from now.

2. *Bon-Voisinage*.—If Ibn Saud hesitates he should be held to the promise given not only to Iraq but to His Majesty's Government to sign agreement provided extradition negotiations are initiated, but without reference to their course. I assume that signature of agreement as initialled will be satisfactory

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unless parties mutually agree to amendments like those suggested by High Commission on 25th March, 1930.

3. *Extradition*.—I would propose to use good offices in favour of any compromise regarding political offenders resembling that contemplated in 1928.

4. Claims should no longer present difficulties unless Nuri objects to the King's proposal to postpone actual payment until other outstanding questions have been settled.

5. *Trade Facilities, Customs and Pilgrim Traffic*.—I might suggest postponement if discussion threatens to create obstacle to agreement on other points.

6. *Ibn Mashhur*.—To be treated as separate question. I might endeavour to promote friendly arrangement as regards handing over of relatives and properties and acceptance of the situation [? group omitted] facts in regard to the man himself and arms alleged to have been surrendered by him.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 87.)

[E 1555/387/25]

No. 64.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 27, 1931.

REFERENCE to telegram No. 26 of 25th March from Transjordan to Colonial Office, repeated to you, No. 23: Transjordan-Nejd frontier crisis.

His Majesty's Government agree that preliminary meeting should be held as soon as possible, as suggested in paragraph 5. Please inform Hejazi Government of proposals in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Transjordan telegram under reference and try to obtain a favourable reply so that necessary arrangements can be made in time.

Urgent consideration is being given to views of High Commissioner impressed in paragraphs 1 to 4 of his telegram, and further instructions will be sent to you.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 42.)

[E 1600/1600/25]

No. 65.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 80.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 13 of the 11th January, 1931, I mentioned that the festivities at Wadi Fatma on the 9th January in honour of Ibn Saud's accession included a Nejd war dance. I did not at the time attach any particular importance to this. It now comes into the same setting as certain more recent manifestations which throw a curious sidelight on the internal situation in this country.

2. The King returned to Mecca for Ramadhan and spent the ensuing festival there. Mecca and Jedda were presently all agog on hearing that the King and princes of the Royal house had danced in public during the feast. Shortly after, as you know, Ibn Saud came to Jedda. He arrived on the 25th February, the principal object of his visit being to gratify the cherished ambition of Mr. Charles R. Crane, a former American Minister and sympathiser with Syrian revolutionaries, to make his acquaintance. This had been engineered partly by Mr. Antonius and perhaps to some extent by Mr. Philby. It was hoped by some that Mr. Crane might produce a substantial gift or loan. Anyhow, the King was all out to do honour to his guest.

3. Various functions were arranged for the King's stay in Jedda. The Diplomatic Corps were invited to several, as was Mr. Crane. We all dined at the municipality on the King's invitation. We all drank tea with Mr. Philby, whose house His Majesty honoured. But the close of the proceedings was a review on the 27th February held mainly, it would appear, to provide local colour for Mr. Crane's edification. There was a small march past of the infantry of the "regular army." It was followed by a much larger parade of men-at-arms

from Nejd who had come back with the King. This was carried out with some show of military order, but it was followed by a dance similar to that given at Wadi Fatma, though on a much larger scale. Many of the Royal princes took part in it. The leader was the King's son, the Emir Feisal, so that the Diplomatic Body enjoyed the unusual spectacle of seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs execute a public dance in front of them. He was most graceful, and he twirls a sword very prettily. He wore an agreeable smile, though it became a little set as the afternoon wore on—it is said that he collapsed at the end of the similar dance in Mecca. Altogether he showed to infinitely greater advantage than when he is conducting the foreign business of his country.

4. All the participants in the dance were Nejdīs. The infantrymen of the regular army, most of whom came from that country, intimated a wish to join in after they had gone through their new-fangled European tricks. The King graciously accorded permission. Next day it was announced that the people of Jedda had expressed a desire to show what *they* could do in the way of a display. The King left Mr. Philby's party on the 28th February somewhat early because he had promised to return to the palace for this Jeddawi performance. I understand that it was on the same lines as the Nejdī display, although less formal. After that the habit of making processions to the palace with drums, singing and dancing appeared to grow on the people of Jedda and there were two or three demonstrations of the kind during the remainder of the King's stay, including one on the 3rd March, when the lead was said to have been taken by the Hadramis, and several gay parties running to many hundred people in all surged past my house on their way back from the palace.

5. On the 2nd March Mr. Philby gave me his version of the dancing at Mecca. It began more or less by accident, he said. On the first day of the festival a crowd of Meccans made a popular demonstration before the palace there. It was doubtful how the King would take it—a question whether he would say, as it were: "Off with their heads!" or "On with the dance!" The King was in a good humour and received the demonstration graciously. Then his Nejdīs said: "Let us have our national dancing too," and the King assented. When he saw it he was so carried away that he himself joined in. It was a brave sight, said Mr. Philby, to see how the others clustered round until the King was the centre of a thousand men or so, each with his sword in the air. Sword-play, the firing of guns and pistols and the beating of drums are a feature of all these dances.

6. The Mecca "Umm-al-Qura" of the 27th February records the performance at Mecca in an article headed: "The Speech of the Sword." It makes no mention of anything having happened on the first day of the festival, but says that on the second the King held a review of his Bedouin troops, in which the princes joined; and that the King threw off his cloak, drew his sword and played with it too, "remembering the old days of his fights." The writer describes this sword-play as a voiceless speech, because every glance and gesture of the King meant many things.

7. The King himself mentioned in my hearing at one of the functions in Jedda that the Nejdī war-dance was a revival, the custom having been in abeyance for over fifteen years. Mr. Philby's version of the Mecca demonstrations ignores the fact that there had been an organised dance at Wadi Fatma on the 9th January, but he too says that these things are the revival of an old practice, and he puts the period of discontinuance at about twenty years. This brings me to my reason for describing at such length in an official despatch what so far reads merely like a record of the picturesque.

8. Ibn Saud started the organisation of the Akhwan colonies round about 1912. They were clearly designed to provide easily mobilisable fighting forces, fanned by zeal by the present Wahhabi doctrine. The rebels of 1929 turned a portion of this instrument against the King. It is difficult to judge how far the revolt permanently impaired the value of the Akhwan as a military machine, but one of the complaints of the rebels was that the King had ceased to be a good Wahhabi. This is true to the extent that, as he has risen, he has had to make many compromises with modern progress and some with less rigid forms of Islam. One sees in his toleration and encouragement of the recent manifestations an indication of his desire to ride on a looser rein a section of his subjects who like things repugnant to the true Wahhabi of the old school—the music of the drum, for instance. Although this new liberty has been allowed to both Nejdīs and Hejazīs,

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it is significant that the easing of the safety valve has taken place in Mecca and Jedda, places with no real appetite for Wahhabism in any form. The King would appear to be reinsuring with the less puritanical elements. His personal participation and that of the princes in the dancing have enabled him to appear as a monarch who not only likes to see his people have a bit of fun, but is democratic enough to join in it.

9. Townsmen count for little in this country, and it would be a mistake to attach a greater political significance to the matter than I have done in the preceding paragraph. The spectacle of the dancing crowd outside my house on the 3rd March conjured up the atmosphere of expansiveness characteristic of the cheerfuller phases of European revolutions which have ended in the downfall of Kings; but I should be slow to suggest that Ibn Saud's complaisance denotes, in an Arabian setting, any consciousness of a serious weakening in his position.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner at Bagdad, Cairo, the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and to the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1601/569/25]

No. 66.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1931.

IN my despatch No. 80 of to-day's date I have had occasion to mention the visit of Mr. Charles R. Crane to Jedda. As this event has attracted a good deal of attention, it may be worth while to make it the subject of a report.

2. It will be remembered that Mr. Crane visited Jedda at the end of 1926, as recorded in the Jedda report for December of that year. He did not then meet Ibn Saud, but they exchanged presents. His recent visit would appear to have been arranged by Mr. Antonius, who was formerly employed in the Palestine Administration, and who assisted Sir G. Clayton here at various times from 1925 to 1928. I first heard of it from Mr. Philby, shortly before I received a telegram from Sir John Chancellor on the subject.

3. Mr. Crane appears to have come specially from America to accomplish his personal visit to Ibn Saud. He arrived here on the 25th February and left on the 3rd March. He was accompanied by Mr. Antonius. He stayed, by his own request, at the house of a local notable who had entertained him in 1926. He saw a great deal of the King in one way or another, both by special arrangement and at functions.

4. In 1926-27 Mr. Crane was *mal vu* in French and British official circles because of his association with Syrian revolutionaries. I have no full information on the subject, but my French colleague here tells me that, in his opinion, the French authorities took a rather exaggerated view. He seems to regard Mr. Crane as an amiable busybody, who makes oriental peoples his hobby and who has money to burn, although he does not burn it as freely as he is sometimes expected to do. My own observation tends to confirm this. Mr. Crane called on me, and I entertained him a little during his stay without going beyond the courtesy which it is natural to show in this place to any distinguished visitor. He rode his hobby all the time, caracoling from Turkey to the Far East, and he seemed to be merely an interested, though sympathetic, observer of experiments in uplift in the various countries. He dwelt greatly on the many things he had seen disappear "into history."

5. Mr. Crane is interested in the Yemen, and is said to be building a road there from benevolent motives. His visit to Jedda was heralded by rumours that he was going to give or lend Ibn Saud a handsome sum of money. I have not yet heard what passed between them, except that, when the King drank tea at Mr. Philby's on the 28th February, the conversation turned on artesian wells, and Mr. Crane offered to arrange for his engineer in the Yemen to call in at Jedda on his next voyage up the Red Sea to size up the possibilities of boring hereabouts. The King, who toys a good deal with the idea of finding new water in his

Dominion, accepted the offer. The conversation, in which it was made and accepted and at which I was present, appeared to be quite accidental.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Egypt, the High Commissioner for Transjordan and the political resident and Commander-in-chief at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1605/387/25]

No. 67.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 7, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 53 of the 4th March, I have the honour to forward herewith a full record of my discussion with Ibn Saud on the 2nd March regarding the Transjordan frontier question and translations of the notes⁽¹⁾ addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs next day in reply to my communications of the 28th February.

2. Before receiving your final instructions, I had given Sheikh Yusuf Yasin a list of various matters about which I wished to speak to the King. They included the Transjordan frontier question and the "Biscoe incident," which I dealt with on the 2nd March. There were four other matters of considerable importance, which I did not raise for the reason given in the enclosed record.

3. On the evening of the 3rd March, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin telephoned that the King would be glad to receive me again to discuss further business before he returned to Mecca. As I was anxious to get on with the miscellaneous questions, and especially to elucidate the position as regards the Hejaz Air Force, I treated this invitation as a command and spent nearly three hours with the King on the 4th March. No allusion was made on either side to the frontier question. When we left the audience room, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin observed that we were getting on with the work. Lest he should think that all was well in a sunny world, I remarked that one grave question over-shadowed everything else. He passed this off, and there has been no mention of the frontier question in any subsequent conversation, although we met on the 5th and 6th March to discuss other things.

4. The King and the sheikh would appear to have kept the matter within the smallest possible circle. I have had no indication that anyone outside the Palace and the Legation knows of the crisis. I doubt whether even Mr. Philby, in spite of his constant frequentation of the King and his *Eminence grise* reputation, has been told anything important. If he has, he has had the sense to keep it to himself.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Record of Sir A. Ryan's Audience with Ibn Saud on March 2, 1931.

I WENT to the palace at 9.30 A.M. accompanied by Mr. Wikeley and Ismail Effendi, who interpreted. The King was attended by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who was present throughout, except for short exits to get papers. I was with the King until about 11.45, and nearly the whole of the time was devoted to the Transjordan frontier question.

2. I had given Sheikh Yusuf some days before a list of seven matters which I wished to lay before the King in person. On receipt of my final instructions on the Transjordan question, I decided not to detract from its importance by discussing other business. I made an exception in favour of the communication

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

I had to make about the Biscoe incident. After compliments, I told the King that I would confine myself to two subjects, and I disposed of the Biscoe affair in the manner recorded in a separate despatch to the Foreign Office. I then said I must turn to a much more difficult matter.

3. I told the King that I had addressed two communications to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 28th February. I was instructed to see His Majesty personally in connexion with both. I reminded him of my personal efforts from the date of my audience with him on the 11th June last up to that of my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 3rd February to get the Transjordan situation placed on a satisfactory basis. I had made those efforts with the knowledge of His Majesty's Government and under instructions. They had failed. His Majesty's Government had now stated their position in their own language. The matter was no longer in my hands, but I was instructed to follow up the two communications in which I had reproduced the views of His Majesty's Government by seeing the King personally.

4. The first purpose of this, I explained, was to confirm what His Majesty's Government had said about Captain Glubb. I presumed that His Majesty had seen my note, and that I need not recapitulate its contents. I emphasised, however, its importance. Most serious accusations had been made by the Hejazi Government against Captain Glubb. He had been charged with circulating false rumours and converting camels belonging to Nejd to his own use, which might mean his own use or use in connexion with his work. Those accusations did not impair the confidence of His Majesty's Government in Captain Glubb. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the accusations reflected on themselves, as they had specially chosen Captain Glubb for his task.

5. My second purpose was even more important. His Majesty's Government had stated their position explicitly in the memorandum enclosed in my second note. The matter was therefore out of my hands, as I had said, but I had been instructed to supplement the memorandum and had two observations to add. (I corrected this later by saying that there was a third.) They were these:—

- (1) I was to impress on the King the extreme gravity of the situation. To use the language of my instructions, I was to do this with all the force of which I was capable.
- (2) I was to say that His Majesty's Government wished me to obtain a definite answer before the King left Jedda, and at latest before the evening of the 4th March, *i.e.*, within four days of delivering the memorandum.
- (3) I had to add, even at the risk of offending the King's person, that it was universally believed on the frontier that the large-scale raids from Nejd into Transjordan were carried out under his authority.

6. As regards (3), I suggested, with an explanation that what I was about to say was a personal elucidation not covered by my instructions, certain points which gave colour to the belief entertained on the frontier. There had been no reply to the British memorandum of last October, but in a later note the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that raiding from Nejd could not be condemned until raiding from Transjordan had entirely ceased. In making my second point, I was hampered by my inability to state that His Majesty's Government secretly knew that Ibn Saud had himself instigated the October raids. It was that within a few days of the delivery of the October memorandum, there had been two great raids into Transjordan, of the imminence of which the authorities at Jaufr had had previous knowledge, as was shown by a telegram from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Legation sent on the day on which the raids actually took place. This warning was too late because of the circuitous route by which it was sent, Jaufr-Mecca-Jedda-Jerusalem-Amman, but it showed that the authorities at Jaufr, knowing of the departure of the raiders, could the more easily have rounded them up on their return. The 800 camels taken in these raids were, until recently at any rate, known to be kept close to the frontier. Finally, when I had on the 17th February written to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin about alleged preparations for further raiding, he had written on the day of receiving my letter to say that the report was false. How could so swift a denial, without investigation, be given without suggesting that, if the report were true, the authorities in Mecca would have knowledge of the preparations?

7. I said I had nothing to add except to repeat that the situation was one of extreme gravity. The King listened patiently and without interruption to the whole of my statement. His reply was not equally consecutive and necessitated discussion on points as they arose. The following account of what passed is based largely on notes taken by Mr. Wikeley, and gives the gist of the conversation; but it was so often led aside from its main source and at times so involved that there may be errors in the arrangement of the various passages.

8. The King said that it was not for him to speak about Captain Glubb. Thinking that he was going to pass my first note off in this way, I interpolated that His Majesty's Ministers had said a great deal. He said he had not finished what he was about to say. Captain Glubb had started the matter by allegations that the Nejd authorities were encouraging raids and distributing money. These allegations were false. The King rather qualified the express attribution of them to Captain Glubb by saying that they were false, whether it was Captain Glubb or anyone else who was responsible for them, and he tried to make out that there was no definite attack on Captain Glubb personally. I pointed out that categorical accusations had been made in two written communications and by Yusuf Yasin in official conversations with me.

9. The King denied that En-Neshmi any longer held any official employment in his service. He insisted that there were no preparations for raiding, and that the new Governor of Jaufr had been ordered to do all in his power to stop it. He had dismissed En-Neshmi some time ago because of the views held regarding him in Transjordan and because he could not work in with the authorities there. As a matter of fact, Neshmi was probably more capable than the new Governor whom he had sent when he appointed Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid to his present post.

10. His Majesty said that he looked to His Majesty's Government to deal equitably with both sides. If crimes were committed they should be punished irrespective of side. His Majesty's Government were much stronger than he was. If they sought to ruin him or wished to humiliate him, it was not the treatment he expected of old friends. Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd should receive equal treatment. He held his subjects as completely as the ring on his finger. If offenders in Transjordan were punished he was ready to mete out twice the punishment to those on his own side.

11. The King said that the suggestion that raids were carried out under his authority reflected on him personally. It was, he intimated, false. He was entitled as a King to ask for an explanation of it, and, if it could not be substantiated, to demand satisfaction. I said that I had not made an accusation but had told him what was believed on the frontier. I stressed the importance of such a belief being entertained. He said something to the effect that this was not an adequate excuse. I replied that I was making no excuse and repeated that I had made no accusation, but had stated a fact as to what was thought on the frontier. In order to emphasise the point without committing myself too far, I attempted again to develop the considerations stated in paragraph 6 above. When I again mentioned Fuad Bey's note stating that raids from Nejd could not be condemned unless raids from Transjordan ceased, His Majesty asked whether that view was right or wrong. He evidently expected me to admit its justice. I said "Wrong!" During this portion of the conversation the King drew some sort of a parallel between the accusations against himself and those against Captain Glubb. I said that the accusations against Captain Glubb were made by His Majesty's Ministers. He said that he regarded anything I said as even more official than what his own Ministers said. I replied that, in anything I did say, I certainly spoke as the representative of my Government, but pointed out again that what I had said was not that the King had encouraged raiding, but that he was generally believed on the frontier to have done so. (I was careful throughout this passage of arms neither to express disbelief in the King's complicity nor to assert His Majesty's Government's belief in it.)

12. The King said that he could impose his authority on his tribes, and referred at one moment to the action he had taken against Feisal-ed-Dawish and others. He could not, however, see his subjects killed and plundered. I worked back to the failure of his Government to answer the British memorandum of October. He said that an answer had been sent raising one point on which a reply had been awaited. I told him that I remembered the note to which he referred and asked him whether he, as the head of a great Government, meant to say

seriously that it was in any sense a reply to a considered statement of what His Majesty's Government had done and what they wanted done. He admitted that it could not be so regarded. I said that in any case I had answered Fuad Bey's interim reply to the October memorandum in my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 3rd February. At this Yusuf Yasin showed visible perturbation and tried to make out that we had been talking about something different. I scouted this and reminded him of the heads of the conversation, as recorded in my despatch No. 45 of the 4th February, 1931.

13. His Majesty remarked that the questions at issue were too long to be threshed out in a private audience and that he was not conversant with all their details. If His Majesty's Government wished for an answer to the memorandum of the 28th February, he would instruct his Government to prepare one, but he had three suggestions to make. I at once said that, while I would communicate any suggestions, His Majesty's Government certainly required an answer to their memorandum. I had said that I had instructions to obtain one by the 4th March. The King intimated, with a gesture more than by words, that there need be no delay and proceeded to make his three suggestions as follows:—

- (1) Steps should be taken to ascertain which side had started the raiding.
- (2) Each side should promise that there would be no raiding during the proposed meeting, and should take stringent measures to restrain their tribes while it lasted, whatever the time might be—he spoke of a fortnight or a month.
- (3) At some stage in the meeting the loot taken by each side should be mutually restored.

14. I said that I did not understand the first suggestion and that the other two seemed to come within the scope of the reply to His Majesty's Government's memorandum. Raiding had gone on for years. The discussion became involved, as Yusuf Yasin presently joined in a duet with the King. It emerged, however, (a) that they were speaking only of the series of raids since the 1st August; (b) that the object of the King's first suggestion was not that the side which had initiated the raids after the 1st August should be held responsible for everything that followed and should alone be called on to restore loot, but that it should be saddled with the guilt of treachery; and (c) that this should be without prejudice to the mutual restitution of loot as contemplated in the King's third suggestion.

15. This led up to the conclusion of the discussion, in the course of which I urged two points and the King added three of his own. He said that his Government would reply to the memorandum of the 28th February, if he and Transjordan were treated equally. I intimated that the memorandum called for a reply by the 4th March, and that it should be an explicit reply. His Majesty's Government had stated their desiderata under four distinct headings and had made one offer, namely, an offer of assistance in the Wadi Sirhan. The King intimated quite pleasantly that he did not think it would be necessary to take advantage of the latter offer. I again said I would put forward any suggestions he made, but I should like to have them in writing, either as part of the reply to the memorandum or in the form of a separate paper, just as His Majesty's Government had made Captain Glubb the subject of a separate paper. The essential thing was that His Majesty's Government desired to have explicit replies to what they had said under the four heads. I had indicated the extreme gravity of the situation. It would be graver still, and graver than I could describe, if the reply were not explicit. My further point was that I could see no reason for making the return of the 800 camels raided from the Howaitat dependent on anything else. They had been taken in raids of which the Hejaz Government had previous knowledge. They were or had recently been close to the frontier.

16. The King attempted to deny that the Hejaz Government had had foreknowledge of the October raids. I cited the warning telegram to His Majesty's Legation as proof. This drove the King on to another line of defence which appeared to be that there had been some warning from Amman of an impending Transjordan raid and that the same principle should apply, namely, that Transjordan, having known of the raid or raids, should have been able to round up the raiders and return the loot. As neither of us knew the exact facts, this led to nothing definite, but I clung to my point that the loss of 800 camels taken in October had reduced the Howaitat to starvation, and that they should be

restored, else the Howaitat could not be restrained. I asked how it was that, if there was any good answer about the October raids, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had ignored the notes of the Legation regarding them; His Majesty had the reputation of giving personal attention to the petitions of the meanest of his subjects. His Government appeared to think that they could leave unanswered important communications from His Majesty's Government like the October memorandum and the protests regarding the October raids.

17. The King's final points were as follows:—

- (1) He tried to preserve the best relations with His Majesty's Government and with British officials.
- (2) He had full authority over his subjects and was ready to inflict merited punishment.
- (3) He would never accept that his subjects should be treated inequitably.

18. I had already once or twice attempted to bring the discussion to an end. On hearing his final points, I thanked the King for what he had said about his desire for good relations and asked permission not to tire him any longer. I withdrew with the feeling that he was impressed by the magnitude of His Majesty's Government's demonstration, but not fully conscious of its categorical nature. He contained himself admirably throughout the audience and never forgot his habitual courtesy, although at moments he spoke with emphasis and an appearance of strong feeling. On my side, I said all I could to impress on him the importance of replying definitely to His Majesty's Government's memorandum; but I was somewhat cramped in my style by not knowing what His Majesty's Government intended to do, if the reply were not satisfactory on all points.

Jedda, March 2, 1931.

[E 1637/387/25]

No. 68.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 30, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 50.

I sent urgent note on 28th March as instructed. Following is the gist of Hejaz Government's reply dated 29th March:—

"We agree in principle to meeting near the frontier, but, as stated already, see no practical advantage in such meeting unless there is agreement between the two Governments upon matters to be discussed, because we cannot on our side give Ibn Zeid instructions regarding matters in dispute falling within his competency before we receive final reply of British Government on our previous suggestions. Ibn Zeid cannot at present, for reasons already given, discuss with Glubb any of the questions forming the subject of our last note. If object of meeting is that the two should reach an understanding on measures to be taken against evil-doers to prevent their evil actions, the matter is simple, as measures are known and necessary information can be exchanged between them by Jauf wireless even if they do not meet. In case British Government consider meeting essential, even though its object be to arrive at agreement for interchange of information only, we see no objection to meeting if they inform us that they insist on their view. We hope it will meet with their approval that parties should initiate exchange of information by means of Jauf wireless station from now. If this is approved we should be glad to know telegraphic signals used by Transjordan wireless station so that Jauf station may be notified and thus enabled to communicate."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 90.)

[E 1515/27/25]

No. 69.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 30, 1931.

YOUR despatch No. 41 of 2nd February: Ibn Mashhur.

I approve your language.

Since "Lupin" Conference His Majesty's Government have not advanced matters by intervening in this question, which concerns the two Kings alone. In these circumstances, unless you see objection, you should reply to Hejazi note on following lines:—

Question of Ibn Mashhur was discussed by two Kings at "Lupin" Conference precisely because it was special case differing from that of other surrendered rebels. Two Kings agreed as to disposal of case, and any interest since taken by His Majesty's Government has been taken by them purely as friend of both parties anxious to assist establishment of good relations between them. In present circumstances, however, His Majesty's Government can only disinterest themselves from it and leave it to direct settlement with King Feisal and Iraqi Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 130.)

[E 1516/723/25]

No. 70.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 30, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 57 of the 7th March: Facilities for flights along the Hasa coast.

I approve your proposed course of action.

Air Ministry suggest that when you broach question of landing grounds you should explain that, for complete safety, three grounds are considered necessary, but that, if marked landing ground is available on Jinnah Island for use in emergency, this would somewhat allay anxiety of His Majesty's Government pending provision of other two.

[E 1658/387/25]

No. 71.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, March 31, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I feel bound to express the opinion that combined effect of Ibn Saud's proposals up to date will deprive meeting of any practical [group undecypherable] as a means of establishing the co-operation which His Majesty's Government desire. He is unwilling to give Ibn Zeid power to take any important decisions. What he really contemplates is a duel *ad referendum* between the two backers of the respective tribes, preceded, if you insist, by preliminary meeting from which discussion of joint measures will be excluded.

Above appreciation is based on correspondence exchanged. I have refrained since 2nd March from any personal discussions in order to emphasise the fact that Hejaz Government are directly up against His Majesty's Government. The latter can alone judge whether it suits them to agree to meeting on Ibn Saud's terms, but it should be realised that it will almost certainly be nothing more than a fresh round in the game of evasion which he has played so successfully during the last months and will merely postpone necessity for taking stronger line if you intend to enforce the essence of your demands of 26th February.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 91.)

[E 1637/387/25]

No. 72.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 2, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 30th March: Transjordan frontier situation.

His Majesty's Government's proposal is that, while discussions continue between two Governments with a view to agreeing on details of procedure to be adopted by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid in examining claims arising from raids since 1st August, these two officials should meet immediately, even if only for purpose of making contact and exchanging information and views in order to promote co-operation in prevention or limitation of further raiding from both sides. Points still under discussion with Hejazi Government will therefore not arise in connexion with meeting and need not delay it. His Majesty's Government certainly insist on their view that this preliminary meeting should take place immediately.

2. High Commissioner, Transjordan, is being requested to telegraph to you suggesting new date for meeting and giving material for reply on question of use of Jauif wireless raised in Hejazi note of 29th March.

3. On receipt of his views, and unless he demurs, you should address Hejazi Government in accordance with paragraph 1 above, proposing date suggested by High Commissioner, repeating proposal that meeting should take place at Al Meisiri or other place near frontier which Hejazi Government may select, and embodying High Commissioner's reply regarding wireless.

4. You should thereafter make every effort to secure that Hejazi Government accept proposal for meeting without raising further difficulties.

Above telegram was drafted prior to receipt of your telegram No. 72 of 31st March, which, however, does not modify above instructions.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 44.)

[E 1569/2/25]

No. 73.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 3, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 68 of 27th March: Iraqi Prime Minister's visit to Jedda.

You should refrain from intervening unless requested by either side. In that case you may use your good offices in personal capacity with a view to removal of differences.

You will of course appreciate that, if intervention on your part is to be successful, it is essential that neither Nuri nor Hejazi Government should, however wrongly, form impression that your sympathies are engaged on one side or the other.

As regards individual questions mentioned in your telegram, His Majesty's Government agree generally to lines you propose to follow except in the case of (3) extradition and (6) Ibn Mashhur. Iraqi Government were only prepared to offer extradition concession in 1928 as a means of promoting a comprehensive settlement of the principal matters then in dispute between the two countries. Those conditions no longer obtain, and it is therefore advisable that you should avoid any language which might give the impression that you are supporting the Hejazi Government in holding the Iraqi Government to the concession proposed in 1928.

As regards Ibn Mashhur, please see my telegrams No. 52 of 30th March and No. 55 of 2nd April.

As regards (2), your assumption is correct.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 57, and Bagdad, No. 134.)

[E 1727/387/25]

No. 74.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, April 6, 1931.

IN note of 5th April Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of following:—

1. British aircraft have recently violated Hejaz-Nejd territory by repeatedly flying over Qariyat and Wadi Sirhan and between Qariyat and Jauf.
2. Transjordan caravans circulating near frontier have crossed it several times and moved about in Hejaz-Nejd territory, to which Hejaz-Nejd Government cannot consent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs protests, and requests punishment of those responsible. He asks pressingly that there may be no recurrence of such incidents, which increase difficulties on frontier and foreshadow danger extent of which his Government cannot know.

Note expresses belief that activities complained of are directed towards impairing good relations at the time when Hejaz Government, in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, are earnestly striving to overcome frontier difficulties, and confidence that His Majesty's Government will rigorously prevent repetition of such dangerous accidents.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 94.)

[E 1780/387/25]

No. 75.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 7, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Reports have been floating about recently to the effect that Ibn Saud has been strengthening forces in north. I hear also of camel corps being organised at Medina and the Government workshops at Mecca being engaged in conversion of ordinary motor cars into extemporised armoured cars.

I cannot vouch for the last two items, and reports of unusual movements of troops are [? omitted: too] common in this country to deserve much attention. Language of last notes read in conjunction with other recent communications suggests, however, the bare possibility that the King may be trying to work up justification for some kind of forward action. I think such action unlikely, but possibility should be borne in mind, as he may feel freer after the conclusion of Iraq negotiations, and recent indications point to easier situation between him and Imam Yahya. If there is any foundation for reports, measures taken may be equally due to apprehension as to intention of His Majesty's Government. I am reporting by letter conversation with Yasin on 1st April when he called for the sole purpose of expressing Ibn Saud's perturbation over recent attitude of His Majesty's Government as regards Transjordan and the severity of my own language about Eastern Telegraph Company's claim. I deprecated the idea that there was any fundamental change in friendly policy hitherto, but emphasised the capital importance of the frontier question.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 95.)

[E 584/584/25]

No. 76.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 137.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 8, 1931.

YOU recorded in your despatch No. 186 of the 23rd July, 1930, the substance of conversations with the Hejazi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the possibility of the Hejaz-Nejd entering the League of Nations, and this question has since been examined in all its aspects, as a result of your discussions

with members of my department during your visit to London in October of last year.

2. I recognise that from considerations of local expediency there are certain important arguments which might be adduced in favour of the Hejaz-Nejd becoming a member of the League. It could be pointed out that membership of the League might conceivably lead the Hejazi Government to adopt a policy of co-operation with other countries in regard to various matters of international concern; and that the participation of the Hejaz and Nejd in the normal activities of the League would be of special value in connexion with such matters as the development of international communications (more particularly by air) and of international health control, although it may be doubted whether British interests would be best served by laying stress on the international aspect of the Arabian air route and of the sanitary control of the Mecca Pilgrimage. An argument of greater weight is perhaps to be found in the possible effect of the admission of Ibn Saud's territories to the League on the relations between the Hejaz-Nejd and Iraq. Since Iraq appears likely to become a member of the League in 1932, it would no doubt be to the good that the Hejaz-Nejd should thenceforward be on a similar international footing, and the fact that both countries had undertaken the common obligations incumbent upon members of the League might conceivably facilitate the settlement of possible future disputes between them.

3. From the point of view of the League of Nations itself, on the other hand, it is not clear that that body would necessarily be strengthened by the admission to membership of a country where conditions are so primitive as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for it to participate at present in general measures for furthering the cause of civilisation. The activities of the League in such fields as the suppression of slavery are already somewhat weakened by the presence in the League of certain countries in which slavery exists, such as Abyssinia, whose influence is occasionally exercised against progressive measures. For this reason, an application for membership of the League by the Hejaz-Nejd might not be welcomed by all members of the League.

4. The position in regard to slavery in the Hejaz and Nejd might, in fact, give rise to serious difficulty if an application on the part of Ibn Saud to be admitted to membership were to come before the League. The existence of domestic slavery in the Hejaz-Nejd, the apparent absence of any intention on the part of the Government to suppress it, and the difficulties King Ibn Saud is understood to be raising to the inclusion of anti-slavery provisions in the treaties under negotiation with Italy and France might perhaps be regarded as evidence that the Hejaz-Nejd is not at present in a position to undertake the obligations devolving from article 23 of the Covenant, even though similar difficulties may have been surmounted or ignored in certain other cases. If His Majesty's Government were too active to encourage King Ibn Saud to seek admission to the League, they might thus find themselves in an invidious position, if such difficulties were raised at Geneva, and the King might hold them responsible for any rebuff which he might eventually encounter as a consequence of compliance with their advice.

5. Further, the League of Nations, in considering an application for membership, requires to be satisfied that the applicant State possesses established frontiers. In view of the fact that Asir is now considered by King Ibn Saud as a part of his dominions, difficulty might arise from the undefined nature of the frontier between Asir and the Yemen. It is possible, too, that the question of the frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan, which is only provisionally disposed of by the exchange of notes on this subject attached to the Treaty of Jedda, might arise in this connexion. There would be some inconvenience in the discussion of either of these questions at Geneva at the present time.

6. I now turn to the legal aspect of the question, on which I understand that the Hejazi Government have invited the views of His Majesty's Government. The main point to be considered in this connexion is the fact that the Hejaz is already included in the annex of the Covenant of the League of Nations as one of the "original members of the League of Nations signatories of the Treaty of Peace" and therefore comes within the words of article 1 of the Covenant:—

"The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this Covenant."

7. It is clear, however, that the mere inclusion of the name of a State in the annex does not, by itself, make that State a member of the League, because there must be, on the part of the State, some act undertaking the obligations of the Covenant, and, in the case of those States enumerated in the first part of the annex, this act is the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which contains the Covenant. The question is therefore, in the first place, whether the Hejaz could now, by ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, *ipso facto* become a member of the League. The answer depends upon the effect of the events which have taken place since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles by plenipotentiaries of ex-King Hussein, and the question appears really to turn on the point whether the Hejaz still exists to-day as the same international unit which it was in 1919. It is clear that the mere fact that the former reigning dynasty has been deposed and replaced by another does not, in itself, affect the continuance of the Hejaz as the same international unit, any more than in other cases a revolutionary change of régime in a State involves the extinction of the former State and the creation of a new one. In the present case, however, something more has occurred. The present ruler of the Hejaz is also ruler of Nejd, and was ruler of Nejd before he became ruler of the Hejaz, and the question of the precise character of the union of the two States under his rule is therefore of decisive importance.

8. You will have observed that, in a reply to a question in the House of Commons on the 3rd April, 1930, of which a copy was forwarded to you under cover of my despatch No. 103 of the 9th April, 1930, I stated that the Kingdoms of the Hejaz and of Nejd are recognised by His Majesty's Government as separate sovereign States under one ruler, King Abd-el-Aziz-bin-Saud. The form of this reply might suggest, though it does not necessarily imply, that His Majesty's Government regard the Hejaz and Nejd as being two entirely separate States in international law, united only in a personal union by reason of the fact that they have a common King. If this were the case—that is to say, if the Hejaz and Nejd formed only what is known as a "personal union"—then it might be true to say that the Hejaz continues as the same international unit, and could now ratify the Treaty of Versailles and claim to become a member of the League of Nations by that means. King Ibn Saud might in this way not only make the Hejaz a separate member of the League of Nations, but could also apply later for separate membership in respect of Nejd. Various inconveniences would, however, arise. By ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, King Ibn Saud would become a party to the treaty for all purposes, a result which might even produce complications in connexion, for instance, with such subjects as that of German reparations. Moreover, it might be asked by other parties to the Treaty of Versailles whether the deposit of a ratification of the treaty more than ten years after it had come into force was now permissible, at any rate without the consent of the other contracting Powers.

9. Although it might be possible, in support of the foregoing view, to adduce the declaration made by King Ibn Saud himself at the time of his election as King of the Hejaz that the administration of the Hejaz would be kept separate from that of Nejd (see Mr. Jordan's telegram No. 6 of the 11th January, 1926), this view does not appear to His Majesty's Government to be the correct legal interpretation of the situation. While it is both theoretically and practically possible for two countries which have democratic parliamentary institutions, and in which the King is a constitutional monarch, to keep their separate international status in spite of having a common King, and to contend that they remain in international law two entirely separate units, as in the case of the former union of England and Hanover, it seems difficult to contend that this can be the case where the common King is not a constitutional monarch, but virtually—as is King Ibn Saud—an autocrat, who is himself the Government of the country. In these circumstances a common King involves also virtually a common Government even if, for purposes of administration, &c., the two countries are kept more or less distinct. The relationship of the Hejaz and Nejd under the present régime appears to be much more in the nature of a "real union," such as that of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, than in the nature of a "personal union." This impression is confirmed by the manner in which the foreign affairs of the two countries are conducted. They have only one Foreign Office and one Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the recent treaties of King Ibn Saud are not signed by him in duplicate, one as King of the Hejaz and another as King of Nejd, but are signed by him as King of the Hejaz and Nejd.

10. In the circumstances the exact relationship between the two countries may fairly be said to be known only to Ibn Saud himself. For the reasons given above, however, His Majesty's Government consider that, for the present purpose, the Hejaz and Nejd should be regarded as a single State. It follows that in international law both the Hejaz and Nejd have disappeared as separate international units, and a new unit, consisting of the union, has taken their place. If this is so, then it would be no longer possible for the Hejaz to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, because the former State of the Hejaz has really ceased to exist; and it would be impossible for the Hejaz separately to become a member of the League of Nations, because it does not exist as a separate State. The only way, then, in which the Hejaz and Nejd could obtain membership of the League of Nations would be to apply for it and be elected under the second paragraph of article 1 of the Covenant, and the new member would be the joint Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd.

11. I would point out, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that the creation of a new State out of two formerly separate States united in a real union does not, under the principles of State succession, involve the extinction of all the international obligations of the two component States. The foregoing view of the present status of the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd does not therefore imply that King Ibn Saud is entitled to ignore the obligations previously contracted by the Hejaz and Nejd when they were separate international units.

12. Should the Hejazi authorities again approach you in regard to the question of the admission of the Hejaz and Nejd to membership of the League of Nations, you may explain to them the legal situation, as described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of this despatch, and may discuss the question generally with them in the light of the considerations set forth above.

13. All these considerations are, however, subordinate to the general principle that His Majesty's Government desire to see membership of the League of Nations as nearly universal as possible. They cannot, consistently with this principle, do anything to dissuade a State which is now outside the League but wishes to come in from applying for membership. If, therefore, the Hejazi Government express such a wish, you should say that His Majesty's Government welcome their decision and will support their candidature at Geneva.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 1790/1600/25]

No. 77.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 95.)
Sir,

Jedda, March 14, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an appreciation of conditions in the Hejaz by Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay Pilgrimage Officer attached to this Legation. This paper, written by an educated Moslem, who is a senior member of the Malay civil service, and whose work here and during occasional visits to Mecca, gives him special opportunities of observing the reactions in the Hejaz of a conquering but somewhat decadent Wahabism, has considerable value.

2. I agree generally with Haji Abdul Majid's views, although I doubt personally whether Ibn Saud has yet reached the point at which he would for a monetary consideration encourage any scheme for rebuilding shrines already destroyed. There is no doubt, however, that growing financial stringency, with its hampering effect on the King's convenience and ambitions, is a cardinal feature of the situation.

3. I have dealt separately with two matters to which reference is made in passing in the enclosed paper, namely, the significance of the recent revival of Nejd dancing and the difficulties with which the Government have had to cope during the past few weeks owing to the exchange crisis.

4. I am distributing copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, his Excellency the

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Governor of the Straits Settlements, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo, the Honourable the Political Resident at Bushire, and His Majesty's Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Present Conditions in the Hejaz.

THE Wahabi régime in the Hejaz is, to the outside observer, synonymous with Wahabi fanaticism for an Islamic renaissance to equal, if not to surpass, Islamic glory of the days of the famous four Caliphs, and Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, the Wahabi King, is hailed as the greatest Arab hero of modern times. It will be misleading not to admit that out of chaos and turbulence, which was the order of the day in the Hejaz during both the Hashimite rule and that of the Turks, Arab unity to a considerable extent in the central block of the peninsula stretching from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf has been accomplished and peace and security to life and property, particularly in the zones traversed and frequented by pilgrims from overseas, have been effected for which the Moslem world is heartily grateful. The wonderful transformation is so conspicuous that all Moslem hearts beat with pride for it, and adopting Wahabi doctrines which primarily aim at removing superstitions and a reversion to the simple ways of the Prophet, they expect to see advancement and progress in their own well-being, not only morally and spiritually, but also politically. It should be recalled that, in the first Moslem Congress convened by Ibn Saud in 1926, many of the Moslem representatives, encouraged by the public declaration of the erstwhile Moslem hero on his entry to and occupation of Mecca that he was there to serve Islam and the Moslems, conjured up visions of a united Moslem Empire throughout the world with a Moslem republic in the Hejaz as its nucleus. And, indeed, the speeches made at the said congress savoured much of the idea of forming the republic. The failure by non-attendance of the Moslem Congress in the following year was undoubtedly due to the aversion to such an idea by Ibn Saud, who by this time had made it evident, directly and indirectly, of his determination to rule the Hejaz by himself and for himself. And it so happened that the year 1927 saw the record number of pilgrims visiting the Hejaz, so that the record amount of revenue accruing therefrom proved too much for the simple-living Bedouin conqueror not to be somewhat demoralised in his worldly tastes and outlook. The Mehmäl incident in the same year, however, thanks to the stubbornness of the Egyptian Government over a principle which they deemed it prudent to insist upon, ended happily for the King without giving grounds to his fanatic followers to suspect of his motives other than that, according to his avowed intention, of "wiping out superstitious beliefs and practices in the Hejaz." Nevertheless, modern means of communication, such as the automobile, the telephone and the radiograph, appealed to him as military measures for strengthening his position, and these he soon introduced to the country without taking into consideration the fact that his own people were so backward and far from ready to make use of, much less to appreciate, them. The revolt of almost all his staunch supporters, namely, Feisal-ad-Dawish, Mimbajad, Ibn Fadhil and Ibn Thanian, signifies not only the unfulfilment of secret treaties or personal understanding between them, but also a divergence of policy to be pursued in future by the King. Hitherto he planned all his movements and his campaigns with his supporters for the spread of Wahabiism, but now he discusses offensive and defensive measures with his councillors for the safety and expansion of his Empire. That the latter policy is becoming more and more expensive to be effective in the way satisfactory to him is evident from the fact that pilgrim taxation (which, by the way, is in the Hejaz by far the main source of revenue) has to be increased year by year, so much so that the Moslem world already begins to wonder where such increases will stop. Perhaps the weakest point in his Government, that is severely criticised behind the scenes by those who are directly effected, is that no provision whatsoever seems to have been made "for

rainy days," so that during a lean season, such as is being experienced now, the wealthy inhabitants are called upon to replenish his exchequer by loans which are as uncertain of being repaid as the East is always uncertain of the morrow. It is said that the old Kaimakam (Governor) of Jedda, Haji Abdullah Ridha, left the country ostensibly to recruit his health, but in reality to avoid repeated demands from the King for monetary loans. So absorbed is Ibn Saud now in his empire-building schemes that the hitherto very stringent laws about smoking in the streets of Mecca and other similar fanatic measures have been relaxed, and so engrossed is he in securing money almost by fair means or foul in order to advance those schemes that it is said, if some wealthy Moslem submit it to him that if he is allowed to rebuild those places of reverence that the Wahabis destroyed in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, he will pay the King a handsome sum of money, Ibn Saud will have to think twice before he rejects such a proposition. In any event, the change in the policy of the King is noticeable even to the man in the street, who, groaning under the effects of the prevailing trade depression, grumbles at the extra burden put upon him by increased taxes. Reports of careless management of the King's Motor Transport Department, said to be the highest item in the expenditure of the Government, only help to add further dissatisfaction in the public mind. Government officials, except the few who are immediately about the person of the King, begin to lose faith when their salaries, besides being several months overdue, are reduced. Wild rumours are circulated in hushed whispers that the overthrow of Ibn Saud is near at hand, and wild conjectures are made, such as illiterate Arabs only can make, as to who is the probable conqueror of the country and successor of the King. The recent drop in the market value of the Hejazian Government currency, though promptly suppressed with drastic measures, cannot but serve as the best index for the public faith in the instability of the Saudi régime. On the other hand, the King, being confident of his security from the impunity of his fanatic subjects in Nejd, after defeating their rebellious leaders, spends his time more in the Hejaz than has been his wont, and this, with his own personal display of a Bedouin war-dance to the public in Mecca during the 'Id days of 1349 A.H. (February 1931) is, perhaps, calculated to inspire confidence and faith in him as a promoter of democracy, the essence of Islam, among the more important of his Hejazian subjects, the Meccans. Time alone will show whether he can conquer the hearts of Mecca, believed to be the hardest of Arab hearts even from the days of the Prophet, as easily as he did conquer the city seven years ago. His two eldest sons, however (more particularly in the case of Emir Feisal than in that of his elder brother, Emir Saud), have already earned the reputation of being the friends of the immoral section of Mecca, and clean-minded or level-headed men wonder, unless they change their conduct, if they can be strong enough to rule the country between them and keep the turbulent spirit of the Meccans as well as that of the untutored Bedouins in subjugation when the time comes for them to take over the reins of government. It would not be quite unjust, under the circumstances, to conclude that Ibn Saud is now no more a Wahabi, in the sense of being a Moslem puritan, than the average follower of the Prophet in any of the four orthodox sects, Wahabiism being to him, as it was to his ancestor who first espoused the Cause, a means whereby to achieve an end. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Ibn Saud, by his conquest of the Hejaz, was greatly responsible for bringing the movement into the limelight of the Moslem world, and for its ultimate acceptance Wahabiism must depend on the merits of its own doctrines. And the Hejaz, or rather Mecca, its principal holy city, though it can never be moved into fanaticism as was Nejd, will always remain as the principal seat of Wahabi education and influence so long as Ibn Saud or his line of descendants is on the throne, and this, if for no other reason, but to save his reputation as the Wahabi King.

HAJI ABDUL MAJID.

March 4, 1931.

[E 1856/2/25]

No. 78.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 9, 1931.

MY telegram No. 80.

Negotiations took place in Mecca. Settlement on all important points was completed yesterday afternoon. There was no need for my intervention.

Following is summary of what Nuri Pasha told me spontaneously after dining at the Legation last evening:—

1. *Desert Posts*.—Arrangements made on board "Lupin" seem to have been renewed.
2. "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement and attached protocol were signed on 8th April after much discussion of details; mainly drafting points I gather.
3. *Extradition*.—Text of treaty and accompanying letter to be written by Nuri were agreed. He says latter will not go to Parliament and that combined texts have given Ibn Saud great satisfaction. Minister for Foreign Affairs signed yesterday, Nuri to-day.
4. Ibn Mashhur Pasha claims to have satisfied the King. Nuri did not mention to me remaining questions enumerated in my telegram No. 68. He said the King had raised other questions about wells, Wakfs, &c., but had been induced to postpone them. Pasha added this morning that he had conceded some points regarding Wakfs. I am telegraphing separately about matters not directly connected with main negotiations.

I have not heard Hejaz Government's version, but Yussuf Yasin who also came to dinner was full of joy.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 97.)

[E 1859/387/25]

No. 79.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 10.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

April 8, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, No. 30:—

"Reference Secretary of State's telegram No. 45, repeated to you No. 56. I concur in proposed reply contained in Foreign Office telegram No. 54 to you.

"I suggest 20th April as date of meeting.

"Direct communication by wireless between Glubb and Jauf would be advantageous and should be instituted without delay. Wireless call sign of Glubb is ZEB, wave-length 1,250 metres. Please inform me of call sign and wave-length of Jauf wireless. I shall be grateful if you will make it clear to Hejaz Government that use of wireless is intended to expedite and facilitate exchange of communications between Glubb and Ibn Zeid, and not to supersede personal meeting which I regard as absolutely essential. As regards paragraph 7 of Secretary of State's telegram No. 45 of 7th March, please inform Hejaz Government that Transjordan authorities have at all times done their utmost to prevent raiding by Transjordan tribes, and will inflict exemplary punishment on any Transjordan tribesmen who raid during meeting of Glubb and Ibn Zeid."

[E 1882/387/25]

No. 80.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 10.)

(Nos. 87 and 88.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 10, 1931.

(R.) TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 30 to me, repeated to Colonial Office, No. 32.

I have communicated note to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day embodying paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 54 and contents of telegram under reference as far as "essential." I had already reproduced paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 45 in memorandum sent to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10th March. (End of R.)

In that paragraph you proposed simultaneous *public* announcements.

Neither assurance given in Hejaz Government's reply of 12th March nor that proposed in last sentence of telegram under reference (which in form is weaker than that given by Ibn Saud) corresponds with your demand. I doubt expediency of such statement at present stage, especially as you are still considering Hejaz memorandum of 12th March as a whole. If, however, you think it should be made, I can embody it in supplementary communication.

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 107 and 108.)

[E 1967/387/25]

No. 81.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, April 14, 1931.

MY telegram No. 87.

Following is gist of Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply of 13th April:—

"We have no objection to the meeting, though it be only for exchange of information, seeing that His Majesty's Government insist. As, however, atmospheric conditions have made it impossible to communicate between Mecca and Jauf, we will inform Ibn Zeid by mail car and will take the first opportunity of communicating with Jauf to telegraph instructions to him to telegraph to Glubb with a view to agreement as to time and place of meeting.

"We have informed Telegraph Administration of sign indicated by you. They hope it will be possible to reduce Transjordan wave-length to between 600 and 800 metres. Jauf call sign is 'H R S'; wave-length 600 metres.

"I will convey any further information about Ibn Zeid's movements at first opportunity."

I had only time for hurried glance at above note before previously arranged interview with Yussuf Yasin this morning. He said the latest news of Ibn Zeid was that he had gone to Qariat, but that his further plans were uncertain. I urged the importance of early meeting in view of recent incidents and offered to send any message to Qariat which might help. I expressed disappointment at the insistence on preliminary meeting being only for exchange of information. His Majesty's Government had contemplated discussion of joint measures as well. Hejaz Government had replied that measures were "known." Each side might know its own measures, but what His Majesty's Government wanted was collaboration. I urged greater elasticity in instructions to Ibn Zeid.

Yussuf Yasin promised to consult the King regarding the offer of assistance in communication and to have Ibn Zeid's instructions worded with suitable latitude.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 112.)

[E 1942/387/25]

No. 82.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 15, 1931.

MY telegram No. 50 of 27th March: Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

Following are views of His Majesty's Government regarding reply to be returned to remaining points in Hejazi Government's memorandum of 12th March:—

2. As regards prevention of raiding for the future, you should point out that the Hejazi Government have failed to return adequate reply to proposal in paragraph 7 of my telegram No. 45 of 7th March. They merely repeat their original statement that they are prepared definitely to prevent raids by their subjects during meeting, and when meeting is announced. This is not what His Majesty's Government had in mind. They count upon both Hejazi and Transjordan Governments to do their utmost at all times, and not only during meeting, to prevent their subjects from raiding. It is with this end in view, and in order to dispose once and for all of the rumours current on the frontier that Hejazi Government countenance or have countenanced raids on Transjordan tribes, that His Majesty's Government have proposed public announcement by both sides categorically forbidding and disavowing all forms of raiding by their tribesmen at all times, and intimating that offenders will receive exemplary punishment.

3. As regards other equally important aspect of the question, i.e., that of immediate restoration of loot, I observe from enclosure in your despatch No. 90 of the 10th March that an important passage appears to have been omitted from your memorandum of the 10th March to the Hejazi Government. Section 4 (c) of my telegram No. 45 proposed that representatives should be empowered personally to supervise the arrangements for the immediate restoration of loot on either side. Reply to Hejazi Government's memorandum must take this into account.

4. You should explain to Hejazi Government, with reference to points (a) to (e) in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 61 of the 14th March, that His Majesty's Government have already (albeit reluctantly) agreed to decisions reached by representatives being *ad referendum*, on condition that the necessary sanction shall be given without undue delay, and that they do not consider it desirable that matters should any longer be postponed by discussion on points of procedure and details of minor importance. The main thing is that the representatives should be enabled to start practical work and should be empowered personally to supervise arrangements for immediate mutual restoration of loot without further delay.

5. His Majesty's Government agree that representatives should, in the first instance, take with them all available information regarding raids, but they must obviously be free to supplement such information from local sources. They will, as far as possible, reach their decisions without summoning tribal sheikhs. At the same time, presence of certain representative sheikhs may clearly be necessary in order to establish the facts. It would be useless to expect the Governments concerned to investigate the truth of conflicting statements regarding what has actually occurred. The facts can only be determined on the spot. His Majesty's Government accordingly feel that, in cases where the two representatives cannot agree as to the facts, it is essential that they shall be empowered to summon those sheikhs whose attendance may be considered necessary in order to assist them in their task. His Majesty's Government appreciate danger of quarrels arising between the sheikhs at isolated meeting-place on the frontier, but consider that this could be much reduced if guarantees of good behaviour are taken in advance by two Governments from sheikhs concerned, and if two representatives take reasonable precautions.

6. As regards scope of the representatives' discussions, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that they should deal with any raids which, owing to the date on which they occurred, fall outside the scope of the MacDonnell enquiry.

7. As regards the surrender of raiding criminals, you should explain that this is a question which does not affect the immediate issue, settlement of which

it should not be allowed to delay, but that His Majesty's Government hope to be able to deal with it in a separate communication in the near future.

8. Please address Hejazi Government accordingly.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 65. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 48.)

[E 1942/387/25]

No. 83.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram: Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

1. *Announcement regarding Cessation of Raiding.*—I approve your decision reported in last paragraph of your telegram No. 88 of 10th April not to make communication to Hejazi Government proposed by High Commissioner for Transjordan, to whom position is being explained. His Majesty's Government have already undertaken that Transjordan authorities shall issue announcement as soon as Hejazi Government have done so (see my telegram No. 45 of 7th March, paragraph 7).

2. *Evidence of Sheikhs.*—It seems preferable to omit from proposed reply to Hejazi Government any indication that sheikhs summoned by the two representatives will be called upon to give evidence on oath.

3. *Date of Raids to be Considered.*—Formula proposed is designed to exclude alleged Transjordan raid of 26th July (see your telegram No. 53 of 4th March, paragraphs 3 and 6); you will realise that 1st August is in fact the agreed date, to which His Majesty's Government must hold the Hejazi Government, if and when it becomes necessary to name an actual date. But present formula is perhaps less likely to give rise to argument, which would again delay meeting.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 66. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 49.)

[E 1997/387/25]

No. 84.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 16.)

(Nos. 95 and 96.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, April 16, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 65 and 66.

I am preparing statement, using memorandum form for sake of continuity and greater impressiveness. I should like to be clear as to following:—

I presume you still contemplate separate preliminary meeting. If so, I think I should state this categorically. Paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 45 suggested public announcement as means of giving effect to proposal made by the King with express reference to prevention of raids *during meeting*, which both sides have held to be peculiarly scandalous. I cannot trace any other "original statement." May I alter language slightly to cover these points, without, however, omitting words "at all times"?

(R.) Your telegram No. 45 as received here omitted portion from "(c)" to "either side" inclusive. I have traced them in sections and will now incorporate them. (End of R.)

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 114.)

[E 1997/387/25]

No. 85.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 95 of 16th April: Raiding situation on Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

You may make slight alterations on the lines you propose.

Your assumption regarding separate character of preliminary meeting is correct.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 70. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 51.)

[E 2016/387/25]

No. 86.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, April 18, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 70.

I have to-day sent memorandum, which with necessary alterations reproduces your telegram No. 65, except as follows:—

Paragraph 1 introduces statement of view of His Majesty's Government, but says that it does not affect arrangements for preliminary meeting, to holding of which as soon as possible His Majesty's Government attach importance.

Paragraph 2. Words "repeat their original statement" are replaced by "state." I have inserted after "have proposed" "and that meeting should be preceded by." I have omitted "at all times" later in this sentence, and added new sentence "they consider this prohibition and disavowal should extend to all raids at all times."

Paragraph 3 mentions omission from your memorandum of 10th March owing to telegraphic error of one phrase, and reproduces correct text of paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 45 from "(b)" to the end.

Paragraphs 4 to 7 of memorandum correspond without material alteration to similarly numbered paragraphs of your telegram under reference.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 116.)

[E 2064/2064/25]

No. 87.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 108.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 23, 1931.

I HAD occasion in a recent despatch regarding the situation between the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Hejazi Government to refer to the exchange crisis in this country in February. Being now able to give a somewhat clearer view, I think it may be useful to sum up all the facts known to me in a separate despatch.

2. As you are aware, the currency system of this country rests on a double basis, the English gold sovereign and the silver riyal, the equivalence of which is legally fixed at 10 riyals to the £ sterling. There is a large floating supply of gold and the face value of riyals in circulation is estimated at from £150,000 to £180,000. The value of silver in the riyal is said to be about -/10 at present prices. It is reckoned for accountancy purposes into 11 piastres miri, which do not exist as actual currency, the base metal coinage consisting of nickel piastres, which are theoretically worth 22 to the riyal or 220 to the £ sterling, but are always somewhat depreciated in the market. The currency thus consists of gold pounds, silver riyals and fractions thereof and the nickel piastre and its fractions, one of which, the quarter-piastre, is known as halala. I should explain that the use of this currency is general in the Hejaz proper and that the circulation of Maria Theresa dollars is negligible, although they remain, I understand, the principal currency elsewhere in Ibn Saud's dominions, including Asir.

3. Some weeks ago the riyal broke away from the sovereign and went down to 13 or even lower in a panicky market, halalas following suit. The Government, who at times are large holders of gold, appeared to be running short of it. The local market was depressed owing to general conditions and the prospect of a much diminished pilgrimage. Customs dues were raised considerably on staple articles, as reported in my despatch No. O.T. 9 of the 8th March to the Department of Overseas Trade.

4. All these causes doubtless contributed to the slump in riyals, although I have not sufficient expert knowledge to judge of the effect of particular factors nor do I know what quantity of riyals is required for the normal business of the country. The Government were forced to take the situation in hand, and an attempt was made to restore the riyal by a proclamation, which in Jedda was disseminated late one evening by that picturesque survival, the town crier. The Government action produced its effect, but it was said that the riyal still passed surreptitiously at a depreciated price. When the King came to Jedda on the 25th February, conferences were held between the authorities, bankers and merchants. It was decided to enforce the law stringently and to bolster up the riyal by prohibiting the exportation of gold. The Government expressed readiness themselves to accept riyals for all purposes at 10 to the £ sterling, and enjoined this on everyone else. They secured the support of the *Nederlandische Handel Maatschappij* (Netherlands Trading Society), which undertook to take riyals at the official rate, plus a small supplement in payment for drafts. The only other banking firm in Jedda, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), took up a more conservative attitude and declined to commit themselves, although they are in fact dealing at the official rate up to a limit.

5. I enclose a translation of a communiqué issued in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 6th March.⁽¹⁾ The same number of the paper had a leading article attributing the crisis to the fraudulent manoeuvres of speculators, denying that there has been any real crisis at all and describing the action of the Government.

6. The measures taken have produced stability for the time being, the riyal being pegged at 10 to export-prohibited gold. The effect has been not to rehabilitate the riyal so much as to bring gold down to its level. In view of the poor pilgrimage prospects, it is difficult to see what the outcome will be in a country with no export trade and little capacity in the highest places for any form of earning other than that of postponing, where possible, the payment of debts. It is to be supposed that the level of prices will rise. The action of the Dutch Bank has been of material assistance to the Government, but it is not clear on what basis that action rests. When he embarked on it, the manager, Mr. Jacobs, appeared to be confident and to think that the Hejaz was good for any amount up to the total value of riyals in circulation. He professed to rely on the honour of the Government and thus found common ground with Mr. Philby, who in one conversation suggested that anyone who did not share this simple faith might as well give up trying to do business here.

7. Mr. Jacobs seems to be a pretty astute financier and had no doubt some more solid basis to work on. On the face of it his bank make six halalas per £ or about 1½d. at par on every draft they sell, and they also charge a commission of 1 per cent. As they are in effect lending gold or its equivalent abroad on the security of riyals, the value to them of these two profits would appear to depend not only on the eventual solvency of the Government, but on the length of time for which they have to carry any riyals not required for current business. They doubtless have some redemption arrangement, but I have been unable to ascertain its exact nature. It is within my knowledge that on the 3rd March the Minister of Finance produced a certain quantity of gold for this purpose. My latest information at the time of writing is that Mr. Jacobs is not as well satisfied as he was three weeks ago. He told a member of my staff on the 22nd March that he would get out of the arrangement if he could.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2209/387/25]

No. 88.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, April 25.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, April 24, 1931.

NO reply has yet been sent to Hejazi request regarding raiding criminals (see paragraph 9 of Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 53; paragraph 7 of Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 61; paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 26; and paragraph 7 of Foreign Office telegram to Jedda, No. 65). Matter has been raised here by Hejazi Minister, and from discussion with him it is clear that Hejazi Government refer merely to surrender of Hejazi and Nejdi raiding criminals fleeing from punishment into Transjordan, and of Transjordan criminals fleeing from punishment into Hejaz-Nejd. It is not intended to raise the wider issue of punishment of tribesmen caught in act of raiding.

The formula suggested in your telegram No. 26 seems generally suitable, but in view of importance of not giving any undertaking which it may be impossible to carry out, I should prefer to amplify the formula, and I suggest the following form of words:—

"Hejazi or Nejdi nationals who have taken part in raids in Transjordan territory and have returned to the Hejaz-Nejd, and who attempt to escape the penalties imposed on them for raiding by fleeing into Transjordan, will, if possible, be prevented, upon the receipt of notification from the authorities of the Hejaz-Nejd, from crossing the frontier into Transjordan. If they enter Transjordan the Transjordan authorities will, on receiving the necessary information from the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, use their best endeavours to prevent them from remaining in Transjordan, and, if possible, to expel them into the Hejaz-Nejd."

"This undertaking is given on the understanding that the authorities of the Hejaz-Nejd will deal in the same manner with Transjordan raiding criminals in similar circumstances. This undertaking may be terminated either by the Hejaz-Nejd Government or by the Transjordan Government on two months' notice, and shall thereafter apply only to those raiding criminals who have crossed the frontier before its termination."

It might be difficult at present to negotiate a formal extradition agreement with Ibn Saud, and I should prefer that we should content ourselves for the moment with some formula which could be agreed upon in much shorter time than would be required for negotiation of formal agreement.

Please let me know as soon as possible whether you agree to this procedure and to the form of words now suggested. If so, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda will be instructed to submit this formula to the Hejazi Government and to enquire whether they will be prepared to give a similar undertaking, which, if agreed upon, might be embodied in an exchange of notes.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 74.)

[E 2180/387/25]

No. 89.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, April 26, 1931.

COLONIAL Office telegram No. 74 to Transjordan.

I suggest phrase in formula beginning "upon receipt" should read: "upon direct notification of names and other available particulars by Hejaz-Nejd frontier authorities to corresponding Transjordan authorities."

This would reduce area of possible dispute and facilitate practical co-operation on lines of article 3 of Hadda Agreement.

I suggest, also, that communication should refer expressly to explanations furnished by Hejaz Minister in London.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 126.)

[E 2181/387/25]

No. 90.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, April 26, 1931.

MY telegram No. 98.

Following is summary of Hejaz Government's answering memorandum of 24th April enclosed in formal note to me of same date:—

1. Hejaz Government wish to explain that the steps taken with a view to meeting of Glubb and Ibn Zeid will lead to its taking place within the next days.

2. They have emphasised, and still emphasise, necessity for application of provisions of Hadda Agreement as regards cessation of raiding on both sides. They are doing what they can with this object, but they have already stated that their measures are unlikely to succeed unless similar measures are taken on other side. In their recent memorandum they expressed wish that raiding should cease at least during meeting, only they had not observed any tangible result from previous arrangements to prevent it. They are glad to intimate concurrence in publication of general announcement prohibiting raiding on both sides because they consider prevention of raiding essential now and in future and at all times.

3. They consider question of summoning certain sheikhs to meeting-place should be left to representatives, because it is of course understood that there will be no reciprocal trials or interrogation, but that attendance of sheikhs will be for representatives to consider and will be for the purpose of their personal consultation only. Representative of one party should have no right to interfere with sheikhs of the other party or to put questions to them.

4. Hejaz Government note that His Majesty's Government concur in principle that representatives' decision will not take effect until sanctioned by the two Governments.

5. They note that His Majesty's Government concur in suggestion that representatives should be provided with all necessary information regarding cases. They have explained in paragraph 3 above their views as to attendance of persons concerned.

6. They agree that investigation should include all raids mentioned in paragraph 6 of British memorandum of 18th April.

7. They note paragraph 7 of British memorandum and await promised reply of His Majesty's Government regarding surrender of criminals.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 294.)

[E 2221/81/25]

No. 91.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 122.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 1, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for January and February 1931. The report has been delayed by pressure of other work, but I have thought it preferable to confine it to the first two months of the year in accordance with new arrangement mentioned in the prefatory note.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, New Delhi, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Jedda Report for January and February 1931.

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PREFATORY NOTE.

IN view of the increased pressure on the Legation at Jedda, it has been decided, with the approval of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to issue these reports at intervals of two months in future. It is hoped that this will not materially reduce their value to the recipients, and that it will enable the Legation to issue the reports more punctually, although on the present occasion special reasons have caused delay.

The following arrangement will be adopted in future:—

The main divisions will be retained with Roman numerals and cross-headings. Sub-sections will be shown by unnumbered cross-headings. The paragraphs will be numbered consecutively throughout to facilitate back-reference.

This opportunity is taken of mentioning that the spelling Jedda is consecrated by Foreign Office usage. Whatever may be said for or against it, it is convenient that the place where the Legation is should be known in official English by a fixed name. If other posts can reconcile it with their philological principles to adopt the Foreign Office version it will be much appreciated. The Legation is conscious of many defects in its own spelling and will welcome suggestions from other posts as to the spelling of important place-names in their respective spheres.

I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Ibn Saud.

1. The King returned to Mecca on the 20th January and spent the whole of Ramadan there. He came to Jedda on the 25th February and stayed over the end of the month. On the day of his arrival he held a formal reception of foreign representatives. The principal object of his visit was to receive the rich American Mr. Charles R. Crane, who, having come from the United States specially for the purpose, arrived in Jedda on the 25th February, accompanied by Mr. G. Antonius. An account of a previous visit by Mr. Crane to Jedda will be found in the report for December 1926. It may be remarked incidentally that, at that time, he was *mal vu* in French and British circles owing to his connexion with Syrian revolutionaries. At present he creates the impression of being an innocuous old gentleman, with wide interests and a passion for recording the many things he has seen pass "into history." Ibn Saud showered attentions on Mr. Crane, for whose benefit a Bedouin review was held on the 27th February (see paragraph 9). The foreign representatives were also present, and the King entertained them and Mr. Crane at dinner the same evening. On the following day he honoured Mr. Philby with his company at tea, the principal members of the party being much the same. Ibn Saud appeared to have derived benefit from his visit to Nejd and was in his best form during his stay in Jedda. The unusual coolness and pleasantness of the climate earned his commendation.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. The unsatisfactory state of affairs resulting from the illness of Fuad Bey Hamza (December report, paragraph 1 (b)) continued throughout January, and no business could be done by personal interview. The Emir Feisal visited Jedda on the 8th and 9th January for the celebration of the King's accession. He received Sir A. Ryan at a specially arranged interview on the 8th January, but it was almost entirely of a formal nature. It was afterwards explained that he had visited Jedda as Viceroy of the Hejaz only. He returned on the 28th January, accompanied by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. Owing to Fuad Bey's illness, which culminated in his departure for Egypt on the 30th January, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin became Acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, remaining at the same time private secretary, head of the Political Section of the Divan and general factotum to the King. The Prince having formally received the foreign representatives, apparently with some exceptions, on the 29th January, arranged to receive His Majesty's Minister for business on the 30th January. When Sir A. Ryan went to keep this appointment the palace resembled that of the Sleeping Beauty, with the Beauty and nearly everyone else in the background. Neither the Prince, Under-Secretary, A.D.C. nor servants were to be seen, and Sir A. Ryan left, after a lively conversation with the A.D.C., who appeared as he was going out. In the event it appeared that the principals had a good excuse for everything except mismanagement. The Prince had been taken ill after going to mosque. Sheikh Yusuf had been seeing Fuad Bey off, and was greatly taken aback when Sir A. Ryan passed him without stopping on his way back to the Legation. As for the subordinates, they were doubtless sleeping through the Ramadan fast. Notwithstanding all this, the reception accorded to the British representative on his first business visit to a new Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to be too cavalier to be tolerated. Sir A. Ryan demanded satisfaction, and after a first insufficient attempt to placate him, Sheikh Yusuf called and offered an unqualified apology. All was thus happily settled by dinner-time.

3. This incident, although regrettable, cleared the air. Sir A. Ryan had let it be known that he expected his formal visit to be returned, a courtesy which a Minister of princely rank might have thought he could dispense with. The Emir called on the foreign representatives on the 1st February and stayed half an hour at the British Legation. He had on the previous day received Sir A. Ryan for business, but after his round of visits he collapsed with severe malaria. He returned to Mecca on the 3rd or 4th February and went into the country for change. Sheikh Yusuf remained and put in much work before going back to Mecca on the 6th February. He proved more reasonable in discussion than had

been anticipated. His chief, the Emir, recovered in due course, but up to the end of February he showed no interest in or capacity for foreign affairs. Sheikh Yusuf effectively dealt with them throughout the whole period. He is very much the King's man and Ibn Saud has shown a tendency to put him in the forefront, although it is clear that he himself still pulls the strings.

Finance.

4. The financial situation went from bad to worse early in the year. Pilgrims have come forward in somewhat greater numbers than was anticipated, but the total number from overseas seems unlikely to exceed 50,000. Revenue must suffer accordingly. The two most notable indications of Treasury straits have been a heavy increase in customs duty on most staple imports, which was announced in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 6th February; and a temporary decline of the silver currency, which became acute in February. The silver riyal, the value of which is officially fixed at 10 to the gold pound sterling, slumped to 13 or even lower in Jedda and Mecca. The Government found themselves short of gold, although it always seems possible to produce some at a pinch. They made strong efforts to restore the balance between riyals and pounds. It may be said in anticipation of the next report that they succeeded, but only by prohibiting the export of gold and by arrangements with the Dutch Bank in Jedda, the exact nature of which has not been disclosed, to accept riyals at 10 plus a small margin in payment for drafts on foreign countries. It was suggested that Mr. Crane might in some way come to the help of Ibn Saud. There is no indication that he did so. Further rumours of American financial assistance were floated when, about the same time as Mr. Crane, Mr. Dickerson, the commercial secretary of the United States Legation at Cairo, visited Jedda in the course of an extensive tour. On hearing that the bazaars were talking of an American loan to the tune of £1,000,000, Mr. Dickerson laughed.

5. His Majesty's Minister took up with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 5th February the outstanding claims of the Government of India, the Eastern Telegraph Company and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (September to November report, paragraph 3 (b)). The position at the end of February was that the Government of India claim was still completely in the air; the Eastern Telegraph Company had some prospect of being paid, but the Government were trying hard to engineer a settlement in riyals; and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey's situation was a good deal easier. In the last-named case the financial authorities on the 1st February deposited with the firm 55,000 riyals, with promise of redemption in six weeks to cover the balance of £5,000 still due in respect of their loan to the Government. At one moment it looked as though they might be hit by a refusal to accept drafts on customs, of which they held large quantities, in payment of duty, this being the only means of realising them without loss. The idea of thus dishonouring their own drafts was, however, relinquished by the Government. The wages of the unfortunate Sudanese chauffeurs (December report, paragraph (2)), were still greatly in arrear at the end of February.

6. The Government are heavily indebted in other directions. They are said to owe the Qusaibi firm some £80,000 and the rich Governor of Jedda £4,000. In January, however, the director of the Dutch Bank expressed the view that the whole floating debt did not exceed £500,000, and that the country should be solvent with good management. Good management is, unfortunately, the last thing that can be hoped for. The only economy consistently practised is that of evading payment of debts, although certain services are starved, e.g., the supply of doctors in the sanitary service has decreased in recent years.

General.

7. There was no news of any important development in the interior in January and February, although silly rumours of the usual kind were circulated in connexion with the King's visit to Nejd, how, for instance, there had been dissension in the Royal family; the King had practically fled from Riyadh, &c. Early in January there were reports, more substantial in appearance, of trouble with the Ajman tribe, but they were not confirmed.

8. Ibn Saud's accession was celebrated in the Hejaz on the 8th and 9th January in a manner similar to that of last year (report for

January 1930, paragraph 23). The view held by some that such celebrations are un-Islamic seems to have been definitely set aside.

9. Much excitement was aroused in February on its being announced that on the second day of the 'Id festival there had been a war dance at Mecca, in which the King himself had taken part together with several of the princes. According to one account this was the sequel to a demonstration by Meccans on the previous day, the reception of which by the King proved to be favourable, whereupon the King's own Nejd, of whom a great number would appear to have come back with him from Riyadh, asked to be allowed to perform. This happy accident theory is discounted by the fact that a dance of the same kind, though on a smaller scale, was a feature of the celebration of the King's accession at a sort of official *fête champêtre* between Jedda and Mecca on the 9th January. Anyhow the Nejd dance was done again at a Bedouin review in Jedda on the 27th February. On this occasion the King was present, but only the princes took part, led by the Emir Feisal, who performed very gracefully in front of the diplomats accredited to the Government in which he is Minister for Foreign Affairs. Next day the Jeddawis asked to be allowed to show what they could do, and for several days demonstrations on a considerable scale took place outside the palace.

10. These events have probably a political significance. The Nejd dancing is a revival of a practice which has, it seems, been in abeyance for fifteen or twenty years, although the skill shown by the dancers proves that it must have been kept up somehow, even though not officially countenanced. It may be taken as a working theory, provided it be not assumed too confidently, that Ibn Saud is anxious to efface some of the differences between the Hejaz and Nejd, and is prepared to ride his subjects in both kingdoms on a looser reign than is admitted by the extreme tenets of Wahhabism. Drums were a notable feature in the dancing demonstrations and even more musical instruments have of late been tolerated. Ibn Saud built formerly on an aggressive Wahhabism, which was turned against him by the rebels of 1929. He would now appear to be building on compromise with a world in which it pays to seek popularity and a flesh which, in the Hejaz at least, has always been weak. But he remains too good a Moslem to have much use for the devil, at any rate the foreign devil.

II.—FRONTIER QUESTIONS.

Transjordan.

MacDonnell Investigation.

11. No information reached Jedda during January and February regarding the action taken by His Majesty's Government on Mr. MacDonnell's report; nor was any reply returned to the Hejazi Government's note of the 24th December regarding the Beni Atiya (December report, section 5 (a)).

Current Raiding.

12. The lull noted in the December report, section 5 (b), continued until late in January. Transjordan complained of one raid from Nejd on the 25th January. Up to the end of February the Hejazi Government had alleged a raid from Transjordan on a date between the 3rd and 7th February and two others on the 10th and 13th February. On three occasions His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan drew the attention of the Legation at Jedda to reports of preparations for raids. These reports were duly communicated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Hejazi Government suggested that the first report had its origin in certain measures taken to collect taxes in the Wadi Sirhan. They indignantly denied the later reports and ascribed them to the activities of Captain Glubb, the desert control officer in Transjordan, who had been appointed in pursuance of the programme adopted by His Majesty's Government last autumn.

13. Correspondence also passed regarding various raids alleged to have taken place in the latter part of 1930. In this, as well as in the correspondence relative to the raids and rumours of raids mentioned in the last paragraph, the Legation sought to impress on the Hejazi Government the importance of taking measures on their side as efficacious as those adopted in Transjordan and more especially of arranging for direct communication between the authorities on both

sides of the frontier, as provided in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. The correspondence thus bore not only on particular raids and rumours, but on the general situation. Its details were, however, submerged in the crisis to be described in the following paragraphs.

General Frontier Situation.

14. While the correspondence mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs was proceeding, the visit of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Jedda at last enabled Sir A. Ryan to carry out, on the 3rd February, his instructions (December report, section 5 (c)) to discuss the general situation of the frontier orally. He took the sheikh over the whole of the recent ground, reproached the Hejazi Government with their failure to reply seriously to the British memorandum of October, disposed of the interim reply which had been their only attempt at a direct answer up to date and strongly deprecated the practical condonation of Nejd raids in Fuad Bey Hamza's note of the 29th November. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's reaction was unexpectedly favourable. He, indeed, made play with arguments on his own side. He developed the thesis that His Majesty's Government were really responsible for Transjordan and that their interposition between the parties served as a protection to Transjordanian raiders. He manifested openly the hostility of his Government towards Captain Glubb, a hostility dating from the time when that officer was employed in the Southern Desert of Iraq. He explained, however, that the Hejazi Government were preparing a statement of the measures they were taking on their side of the frontier. He added that the King was taking active steps to bring article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation. His Majesty had appointed Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Zeid, the former Hejazi agent at the MacDonnell investigation, to be Inspector of Bedouin on the frontier. En Neshmi had been removed from the Governorate of Jauf. The sheikh asked for suggestions as to the best means of providing for the communication contemplated in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement.

15. Before this conversation was reported home a storm of indignation had been aroused in Downing Street by a report from Captain Glubb. This report dealt mainly with the situation resulting from the last considerable raid from Nejd, which had taken place in October and the victims of which were the Howaitat tribe. Captain Glubb's main conclusions were that the Howaitat, deprived of the camels then captured, were in a state of starvation and could not easily be restrained from counter-raiding, especially as their 800 or more camels were known to be pasturing close to the frontier on the other side; that Ibn Saud, seconded by En Neshmi, was directly responsible for the raids conducted or encouraged by the latter in 1930; and that the King was pursuing a deliberate policy of seducing the Howaitat into his own allegiance, a plan which, if successful, would be disastrous to British prestige. Captain Glubb's views were endorsed, subject to some differences on points of detail, by the principal British authorities in Transjordan, including His Majesty's High Commissioner, who expressed an even more serious view of the consequences of a secession of Transjordan Bedouins to Ibn Saud, in view of the difficult situation it would create in the event of trouble in Palestine.

16. On the 6th February the Foreign Office instructed Sir A. Ryan to make the strongest possible representations. As these instructions had in effect crossed his report on his own recent action, he suggested that, having regard to the more favourable turn taken by his conversations in Jedda, it might be unwise to take so strenuous a line as that contemplated at home. There ensued an active correspondence, the result of which was that the Foreign Office consented to an attempt being made to reach an understanding with Ibn Saud, but indicated the lines on which the representations were to be made to him in a precise memorandum, the terms of which were in no way to be weakened and a copy of which was to be left with the King, if Sir A. Ryan thought it advisable. Every effort was to be made to obtain a definite reply within four days and the King was to be informed, if necessary, that this was expected by His Majesty's Government.

17. On receipt of his final instructions His Majesty's Minister, who had contemplated a strong but conversational onslaught on the King, thought that, as the basis of the representations was to be a long memorandum in set terms, it would, after all, be better to communicate it first to the Hejazi Government and see the King afterwards. His Majesty's Government having concurred, the

Legation forwarded it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 28th February, slightly modified in accordance with suggestions made by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan. The memorandum was accompanied by a short covering note requesting an early audience to discuss the question and intimating His Majesty's Government's desire to obtain a definite reply to their memorandum as soon as possible. A separate note sent earlier in the same day, also under instructions, strongly repudiated the aspersions which had been cast on Captain Glubb in the course of the conversations and correspondence in February.

18. In their memorandum of the 28th February His Majesty's Government propounded the following points in the nature of suggestions or demands, with the necessary explanatory comments:—

- (1) Noting Ibn Saud's expressed readiness to bring article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation and having in view the proved necessity for immediate co-operation between the authorities on both sides of the frontier, they proposed, in pursuance of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's request for suggestions as to the method of initiating such co-operation, that Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should meet (a) to examine all representatives and claims regarding raids since the 1st August; (b) to arrange for immediate restoration of loot on both sides; and (c) to arrange for the intercommunication of information and mutual restoration of loot in future.
- (2) They asked that Ibn Zeid should be invested with full executive powers, and that he and Captain Glubb should have power to call upon the representative sheikhs to put forward claims, &c.
- (3) Having explained the inability of the Transjordan authorities to maintain the recent improvement of the situation unless immediate steps should be taken to return the loot captured from their tribes since the 1st August, His Majesty's Government dwelt on various flagrant features of those raids, including the proved culpability of En Neshmi and his public statement that Ibn Saud permitted raiding into Transjordan, a statement widely believed and not effectively disproved. They said they "must insist that if this has not already been done, the strongest measures should be taken to counteract the effect of En Neshmi's action in giving countenance to raiding and to make it publicly known that His Majesty King Abdul Aziz expressly disavows and condemns it." They expressed hope that a recent report of En Neshmi's appointment to the command of tribal forces would prove to be unfounded.
- (4) They asked the Hejazi Government to inform them as soon as possible that they agreed to the proposed meeting and that Ibn Zeid would receive full powers to deal with the matters proposed, including the immediate restitution of camels and other loot captured from Transjordan tribes since the 1st August. They added that Captain Glubb would be authorised to arrange for the restitution of any loot identified as having been taken from Hejazi or Nejd tribes.
- (5) Finally, His Majesty's Government, having regard to the urgent necessity for restoring the camels looted from Transjordan, offered British co-operation in the Wadi Sirhan, if the Hejazi Government should find themselves confronted with any practical difficulty in returning them immediately.

19. The sequel to this firm all-but-ultimatum will be related in the next report. To complete the present section it is only necessary to add that during the period under review it was decided under Captain Glubb's advice to introduce various modifications into the scheme adopted last autumn for the improvement of the frontier control on the Transjordan side.

Druse Refugees in Nejd.

20. The question of the disposal of Sultan Al Atrash and his followers, who have for some time been in Nejd close to the Transjordan frontier, again engaged attention early in the year. There were last year two alternative proposals, viz., that Ibn Saud should be asked to move them further into the interior or that arrangements should be made for the party to be allowed to settle in Iraq. No

decision had apparently been taken up to the end of February. The presence of the refugees so close to it is a thorn in the side of Transjordan. According to one account, which cannot be vouched for, the French are for their part displeased with Ibn Saud for affording hospitality to the party.

Iraq.

"Bon-Voisinage," &c.

21. Following on the transactions related in section 6 (a) of the December report and after further consultations between Bagdad and London, King Feisal telegraphed to Ibn Saud on the 7th February proposing that his Prime Minister should take advantage of a recess of the Iraq Parliament to visit Jedda immediately after Ramadan in order to sign the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty, and discuss all outstanding questions including extradition. A Bagdad telegram to the Colonial Office of the 8th February showed that Nuri Pasha also proposed to deal with claims, trade facilities and pilgrim traffic, besides showing and explaining to Ibn Saud the new Iraq-Transjordan Treaty (which he was to sign at Amman *en route*) and discussing the case of Ibn Mashhur. Ibn Saud replied at once in terms of cordial acquiescence. Things looked all the rosier because it was known that the Iraq Government were not so uncompromising about extradition as might have been supposed from their letter of the middle of December and because Ibn Saud on his side accepted in a letter written by his Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 29th January King Feisal's explanation regarding his £30,000 award, adding only that the money would be paid when a settlement of other outstanding questions had been reached. A more conciliatory letter on the former point was addressed by the Iraq Government to the Hejazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 1st February.

22. Alas for the roses that bloomed in Bagdad! When Ibn Saud was at the height of his pleasurable anticipation and full of preparations for the reception of Nuri Pasha, the latter sent a message on the 18th February through Sir F. Humphrys and Sir A. Ryan expressing regret that, owing to delay over pending oil negotiations, he was compelled to postpone his visit. His delay aroused suspicions in the Hejazi mind, which the Legation in Jedda sought to allay. Things would not have been so bad, had the delay been short or had not the Bagdad press announced that Nuri Pasha was to visit Jedda on Ibn Saud's invitation to discuss the Arab Alliance. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came to see Sir A. Ryan on the 26th February, waving a Bagdad newspaper in which this tendentious statement was attributed to Nuri Pasha himself. In the course of a long conversation on the whole position Sir A. Ryan administered all the soothing syrup he could, but the outlook was not a happy one at the end of February.

Ibn Mashhur.

23. This question, of course, bobbed up again. It always does. On the 7th January the Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote a mild note to the Legation paying a tribute to King Feisal's attitude and enquiring as to the number and names of the companions of Ibn Mashhur whom it was proposed to hand over and the arrangements proposed for their delivery. While this was still under consideration, the Minister produced a further note of the 29th January, which *inter alia* strongly asserted the responsibility of His Majesty's Government for the surrender of Ibn Mashhur and explained that he had the King's instructions to discuss the matter orally with His Majesty's Minister with a view to elucidating the attitude of his Government. The note put two specific questions as to (1) what had passed between His Majesty's Government and the French Government regarding the passage of Ibn Mashhur through Syria, and (2) what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government if Ibn Mashhur should enter territory under British influence, *e.g.*, Palestine or Transjordan. The note ended with an offensive remark that "on the reply depends, to a great extent, the degree of confidence to be placed in official Government promises."

24. This note led to two conversations, the first with the Emir Feisal and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 31st January, the second with the Sheikh alone on the 1st February. Sir A. Ryan engaged in them not only because of the wish expressed by the Emir, but also because he wished to give His Majesty's Government plenty of time to consider their attitude. In the first conversation he stated

the position as he himself saw it, giving reasons why, in his opinion, His Majesty's Government had never had a formal responsibility for the return of Ibn Mashhur, though they had done all in their power to promote it. He strongly objected to the concluding phrase in the Minister's note, and elicited a lame explanation that it referred to the value not of British but Iraqi promises. The second conversation was acrimonious but fertile.

25. The matter cropped up again in the discussion on the 26th February (see paragraph 22) of the general position between Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd. Sheikh Yusuf remarked that his Government had been willing to postpone the Ibn Mashhur question until it could be discussed with Nuri Pasha, and had refrained from publicity. He accused the Iraq Government of having rushed into print with their version, and suggested that the Hejazi Government might have to alter their attitude. He was referring, it appeared, to the leading article in the "Near East" of the 5th February. Sir A. Ryan drew his attention to the letter in the same paper of the 25th December, in which Mr. Philby, a person known to be in the closest touch with the Hejazi Government, had publicly ventilated their grievance in a more extravagant form than they themselves had officially given it, for Mr. Philby had not only accused His Majesty's Government of failure to fulfil an obligation, but had stated that the obligation was one which they had admitted. The rest of the conversation on this point is not worth recording.

26. On the 2nd February the Legation had forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a list received from Bagdad of persons and property which they were prepared to hand over on the frontier at any date convenient to Ibn Saud. In reply to an advance intimation of this on the 1st February, Sheikh Yusuf remarked that no arms were mentioned. This gave rise to some inconclusive correspondence between Sir F. Humphrys and the Iraqi Government, and Sir Francis thought the matter had better be left for Nuri Pasha to discuss in Jedda. As for the Emir Feisal's note of the 28th January, which directly affected His Majesty's Government, they had not replied to it up to the end of February.

Koweit and Bahrein.

Persian Gulf Negotiations.

27. There were no important developments in January and February in connexion with the proposed discussion of Koweit questions, or, as Ibn Saud would like it to be, a general discussion of "Persian Gulf Questions." A certain amount of correspondence passed on incidental matters with results which may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) The proposal that the Political Resident in Bushire should visit Ibn Saud (December report, 7 (a)) followed the King to Riyadh, but reached him too late to be acted on. On his return to Mecca, he addressed a friendly letter to Sir A. Ryan on the 28th January expressing regret and offering to receive Colonel Biscoe in Jedda. This suggestion was negatived by His Majesty's Government, and Sir A. Ryan was instructed on the 4th February to return a suitably polite reply. He conveyed the substance of this through Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, but owing to various delays postponed any direct communication to the King until he could make it orally. The general position at the end of February was that it was hoped that an opportunity for a meeting between Ibn Saud and Colonel Biscoe in Nejd might present itself later, and it was considered that there was no such emergency about the Koweit questions as to necessitate their being discussed before the autumn. Meanwhile, it appears from various reports of the Political Resident that there has been a certain *rapprochement* between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit.
- (b) A suggestion was put forward in February that Colonel Biscoe might take advantage of Ibn Saud's invitation to Jedda to write himself to the King. It was considered at the Legation that it would be better not to do this and to confine action for the time being to the communication referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph.
- (c) His Majesty's Government decided in February to take a firm line with the Iraqi and Hejazi Governments regarding the allocation of the

£10,000 paid by the Hejazi Government last summer in fulfilment of the promise given by Ibn Saud to Colonel Biscoe in January 1930 (see report for September to November, 11 (b)). It was arranged that £7,000 should be given to Iraq and £3,000 to Koweit, as originally intended. The necessary drafts were sent by the Legation to Bagdad and Bushire on the 10th February, and the Hejazi Government were duly informed. They did not reply, but it is clear from the earlier correspondence and various conversations that they are unlikely to contest the allocation, which interests them only as far as it will affect the total amount eventually payable to Iraq under the settlement mentioned in paragraph 23.

- (d) A question which arose early in 1930 regarding the treatment of Bahrainis in El-Hasa gave rise to instructions to His Majesty's Minister in May to make general representations on their behalf to the Hejaz Government, if he saw no objection. The execution of these instructions having been delayed for more or less accidental reasons, Sir A. Ryan reconsidered the matter on his return from leave. On the 10th February, 1931, he reported that, in his opinion, it would now be preferable to postpone action pending developments in connexion with the Hejazi Law on Nationality and the possible general discussion of Persian Gulf questions.

New Trade Route.

28. Little more was heard in January and February of the proposed new route for pilgrims and trade from the Hasa Coast to the Hejaz (December report, section 8). The matter still appears to be engaging attention, however. In the course of general conversation at Mr. Philby's tea party on the 28th February, Ibn Saud admitted that it was intended to bore for water at Ras Tanuran, which has been thought of as a possible site for a future port. His Majesty said that no actual boring had taken place, but that he had ordered a start to be made after Ramadan.

Yemen and Asir.

29. There were still no signs in January and February of any serious repercussion on the relations between the Imam and Ibn Saud as a result of the latter's annexation of Asir. Both sides have been reported to be strengthening their military forces. In January the Italian Government manifested in London anxiety lest the two parties should come to blows, and suggested that they and His Majesty's Government should exert a moderating influence on the Imam and the King respectively. His Majesty's Minister was authorised, if at any time he received categorical information pointing to a danger of conflict, to make such representations as he might consider useful. No situation arose up to the end of February which would justify such intervention, and on the 28th February Sir A. Ryan was directed to take no action. It seems improbable than Ibn Saud, in his present financial straits, would embark on an adventure in the extreme south, though the temptation may ultimately be too strong for him; and there has been nothing to show that the measures which the Imam has almost certainly taken on his own side of the Asir frontier are more than defensive.

30. On the 14th February the Foreign Office reviewed the position in regard to Asir in an important paper addressed to the Colonial and India Offices. It analysed the legal situation as regards the consequences of Ibn Saud's action on the status of Asir, and as regards the treaty between Great Britain and Asir concluded in 1917. The legal conclusions were doubtful, but tended, as regards the treaty of 1917, to the view that, even if it had not previously ceased to operate for other reasons, it must now be regarded as having lapsed owing to the apparent extinction of the Idrisi as an international person, and as not being in its nature an instrument the benefits and obligations of which could be held to have passed to a succession State. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cited the agreements reached between His Majesty's Government and Italy in the course of the Rome Convention of 1927. The final conclusion from all these considerations was that, in Mr. Henderson's opinion, it would be best, subject to the concurrence of the departments addressed, to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Jedda not to

commit His Majesty's Government to recognition of the absorption of Asir into Ibn Saud's dominions, or to take any action implying such recognition without further instructions. It was suggested that the position regarding the 1917 treaty should be left intact in view of the possibility that it might usefully be invoked, if a turn of the tide should restore some measure of independence to the Idrisi.

III.—RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE ARABIA.

British Empire.

Courtesies.

31. His Majesty the King telegraphed congratulations to Ibn Saud on the occasion of the anniversary of the latter's accession, and a suitable reply was returned after an interval just long enough to admit of its having been drawn up by Ibn Saud himself at Riyadh. After correspondence with the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Minister attended various ceremonies on the 8th and 9th January, notwithstanding the recent death of the Princess Royal, a bereavement on which, in his father's absence, the Emir Feisal telegraphed condolences both to His Majesty the King and to the Legation in Jedda. The Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London postponed his reception in honour of Ibn Saud's accession until after the Court had gone out of mourning. The deferred reception was held at the Hyde Park Hotel on the 20th February.

Consuls at Bombay and Singapore.

32. The question of the proposed appointment of Hejaz-Nejd consuls at Bombay and Singapore (December report, section 10 (b)) was discussed between Sir A. Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 6th February, after it had been decided that the Singapore appointment might be agreed to in principle subject to safeguards roughly similar to those suggested for Bombay. Sir A. Ryan had been authorised to handle the matter on the lines suggested in his telegram of the 29th December. He obtained from the sheikh an admission that such appointments must be the subject of international agreement. He emphasised the readiness of His Majesty's Government to agree to the appointments in principle, but pointed out the necessity for safeguards for pilgrims, and asked for an assurance that, if the two consuls were appointed, Ibn Saud would be prepared to receive British consuls in his dominions. Both points were clearly unpalatable to the sheikh, who promised to submit the matter to the King, but did not return to the subject up to the end of February.

Money Order Agreement with India.

33. The Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department intimated to the Hejazi Director-General of Posts, &c., by a letter of the 31st December, their readiness to waive the proposed claim in the Money Order Agreement regarding interest on outstanding balances. Up to the end of February, however, the agreement was still unconcluded owing to difficulties of pure form.

Hejaz Railway.

34. On the 6th February Sheikh Yusuf Yasin expressed a wish to discuss on some future occasion the question of the Hejaz Railway, which had been in abeyance for a considerable time. He did not return to the subject up to the end of the month. His Majesty's Government are not anxious to pursue this subject unless it is forced upon them and Ibn Saud's personal attitude is obscure, as it is not certain how far he really wishes to raise the question or merely allows it to be played with for the edification of Moslems.

Ibn Saud's Buying Proposals.

35. The King's request that His Majesty's Government should act as his intermediary for purchases in Great Britain (July-August report, section 4 (c)) was carefully considered during and after Sir A. Ryan's visit to England on leave. The conclusions reached were embodied in a Foreign Office despatch of the 15th January prescribing the reply to be returned. Ibn Saud was to be

informed that His Majesty's Government could not act as buyers on his behalf, but they expressed willingness to give advice in connexion with particular transactions of importance, as they had done in the case of the Marconi wireless contract (September-November report, section 5). Sir A. Ryan was to urge upon the King the desirability of doing business through established houses. He was given discretion to point out the advantages presented in this respect by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., an old-established firm with wide connexions, and to impress on the King the importance of following sound methods as regards punctual payment, &c., if his Government wished to do business with British firms on favourable terms. Owing to pressure of other affairs, these instructions had not been carried out up to the 28th February.

France.

36. The negotiations for a treaty between France and Hejaz-Nejd were resumed when the Hejazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs returned to life at the end of January. Progress appears to have been made, but both sides have been reticent. It is partly clear that France will not insist on the slavery article (December report, section 11). The French consulate hoped to find some way round the difficulty over the Algerians at Medina, which is apparently not disposed of by the new Law on Nationality (paragraph 56).

Italy.

37. The negotiations for a treaty between Italy and Hejaz-Nejd were also resumed early in the year. Italy also apparently intends to abandon the slavery article. The Italian consul spoke to Sir A. Ryan vaguely of obtaining some substitute for it in the form of a declaration by Ibn Saud, but gave no indication of what exactly he had in view, if anything. Otherwise there has been much reticence about these, as about the French negotiations.

Germany.

38. The German Government apparently decided some little time ago to make Herr de Haas (September-November report, section 18 (b)) consul at Jedda, but he had not up to the time of writing made any communication to his future foreign colleagues. He is without official experience, and may be having difficulties in getting his position clear with the Hejazi Government. There are two versions: one that he wished to present credentials of some sort to the King; the other that he has applied for and is awaiting an exequatur. Meanwhile, he appears to be a somewhat enterprising business man, and has been first favourite in the competition for the Government benzine contract, formerly held by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. on behalf of Shell, but not renewed for 1931.

Egypt.

General.

39. The Egyptian consul is understood to have continued his conversations with a view to a settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and Egypt. A few days after his return to Jedda (December report, section 12), the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs denied in an interview given to a Cairo paper that the consul had been instructed to carry on negotiations, although it was admitted that M. Achmouni had brought back a letter from King Fuad to Ibn Saud in reply to one from the latter.

Aida Incident.

40. A small incident which might have complicated relations between Hejaz-Nejd and Egypt occurred on the 7th-8th February. Admiral Tomlin, head of the Egyptian Ports and Lights Administration, had projected a visit to Jedda in the course of a cruise of inspection in the administration's vessel "Aida." He had informed the Egyptian Government, and, supposing them to have made the necessary arrangements, arrived in Jedda on the 7th February. The Egyptian Government had, in fact, done nothing, although a belated

telegram reached the Egyptian consul more or less simultaneously with the "Aida's" arrival. The Hejazi Government took great offence. On the 8th February they addressed oral enquiries to Sir A. Ryan, who, though he had actually heard of the impending visit from Suez on the 6th February, naturally disclaimed any concern in the matter. Later in the morning the Egyptian consul called at the Legation in a state of great agitation, as he had arranged for Admiral Tomlin to call on the Acting Governor of Jedda, and had learnt that the latter had been instructed not to return the call. As the matter threatened to be disagreeable and to involve a British officer in the Egyptian service, His Majesty's Minister offered to use his good offices as a friend of both parties, and was able to put the matter in such a way that the Hejazi Government relented. Not only was the admiral's call properly returned, but presents of sheep, &c., were sent on board the "Aida." The impression left by the incident was that, although Ibn Saud had mounted his high horse, not without reason, he was pleased enough to ride out of the affair on a friendly British intervention.

Other Powers.

41. There is nothing of importance to record. The Persian Legation remained closed during the two months (December report, section 14). The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires was absent from Jedda on a tour in the Sudan for two or three weeks, and left again on the 25th February to visit Aden, Kamaran, the Yemen, and, if possible, Hadramaut, between which country and Java there is said to be much intercourse.

IV.—AIR MATTERS.

Hejaz Air Force.

42. The deplorable situation in this force (December report, section 15) became more deplorable in January. The four remaining mechanics resigned about the end of December and left on the 11th February, the other two having already gone. This reduced the force to three pilots, one of whom, Mr. Lowe, was not on speaking terms with his colleagues, engaged apparently in intrigues with certain local officers and boycotted the Legation. Sir A. Ryan doubted whether he could usefully intervene, but His Majesty's Government still hoped at the end of January that the elimination of Mr. Lowe would do good. On the 2nd February, acting under instructions, he discussed the situation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and strongly advised the discharge of Mr. Lowe. The ins and outs of the matter are too complicated to be stated briefly. The position at the end of February was that the other two pilots had threatened some time before to resign, if Mr. Lowe were not dismissed, but all three were still employed.

43. Late in January His Majesty's Government furnished material for a reply to the Hejazi Government's request for assistance in connexion with the spare parts for the aeroplanes (September-November report, section 21). The reply regarding instructional machines and machine-guns reached the Legation on the 25th February, but action on the despatch was delayed by the Transjordan frontier crisis.

44. In February the Legation succeeded after long efforts in recovering from the Hejazi Government a balance of £14 7s. due in respect of travelling expenses back to Iraq of the pilot lent by the Royal Air Force when the Hejaz Air Force was transferred to Jedda. This trifle is placed on record, as it was the one solid diplomatic triumph achieved during the period under review. The gilt was taken off the Minister's gingerbread when the Command Accountant in Iraq asked him to recover £30 more, which had been advanced to the officer before he started and which he had apparently overlooked. Sir A. Ryan, having, as he thought, disposed of the matter financially on the bases of the earlier claim, suggested that, if a further claim were to be made, it should be submitted to the Air Ministry to be dealt with in consultation with the Foreign Office.

Arabian Air Route.

45. The question was raised in February whether a renewed effort should be made this year to obtain Ibn Saud's consent to British aircraft flying over the Hasa coast (see report for July-August, section 24). The Legation was

informed towards the end of February that the project of pearly flights between Bahrein and Iraq had been dropped. His Majesty's Government were, however, anxious to secure general facilities for the use of the El Hasa route by British aircraft, whether military or civil. His Majesty's Minister was given discretion as to how much should be asked for in the first instance, and as to how and when the matter should be broached. The objective was, not to request general permission to fly over Nejd territory, but to ensure that any aircraft compelled to enter or alight therein, should receive general assistance and good treatment; that no objection should be raised to the despatch of assistance by air, if necessary; and that the pilots should have knowledge of the position of landing grounds between Koweit and Bahrein, of which there should preferably be three, to be spaced at intervals of about 60 miles and to be chosen, if possible, in consultation with the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq. These instructions were issued on the 26th February.

V.—MILITARY MATTERS.

General.

46. There is nothing definite to record about military movements. Reference has been made in paragraph 29 to alleged despatches of forces to Asir. The King would appear to have brought back a good many Nejd fighting men on his return from Riyadh to Mecca. Their prowess as dancers has been described in paragraph 9.

New Regular Army.

47. The organisation of a regular army in the Hejaz, though very embryonic, has made some progress. The Director of Military Organisation mentioned in section 26 of the September–November report gave place shortly after his appointment to another Syrian ex-Turkish officer, German-trained, named Faudhi-al-Kawokji. This officer fought against the French during the Syrian revolt and came to the Hejaz as a refugee. The results of his efforts to create a regular army were seen at a review in Jedda on the King's Accession Day. The march past consisted of two detachments of infantry, about 500 men in all, reasonably workmanlike and disciplined; pack animals with various equipment and about 100 men in charge; two armoured cars; a disorderly rout of less than forty horsemen posing as "cavalry"; and a much more impressive camel corps of from 300 to 400 men. Although the army is being organised in the Hejaz, most of the men in it appear to be Nejdīs. The Bedouin review on the 27th February (paragraph 9) began with a small turn out of regular infantrymen. These, after performing their European evolutions, sought and obtained the King's permission to take part in the war-dance. Faudhi Bey seems to be a man of intelligence and initiative. He told Sir A. Ryan in February that he intended to start a school for n.c.o.'s. This is probably sensible, as trained ex-Turkish officers are available for present requirements in the higher ranks. It appeared from Faudhi Bey's conversation that the King's ultimate ideal is to have a regular army for the whole of his dominions.

VI.—NAVAL MATTERS.

British.

48. The Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, arrived in Jedda on the 13th February in H.M.S. "Lupin" and stayed three days. The opportunity was taken of discussing with Captain Dicken various matters of naval interest including the following:—

- (a) Restrictions, if any, to be placed on searches for arms in Hejazi territorial waters and in dhows of Hejazi nationality outside them (July–August report, section 34).
- (b) Possibility of more frequent visits to Jedda and of reviving the practice of visiting other ports.
- (c) Naval salutes for Hejazi dignitaries.

A practically complete measure of personal agreement was reached on these subjects, but, as final decisions have still to be taken at home, any further account of them is deferred owing to considerations of space.

French.

49. The French sloop "Baccarat" visited Jedda from the 6th to 10th January. The officers were much in evidence during the festivities in honour of the King's accession.

50. Rear-Admiral Deville, Commander-in-chief of the French naval division in the Levant, arrived at Jedda from Port Sudan in the naval yacht "Diana" on the 18th February and left for Suez on the 20th February. This was the last stage of a lengthy journey by land and sea across Syria and Iraq and round from the Persian Gulf. The admiral was good enough to call privately at the British Legation, and expressed much appreciation of the courtesy he had received throughout his journey from British authorities. The "Diana" accorded a salute of thirteen guns to the Acting Governor of Jedda, to whom it had been decided that H.M.S. "Lupin" should not give a salute in view of his subordinate position and the unsettled state of the general question.

VII.—PILGRIMAGE.

Forged Rupee Notes.

51. See December report, section 19. No definite news reached Jedda in January or February regarding the progress made by the French authorities in Syria. It was suggested towards the end of February that it might be well for the member of the Legation Staff who dealt with the matter last year to address a final letter to the broker in Syria, in order to disarm the suspicion that might result from complete silence. This suggestion was referred to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut for his views on the 9th March.

Movement of Pilgrims.

52. A much reduced pilgrimage was still anticipated at the end of February, although the prospect as regards numbers was perhaps a little better than in December. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 13th March put the total of arrivals up to date at 20,337. The total number of Dutch East Indian pilgrims, including the last arrivals in March, is about 15,000, not including children, or rather less than half the figure for last year. Pilgrim ships from India brought 1,679 pilgrims up to the 28th February. On this same date 397 had arrived from Malaya. It is difficult to estimate the probable number of Egyptians, who are for obvious reasons late starters. The Khedivial Mail Steamship Company would appear to have lost the contract for transporting them, but the information in Jedda on this subject is meagre. It is stated that the pilgrimage from Algeria has been prohibited for sanitary reasons, a decision which, if confirmed, will seriously affect the movement from French North Africa as a whole.

Control of Nigerian Pilgrims.

53. Arrangements were made more or less informally in February for the Commissioner at Port Sudan to visit Jedda in order to discuss this question further, with a view to the elaboration of a scheme which might in due course be proposed to the Nigerian Government as an effort to secure their main desiderata without overtaxing the means at the disposal of the Sudan Government and the Legation in Jedda (December report, section 21).

VIII.—SLAVERY.

54. The number of slaves manumitted by the Legation in January and February was three, all of whom were male. One other man, an Abyssinian, took refuge, but relinquished his desire for freedom. There is reason to suppose that the local authorities have taken measures to make it more difficult for slaves to obtain access to the Legation, e.g., by prohibiting the movement of negroes in the interior without permits. Information of this kind is difficult to control. A concrete instance of obstruction of another kind occurred on the 17th January when the Acting Governor of Jedda, acting under instructions from Mecca, showed hesitation in giving the necessary paper to enable a freed slave to be embarked for Massowah next day. The notice given was admittedly short, but, in

order to discourage the tendency to obstruct, the Legation telegraphed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Mecca, with the result that orders were given in time for the man to be embarked according to plan; but only after the Legation had, by considerable use of the telephone, tracked the progress of its own telegram through all stages.

IX.—MISCELLANEOUS.

Reuter Service.

55. No progress appears to have been made.

Law on Nationality.

56. The "Umm-al-Qura" of the 13th February published the text of a regulation amending the Regulation on Hejazi Nationality promulgated in 1926. In view of the importance of these enactments an attempt has been made in the appendix to this report to produce a consolidated English text giving their combined effect. The law of 1926 was much criticised by foreign Powers, and in 1927 His Majesty's Government sought to establish certain principles which they hoped might be embodied in an exchange of notes. Negotiations in 1928 led to no result, and, as the law was not in practice giving rise to much difficulty, the matter was allowed to stand over until the summer of 1930, when it was thought desirable to reopen it in order to facilitate the settlement of certain particular questions affected by it. Little progress was then made beyond ascertaining that the Hejaz Government were disposed to satisfy His Majesty's Government on certain points but, through jealousy of their sovereign rights, wished to proceed by way of legislation of their own. On the other hand the Legation found it necessary to seek further guidance from His Majesty's Government on various matters, a final decision on which was not taken until the 6th February, when instructions were sent to Sir A. Ryan.

57. Before those instructions reached Jedda, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had intimated that the Hejaz Government were anxious to get on with the new law and expressed a wish to discuss the matter unofficially. This led to a conversation on the 4th February, to which Sir A. Ryan consented rather than run the risk of seeing an unsatisfactory new law promulgated without previous discussion. It appeared from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's explanations that the Hejaz Government proposed to meet the views of His Majesty's Government on two important points, viz., the wording of article 3, which originally asserted the Hejazi nationality of all persons born in the Hejaz, without right of subsequent option; and the wording of article 10, which, in its original form, provided that any foreigner "residing" in the Hejaz who was not in possession of documents proving his nationality would be deemed a Hejazi as from the date of the law. The amending regulation promulgated shortly after the above conversation provides more satisfactory texts of those two articles; although His Majesty's Government would have preferred article 3 to be given such a form that Hejazi nationality acquired by birth did not take effect until the child had attained his majority, subject then to a right of option; and the new wording of article 10 is not so precise as could be wished. The Hejaz Government could not see their way to accept a suggestion of His Majesty's Government that the words "who have in the past" should be omitted from article 6 or that in practice the clause containing them should not be applied retrospectively.

58. From a practical point of view the amended law seems unlikely, if it is faithfully applied, to impose any hardship on British subjects and protected persons. In his conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 4th February, Sir A. Ryan intimated that he would not consider the acquisition of Hejazi nationality by a child born in the Hejaz of British parents as necessarily precluding the Legation from intervening in certain circumstances on behalf of the child and its parents. He had in mind such a case as that of the technically Hejazi minor daughter of a British subject being abducted, in which case it should be possible to intervene at the instance of the injured father.

59. It is important to note that the law has now been expressly extended to the whole of Ibn Saud's dominions, though without any express mention of Asir.

Beacons at Yanbo.

60. Two beacons were swept away by storms in December and January thus increasing the danger of approaching this always difficult port. As it is principally frequented by Khedivial steamers the Legation strongly urged that the beacons should be restored without delay. This work had not been completed by the 28th February, but the prospect of its being done was good, helped perhaps by a personal conversation which Mr. Hope-Gill had with the Emir of Yanbo on his voyage to Suez at the end of January. The Khedivial Company themselves propounded a scheme for supplying a complete outfit of five or six beacons at a little over £100 each, but the Hejazi authorities found this beyond their means and preferred to undertake the essential work themselves.

Approach to Jedda.

61. Sir A. Ryan had some general conversation with the Emir Feisal, during the latter's formal visit on the 1st February, about the desirability of port improvements. The Emir assured him that the whole subject was receiving earnest consideration. Inshallah!

Indian Visitors.

62. Three members of the Round Table Conference announced their intention of paying short visits to the Hejaz on their return. Two of them, including Sir Akbar Hydari, abandoned the visits. The third, Nawab Mar Jang, Foreign Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad, arrived with his family on the 10th February and left on the 15th February after visiting Mecca and Medina. The Legation had asked for ordinary facilities. The result was that Ibn Saud took complete possession of the Nawab and himself made all arrangements as for a Royal guest.

Yacht "Sister Anne."

63. The yacht "Sister Anne," having on board the owner, the Hon. Mrs. R. Fellowes (a French lady, *née* Decazes), and two other ladies, visited Jedda in February. She called at Yanbo on her way north, with the assent of the Hejazi Government, intending merely to lie off for the night. In the event the ladies were very hospitably welcomed on shore by the local authorities.

Legation Staff.

64. Mr. Wikeley returned from sick leave on the 20th January after undergoing an operation for appendicitis in Egypt. Mr. Hope-Gill went on long leave on the 30th January.

Book on Stamps.

65. Captain C. C. Lewis of the Legation Staff projects a book on Hejaz-Nejd stamps since 1926. His Majesty's Minister has asked unofficially on his behalf for facilities and permission to dedicate the book to Ibn Saud. Sheikh Yusuf's reaction in February was favourable.

Meteorological.

66. After the middle of January the climate was unusually clement until the end of February, not much hotter than in a really warm English summer, minus the rain, of which there was very little. Owing to Mr. Hope-Gill's absence it is proposed to reserve the meteorological record until the May-June report and then, if possible, to give the figures for the first six months of 1931.

APPENDIX.

Nationality Law.

Consolidated text showing the effect of the Amending Regulation of February 1931 on the original Regulation on Hejazi Nationality promulgated on Rabi-al-Awwal, 1345 (the 29th September, 1926). Amendments in the original text are shown by underlining.⁽¹⁾ Relevant provisions in the Amending Regulation which cannot be so shown are noted in brackets. Several articles, the text of which is not expressly changed, are nevertheless affected by the extension of the Regulation to Nejd as well as the Hejaz.

REGULATION OF HEJAZ-NEJD NATIONALITY.

(Article 1 of the Amending Regulation provides that the regulation, the title of which is thus altered, shall apply to subjects of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies. Article 4 provides that "All dealings and acts done in accordance with the original regulation since its promulgation up to the promulgation of this amendment shall be deemed lawful, effective and unchangeable.")

Article 1. Persons of Hejaz origin or residence, who were Ottoman subjects before the Great War, are considered Hejazis.

Art. 2. Persons born of Hejazi parents, or whose father is a Hejazi, are Hejazis.

Art. 3 (modified throughout).—*Every person born in the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd will be deemed a Hejazi or Nejdi national, subject to the provision that persons born in those territories of foreign parents shall have the right to opt for the original nationality of their parents during one year after they reach the age of 18, and if they fail to notify the Hejaz-Nejd authorities of their choice during that fixed period they shall lose their right to opt.*

Art. 4. Any Moslem who is not a minor and has resided in the Hejaz for three consecutive years is entitled to adopt Hejaz nationality after application to the authorities either directly or indirectly.

Art. 5. Hejaz nationality may be granted by a special Royal irada to any Moslem, when such appears to the advantage of the Hejaz.

Art. 6. A Hejazi cannot adopt foreign nationality, either in the Hejaz or abroad, without proper authorisation from the Hejaz Government, which can only be by Royal irada.

(Article 6 of the Amending Regulation adds the further provision that "Hejazi or Nejdi nationals who renounce their nationality and become naturalised as nationals of a foreign State without permission of the Hejaz-Nejd Government will not be allowed to reside in or return to the Hejaz or Nejd.")

Art. 7. Hejazis who accept military service under a foreign Government without previous authority from the Hejaz Government may lose their Hejaz nationality. Such persons may also be prohibited from returning to or residing in the Hejaz.

Art. 8. A woman of alien nationality who marries a Hejazi becomes a Hejazi, and will not lose her Hejaz nationality on termination of the marriage, unless she reside abroad and readopt her former nationality. A Hejazi woman who marries an alien reassumes her Hejaz nationality on termination of the marriage.

Art. 9. When a Hejazi adopts a foreign nationality, his young (minor?) children do not assume that nationality while they are resident in the Hejaz.

If their residence is in a place other than the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd and the nationality regulation of the country in which their father has been naturalised does not entitle them to adopt that nationality, they will remain Hejazis or Nejdīs, but if such regulation of the country in which their father has been naturalised entitles them to adopt that nationality, they will have the right to revert to Hejazi or Nejdi nationality when they reach the age of 18 if they choose to do so.

⁽¹⁾ Printed in italics.

Art. 10 (modified throughout).—*Every person who was resident in the territories of the Hejaz or Nejd at the date of the promulgation of the Regulation on Nationality of Rabi-al-Awwal 1345 shall be deemed Hejazi or Nejdi unless his foreign nationality is proved by official documents.*

Art. 11. This regulation is to be considered effective as from the date of promulgation.

Our Viceroy is charged with the application of this law.

(Article 9 of the Amending Regulation empowers the Viceroy to issue instructions relative to the application of the provisions of both regulations. Article 10 brings the Amending Regulation into force from the date of promulgation.)

[E 2222/2222/25]

No. 92.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 2, 1931.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5 of 6th January last, I have the honour to state that, in the course of general conversation with Sheikh Yussuf Yasin on the 29th March, I remarked that I saw by the "Near East" of the 12th February that he was making good progress with the negotiations with France and Italy. The sheikh seemed to think that I was getting at him in some way. He said that he had not seen the "Near East," and would have preferred that nothing should be published until all was settled. I told him that I was only interested in the matter in a general way, just as the Hejaz-Nejd Minister in London might be interested in the recent naval negotiations. I had much too much business of my own to concern myself otherwise.

2. This elicited a very slight burst of confidence. The sheikh said that the negotiations with France and Italy were getting on, but that the attitude of Great Britain had created some difficulty. I expressed surprise, and asked what he meant. He explained that he was not referring to interference, but to the fact that France and Italy wanted certain things that had been conceded to His Majesty's Government, notably an article on slavery, which the Hejaz Government were not prepared to agreed to. I said nothing further about the French and Italian position in this matter, but observed that slavery was, of course, a very important question. It interested my own Government greatly, and it was an international question which interested all Powers belonging to the League of Nations. I referred to my conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer (see my despatch No. 187 of the 23rd July, 1930).

3. Sheikh Yussuf was emphatic that Ibn Saud had taken the most stringent measures to prevent the importation of slaves. He had also taken measures to prevent persons being sold into slavery in the interior of his dominions, *e.g.*, by persons coming on pilgrimage.

4. The most interesting points in what the sheikh said were his admission that the pilgrimage might be an occasional means of bringing slaves on to the market, and a remark that it was contrary to religious law that people should be sold into slavery in this way.

5. I have no means of ascertaining to what extent any prohibition of import of slaves is enforced. It is obvious that so long as there is a supply and a demand, such measures can be easily circumvented, either with the connivance of competent local authorities or by landing slaves from dhows away from seaports. It is at least satisfactory that Ibn Saud, while unwilling to commit himself to other Powers and entirely recalcitrant to any idea of suppressing slavery as an institution, is conscious of his commitment to His Majesty's Government. It is useful to remind him of it from time to time, as opportunities occur.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2225/387/25]

No. 93.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 126.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 2, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to state that Sheikh Yussuf Yasin called on me on the 1st April to talk over privately the general state of the relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. He had proposed this visit, without indicating its object, at the end of a personal letter informing me of the settlement of the question of the arrears due to the Eastern Telegraph Company. When he came, he explained that he had hung his request to see me on to that matter, because there was a connexion between it and the much more general purpose he now had in view. He had thought of putting what he had to say in writing, but the King had preferred that he should do it by word of mouth.

2. The sheikh expatiated, in the kind of language to which we are accustomed, on Ibn Saud's desire for sincere friendship with and his reliance on Great Britain. From a general statement, of which this was the padding, I extracted four points, which, after hearing it, I enumerated for the purposes of my reply. They were as follows:—

- (1) The King and his Government had of late been reduced to a state of perplexity by the severe attitude in the recent past of His Majesty's Government and myself. They were anxious lest this attitude should reflect a change of policy towards this country.
- (2) The severity in question had been exhibited more particularly in connexion with the Transjordan frontier question. (In this part of his statement, the sheikh spoke of the frontier question as one in which his Government regarded themselves as being the injured party.)
- (3) Similar severity had marked my representations in connexion with the Eastern Telegraph Company claim.
- (4) The sheikh hinted, rather than said, that my own recent language had been peculiarly stiff and rigorous and had contributed to the disquietude of the King and the Hejazi Government.

3. I replied at considerable length to Sheikh Yussuf Yasin, thinking that it would be useful to speak to him candidly, though temperately, provided I confined myself to personal expressions of opinion. The general tenor of the conversation was more important than its details and it is therefore unnecessary to record what passed, except in brief outline.

4. Having isolated Sheikh Yussuf's points as above, I took them in reverse order. I explained my personal position as being that of a Minister who had been appointed here in rather unusual circumstances in order to promote the growth of good relations already existing. I had held in agreement with the King and Fuad Bey Hamza that frankness, even if it sometimes entailed disagreeably strong language, was the best diplomacy. If my methods led to the failure of my efforts, I should not shrink particularly from being relieved of a post which had its disadvantages, despite my interest in my work and the kindness which I had received.

5. Turning to particular questions, I reminded Sheikh Yussuf that I had discussed many questions of importance since the beginning of February, and that the two he had named were the only two which had given rise to serious trouble. The others had not all been settled, but some of them had been disposed of and the rest were following a normal course.

6. I had, I said, taken a strong line on the question of the Eastern Telegraph Company, simply because it had gone on for years and had become a scandal, owing to the failure of the Hejazi Postal Administration to carry out its obligations under the agreement.

7. I recapitulated the history of the Transjordan frontier question throughout the period during which I had dealt with it. My ultimate conversation with Sheikh Yussuf Yasin early in February had been fairly satisfactory. Just about that time, however, His Majesty's Government had been strongly impressed by a report from Captain Glubb, whose views were endorsed by all other competent observers in Transjordan. They considered it necessary to make the strongest possible representations and after mature consideration of every material factor,

including my latest conversation, they had decided that it was imperative to take a strong line.

8. I told Sheikh Yussuf that I was a talkative man. He would have noticed that, except for two passing references, I had kept complete silence on this question since my audience on the 2nd March. The reason for that was that His Majesty's Government were themselves dealing with the matter. I had no authority to discuss it further. If I were to express my personal opinion, it would be that the recent communications from the Hejazi Government had been unsatisfactory. The matter was, however, out of my hands and I could not say what its outcome would be.

9. I then took Sheikh Yussuf's first point. I said that there was no general change in His Majesty's Government towards Ibn Saud. Nevertheless, particular questions might affect the relations of States, if they were of sufficient importance. The Eastern Telegraph Company question was not of that importance. The Transjordan question might be. Even so, it was the practice of His Majesty's Government to deal as far as possible with all questions, even the most important, on their individual merits. They had not, for instance, allowed the Transjordan question to stand in the way of Nuri Pasha's visit as they might have done even though they were no longer directly concerned in the negotiations for which he was coming. They had, like the Hejazi Government, given no publicity to the existence of an acute controversy. Had they let it be known, Ibn Saud might have sustained damage, *e.g.*, it would have affected the Indian pilgrimage, the only element in the whole of this year's pilgrimage which seemed likely to be up to last year's strength.

10. As for myself, I said, I had continued to discuss other questions which were already in hand. The only change I had made was that I had delayed certain communications pending a settlement of the one capital question. I had been at pains to avoid any fresh cause of quarrel, *e.g.*, I had in one case acted with great restraint over a new non-political question, that of the Government chauffeurs. We then had some conversation on that subject, on which I have reported separately.

11. My main object throughout this conversation was to impress Sheikh Yussuf with the extreme importance of the Transjordan frontier question, without involving myself in any discussion of its recent phases. Though perturbed over it, he gave me the impression of thinking that it had ceased to be acute, as, for instance, when he said that he had waited until things were easier to make his general communication. When he was leaving I asked him to convey my respects to the King and to assure His Majesty that I was always striving for a good understanding; but I added that there was one cloud, and that that cloud had not been dispersed.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad and to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2230/2/25]

No. 94.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 140.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 13, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to submit a fuller account of the proceedings during the visit of the Prime Minister for Iraq to this country. Although it may be some little time before I can send this despatch, I think it will conduce to clarity if I embody in it all that I know of what passed while Nuri Pasha was actually here and reserve for a further report anything that I may hear from the other side in due course.

2. Nuri Pasha arrived in Jedda by Khedivial steamer from Suez on the morning of Easter Sunday, the 5th April, accompanied by three other delegates, namely, Taha Pasha El Hashimi, Muwaffaq Bey El Alousi and Ahmed Bey Manafisi. Considering it appropriate in the circumstances to show special courtesy, although the mission were the guests of the Hejazi Government, I sent

Mr. Wikeley to present compliments to Nuri Pasha on board and myself met him on the quay.

3. From what the Pasha told Mr. Wikeley, it appeared that he expected to find Ibn Saud in Jedda. As a matter of fact, not only the King but our nominal Minister for Foreign Affairs sat tight in Mecca. Minor officials greeted Nuri Pasha on board, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, with the Governor of Jedda and others, received him on the quay. A respectable guard was turned out and there were plenty of cars, but the reception otherwise was, perhaps, hardly adequate to the principal visitor's rank, according to oriental ideas.

4. I had understood that Nuri Pasha would be accommodated at the villa outside Jedda usually assigned to official European visitors of high rank, and had supposed that the main negotiations would take place in Jedda. It was, in fact, the intention that the mission should be put up at Kandara, at any rate for the first night, and that Yusuf Yasin should give a dinner, to which I was to be bidden. This plan was upset, apparently by Nuri Pasha himself, and the mission went on to Mecca in the afternoon. I at first supposed that this might be due to an objection on the Pasha's part to being put off with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, but I cannot affirm this now. The Pasha had expected to arrive on the 4th April and to leave on the 11th. The Khedivial time table did not allow of his getting here before the 5th and necessitated his leaving on the 8th or 9th. Expedition was therefore essential, and it was certainly a more practical plan, as Ibn Saud elected to remain in Mecca, to mobilise everybody concerned there as soon as possible.

5. The same need for haste probably accounted for the fact that the Pasha did not call on me after his arrival, although he sent a card. Nothing in our subsequent intercourse could justify me in supposing that he wished to ignore me or come the Premier over a British representative of inferior rank. When I met him he hailed me as an old friend, for he had come to see me in 1913 or 1914 when he was a young officer in Constantinople for some political purpose. I gathered afterwards that it had to do with the events which led to the arrest by the Turkish Government of the well-known El Masri and the intervention of the British Embassy to prevent his being put to death.

6. So the mission and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin hurried off to Mecca on the afternoon of the 5th April. I heard nothing further until the 7th, when the telephone wires buzzed with enquiries about steamers to take Taha Pasha and Muwaffaq Bey to Hodeidah and Nuri Pasha himself to Suez. I received the same day a reply to a suggestion I had broached just after the mission arrived that they should dine at the Legation any night that would fit in with the official programme. I had not pursued this further after the mission's departure for Mecca, but I received a spontaneous intimation on the 7th that they and Yusuf Yasin would dine with us next evening, but that the Emir Feisal could not leave Mecca. There was still no news of the progress of the negotiations.

7. On the afternoon of the 9th Sheikh Yusuf Yasin telephoned to ask whether we should mind if he and Nuri Pasha were late for dinner. He added, on Nuri Pasha's behalf and his own, that things were going well and that everything was nearly settled. I replied that, if they brought news of a complete agreement on all important matters, it would be a happy evening for me as well as for them. This little bit of encouragement was my only intervention in the actual negotiations. Later, I heard that all the important questions had been settled, not without difficulty, and when the Pasha and the Sheikh arrived late at the Legation they were extremely pleased both with themselves and with each other. The utmost good feeling prevailed at our party, which was attended by Nuri Pasha, Ahmed Bey, Sheikh Yusuf, with other local notables, selected members of the British community and the representatives of countries bordering on Iraq.

8. I have related these individually trivial incidents in detail, as they show the setting of the first meeting of capital importance in which Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd have met, conscious of the presence of His Majesty's Government in the background, but not looking to them for guidance. The event has proved me wrong in my forecast that they would be unable to agree without British mediation. It almost looks as though both sides wished to show how well Arabs could get on if left to themselves; but it is only fair to add that, when I warmly congratulated Nuri Pasha and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the outcome, they acknowledged handsomely how much they owed to Great Britain and her representatives.

9. As regards the actual negotiations, I can add little material to what I have telegraphed. Sheikh Yusuf said that he hoped to see me in two or three days after a necessary return to Mecca. Meanwhile I have only the information which Nuri Pasha gave me on the evening of the 8th April. He expressed spontaneously a wish to tell me something about what had passed. We talked privately for over an hour after dinner, but I confined myself to asking only such questions as arose out of his explanations and put only one important question of my own, namely, whether he had disposed of the Ibn Mashhur affair. He replied to this question affirmatively but without going into detail.

10. Nuri Pasha did not dwell on the question of the desert posts, but it appeared from his rather vague statement that it had once more been agreed to have recourse to arbitration after a further attempt to settle the matter amicably. He had had difficulty in getting the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement actually signed. The Hejazis raised all sorts of points of detail, and it was evident from what the Pasha told me that they were still reluctant to commit themselves finally to "Bon-Voisinage" without being sure of an extradition treaty. On the 6th and 7th April he found Yusuf Yasin sticky, and the 8th April was a difficult day. Nuri Pasha went off to the King at least twice, and eventually the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement was signed, while the question of extradition was still under discussion. I did not gather what form had been finally given to the clause on political offenders in the text of the Extradition Agreement. Nuri Pasha spoke more of the play which he had made with the Iraqi law on raiding and of the letter in agreed terms which it was finally settled that he should write on that subject. He gave me no details of the subsidiary questions which the King had wished to discuss, such as wells near the frontier, the collection of taxes in the neutral zone and Wakfs, but said that the King had accepted his view that these matters could be settled best in later correspondence. He left Mecca without having actually signed the Extradition Agreement, but the text signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th April was brought to Jedda at midnight and Nuri Pasha signed it here on the morning of the 9th April. It is interesting to note that the Prince-Minister apparently played no rôle except as a signatory of texts.

11. Nuri Pasha seemed to be confident of putting both the agreements through the Iraq Parliament before the end of the present session.

12. I was struck by the Pasha's eagerness to get the question of Sultan Al Atrash and his followers settled on the basis of their being received in Iraq. That must be my justification for troubling you with a separate telegram on a subject with which I have not had occasion to deal previously, although I have followed the correspondence with care.

13. Nuri Pasha said that he had been anxious to explain to the King his reasons for sending Taha Pasha El Hashimi and Muwaffaq Bey to Sana and to assure himself that it would not indispose Ibn Saud if they went on straight from here. To me he explained that Taha Pasha had been employed as Chief of Staff, I did not gather when or by what Government, in the Yemen and knew the Imam well. He was therefore peculiarly qualified to explore a situation of which very little was known. He believed that His Majesty's Government themselves had only scanty information. Taha Pasha and his colleagues were unable to catch a south-bound steamer leaving here on the 8th April and stayed behind in Mecca when Nuri Pasha came here.

14. The Pasha mentioned one matter not recorded in my telegrams, namely, that he had reconciled Ibn Saud to Dr. Abdullah Damluji, and had received a friendly message from His Majesty to deliver to that gentleman.

15. Nuri Pasha left Jedda on the 9th August by the Khedivial steamer which had brought him and which delayed its return to Suez twenty-four hours to give him more time. He was seen off by much the same local notables as had received him, except that I think Sheikh Yusuf Yasin went on board. The Turkish and Persian representatives, Mr. Wikeley and I also went to the quay.

16. Altogether the mission has been a greater success than I had dared to anticipate. Both sides have shown qualities of statesmanship. They will doubtless quarrel a great deal in the future, but the present agreement with them marks a notable advance along the road which His Majesty's Government wish to see the Arab States follow in their relations with each other. If Nuri Pasha has a fault it is, perhaps, that he exaggerates his personal success with

people like the King and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. He is, I fancy, too much of a European in externals and too little of a practising Moslem to appeal to them really. On the other hand, he seems to have been both businesslike and conciliatory, and his general qualities could not fail both to impress and to attract others, however different their outlook. He seems to have a gift for remembering people. Changes of hair and headdress make recognition difficult in the Near East of to-day, but it was delightful to see the Prime Minister of Iraq twice chuck the Hejazi Director-General of Military Organisation under the chin when the former discovered an old colleague in the latter; and the Pasha and the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires were with difficulty parted at 1 A.M. after they had located a common past.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2181/387/25]

No. 95.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 30, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 110 of 26th April: Raiding situation on the Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier.

1. Hejazi Government do not reply regarding local supervision of arrangements for mutual restoration of loot. Their failure to do so, if deliberate, is most unsatisfactory, and they should in any case be pressed to accept proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to agree that restitution should take place in every case as soon as sanction of Governments is received.

2. Conditions attached by Hejazi Government to attendance of sheikhs seem likely to render their presence purposeless. His Majesty's Government desire that in cases where Government representatives think it advisable, representative sheikhs, who are people directly involved and responsible, and are alone possessed of full knowledge of facts, should be enabled to give evidence to the representative of either Government. If you think fit, you may say that restrictive conditions which Hejazi Government seek to impose on this point threaten to defeat chief object of meeting and can only convey impression that Hejazi Government are not genuinely anxious to reach satisfactory settlement.

3. His Majesty's Government propose that pronouncement against raiding should be made on same date by both sides. Please urge Hejazi Government to agree and to propose early date for simultaneous publication in terms proposed.

4. Please take action on above lines as soon as you learn that High Commissioner for Transjordan has no objection. I leave manner, form and force of your representations on each point to your discretion in light of your appreciation of Hejazi attitude.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 55.)

[E 2181/387/25]

No. 96.

Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 7.)

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.)

May 5, 1931.

FOLLOWING addressed to Jedda, telegram No. 39:—

"Secretary of State's telegram No. 55 of 30th April, paragraph 4. I have no objection."

[E 2417/387/25]

No. 97.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 7, 1931.

TRANSJORDAN telegram No. 39 to me, repeated to Colonial Office, No. 40.

As all Hejaz personages concerned are at Mecca, I took following action on 6th May:—

I addressed note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs consisting of formal preamble and numbered paragraphs stating points in your telegram No. 76 transposed so as to follow order in which they arise out of recent correspondence.

Paragraph 1 is based on your paragraph 3 with addition of request for information as to manner in which Hejaz Government propose to give necessary publicity to announcement.

Paragraph 2 is based on your paragraph 1, omitting suggestion of deliberate omission, but restating desideratum in express terms.

Paragraph 3 closely follows your paragraph 2, omitting words "can any [sic] only convey" to the end.

Concluding paragraph states that these points are put forward with the sole object of making meeting the means of arriving at settlement whereby frontier situation may be on sound basis, and recommends them to the earnest attention of the King and Government.

I addressed simultaneously to Fuad personal letter, of which the following is very condensed summary:—

"Correspondence up to date has produced two results, viz., agreement on preliminary meeting and agreement on further meeting as soon as details of procedure are settled to dispose of recent raids. I need not now say anything further about the former, except to repeat what I said to Yusuf Yasin as to importance of elasticity. I cannot conceal unfavourable impression made on His Majesty's Government by restrictions with which Hejaz Government have sought to surround the other meeting. Please read note to-day in the light of this statement, which I prefer to make personally in view of our joint desire to bring matters to successful issue. His Majesty's Government having reluctantly agreed to decisions being *ad referendum*, it is all the more important that there should be no doubt or delay over restitution once they are sanctioned. His Majesty's Government have also agreed that sheikhs should be summoned only when essential. Surely they should then be at the disposal of both representatives acting in agreement. I should have preferred to discuss these and other points personally. I cannot suggest delay in official correspondence as His Majesty's Government desire earliest possible settlement, but if we could meet within two or three days it would contribute to the attainment of our common object."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 144.)

[E 2418/387/25]

No. 98.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 7, 1931.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

While using latitude kindly allowed me as regards form, I have followed your instructions as closely as possible, adding only request for information on method of public announcement. I consider it important in local conditions to obtain explicit statement on this point. I do not think any answer returned can be of such a nature as to embarrass Transjordan authorities. Personal letter has two objects. First is to emphasise distinction between the two meetings, which memorandum of Hejaz Government ignored and which may be important if discussion of procedure at second meeting is further prolonged; second object

is to play upon Fuad's probable wish to get credit of overcoming such difficulties as may be attributed to Yusuf Yasin, while acting for him. If he comes to Jedda in the near future I will follow letter up in conversation.

I trust I may receive earliest possible information regarding final arrangements and, of course, of preliminary meeting.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 145.)

[E 2421/1110/25]

No. 99.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda), No. 185, and to Mr. R. I. Campbell (Washington), No. 648, mutatis mutandis.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1931.

I HAVE to inform you that a member of the United States Embassy in London called at this Department on the 7th May in order to convey the information that, under instructions from the State Department, the United States Ambassador had, on the 2nd May, formally notified the Minister of the Hejaz and Nejd that the United States Government officially recognised King Ibn Saud.

2. The United States Embassy had no information as to whether the United States Government proposed to send a diplomatic or consular officer to Jedda, but appeared to consider it unlikely that any such step would be taken in the immediate future.

3. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 2399/1098/25]

No. 100.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 554.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 11, 1931.

AS you are aware from the enclosure in my despatch No. 192 of the 16th February, regarding the absorption of Asir into the dominions of King Ibn Saud, it was proposed to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Jedda not to commit His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the recognition of this change in the status of Asir, nor, in the absence of further instructions, to take any action which could be regarded as implying such recognition.

2. Before the concurrence of the interested Departments in this course of action could be obtained, the situation was, however, changed by the receipt from Sir A. Ryan of the telegram of which a copy is enclosed.⁽¹⁾ As Sir A. Ryan pointed out, the request contained in the Hejazi Government's note assumed the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government in the newly-modified status of Asir, with the result that any reply returned to that note would imply such recognition, unless the contrary were explicitly stated.

3. Your Excellency will remember that in 1927, at the time of the Rome conversations regarding the interests of His Majesty's Government and of the Italian Government in the Red Sea, an undertaking was given to the Italian Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government would not volunteer recognition of the Treaty of Mecca, by which King Ibn Saud's original protectorate over Asir was established, and that, while it might be impossible to defer this recognition indefinitely, they would in any case withhold recognition of the territorial provisions and implications of that treaty. It seems clear that this undertaking would *à fortiori* preclude recognition of the new status of Asir resulting from the later arrangement recently concluded between King Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, by which Asir is now for practical purposes ceded to King Ibn Saud in full sovereignty. His Majesty's Government are, however, of the opinion that it would be difficult to abstain from returning an answer to the

⁽¹⁾ From Jedda, No. 62-3, Telegraphic, March 14.

Hejazi Government's note of the 11th March, and to other communications affecting Asir which may be received in the future, and that it would be undesirable to refuse explicitly to recognise what must in their opinion now be regarded as the *de facto* and *de jure* status of Asir.

4. I shall be glad if, in the light of these considerations, you will now discuss the position frankly with the Italian Government. You should point out to them that the situation has materially changed since the date of the undertaking given by yourself and the late Sir G. Clayton at Rome in 1927; that, as the result of the complete surrender by the Idrisi of all his powers of internal government to King Ibn Saud, it seems clear that the Idrisi's territories can now only be regarded, from the standpoint of international law, as a part of King Ibn Saud's dominions; and that there are considerable practical obstacles in the way of refusing to communicate with the Hejazi Government regarding Asir, as exemplified by the present case. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government propose, subject to any observations which the Italian Government may wish to offer, forthwith officially to recognise the effects of the new arrangement made between Ibn Saud and the Idrisi and the new status of Asir.

5. I trust that the Italian Government will be ready to return a favourable reply on this subject at an early date, more especially as the complete absorption of Asir into Ibn Saud's dominions is a fact which they will themselves almost certainly be obliged to accept, if they conclude with the Hejazi Government the treaty which they are at present in process of negotiating.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 2484/282/25]

No. 101.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 148.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 17, 1931.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 19 of the 2nd February, I have the honour to state that Fuad Bey Hamza returned to Jedda on the 13th April and informed me by a personal letter of the 15th April that he had resumed his duties, *i.e.*, those of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

2. Although Fuad Bey's illness in December and January was undoubtedly genuine, many people thought him unlikely to return to the Hejaz. Now that he has come back, it remains to be seen what balance will be established between him and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, whose position with the King is strong and who has since the beginning of February been thrust into close contact with the foreign representatives. It will also be interesting to see how much of his time Fuad Bey will spend in Jedda, either as a visiting representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs or as head of a properly-organised local branch of the Ministry.

3. It has been evident during the last two or three months that the Emir Feisal himself plays no effective rôle as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He does not appear to have had anything to do with the recent negotiations with Iraq except when texts had to be signed. I doubt whether he has even followed the correspondence about Transjordan. On one occasion when I suggested to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that certain British-protected persons on whose behalf I had made oral representations to him had been rebuked by the Hejazi Government for appealing to the Legation, he said that there could be no connexion because only he, the King, my interpreter and myself had had knowledge of our conversation. It did not occur to the sheikh to include in his list the Minister whose Acting Under-Secretary he theoretically was at the time.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan, the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2498/387/25]

No. 102.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 11, 1931.

MY telegram No. 123.

I had long conversation with Fuad 10th May. I stressed all points and read to him phrases in your telegram No. 76, which I had omitted from official communication. I said that attitude held by Government really suggested doubt as to whether we were pursuing the same object of peaceful settlement, *e.g.*, restrictions which they sought to impose on use to be made of tribal sheikhs, was perfectly inexplicable to anyone with British outlook. I urged only way out of the present difficulties was that the two meetings arranged should be conducted in spirit of co-operation between responsible Governments, not in that of duel between two combatants.

Fuad seemed to think there need be only one continued meeting. He spoke bitterly but without personal discourtesy about Glubb's activities, and more than hinted that he ought to be removed in the interests of peace, just as Neshmi had been removed. I scouted any comparison between them.

Fuad brought official reply to my note this morning. My immediately following telegram gives summary. He had time in the interval to consult the King, but reply is on the lines which he foreshadowed in our conversation of 10th May. I inferred that the King feels very strongly about tribal sheikhs. Fuad's language rather suggested that assurance to be asked for as regards sheikhs seeking refuge in Transjordan might facilitate understanding as to how they should be heard. I said, therefore, that although point was new to me and must be considered, I did not personally think asylum would be given in suggested contingency. Actual words of note do not imply readiness to allow joint examination of sheikhs in any circumstances. It is just possible that if assurance were given it might facilitate compromise, but I am not hopeful of this.

References to previous meetings covered those from sitting of Jericho tribunal to MacDonnell investigation. Fuad remarked pointedly that nothing had been heard of the result of the latter.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 154.)

[E 2513/387/25]

No. 103.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 12, 1931.

FOLLOWING is summary mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"1. Hejaz Government agree that publication should be simultaneous. In their opinion, it should take place on earliest possible date. They suggest 18th May. As to method, they propose to instruct all Governors by telegraph to spread announcement amongst Bedouin in their areas as soon as possible.

"2. Hejaz Government have, from the outset, not opposed earliest possible restitution of loot. They welcome anything which will expedite settlement of past incidents. They have therefore instructed Ibn Zeid that when final decision has been approved by both Governments restitution shall be effected reciprocally in respect of all claims from date of MacDonnell enquiry up to now.

"3. Opinion held by Government regarding attendance of sheikhs is, as stated already, that presence at the same meeting of sheikhs from both sides may produce unfavourable consequences, as on previous occasions when fruitless meetings have taken place.

"Hejaz Government consider continued collecting of Bedouin without being able to secure for them part of their rights may diminish their consideration in the eyes of tribes. Having seen no result from past meetings, they cannot be made to attend except under compulsion, and if they are forced they may commit acts, such as disturbance of serenity of meeting. Occurrence of such incidents is not naturally desired by Governments, and

Hejaz Government cannot accept responsibility for them. Moreover, when Bedouin realise that they are being called to meeting with a view to recovery of loot in their possession, they will not come willingly, and if Government use compulsion they may fly into Transjordan. I must request His Majesty's Government to undertake not to give asylum to persons seeking it in these circumstances.

"On the receipt of His Majesty's Government's reply on the first two questions mentioned above, instructions can be issued. Text is not clear as to which questions are referred to."

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 155.)

[E 2600/298/25]

No. 104.

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 14.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 9, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you for information copy of a letter from the private secretary to King Feisal on the subject of the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq to Transjordan, Egypt and Hejaz.

2. Copies of the first two enclosures have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah, and of the other enclosures to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Transjordan and Aden, respectively.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

*Abdullah-al-Haj to Major Young.**The Royal Court,**Bagdad, March 30, 1931.*

Dear Major Young,

I AM commanded to forward to you, for the information of his Excellency the High Commissioner, copies of letters which His Majesty the King has addressed to the Kings and Rulers of the countries now being visited by the mission headed by his Excellency the Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said.

Yours sincerely,

ABDULLAH-AL-HAJ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Feisal of Iraq to King Ibn Saud of Hejaz and Nejd.

My dear Brother,

PEACE be upon you and the mercy of God!

Your letter, dated the 19th of the blessed month (of Ramadan), has had a most pleasant effect upon our soul, O dear brother! in view of its contents of expressions of kind and noble sentiments towards His Majesty, my father, and myself, and of the welcome news it contained of your Majesty's well-being and good health. I ask the Almighty to preserve you and grant you long life.

In regard to the question of Ibn Mashhur, I have supplied my Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha, with the necessary details on this subject, and, having done so, I see no need to add anything here. I trust that the treaties and agreements which are to be concluded between our two Governments will leave no opportunity for similar incidents to arise in future.

Finally, I wish your Majesty, O my dear brother! health, happiness and prosperity.

Done in Bagdad this 19th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 17th day of February, 1931.

FEISAL.

[6131]

14

Enclosure 3 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Feisal to King Ibn Saud.

My dear Brother,

IT is a cause of great pleasure for us to seize the opportunity of the dispatch of our loyal and trusted Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said, on a mission to the court of our brother to convey to him our most sincere greetings and good wishes, together with our deep thanks for the noble sentiments he has expressed in his last telegram.

I beg my dear brother to know that whenever I recalled my meeting with his dear self and the good understanding and friendship which, thanks to God, were achieved at that meeting, I felt more and more confident that the bonds of friendship which developed at the said meeting would prove most happily effective in cementing the relations of amity and brotherhood between our two kingdoms. It is now most gratifying to me to find that that friendship has borne fruit in our common interest and that of the whole Arab nation, whom, we trust, God will help us to serve and enhance the position thereof.

The object of the deputation of Nuri Pasha Al Said, who admires the high character of our brother, and who longs for the honour of attending on his magnificent person, is, firstly, to sign the Agreement of "Bon-Voisinage," strengthen all the various other relations and connexions normally of interest to friendly sister countries, and submit our views on the question of the extradition of criminals between our sister kingdom, which, but for the fact that it affects our relations with other States, would have been settled a long time ago. Our dear brother may feel assured that we shall spare no effort for the realisation of our common aspirations in this connexion.

As regards other matters which affect the finding of strong bases calculated to help us both to repulse external (? foreign) ambitions and strengthen the position of our Arab nation and enhance its prestige among (other) nations, we have confided to Nuri Pasha Al Said the contemplations of our mind on the subject, and I beg my dear brother to be so good as to lend his special and careful attention to his (Nuri Pasha's) representations.

Finally, I wish my dear brother perfect health and prosperity, and his people every success and happiness.

Done at Bagdad, this 23rd day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 11th February, 1931.

FEISAL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Feisal to King Fuad of Egypt.

My dear Brother,

PEACE be upon you and the mercy of God!

I take the occasion of the departure of my Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said, for the capital of your Majesty's kingdom, for the signing of the Treaty of Extradition between our two Governments, as a valuable opportunity which I should seize to introduce him to you in order that he should have the honour of attending to your person, expressing my great respect to your noble self and renewing the pledge of friendship and amity which I trust will last for all time.

I pray God to keep you and the great Royal household in health, prosperity and happiness.

Done at Bagdad, this 29th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 17th day of February, 1931.

Enclosure 5 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Feisal to Imam Yahia of Yemen.

My dear Brother,

PEACE be upon you and the mercy of God and his blessing!

I pray God that this may find you enjoying perfect health, happiness and prosperity.

The motive for the submission of this message is the desire to resume the relations of friendship and amity with your Majesty, for I have always been and continue to be among those who admire your Majesty's brilliant achievements, your good intentions, and your continuous efforts for the maintenance and enhancement of the prestige of the ideal faith, and the protection and improvement of that country (of yours) in order that it should continue to be, as it was at the time of your illustrious grandfathers, the most precious gem and the most impregnable stronghold among all the countries of Arabia.

We have pleasure in introducing to you the bearer of this our message, who enjoys our confidence, Al Fariq Taha Pasha Al Hashimi, Chief of Staff of our army, and one of our loyal subjects, who had spent long years in your prosperous land enjoying the sympathy and high attention of your Majesty. He will express to you the feelings of friendship and amity we cherish towards your Majesty, and make representations concerning the increase of the old relations of friendship and pledges of amity, in the hope that God (may He be praised) may make of this initial step the beginning of an early coming era of common welfare for us and for all Arabian countries.

His Majesty my brother King Ali seizes this occasion to desire me to submit to your Majesty an expression of his friendship, together with his brotherly greetings.

Finally, we pray the Almighty God to lengthen your life and grant you and your country happiness, prosperity and glory.

Done in our palace at Bagdad, this 28th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 16th day of February, 1931.

Enclosure 6 in No. 104.

Translation of Letter from King Feisal to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan.

My dear Brother,

I HAVE great pleasure in deputing my Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha Al Said, to your Highness's court to sign the Treaty of Friendship, and to convey to you, my lord and brother, my respect and cordial greetings.

I have confided to Nuri Pasha full instructions in regard to all matters affecting the common interests of our two countries, and charged him to explain my views on the Arab alliance idea, advising him to be guided with your views in this connexion.

I trust that, with the help of God, our aspirations will be realised, and that, with your help, we shall be able to work for the enhancement of the standing of our nation among the nations (of the world). May God help us to do what is right. He is the source of success.

Done in Bagdad this 29th day of Ramadan, 1349, corresponding with the 17th day of February, 1931.

[E 2526/387/25] No. 105.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 14, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 109 of 26th April: Reciprocal undertaking by Transjordan and Hejazi Governments regarding expulsion of raiding criminals fleeing into territory of the other.

I agree to both your suggestions. Please now submit formula to Hejazi Government in manner proposed in final paragraph of Colonial Office telegram No. 52 of 24th April to Transjordan, repeated to you as No. 74.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 60.)

[E 2608/387/25] No. 106.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 16.)

(Nos. 137 and 138.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 16, 1931.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 82.

I have submitted formula as enclosure to note describing it as proposal of His Majesty's Government made after considering matter "in consultation with the authorities concerned in Transjordan."

I take it that words "if possible" refer to physical possibility, and have no reference to legal difficulties. I would propose to explain this orally if necessary.

If Hejaz Government agree, I presume I may proceed with exchange of notes. Should I, in that case, give undertaking in the name of His Majesty's Government only, or should I mention the Amir, or otherwise refer to Transjordan authorities? (End of R.)

Last point is important, in view of constant insistence by Hejaz Government of sole responsibility of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 162 and 163.)

[E 2513/387/25] No. 107.

Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 16, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 131 of 12th May and my telegram No. 83 of 14th May: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier situation.

Hejazi reply regarding restitution of loot seems, on the whole, acceptable. If you agree, question of attendance and evidence of sheikhs alone remains outstanding.

His Majesty's Government remain strongly of opinion, which High Commissioner for Transjordan appears to share (see Transjordan telegram No. 26 of 25th March to Colonial Office) that satisfactory investigation and settlement of claims by Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid will be impracticable unless they can summon and cross-examine sheikhs concerned. Before decision on this question is taken, please telegraph (a) real reason of Ibn Saud's reluctance to accept proposal; (b) whether there is hope of his giving way as a result of further representations; (c) if so, on what lines they should be made.

If question of sheikhs is pursued, Hejazi request for undertaking regarding refusal of asylum to fugitive witnesses (see last sentence of penultimate paragraph of your telegram) might be met by application to these cases of formula referred to in my telegram No. 82 of 14th May, subject, of course, to views of Transjordan authorities.

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 62.)

[E 2630/387/25] No. 108.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 17, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 84.

Paragraph 1. I concur. Difficulty will be to agree on decisions rather than to secure their subsequent execution.

Paragraph 2. Reply to (a) can only be conjectural. In my opinion objections stated in paragraph 3 of Hejaz Government's note of 11th May are genuine so far as they go, but rest on more fundamental considerations, viz., intense mistrust of Glubb and Amir Abdullah and considerable suspicion of His Majesty's Government and myself. These feelings are almost certainly stimulated by certain features of correspondence since February, e.g., violent explosion on part of His Majesty's Government after Ibn Saud has at last shown signs of willingness to produce statement of his measures to control situation and to bring article 3 of Hadda Agreement into operation; "offer" of military assistance in his territory; and adoption by Transjordan of fixed formula "Send victims of raids to Glubb." His internal situation is none too secure, and he has to reckon with possibility of trouble in area south-east of frontier if it should grow worse. All these are reasons why he should not do anything to risk his prestige with his tribes or to promote direct contact between them and Transjordan authorities, who might, in his view, seek to seduce them.

In these circumstances I think answer to (b) is negative, especially as my personal influence with the King is at low ebb, except in so far as he may be afraid of me and of influence he supposes me to use with His Majesty's Government to his disadvantage.

As regards (c), I might attempt compromise with Fuad on basis indicated in last sentence of paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 130 if Transjordan authorities are prepared to give undertaking regarding fugitive witnesses in form you suggested or any other shape. Prospects of success are, however, small. It may therefore be better to let meeting take place without further discussion and see what comes of it. Alternatively, would it be possible to say that unless representatives are authorised to hear sheikhs jointly as investigators, not as tribunal using judicial forms like oath, we must drop present proposal and request formation of tribunal under article 6 of Hadda Agreement to deal with raids since 1st August?

I am not sure whether that article is now regarded as dead letter for all purposes.

It would help me to know (a) for my own information position regarding award to be based on MacDonnell investigation, (b) whether, as Fuad thinks, preliminary meeting has taken place, and if so with what result.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 164.)

[E 2693/387/25] No. 109.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 21, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 137 and 138 of 16th May: Formula for mutual surrender of fugitive raiders between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd.

It would be preferable to avoid defining phrase "if possible" more closely, as cases might conceivably arise where, although it might be physically possible to surrender criminals, such surrender would be inadmissible on other grounds, such as nationality, &c. You should therefore try to avoid discussion of precise implications of phrase, which is one in general use, and is obviously not intended to bear any meaning which would vitiate main purpose of agreement.

Undertaking should be given, not in the name of His Majesty's Government, but in name of the Transjordan Government.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 65.)

[E 2731/387/25]

No. 110.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 22.)(Nos. 145 and 146.)
(Telegraphic.)*Jedda, May 21, 1931.*

MY telegram No. 137.

In reply, dated 18th May, Hejaz Government express satisfaction at result which may be an important factor in pacification. Desiring that proposed solution should be permanent and not liable to creation of misinterpretation, they feel bound to make the following observations:—

- (1) Phrases containing words "if possible" and "use the best endeavours" are likely to produce uncertainty and disputes as to interpretation. Hejaz Government desire to substitute words which will not be elastic or susceptible to different interpretations.
- (2) They wish undertaking to include not only prevention of entry and expulsion, but also surrender by respective Governments of persons fleeing into this territory.
- (3) They wish prevention of entry, expulsion and surrender to apply not only to persons raiding [*sic*, but it looks as though word should be one similar in form which means "fleeing"] into territories of the other party, but also to all persons raiding into territories of the other party or attacking that party's subjects, wherever they may be.
- (4) It is understood that expulsion from each side will be in direction of territories of the other party and not into third country.

Note ends with expression of hope that His Majesty's Government will agree to the above points being embodied in communications to be exchanged.

Points obviously require close scrutiny and elucidation, such as could only be obtained in oral discussion of text. I might suggest such discussion when Fuad comes to Jedda with the King, if I were furnished with instructions as to general lines on which it should be conducted with a view to producing revised formula for submission to you.

Any formula which introduces criterion of nationality is bound to lead to controversy in the case of frontier tribes. Apart from more obvious objections to point (3), its acceptance would greatly increase this particular danger. It is obscurely worded, but is susceptible of interpretation that any Nejd raiding in Transjordan, or attacking other Nejdīs there, should be driven back into or surrendered to Nejd. If this were agreed to I anticipate Ibn Saud would claim all sorts of persons as Nejdīs, and onus of determining their nationality would lie on Transjordan authorities, in whose territory they were. Same difficulty arises in connexion with your own formula, but would not be so acute, as it contemplates expulsion, &c., of persons who have (a) conducted raid in Transjordan, and (b) taken refuge in Nejd, thereby themselves supplying *prima facie* evidence of their Nejdī allegiance.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 172.)

[E 2772/2752/25]

No. 111.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 162.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 4, 1931.

IN paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 81 of the 6th March, relative to Mr. C. R. Crane's visit to Jedda, I mentioned an offer which he had made to Ibn Saud to arrange for the engineer whom he employs in the Yemen to visit this country to look into water possibilities.

2. The engineer in question is a United States citizen named Twitchell, and is engaged on the construction of the new motor road, which is being made under

Mr. Crane's auspices from Hodeida to Sana viâ Hajaa. He arrived in Jedda on or about the 17th April with his wife, an Englishwoman, and was received by Ibn Saud on the 20th April. Since that date he and Mrs. Twitchell have made two journeys inland. I have not been able to discover their range, but doubt whether they have been far from Jedda.

3. On the 24th April the Mecca newspaper "Umm-al-Qura" produced a leading article headed "Two Great Projects." The writer, after rebutting, with the support of a citation from an Italian orientalist, the common belief in the barrenness of the Arabian Peninsula, refers to Ibn Saud's efforts to improve the country in all directions. He speaks, in particular, of two out of many schemes, namely, the sinking of artesian wells and prospecting for minerals, and says that for the former purposes the King has now brought an expert, who is making experiments in the vicinity of Jedda. This obviously refers to Mr. Twitchell, whose visit is mentioned in the news columns of the same issue of the "Umm-al-Qura."

4. I have little doubt that a systematic survey for water would produce appreciable results in various parts of the country. I doubt, however, the King's capacity for directing it with the necessary comprehension and perseverance, and still more his willingness to give any foreign expert a sufficiently free hand to achieve much. As for mining, the prospects are even more nebulous. Until the "Umm-al-Qura" article appeared I had heard of no definite scheme, but when the Commissioner of Port Sudan was visiting here early in March Mr. Philby told him that the King had decided on a geological survey of the country, with a view, I gathered, to concessions being eventually given subject to suitable safeguards.

5. If Ibn Saud knows little about how to set about applying modern contrivances to the development of latent water resources, he is probably infinitely more ignorant of the difficulties surrounding the location and exploitation of minerals in a country like this. In my opinion, the chief interest at present of the matters mentioned in this despatch is the indication they afford of an inclination on Ibn Saud's part to explore tentatively possibilities of economic development. However little grasp he may have of the conditions necessary to achieve real success in that direction, he is quite intelligent enough to realise the need for some new basis of prosperity if the country is to hold its own. So far as the Hejaz is concerned, its almost complete dependence on the pilgrimage as its sole industry is a patent source of weakness; and the weakness has never in recent years been so patent as during the present season, which has brought only some 40,000 pilgrims from overseas to Mecca.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the political resident in Aden, who is interested in Mr. Twitchell, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2795/2/25]

No. 112.

High Commissioner for Iraq to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 28.)

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 6, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies in translation of correspondence between King Ibn Saud and myself, (1) between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hejaz-Nejd Government and Nuri Pasha, and between King Ibn Saud and Nuri Pasha, (2) and also the texts of the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty, Arbitration Protocol and Extradition Treaty, signed at Mecca on the 7th and 8th April, 1931.

2. Nuri Pasha has not yet issued a report on his tour, as the secretary to the mission has not yet returned to Bagdad. Nuri Pasha has, however, told me the gist of his discussions at Mecca, and, in any case, the results of his mission are sufficiently illustrated by the instruments that he negotiated and signed.

(1) Not printed.

3. Before he left Bagdad Nuri Pasha discussed with me in detail the questions that he proposed to raise with the Hejaz-Nejd Government. These were—

- (i) The "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty and Arbitration Protocol.
- (ii) Extradition.
- (iii) Ibn Mashhur.
- (iv) The payment by the Hejaz-Nejd Government of the balance of £23,000 outstanding on account of Iraq tribal claims.

Nuri Pasha told me that he had no intention of discussing the project of a pan-Arab alliance, except in so far as measures for the removal of customs and passport barriers, which he intended to propose, could be said to further this project.

He also informed me of his intention to send Taha-al-Hashimi, the chief of the General Staff, on a mission to the Imam of Yemen, and undertook, on my suggestion, to acquaint King Ibn Saud with his intention first, and to ensure that His Majesty had no objection.

Finally, in view of Sir John Shuckburgh's demi-official letter, dated the 12th November, 1930, I asked Nuri Pasha to ascertain whether King Ibn Saud still harboured any resentment in regard to the appointment of Dr. Abdullah Damluji as Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. As regards the instruments signed by Nuri Pasha at Mecca, your Lordship will observe that the texts of the "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty and Arbitration Protocol correspond closely to the texts initialled in Bagdad a year ago. Such amendments as have been made conform generally to advice tendered by this High Commission. The exceptions are the incorporation in the preamble of a somewhat obscure paragraph referring to "the desire of their Majesties to exert every possible effort to compose the affairs of the Arab nation and unite her word," and the insertion in article 13 of the words "or nationals of the two contracting parties." The former amendment, which seems innocuous, may be attributable to a desire on the part of Nuri Pasha to justify the declaration made before his departure of his intention to promote the cause of Arab unity. The second amendment, which extends to Iraq and Nejd nationals the restrictions which in the original draft were applicable only to foreigners, appears, at first sight, to conflict with article 6, which provides for complete freedom of movement of tribes for grazing purposes. I am advised, however, that the specific obligation involved in article 6 would be considered as overriding the general prohibition contained in article 13.

5. The Extradition Treaty provides in article 3 that the surrender of political offenders shall not be permissible. At the same time, as your Lordship will observe from the notes exchanged between Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, the former has given an assurance that offences normally committed by Bedouin tribesmen fall within the category of extraditable offences and cannot be described as political. I see no objection to the nature of the assurance given by Nuri Pasha, and I consider that he is to be congratulated on having settled this vexed question, which has disturbed relations between Iraq and Nejd for many years.

6. As regards the Ibn Mashhur affair, Nuri Pasha informs me that King Ibn Saud is now quite satisfied, and that with the surrender of his family and property the affair will be considered closed. This is confirmed by His Majesty's letter to myself.

7. In regard to the balance of £23,000 outstanding in respect of the compensation to be paid by the Hejaz-Nejd Government for the Iraq tribes, Nuri Pasha informed me that King Ibn Saud did not attempt to deny the obligation to pay the amount in full. His Majesty explained, however, that owing to a temporary lack of ready money it would be necessary for him to borrow the money if he was to pay it to Nuri Pasha before the latter's departure. Nuri Pasha replied that, in the circumstances, he would not press for immediate payment, and asked that the balance due might be remitted to Bagdad in the course of the next two months.

8. I understand that the matter of customs and passport procedure was discussed with satisfactory results, of which further information will, no doubt, be furnished in the official report. Nuri Pasha informed me, also, that King Ibn Saud welcomed the proposed mission to the Yemen, and that, in regard to

Dr. Abdullah Damluji, His Majesty was quite reconciled to the appointment of his former Minister to the Iraq Foreign Office, and did not desire to raise any objection on that score.

9. So far as I am able to judge at present, Nuri Pasha's visit to the Hejaz seems to have been an unqualified success, and augurs well for the Iraqi Government's ability to control their relations with neighbouring States. I lost no time on the return of Nuri Pasha to Bagdad in conveying to him the message of congratulation from His Majesty's Government contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 148, dated the 19th April, 1931, a message which, as I have already reported to your Lordship, he greatly appreciated.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister, Jeddah, the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112

Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" between Iraq and Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies.

(Translation.)

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

HIS Majesty King Feisal the First of Iraq, son of King Hussein, of the one part, and His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, of the other part;

In view of their meeting on the 23rd and 24th days of the holy month of Ramadhan of the year 1348 of the Hijrah (corresponding with the 22nd and 23rd days of February, 1930, A.D.);

Having regard to the preliminary discussions which took place at the time between representatives of the Governments of their Majesties for the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, and to the suitable bases over which agreement was reached;

In view of the desire evinced by the two Governments for a final determination of the said bases; and

In view of the desire of their Majesties to exert every possible effort to compose the affairs of the Arab nation and unite her word:

Have decided to conclude a treaty for this purpose, and appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty King Feisal the First of Iraq, son of King Hussein:

His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Prime Minister;

His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies:

His Royal Highness Emir Feisal, His Majesty's Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs;

who, having communicated their powers, found in good and due order, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

There shall reign inviolable permanent peace and true friendship between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies. The two high contracting parties undertake to exercise their utmost to preserve the same, and settle in a spirit of peacefulness and friendliness all disputes and differences likely to arise between them.

ARTICLE 2.

Relations of diplomatic and consular representation shall forthwith be established between the two kingdoms, in accordance with the procedure obtaining under public international law.

ARTICLE 3.

Each of the two parties undertakes to preserve friendly relations with the other party, and to endeavour by all the means available to him to prevent his country being used as a base of or preparations for unlawful acts, including raids, aimed against peace and security in the country of the other party.

ARTICLE 4.

As soon as information reaches the competent authorities prescribed in article 8 of preparation being conducted in their territories by one or more armed individuals with the intention of committing highway robbery, or raiding, or other unlawful acts in the zone in the neighbourhood of the frontier of the two kingdoms, these authorities shall mutually inform one another, or the officials or tribes of the other, of the same without delay.

ARTICLE 5.

In the event of either of the two high contracting parties receiving information of any of the acts mentioned in article 4 above having been committed within his territories, he shall have the right to notify the other party with a view to adopting the necessary measures for the punishment of the aggressors after their return to his country if they be of his subjects and to prevent them crossing the frontier if they be subjects of the informant or other Government.

ARTICLE 6.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the first clause of article 3 of the Bahra Agreement, the tribes of both parties shall have complete freedom of movement from place to place (or migration) in the territories of the two kingdoms for purposes of grazing or "musabila" (purchase of provisions), and each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to place the least obstacle in this respect.

ARTICLE 7.

Neither of the two parties shall coerce the subjects of the other party, when within his territory, to join his forces, regular or otherwise, to suppress a rebellion or take part in military operations.

ARTICLE 8.

The competent authorities charged with the organisation of general co-operation and responsibility for the measures to be taken on the frontiers for the application of the provisions of this treaty are:—

On the Iraq side: the highest administrative official in the desert or the person acting for him.

On the Hejaz-Nejd side: the highest administrative official in the desert or the person acting for him.

Only these officials shall have the right to correspond with each other for the purpose of co-operation and solution of disputes arising on the frontiers and between the tribes from time to time. They shall exchange forthwith information pertaining to incidents occurring in the region of either of them of a nature affecting the safety or security in the region of the other.

ARTICLE 9.

In order to facilitate the execution of the provisions of this treaty and, in general, the maintenance of good neighbourly relations, there shall be set up a permanent frontier commission composed of four officials selected from time to time for this purpose, half by the Iraq Government and the other half by the Hejaz-Nejd Government. This commission shall meet once every six months or more often if circumstances so require.

ARTICLE 10.

The commission mentioned in article 9 shall meet for the first time in the neutral zone and thereafter by rotation in Iraq or in Nejd or in the neutral zone in a place appointed by it before the end of each meeting. The duties of this commission shall be to attempt, with the object of giving effect to the provisions of this treaty and of ensuring good neighbourly relations, the amicable settlement of all such questions concerning the application of the provisions of this treaty, relating to grazing, migrations (or movements) of tribes, tribal disputes, assessment of minor losses and other matters concerning frontier affairs, on which no agreement could be reached between the local frontier officials concerned. Any decision agreed upon by the commission should be enforced within three months by both Governments, each in so far as concerns it. In the event of difference arising between the members of the commission on any of the matters within the commission's competence, such difference shall be referred by the members to "their Government" (i.e. their respective Governments) for decision, except in the case of matters within the competence of the court provided for in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, which shall be referred to the said court for consideration in accordance with the terms of the said agreement.

ARTICLE 11.

The two high contracting parties undertake to enforce any decision that may be passed by the tribunal set up under article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, within a period not exceeding six months commencing from the date of its issue.

ARTICLE 12.

The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to prevent officials under them crossing the frontiers and mingling with the tribes or chiefs of tribes of the other party, whether they be pedestrians, horsemen, in cars or aeroplanes. The Government whose territory such persons shall have crossed shall not be responsible for their safety should such crossing take place without its permission, subject to the exception of officials crossing the frontiers in execution of the provisions of article 4 of this treaty.

ARTICLE 13.

The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to adopt the necessary measures to prevent foreigners residing in or coming from their "country" (i.e. territories) or nationals of the two contracting parties from crossing the frontier of the other party's country for the purpose of touring, exploration, shooting or any other purpose, without obtaining previous permission either from the consulates of the party concerned or from the authorities of such party referred to in article 8. Subject to the provisions of the Bahra Agreement and other agreements concluded between the two parties concerning tribes and their migrations, the Government whose territories such persons cross shall not be responsible for their safety if their crossing is not done by its permission.

ARTICLE 14.

The two high contracting parties declare their desire to enter, at the earliest opportunity, into negotiations for the conclusion of special agreements concerning economic, consular, residence and nationality affairs.

ARTICLE 15.

Any difference that may arise between the two high contracting parties in connexion with the provisions of the present treaty or of the treaties or agreements concluded between the two kingdoms before the date of the present treaty, and any difference that may arise after the date thereof as a result of the provisions of the new treaties and agreements concluded between them, shall be referred to arbitration, which shall be conducted in accordance with the protocol accompanying the present treaty.

ARTICLE 16.

The present treaty has been drawn up in Arabic in duplicate. It shall come into force with effect from the date of exchange of copies thereof ratified by both parties, exchange to be effected in a place to be agreed upon between them.

Done at Mecca on the 20th Dhul Qi'dah, 1349, of the Hijrah, corresponding with the 7th April, 1931, A.D.

NURI-AL-SAID.
FEISAL ABDUL AZIZ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Protocol on Arbitration.

(Translation.)

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

IN pursuance of the desire expressed by the two high contracting parties in article 15 of the Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" concluded on the 20th Dhul Qi'dat, 1349 (corresponding with the 7th April, 1931), between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies concerning the settlement of such disputes arising from the provisions of the treaties and agreements "ratified" between them as may prove impossible of settlement by diplomatic means:—

We, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, respectively, having been duly authorised, met together this 20th day of Dhul Qi'dat of the year 1349 (corresponding with the 7th April, 1931), in order to sign the Arbitration Protocol to the above said Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage," and have signed the following:—

ARTICLE 1.

Arbitration shall be conducted by arbitrators not to exceed six in number, to be nominated equally by the two high contracting parties under the presidency of a person to be nominated from time to time in agreement between the said two parties.

ARTICLE 2.

If either of the two high contracting parties wishes to refer to arbitration any of the cases which should be referred under the provisions of this protocol, he shall thereupon notify his desire to the other party, stating the names of his arbitrators, and the other party shall also state the names of his arbitrators to the first party. The meeting (of arbitrators) shall take place within six months from the date of notification by the first party of his desire to go to arbitration.

ARTICLE 3.

The president of the board of arbitration shall be nominated in agreement between the two parties within the period mentioned in article 2 of this protocol.

ARTICLE 4.

Each of the two high contracting parties shall forward to the other party and to the president of the board of arbitration a memorandum explaining his case and setting forth the arguments in support thereof, and the party to whom the memorandum is forwarded may reply thereto provided that he shall do so within the period of six months laid down in article 2 above.

ARTICLE 5.

The arbitrators shall meet at such place as may be agreed upon between the two Governments, and the board of arbitration shall issue their decision within three months.

ARTICLE 6.

The two high contracting parties undertake to afford the board of arbitration all the facilities and assistance that the board may ask for for the execution of its task.

ARTICLE 7.

Each of the two high contracting parties may nominate one or more individuals to expound before the board of arbitration his point of view on the question under dispute.

ARTICLE 8.

The two high contracting parties definitely undertake to accept and give effect to such decision as the arbitrators shall issue on the question referred to them. The arbitrators may, if necessary, issue their decision by a majority of votes.

ARTICLE 9.

Each of the two Governments shall pay the salaries and expenses of the arbitrators nominated by it, and half the salary and expenses of the president and secretaries and such other staff as the arbitrators may require for their assistance.

ARTICLE 10.

This protocol shall come into force with effect from the date of exchange of copies thereof ratified by the two parties.

Done at Mecca this 20th day of Dhul Qi'dat, 1349, corresponding with the 7th day of April, 1931.

NURI-AL-SAID,
Prime Minister of the Iraq Government.

FEISAL ABDUL AZIZ,
Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies.

Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

Extradition Treaty between Iraq and Nejd and Hejaz.

(Translation.)

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

HIS Majesty the King of Iraq, of the one part, and
His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, of the other
part;

Desirous of concluding a treaty relative to the surrender of offenders,
fugitives from justice, who escape from the Kingdom of Iraq into the Kingdom
of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies and from the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd
and Dependencies into the Kingdom of Iraq;

Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Prime Minister;

His Majesty the King of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies:

His Royal Highness Emir Feisal-bin-Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul
Rahman-al-Saud, Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs;

who, having communicated their powers, found in good and due form, have
agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Government of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies undertakes to
surrender to the Government of Iraq any Iraqi nationals who, having committed
within the frontiers of Iraq any of the offences mentioned in article 3 of this
treaty, are found within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and
Dependencies.

ARTICLE 2.

The Iraq Government undertakes to surrender to the Government of Hejaz
and Nejd and Dependencies any nationals of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and
Dependencies who, having committed within the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd
and Dependencies any of the offences mentioned in article 3 of this treaty, are
found within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Iraq.

ARTICLE 3.

The surrender of political offenders shall not be permissible. The offences
in respect of which offenders should be surrendered (and which are not to be
regarded as political offences) are: Brigandage, theft, robbery, plunder, murder,
wounding, raiding "or" (?) and severe assault, whether the offender be an
individual or a group (of individuals) and whether the offence be directed against
an individual or a group (of individuals).

Any attempt against the person of either of their Majesties or against any
member of their respective families shall not be deemed a political offence.

ARTICLE 4.

A demand for extradition made by the Iraq Government shall be addressed
to the competent authority of the Government of Hejaz and Nejd and
Dependencies, and should be accompanied by the following documents:—

- (a) Description sheet of the offender and any information available for his
identification.
- (b) Short summary of the offence committed by the offender.
- (c) Copy of any court judgment already passed against the offender if he
has already been convicted.

All the above documents shall bear the seal of the competent authorities.

ARTICLE 5.

A demand for extradition made by the Government of Hejaz and Nejd and
Dependencies should be addressed to the competent authority of the Iraq
Government and should be accompanied by the documents mentioned in article 4,
all the said documents to bear the seal of the competent authorities.

ARTICLE 6.

No person shall be surrendered under this treaty for any offence committed
previously to the date of its coming into force.

ARTICLE 7.

An offender surrendered under this treaty shall not be tried for any offence
other than the one in respect of which his surrender was applied for. An
offender shall not be tried for an offence committed by him previously to the date
of his surrender and in respect of which no previous request for his surrender has
been made, unless he has first been given a reasonable opportunity to leave the
country and has failed to avail himself thereof.

ARTICLE 8.

This treaty is drawn up in Arabic in duplicate. It shall come into force
with effect from the date of exchange of ratifications thereof by the two parties,
exchange to take place at the place to be agreed upon between them. It shall
remain in force for a period of three years and, failing notice by either party to
the other—three months before its expiry—of his desire for its substitution or
revision, shall remain in force for a further period of three years.

Done in Mecca on the 21st of Dhul Qi'dat, 1349, A.H., corresponding with the
8th April, 1931, A.D.

NURI-AL-SAID.

FEISAL ABDUL AZIZ.

Enclosure 4 in No. 112.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN NURI PASHA AND EMIR FEISAL.

(1)

Nuri Pasha Al Said to His Royal Highness Emir Feisal-al-Saud.

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highness,

21st Dhul Qi'dat, 1349.

(April 8, 1931.)

AS our efforts for the conclusion of an Extradition Treaty have been crowned
with success, and in view of the desire expressed by His Majesty the King in the
course of conversation between us on the morning of the 20th Dhul Qi'dat, 1349,
that I should submit a special formal letter on the subject of offences committed
by bedouins,

I have the honour to submit to your Highness that offences normally
committed by bedouins are bound to come within the acts of assault with violence,
robbery, plunder, highway robbery, theft of the various kinds, wounding or
murder, committed by one or more individuals against an individual or a group.

I assure your Highness that all these offences and also that of raiding, which
are provided for in the Bahra Agreement and in the Iraqi Law No. 47 of 1927
for the prevention of raids and plunder, are considered ordinary offences in
respect of which extradition will be carried out, and which it is impossible to
"construe" as political offences.

I trust that this, my letter, will fully satisfy the desire of His Majesty the
King.

Please accept, &c.

Hejaz-Nejd Minister for Foreign Affairs to Nuri Pasha Al Said.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

21st Dhul Qi'dat, 1349.

(April 8, 1931.)

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 21st Dhul Qi'dat, 1349, corresponding with the 8th April, 1931, and I have noted your statement in regard to offences committed by bedouins, who know only offences of raiding, robbery and plunder, &c., which are very far from being described as political offences. I would like you to feel sure that what you have stated in your letter will be scrupulously executed by us on the principle of reciprocity. I trust that, so long as mutual goodwill and confidence exist between the two countries, co-operation will have the best effects which tend to strengthen the good relations between the two parties.

Please accept, &c.

[E 2835/387/25]

No. 113.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 152.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 28, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 90.

King having postponed visit to Jedda, Fuad came alone last evening. We reviewed present state of negotiations relative to frontier situation this morning. I had not yet received your telegram under reference and explained that I was without instructions, but wished to elucidate various points in recent correspondence. Upshot of conversation was as follows:—

(a) *Proclamations against raids.*—Referring to note from me stating that Transjordanian proclamation would be issued on 30th May, Fuad asked reasons for the delay. He accepted my explanation that it was due to difficulty concerning simultaneous action, but contended that if anything untoward happened during interval between the announcements Transjordanian must be held responsible. Subject to this, we agreed that matter was now settled.

(b) *Arrangements for restitution of loot.*—We agreed that this also might be regarded as settled.

(c) *Evidence of the tribal sheikhs.*—Fuad stated that the two parts of section 3 of note summarised in my telegram No. 131 hung together, and that intention was to agree to representatives hearing sheikhs jointly in cases where their evidence was required, subject to undertaking that witnesses taking refuge in territory of the other side would be turned back. I said we had been considering extension of formula regarding raiding criminals to cover this case. Fuad suggested this would delay meeting unnecessarily, and proposed separate undertaking in simple terms that any witnesses fleeing during or soon after meeting should be surrendered. He is to give me written draft.

(d) *Formula relative to raiding criminals.*—Fuad, who now seems anxious to clear the way for meeting, agreed that this was a separate question. I asked for explanation of note summarised in my telegram No. 145. I explained, without giving precise definition, that if words like "if possible" were not used, formula would be so inelastic as to produce danger of constant disputes like that over Ibn Mashhur which His Majesty's Government were determined to avoid. Fuad said that object of providing for surrender as alternative to expulsion was to cover cases in which representative authorities were in the position to arrest and hand over particular criminals as well as cases in which larger bodies could only be driven out by pursuit or other measures, e.g., pressure on their own tribes not to harbour them. He limited point 3 to cases provided for in your draft formula and cases where Hejaz-Nejd subjects flee to Transjordan after committing attacks in Hejaz-Nejd territory on other persons, whether subjects of either Government or of any third Government. I said that point 4 was expressly covered by your draft subject to words "if possible."

(e) I deprecated language of last Hejaz note on alleged violation of Nejd territory by aeroplanes and cars. I said that it was merely offensive to reiterate charges which had been subject of reasoned reply without adducing specific facts.

Comments on above:—

As regards (c). Fuad's suggestion is not quite in accord with explanation given by Hejaz Minister in London. I agree that question should be kept separate from that of raiding criminals in order to expedite meeting, but I consider in case of witnesses also we should avoid any commitment which we are not certain of being able to fulfil.

As regards (d). Fuad's explanations have reassured me to some extent, although I think we should insist on reasonable elasticity and I still foresee disputes turning on nationality. I asked Fuad whether he would like to produce counter-draft. He preferred to leave it to us to propose revised form of undertaking drawn up in the light of Hejaz Government's observations on original draft.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 179.)

[E 2731/387/25]

No. 114.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 29, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 145A and 146 of 21st May: Denial of refuge to fugitive offenders between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd.

1. In view of length and nature of frontier and limited range of forces available, it is impracticable for Transjordan authorities to give unqualified undertaking. Moreover, exceptional case might occur where it would be impossible for Transjordan authorities to refuse asylum, for example, on legal or humanitarian grounds. It is therefore undesirable, as explained in my telegram No. 87 of 21st May, to attempt to define position more closely, and it is essential that full measure of freedom allowed by present formula should be retained. You may, however, bearing these considerations in mind, discuss with Hejazi Government drafting amendments, which should be submitted to me for consideration of His Majesty's Government and Transjordan authorities.

Point 2 is an extension of original Hejazi request and is open to serious objection. Apart from practical difficulties involved in capture, retention in custody and personal delivery of fugitives to Hejaz-Nejd authorities, possibility that captives thus handed over by British authorities might be subjected to barbarous penalties would be unacceptable to public opinion in this country. You should therefore inform Hejazi Government that this new request cannot be agreed to, emphasising, if necessary, practical difficulties involved.

Point 3. This request is obscure, but appears to amount to wide extension of original proposal. It is unlikely that Transjordan authorities would be willing to undertake to capture and surrender raiders caught red-handed in Transjordan territory and thus sacrifice complete freedom to deal with them as circumstances require. You should inform Hejazi Government that this point is not fully understood, but that in any case it appears to involve so great an extension of request which present formula is designed to meet that it would require mature consideration and should not be allowed to hold up settlement of present formula. Meanwhile you should give no indication of attitude likely to be adopted by Transjordan authorities on this point.

Point 4 appears to be met by terms of second sentence of formula.

(Addressed to Jedda. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 69.)

[E 2849/387/25]

No. 115.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 29, 1931.

MY telegram No. 152, heading (c).

Following is translation of Fuad's draft:—

"The two Governments have agreed that sheikhs shall appear before representatives to give evidence and to make statements on matters in regard to which the two representatives consider it necessary that such evidence and statements should be taken direct, subject to condition that if one of these sheikhs should flee to the other country, whether when called upon to give evidence or during or after meeting, the Government of the country into which he has fled undertakes to hand him over to his Government."

In further discussion to-day I said that I understood "after" to mean within such a time that there would be clear connexion between flight and proceedings at enquiry. Fuad agreed. I said if this were understood between us I would not ask for further definition of that word, but I pressed strongly for insertion after "undertakes" of words "to do everything in their power." I maintained that this would impose definite obligation on the Government to seek out and surrender fugitive witnesses, and would go further than less definite expression "if possible" to satisfy him that Transjordan Government would fulfil that obligation in all cases in which no insuperable difficulty arose.

I said that if he accepted my proposal I would urge you to agree, whereupon there would be no further obstacle to main meeting which representatives could make continuous with their first meeting or arrange separately at their convenience.

Fuad said he must see the King, but promised his support. He returns to Mecca to-morrow. If the King accepts my proposal, may I record agreement on all outstanding points in suitable note?

Fuad begs His Majesty's Government to expedite arbitration on earlier raids. He expresses strong desire that whole ground should be cleared, and that when Glubb and Ibn Zeid have met we should discuss results with a view to establishing firm basis for the future before I take leave.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 180.)

[E 2850/723/25]

No. 116.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 30, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 53.

I gave Fuad, on 28th May, memorandum for the King's consideration on the lines suggested in my telegram No. 57. I added a reference to the desirability of pilots knowing the situation of any existing or proposed landing grounds, and said I should be glad to discuss this when decision had been taken on the general question.

Fuad said that the Government were about to issue a general regulation on landing grounds, &c., which would apply to aircraft of all nationalities. I gather, from further conversation on 29th May, that it would mark advance towards more liberal attitude, but would be on the lines of highly centralised control. I said I was anxious to reach good understanding within the scope of any general regulations before going on leave. I intimated that in the present state of aviation more than one landing ground would be necessary for complete security, although I did not anticipate continual use of them.

Unless Fuad reverts to the matter meanwhile, I propose to await the regulations and see how they affect the matter.

[E 2875/387/25]

No. 117.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 31, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 93.

You will now have received my telegram No. 152. Fuad has returned to Mecca, and owing to uncertainty of internal situation I do not know when I shall see him or the King.

I submit following observations:—

Point 1.—In my conversation with Fuad I endeavoured to follow instructions in your telegram No. 87. I avoided precise definition of words "if possible," &c., on the grounds that every contingency could not be foreseen, but I could not avoid all discussion of their meaning. I defended them as being intended to protect Transjordan against obligations of genuine impossibility of fulfilment without defeating main purpose. I gave hypothetical example and [? group omitted] later to possible difficulty of determining nationality. I emphasised fact that such words are generally used in similar connexion.

It now appears that words have much wider sense than I supposed, and imply in effect "so far as Power giving undertaking considers compatible with its conception of law and humanity." Even if they have this effect in general international usage, it is not Ibn Saud's understanding of them. If I pursue discussion with this reservation in my mind but without giving any indication of it, any subsequent attempt to give effect to it will expose me and perhaps His Majesty's Government to accusation of having been disingenuous.

In my opinion, only safe and defensible alternatives are to use plainer language in the text or to state frankly in discussions that, in spite of what I told Fuad, words are, in fact, very elastic and cover wide range of contingencies of all kinds which cannot be indicated beforehand. This would probably render agreement impossible, which might not be a bad thing.

Point 2.—It is clear that you do not wish me to suggest that Ibn Saud cannot be trusted to treat his own subjects with humanity. I must, however, offer some explanation of refusal to agree to surrender in case suggested by Fuad. As criminals are to be named persons, explanation based solely on practical difficulties will be more likely to arouse King's suspicions than to convince him.

Point 3.—Extension on lines now proposed by Fuad seems to me reasonable.

Point 4.—I agree.

Without wishing to make difficulties, I recommend my observations on first two points to your most earnest consideration.

It would be better to have no agreement than one productive of future quarrels. I suggest that I should be authorised to conclude main negotiations as suggested in my telegram No. 153, and that you should propose revised formula regarding criminals. We can afford to play somewhat with this question now that Fuad has agreed with you as to its separate character. I would propose, if you approve, to tell Fuad that at present stage further oral discussion is desirable, and that I will await his return to Jedda.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 183.)

[E 2849/387/25]

No. 118.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1931.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 152 of 28th May and 153 of 29th May: Transjordan frontier situation.

Solutions of points (a) and (b) are satisfactory. Questions dealt with under (d) and (e), and result of Macdonnell investigation, do not concern Glubb-Ibn Zeid meeting, and must be dealt with separately.

As regards (c), formula regarding fugitive witnesses is clearly only intended to apply to sheikhs who flee into territory of other party as a direct consequence of being called upon to appear or give evidence, and not to classes of fugitives

falling to be dealt with under other formula now under separate discussion. In these circumstances, three alternatives suggested in Fuad's draft seem inappropriate, and His Majesty's Government would suggest following alternative for last portion: "Subject to condition that if one of these sheikhs should refuse to obey the orders of his Government to appear or to give evidence before the representatives, and should attempt to take refuge in the country of which he is not a national, the Government of that country will do everything in its power to apprehend and hand him over to his own Government."

Please propose this alternative to Hejazi Government and make every effort to secure their early acceptance of it, thus enabling main meeting to proceed without further difficulty or delay.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 72.)

[E 2948/387/25]

No. 119.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 4, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 95.

I agree that (d) and (e) in my telegram No. 152 as well as arbitration must be dealt with separately. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud sees frontier situation as a whole. Owing probably to internal difficulties described in other reports he now seems anxious for settlement all along the line which has also been aim pursued by His Majesty's Government during the past year.

King is, however, suspicious and considers certain requirements essential. One of these is that nothing should impair his authority over his own subjects. This underlay his attitude regarding witnesses. He has consented under pressure to their being heard jointly when their evidence is necessary, but in note summarised in my telegram No. 131 he emphasised danger of sheikhs' respect for Government being diminished and suggested that if persons in possession of loot were forced to attend they might flee. Such flights might be resorted to not only to avoid attendance but also after attendance had been ensured by compulsion, if sheikhs thought they were in danger from their own side as result of enquiry.

It may be argued in the latter alternative they would be in similar position to fugitive criminals. This argument is unlikely to satisfy the King. Even if assimilation were complete, agreement regarding surrender of criminals is not yet complete. The King's suspicions will be increased by express reference to nationality in your redraft. I had hoped this might be unnecessary in present case, although it is important in formula regarding criminals which will have more extended application and must therefore be more guarded.

It must be remembered that I am no longer in personal touch with Fuad nor do your instructions allow me any latitude in negotiations. If above considerations appear to you immaterial I will propose redraft in writing, but I feel bound to warn you against danger of further prolongation of discussion which may result.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 186.)

[E 2948/387/25]

No. 120.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 6, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 4th June: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier situation.

Formula in my telegram No. 95 of 2nd June, which was carefully devised to meet numerous difficulties from various quarters was intended to cover all cases in which Hejaz-Nejd sheikhs might attempt to flout Ibn Saud's authority in connexion with, or as result of, his orders that they should attend and give evidence. It should therefore meet the King's anxiety lest compliance with His Majesty's Government's desire for attendance of witnesses should impair his

authority over his own subjects. Cases of attempted flight after evidence had been given could only be covered, however, if it could be shown that flight followed on disobedience of King's orders in connexion with attendance at meeting. It was particularly desired to cover as far as possible all such cases connected with meeting, in order that further discussion on general question of fugitive criminals, which has no direct connexion with question of attendance or attempted escape of witnesses, might proceed independently and not cause further delay in main meeting between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid. Criterion of nationality seems inevitable, since it would obviously be impossible to surrender or drive back to Nejd sheikhs who could prove that they were of Syrian or Iraqi allegiance. It was adopted in order to avoid vague phrases to which so much exception has been taken, and I trust that you may succeed in getting Hejazi Government to accept it without having to embark on further detailed explanations.

In these circumstances you should present revised formula forthwith; unless you feel strongly that it is unsuitable when I will at once consider alternative, provided you can devise one which will meet objections from other quarters, as I realise danger of further prolongation of discussion.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 76.)

[E 2979/387/25]

No. 121.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 8.)

(Nos. 160 and 161.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 5, 1931.

(R.) MY telegram No. 159.

Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs of 3rd June, written without reference to previous correspondence, reproduces sinister information which, if verified, will greatly tend to destroy hopes entertained in connexion with the frontier question.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reminds me of Fuad's observations in recent conversations regarding the unfavourable effect of delay in publishing the Transjordan proclamation and Glubb's delay in meeting Ibn Zeid, but says the effect of these delays, however great, is weak compared with that of the action reported to have been taken by Glubb as follows:—

(1) In November or December certain Beni Sakhr tribesmen looted 18 camels from Ibn Saadina but returned them. While he was returning with the camels Glubb met and detained him, but he escaped on a camel belonging to Ibn Jazi, whose gun he also took. Glubb later captured a Shararat caravan, including women, consisting of 18 camels carrying salt on the pretext of retaliation for Ibn Jazi's camels and gun.

(2) Musaad-al-Faqir and party were recently moving west towards Hazim to obtain restitution of the camels held in Transjordan. Glubb detained him and the camels by way of compensation for the camels alleged to have been looted by Al Awazi from Al Atwat in the past.

(3) It is also reported that Glubb seized 40 camels from Daraan of Rualla by way of compensation, he said, for the camels belonging to Abu Rukab-al-Sharari, who resides with Beni Sakhr.

Remainder of the note consists of comments in the usual vein on the danger of the joint efforts of the Governments being compromised by local activities, which manifest evil intention, and which, moreover, prove the truth of the earlier contention regarding "Glubb's object in exciting the Bedouin and declaring to them that there is no one who can protect them against him, neither Ibn Saud nor anyone else." Minister for Foreign Affairs requests His Majesty's Government to take immediate measures to restrain such activities and asks for very early reply, but adds that the incidents do not affect arrangements for the meeting for which Ibn Zeid has been waiting at Qariat for over a month. (End of R.)

Incidents at (1) and (2) appear to be connected with those dealt with in Transjordan despatches to me numbered C.F./735/29 of 18th April and 9th April action on which I postponed for reasons stated in my telegram to Transjordan,

No. 158. Information contained in them does not suffice to dispose of present accusation. I cannot connect incident at (3) with anything previous.

Ibn Saud's hostility towards Glubb remains unabated. I fear [one group undecipherable] in his general attitude, unless means can be found to expedite main meeting success of which is most doubtful, but which will at least open new phase.

I am sending interim reply of a general nature in order to counteract insinuations of avoidable delay in preamble of Minister for Foreign Affairs' note and convey information regarding message sent by Glubb (see Transjordan telegram to me of 1st June).

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 187 and 188.)

[E 2989/387/25]

No. 122.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 8, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 98.

In course of telephonic conversation with Fuad on other subjects on 6th June I gathered that the King stood by formula of 28th May regarding witnesses without even the amendment I had personally suggested. Fuad intimated intention of coming to Jedda early this week.

In these circumstances I have thought it best to propound officially the formula proposed in your telegram No. 95. I cannot be certain that the King will reject it. If he does it will still afford concrete basis for discussion with Fuad.

My immediately following telegram gives the main points of my note. I will use your further arguments orally. May I, if necessary, amplify reference to explanations furnished by Hejaz Minister in London by saying that they clearly related only to contingency contemplated in your redraft?

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 190.)

[E 3020/3020/25]

No. 123.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 172.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 13, 1931.

AS you are aware, it has become the practice of Ibn Saud to give a banquet for Moslem notables of all nations each year at pilgrimage time. This year it took place on the evening of the 24th April, and was attended by a rather unusual number of Moslems of high standing, if in most cases of no great political importance. The King had on his right ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan, and on his left Sheikh Ahmed-es-Senussi. Among others present were Prince Ahmed Tevhid of Turkey, whose visit I have reported separately, the members of Nadir Khan's official delegation, the Afghan Minister in Cairo, Sir Abdul-Kerim Ghuznavi, of the Council of the Governor of Bengal, and various minor notabilities.

2. The King delivered the principal speech of the evening and spoke strongly on one of his favourite subjects, the weakening of Islam by disunion and by the pursuit of false ideals like that of supposing the imitation of Europeans to be the only way to progress. Had any of the exponents of this theory, he asked, succeeded in making a needle, an aeroplane, a rifle or a gun? No; they imitated the Europeans only in those things contrary to Islam.

3. At this point the King took up a reference by an earlier speaker to an utterance of the Indian leader, Shauqat Ali, during his recent tour about "our brothers the Jews." This drew from Ibn Saud a tirade directed not so much against that people as against any idea of fraternity save in Islam, which was, he said, the means of happiness in this world and the next. He swore a triple oath affirming his wish that all peoples should accept Islam, and declared his preference for the life of one eating herbs on a mountain top, and worshipping

God, over all earthly grandeur. God, he said, had divided Moslems into two classes, the warriors ever in readiness to defend their religion, and those others engaged in industry, agriculture, &c. He reproached Moslems with their internal strife. Pointing to the Turkish Prince present, he described how his ancestors had fought those of the prince rather than call themselves servants of the "Commander of the Faithful." They were the servants of God only.

4. The King attenuated the militant tone of his speech by saying towards the end that he did not profess to be fighting against the people of the world and used the courtesy prescribed by Islam unless he was injured in his religion and his country. He ended with a call to all Moslems to turn to the service of God and the good way of their forbears.

5. This speech was rendered into Urdu by the Indian Ismail Ghuznavi. Various other speeches were also delivered in the course of the evening, including one in English by Sir Abdul-Kerim Ghuznavi.

6. The above account of the proceedings is based mainly on the authorised report in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 1st May. Although it gives the King's address as a connected whole, he would appear to have in fact spoken both before and after dinner. I understand from private sources that the guest who indiscreetly quoted Shauqat Ali was an Egyptian. Not all the oratory was, it seems, to the King's taste, and not all the guests were entirely pleased with His Majesty. My informant describes the function as having ended in an atmosphere of tension. One of the speakers who praised the King was Saif-ur-Rahman, who has been mentioned in other reports as having become the spokesman of the official delegation from Kabul on various occasions. It is said that Amanullah Khan also thought of saying something, but thought better of it.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and also to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, in case Ibn Saud's remarks about the Jews should have any echo in Palestine.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3024/2064/25]

No. 124.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 177.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 15, 1931.

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 108 of the 23rd March, the exchange situation in this country has gone through various vicissitudes, of which it is now possible to give a more or less connected account, although no account by an outsider can be complete or at all points accurate owing to the amazing difficulty of obtaining coherent information in the conditions which prevail.

2. The arrangements with the Dutch Bank, as the Netherlands Trading Society is popularly called, worked for five or six weeks on the lines described in my previous despatch, i.e., the bank sold drafts on abroad in exchange for riyals at 10 to the £ sterling, plus a small premium of 1½ current piastres, and charged for the draft a high commission, the normal rate of which was at first 1 per cent., but was afterwards raised to 2 per cent. The currency remained fairly fixed at the legal rate of £1 gold sterling to 10 riyals, equalling 220 current nickel piastres.

3. About the middle of April, however, the arrangement with the Dutch Bank broke down, apparently for two reasons, namely, that the Government was working on a limit of £10,000 in gold for redemption purposes and threw back on to the market an excessive quantity of the redeemed silver and nickel. At this stage the Government would appear to have relaxed the prohibition of the export of gold, though I cannot discover that any public announcement was made; and the bank attempted to carry on by selling drafts for half gold and half silver, &c. This did not last very long, and presently the bank more or less shut down its exchange business. In Jedda it is difficult even to ascertain at any given moment whether a bank is open or closed.

4. In any case, it was now close to the pilgrimage day, which fell on the 27th April, and which put a stop to all big business from a day or two before the actual date of the standing on Arafat until at least five days later. The pilgrims had all arrived before the 25th April, and their advent, naturally, brought money to replenish temporarily the Government chest. The demand for currency for retail operations is also naturally greatest at the height of the pilgrimage. These reasons probably account for the fact that, although the riyal has been wobbly since the middle of April, there has been no spectacular depreciation. It has stood at rates varying from a little over the legal rate of 10 to a rate of 12 to the £ sterling of late.

5. Shortly before the pilgrimage day, on the other hand, the nickel currency broke loose from all standards, and as it plays an important part in retail business great uneasiness prevailed. It was accentuated by the publication of a communiqué on the 23rd April to the effect that, in view of the frauds which had been practised, the Government had decided to accept nickel at the market rate, which would be announced each morning by the financial authorities. This was followed by a considerable dislocation of retail trade, and, some days later, there was something of a panic in the bazaars of Jedda and Mecca. Piastres went to very low rates, and at one moment all but lost effective value as currency. The Government took stop-gap measures in Jedda to withdraw nickel by collecting supplies of rice, &c., and selling in a shop or shops of their own. I do not know what happened at Mecca, except that prices in piastres went up considerably, much to the discomfiture of pilgrims.

6. A meeting was held in Mecca on the 1st May to consider the whole situation, and a new communiqué issued in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 1st May, which actually appeared on the 3rd May, announced that the Government had opened shops to change nickel for riyals at the legal rate of 22 to the riyal. Various other remedies were adopted about the same time, notably an arrangement which amounts to a forced loan raised by the Government, although, in theory, it is supposed to be worked by committees of representative merchants. The principle of this arrangement appears to be to withdraw from circulation £24,000 of nickel, the Government putting up £8,000, the merchants the rest, each of them being assessed at a stated amount. The nickel thus collected was to be held by the Ministry of Finance, and repayment of the money levied on the public was to be made at a later date. It was further decided about the 7th May to close all the shops of the money changers, who are accused of rigging the currency market.

7. The measures taken have rehabilitated nickel for the time being and, as I have said, the riyal has not fallen unduly low. Nevertheless, the situation is obviously precarious, for the crisis has occurred at what should be the period of greatest prosperity. The months between now and the beginning of the next pilgrimage season late in the autumn, when the 1932 pilgrims will begin to arrive, must necessarily be very lean months. The manager of the Dutch Bank was a very disillusioned man towards the end of April, but he was then negotiating a fresh arrangement with the Government. He did not tell me its exact nature, but he said that the Government would have to put up £60,000 in gold to back it. After the festival he did not reopen his bank for exchange business, and rumours were afloat that the bank contemplated retirement from the country. On the 10th May, however, Mr. Jacobs told me that he was still negotiating. He no longer had any doubt that the Government could dispose of any necessary amount of gold up to £60,000, but he said he was awaiting the King's guarantee of the transaction, whatever it might be. He complained bitterly of the changeableness and incapacity of the Government. He put much of the blame on Mr. Philby, who, he said, had been dangling before the King the idea that it would be an easy matter to arrange, with his (Mr. Philby's) assistance, to introduce another bank, which would give all the help required.

8. The situation is complicated by factors which are even further from my ken than the matters which I have attempted to summarise above in a form more intelligible than most of the reports on which my account is based. There are supposed to be, for instance, some £30,000 worth of nickel coins in circulation, but rumours of inflation by the importation of forged coins have been current and have helped to destroy confidence. Another obscure factor is the difficulty of popularising in Nejd the use of the silver and nickel coinage current in the Hejaz.

9. You will doubtless be struck by the smallness of the amounts on which these locally important crises turn. It needs at most, it appears, £60,000 in gold to sustain a silver currency which is legal tender to an unlimited amount. Operations in nickel to a total of £30,000 can throw the market into convulsions. As I have observed in at least one previous report, it is characteristic of this country that the Government are reduced to all sorts of shifts to cope with what, according to our standards, are quite small liabilities. It is not the first time that Ibn Saud has been in low water, but I doubt whether he has ever been so embarrassed or had so little credit. It is just possible that the present financial situation may react on his political future.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2375/387/25]

No. 125.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 11, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 157 of 31st May: Denial of refuge to fugitive criminals between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd.

Scope of discussion regarding raiding criminals has been greatly enlarged (a) by additional points 2 and 3 raised by Hejazi Government, (b) by apparent necessity to define more precisely cases in which undertaking to refuse asylum would not operate. It appears hopeless in these circumstances to try to agree at short notice on comparatively simple formula, and inevitable that negotiations, if pursued, should necessitate lengthy and detailed discussions.

(Confidential.)

This being so, it might be best to enter into regular negotiations for instrument in nature of extradition treaty between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd Governments. Suggestion is tentative, and I cannot say what Colonial Office and others may think about it, so please do not repeat to anyone your reply, which should contain your views on probable effect on Hejazi Government, to whom, however, you should not mention suggestion, even informally.

[E 3123/387/25]

No. 126.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 167.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 13, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 103.

My point was that original request for undertaking could readily cover both alternatives mentioned in last sentence of second paragraph of my telegram No. 159, and that Fuad's draft defined it in that possible sense, whereas your redraft appeared to cover first alternative only.

Matter has, however, lost its importance, as Fuad has come to Jedda, and I saw him yesterday before I received your telegram under reference. He accepted redraft subject to King's wish to be assured that if, e.g., fugitive Nejd witness got through to Syria and then returned to Transjordan he would be handed over. I said I had no authority to amend redraft, but I reduced my understanding of proposed addition to writing as follows for submission to you, namely, "this condition will apply equally to case of any such sheikh taking refuge in a third country if being a Hejaz-Nejdi national he should subsequently enter Transjordan territory or being Transjordanian national he should subsequently enter Hejaz-Nejd territory."

Fuad informed me this morning that the King would accept redraft if above addition were made.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 193.)

[E 3147/387/25]

No. 127.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 169.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 15, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 102.

Idea that eventual aim should be to broaden the treaty basis of relations between Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd, as in the case of the Hejaz-Nejd and Iraq, has for some time been present to my mind; but I am unaware to what extent such an aim could be made to square with the position and policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Transjordan. I proposed to discuss this question with your Department while on leave.

The proposal made by the High Commissioner for Transjordan in his telegram to the Colonial Office, No. 26, that a formal extradition treaty should be negotiated involves a move in the direction indicated above. I myself thought of reviving that proposal as a possible solution of the difficulties regarding the proposed formula, when preparing my telegram No. 157. My reasons for not mentioning it were:—

1. Judicial machinery, use of which any normal kind of extradition treaty would necessitate, would give less speedy results than the administrative action which, owing to disturbed conditions on frontier, were contemplated in the formula.
2. Main cases will, I imagine, still be those contemplated in original draft of formula, notwithstanding Hejazi desire to widen its scope (see my despatch No. 181). Formula provided for handing over to Ibn Suad of persons who, having originally committed offences within jurisdiction of Transjordan Government, attempted to evade punishment inflicted by Ibn Suad and *vice versa*. Such cases would not be covered by any normal extradition treaty.

I find it hard to guess what position Ibn Suad would adopt if you now proposed an extradition treaty instead of formula. Normally, he might be expected to raise objections, in substance if not in form, similar to my points 1 and 2 above. He is, however, being compelled by internal difficulties to consider how relations between His Majesty's Government and himself can be improved. Realising that disputes connected with Transjordan must be settled, if he is to achieve this, he might be more willing than he would have been a short while ago to drop his own proposal and adopt alternative of extradition treaty.

Since commencement of new series of conversations on 12th June, Fuad has not referred to "criminal formula." I could, if you wished, find an occasion to refer to unexpected difficulties arising from its discussion and sound the ground for alternative proposal discreetly. But, before embarking on alternative, I should require to know whether you contemplated normal extradition treaty or agreement similar in form, but especially designed to obviate difficulties suggested above, and I should have to be given some latitude in my conduct of the conversation.

[E 3123/387/25]

No. 128.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 167 of the 13th June: Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd frontier, formula regarding fugitive witnesses.

His Majesty's Government agree to addition to formula of words proposed in your telegram.

Agreement has now apparently been reached on all points connected with proposed main meeting. His Majesty's Government consider that it can best be left to Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid to settle early date, place and detailed

arrangement for meeting. If Hejazi Government agree, they will, on learning that necessary instructions are being given to Ibn Zeid, request High Commissioner for Transjordan to instruct Captain Glubb to make concrete proposals to Ibn Zeid direct.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 83.)

[E 3227/387/25]

No. 129.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 18.)

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, June 17, 1931.

REFERENCE telegram from Jedda to Foreign Office, No. 157, dated 31st May, repeated to you, on subject of formula regarding raiding criminals. It appears desirable to clarify position. As you will have learned from the telegrams which have passed, I am of opinion that it is essential that the Transjordan authorities should have reasonable measure of latitude. I am also doubtful as to the advisability of undertaking actually to surrender criminals. It may, however, now be necessary more precisely to define the circumstances in which it may be considered impossible to expel fugitive criminals, and the Hejaz-Nejd Government will also want some further explanation with regard to our objections to surrendering criminals. As it may be difficult to arrive at an agreement by further telegraphic correspondence, I have been considering, in consultation with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, possible alternative methods of procedure. Two possibilities have been suggested:—

1. To abandon the formula and endeavour to negotiate a formal agreement between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd so framed as to provide for extradition in such cases as those under discussion. Probably this could be best carried through by the despatch to Jedda of a small Transjordan delegation.
2. To send a suitable official conversant with frontier conditions from Transjordan to Jedda, who could try to reach agreement with the Hejaz-Nejd Government on a revised formula.

I remember that in your telegram of the 25th March, No. 26, you recommended the negotiation of a formal treaty, but it may be pointed out in favour of second alternative above that measure of latitude which we desire might be easier to obtain from the Hejaz-Nejd Government in a formula than in a formal agreement.

Whatever course is taken, it appears to me to be essential that no conditions should be accepted which would have effect of restricting the Transjordan Government's freedom summarily to punish raiders intercepted in Transjordan during the course of a raid. Please furnish your observations as soon as possible, together with any alternative suggestions which you have to offer.

[E 3233/2064/25]

No. 130.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 19, 1931.

I HAVE discussed outstanding questions with Fuad, and did not, therefore, think it necessary to pursue them at this stage with the King, who stayed here for three days from 14th June and goes to Nejd in the near future. The King intimated to me his desire for some sort of permanent understanding with Great Britain at a long audience on 17th June, when he discussed at length our general relations. A full report goes by bag to-morrow. Both Fuad and the King emphasise the serious financial situation which necessitates help from some quarter. The King explained that the exchange situation was in process of

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successful rehabilitation. He also said that he required a bank which would, to all practical purposes, serve as a State bank. Could His Majesty's Government help him? He had had offers from other sources, but would prefer a British institution. The matter was urgent, as he must take an early decision. If any British bank were prepared to give the matter consideration, would they send a representative? I undertook to submit the matter for your consideration, but hinted that it was full of difficulties. In my opinion, it would be a very risky experiment for any British bank to undertake the business. I believe that the Eastern Bank has been suggested to the King, and he may have had this in mind. The Egyptian Lutfallah Bank recently sent a representative here who may have made some proposal, but other offers are probably nebulous. I believe that negotiations with the Dutch Bank have failed. See also my despatches Nos. 177 and 200.

[E 3267/1600/25]

No. 131.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 200. Secret.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 28, 1931.

I HAVE had occasion in various recent reports to refer to various indications of a weakening of Ibn Saud's position in this country. Although the available data are meagre and uncertain, I think the time has come to attempt a review of the King's situation on the eve of an absence from the Hejaz which may last several months, if he carries out his intention of going to Nejd, as reported in my telegram No. 141 of the 20th May.

2. Ibn Saud imposed himself on the Hejaz by force of arms. He maintains himself by force of personality and by a reserve of material force responding to his personal direction and still capable of being applied with sufficient effect at any particular point to enable him to cope with anything short of a fairly general movement of opposition. Such a movement could hardly originate among the parasitic populations of places like Mecca and Jedda, although their inhabitants would almost certainly welcome a change of régime. The tribes have no such cohesion as to produce of themselves an organised movement in opposition to a King whose name and past exploits inspire respect and fear.

3. So far so good, from Ibn Saud's point of view. Nevertheless, he has to reckon with more remote factors. One hears vaguely, but somewhat persistently, of a restive spirit in the north of the Hejaz. Hail and even Medina are potential centres of disaffection. Behind them are the Transjordan frontier and countries ruled by members of the Shereefian family, a family which, though eliminated at present from the Hejazi scheme of things, would be the natural rallying centre for elements bold enough to try conclusions with the present régime. Such elements may emerge in the north, even though it be impossible at present to locate or identify them. Their boldness would strike an echo not of equal boldness, but of sympathy, in Mecca and Jedda, where people chafe under restrictions and recent "Nejdification."

4. The King's religious prestige has diminished as his temporal power has grown. He tends to fall between two stools. He is no longer extreme enough for Wahhabis of the old school. He is too Wahhabi for Hejazis and for the majority of alien Moslems who frequent the Hejaz at pilgrimage time. Native and foreign Moslems react on each other to some extent. The desecration of shrines since the Wahhabi invasion is a cause of widespread feeling shared by foreign pilgrims, who have venerated these from afar, and natives accustomed not only to venerate them, but, in some cases, to make money out of them in the past.

5. There are other factors in this nebulously alarming picture, like economic depression, maladministration, and an almost desperate financial situation. As for economic depression, the Hejaz cannot escape from the repercussion of "world causes." Their effect is manifested in the reduction of the overseas pilgrimage to less than half the numbers for last year. Maladministration is too familiar in a country like this to be in itself a potent cause of discontent. It impresses foreigners more than it is consciously felt by the bulk of the native

population. The dangerous feature in connexion with my present subject is not so much the badness of the administration as the quasi-paralysis which threatens many of those responsible for it, owing to the increasing difficulty of devising shifts to get out of difficulties. Mr. Philby, that most charitable of critics when he is dealing with the affairs of this country, dwelt particularly on this aspect of the situation in our last conversation. He convicted the King himself of floundering, of making mistakes through ignorance, and of clinging to authority amid a posse of advisers, all the more capable of whom were worn out with overwork. He remarked on the complete occultation of the Emir Feisal, to whom it was thought last autumn that the King might delegate some of his powers.

6. The crux of the matter is the financial situation. Ibn Saud has no doubt always lived up to his income and a bit beyond it. The trouble now is that he can only escape the most serious embarrassment by cutting his cloth to fit a greatly diminished income, again because of the slump in the pilgrimage, which has been too great to be balanced by increased taxation, and which is hardly likely to be repaired next year, whatever later prospects may be. He and his family are naturally extravagant. The expenditure, for instance, on a move to Riyadh is enormous in comparison with resources. This extravagance in itself causes adverse comment. The most intelligent foreign pilgrim I have met this year remarked on the poorness of the lighting of the sacred precinct at Mecca as contrasted with the installations in royal houses, and was very much inclined to ask generally why Ibn Saud should affect to miscellaneous State or other purposes money brought by Moslems coming here as of right to fulfil a religious obligation. Royal extravagance in personal expenditure might, however, pass, if royal requirements for other purposes were not so great a drain. The King's strength and prestige must depend on his ability to pay, pay, pay. An Islamised Dutchman here, not hostile to him, has expressed to me doubt as to whether the King means to go to Nejd at all this summer. His doubt is probably unfounded, but his reasons for it are interesting. Custom demands that all who come to the King's threshold in Riyadh should receive food, clothing and gifts. What an excellent plan, then, for His Majesty to put it about that he is going thither; let the expectant Bedouin turn their steps in that direction also; retire to Taif; and leave an eldest son to gratify as best he may the hopes of the Bedouins! Mr. Philby again, in the conversation to which I have already referred, asked me, with unusual diffidence, what I thought of the financial outlook, and had nothing hopeful to suggest when I said I could not see where any money was to come from until late in the autumn.

7. There is little in this despatch that I have not already adverted to in special connexions in other reports. In putting all the facts together in one statement, I may have painted too gloomy a picture. It is not the first time in Ibn Saud's history that he has been confronted with difficulties, nor is there anything in his record to suggest that he would easily relinquish what he has gained. He has often been hard up, and contrived to carry on. His whole position was endangered by the 1929 rebellion, and he came out on top. My object is not to suggest that he is now on the point of collapse in the Hejaz, but to show that his position here rests on foundations so unstable that a strong push from any direction might upset it, and that his downfall, if it could be compassed, would not be unwelcome to the population, however incapable the most visible elements may be of compassing it themselves. My intelligent pilgrim, admittedly a hostile witness, unlike Mr. Philby and the Dutchman, was full of the King's unpopularity, and mentioned a prophecy, of which I had not previously heard, that Ibn Saud's rule in the Hejaz would last seven years from the start. My French colleague tells me that he hears the same tales as myself of unsettled feeling in the Northern Hejaz, and agrees with me in thinking that their importance lies more in their persistency than in the value of particular reports.

8. While drafting this despatch I heard that a council of representatives, in some sense elective, has been convened to meet at Mecca on or about the 1st June, to consider matters affecting the general interests of the country. According to my informant, it will be a considerable gathering, comprising twenty representatives from Mecca, ten each from Medina and Jedda, and representatives from other towns. This piece of news has an interesting bearing on the subject-matter of the present despatch, which, however, I do not wish to delay. If my information is confirmed, I will report separately anything I may hear regarding the council and its proceedings.

[6131]

L 2

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, and His Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3301/387/25] No. 132.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 23, 1931.

YOUR telegram No. 106.

I addressed note to Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 18th June intimating your concurrence in proposed addition to formula of final text, which I enclosed. I said this completed agreement and embodied last sentence of your telegram under reference.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied on 21st June Hejaz Government concur and are instructing Ibn Zeid to meet Glubb on receipt of latter's invitation. Fuad requests in accompanying personal letter that Glubb should delay his communication for some days to enable Ibn Zeid to receive mail sent to him by car from Mecca about 15th June. Fuad again expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government will expedite settlement in regard to raids investigated by MacDonnell.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 201.)

[E 3391/723/25] No. 133.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(Nos. 178 and 179.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 29, 1931.

MY telegram No. 154.

After summarising my memorandum, the Hejazi Government reply that general regulations regarding aviation in sanctioned areas are being prepared by them and that the necessary instructions regarding landing, control or aeroplanes, &c., are being drawn up by the competent authorities. Meanwhile the Hejazi Government wish to enquire on what terms His Majesty's Government would come to a mutual agreement in this respect so that they may study them at the same time.

The object of this reply seems to be to combine considerable vagueness with an appearance that your request has had a friendly reception. It does not appear that the proposed regulations are as far advanced as I was led to believe by Fuad.

The meaning of the last sentence is not clear. Since Ibn Saud's attitude towards every question is now strongly influenced by consideration of lack of money, it may indicate that a proposal to rent the landing grounds would be considered. Your telegram No. 77 of 1930 foresaw this possibility. Time is too short now to do anything before the King leaves for Nejd. For this reason I think it would be best to wait till Fuad comes here again and then question him. I should be glad to know (1) what attitude I should adopt if he should hint at some financial arrangement, and (2) how important it is to reach a satisfactory solution of the question in view of the situation as regards Persia.

With regard to (1), if Ibn Saud is thinking on these lines, I expect his ideas are extravagant. With regard to (2), I think that the chances are poor of getting a really favourable settlement, but that, if there were any possibility of a general understanding on the lines given in the conversation alluded to in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 170, the chances would be better.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 356/206/89]

No. 134.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 14, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to report that ex-King Ali arrived in Damascus on the evening of the 12th January, and proceeded to Bagdad on the 13th.

2. He had passed through Damascus on the 11th, on his way to Beirut, where he dined with M. Ponsot. The French hospitality had aroused a certain interest in Damascus, where the possibility of a Hashimite King of Syria is still canvassed in some quarters.

3. On his arrival Rikabi Pasha called on him with a number of retired military officers, who still cherish the monarchical "idea" and its promise of future employment, and a curious crowd stormed the entry of the hotel where he was staying. So far as I know, no personages of mark called on him, and the candidature of any member of his family, or, indeed, of any other, would be resolutely resisted by the Nationalists.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, to the British Resident at Amman, and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.
E. C. HOLE.

[E 656/656/89]

No. 135.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 30, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit extracts from two interviews given to the local press by Hashem Beg El Atassi and Jamil Beg Mardam Beg. (1) They mark a revival of interest in political questions, which had been dormant since last spring.

2. The promulgation of the Constitution and the subsequent dissolution of the Assembly had long been discounted, and the various manipulations of the Council of Ministers that took place in the second half of the year interested no one but the new Ministers. Indeed, the present Government is so unrepresentative of anything, that its evolutions recall irresistibly certain passages of "Alice in Wonderland." The Nationalists themselves had applied themselves rather to economic than political matters.

3. The two interviews mark a distinct advance in co-operation between the Nationalists and the High Commission, and hold out some promise of a solution of the present deadlock. The declarations of Hashem-el-Atassi are as guarded as those of Jamil Mardam are the contrary, but both express readiness to swallow the High Commissioner's interpolations in the Constitution and to take part in elections, provided that the present Government is prevented from illicit interference with them, and if there is a real prospect of concluding a treaty on the lines of that between England and Iraq. Jamil Mardam Beg is more outspoken in his desire that the broad lines of the future treaty should be made public before the Nationalists take part in the elections, but the same hope, more discreetly expressed, may be found in the declarations of Hashem-el-Atassi.

4. Government newspapers have shown some ingenuity in deducing a split in the Nationalist party from differences in the language of the two leaders. Some Nationalist circles have protested against Mardam's too thorough-going acceptance of the Constitution, and he has been obliged to publish a *mise au point*, emphasising his somewhat perfunctory protest against article 116. On the whole, I am inclined to believe that the two interviews reflect the general trend of the Nationalist opinion.

(1) Not printed.

5. As was inevitable in this country, various newspapers at once fixed the dates of the forthcoming elections, on confidential information from the highest sources, and called forth the customary *démenti* from the Bureau de la Presse.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 2339/2339/89]

No. 136.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 41.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 23, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of High Commission Decree 3339, regarding real estate. This, although dated the 12th November, 1930, was only printed in the "Bulletin officiel" of the 31st January, 1931, which itself was actually distributed only a few weeks ago. The delay in the appearance of the decree is, I understand, largely due to the fact that its translation into Arabic took longer than was expected.

2. I am not competent to express an opinion as to the success achieved by this attempt to replace the Turkish legislation on this highly complicated and technical question by something more clear and comprehensible. The matter is one which in the main concerns the natives of the country, but one part of the decree is of direct interest to foreigners. Article 231, after laying down that a foreigner can only inherit real estate from Syrians and Lebanese if his national law allows them the same right, states that the succession, whether intestate or testamentary, to the real estate left by a foreigner is governed by his national law. Article 232 states that in the case of donations *inter vivos* the local law is applicable to foreigners. I am asking the French High Commission to let me know what is the local law referred to in this article.

3. One of my colleagues having expressed doubts as to the possibility of applying article 231 without causing grave inconvenience to foreign heirs, I recently convened a meeting of the consular body to consider the matter. The general opinion of the meeting was that, although a certain amount of inconvenience and delay must inevitably occur because the local courts will have to apply a variety of foreign laws, the change is on the whole, beyond doubt, much to the advantage of the foreigner.

4. At some time or other I shall undoubtedly be asked by the local courts for information as to the dispositions of the British law to be applied under article 231. I should be grateful for instructions as to how in such a case I should reply.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

P.S.—Copies of the decree have been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Palestine.

H. E. S.

Enclosure in No. 136.

Extract from Arrêté No. 3339.

Titre IX, Chapitre II.—Des Successions ab intestat et testamentaires en Matière immobilière.

Article 231.—Le droit de succession immobilière, ab intestat ou testamentaire, n'est accordé à l'étranger que si sa loi nationale l'accorde aux Syriens et Libanais.

La succession immobilière, ab intestat ou testamentaire, de l'étranger est réglée selon les dispositions de sa loi nationale.

[E 2689/656/89]

No. 137.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 51.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 9, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to report that a public meeting was held on the 6th May in memory of a number of Arab leaders executed by Jemal Pasha during the war. This anniversary has been celebrated with more and more emphasis during the last few years, and has now reached the full status of an official holiday.

2. The commemoration of the "Martyrs" lends itself to the ventilation of public grievances; and on this occasion the presence of members of the Syrian Government gave an additional savour to the speeches, in which they were vigorously criticised.

3. After a reference by the first speaker to the Italian atrocities in Libya, and an ode contributed by a Transjordan poet denouncing the Government's subservience to French advisers, the chief speech was made by Aref-el-Nakady, the late Government Attorney, the circumstances of whose dismissal were reported in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 44 of the 23rd August, 1930. He pointed out first of all how the Syrians had not been allowed by the French to make any progress towards autonomy, and how the Syrian Government and Administration were completely under the heel of the mandatory Power, who allowed them no freedom of action in even the smallest matter.

4. He proceeded to chastise the Nationalist leaders (most of whom were present) for their supineness. Their inactivity was draining the strength of the country. They should unite and provoke a new revolution not by arms, because the French were too strong for them, but by political action, in which they were at least as intelligent. It was quite useless to wait for the French to do anything for them, as they evidently had no intention of doing so.

5. The only indication of the methods of his peaceful revolutions that he gave was an injunction to tour the villages regularly and teach the rural population their rights and duties.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 6963/226/65]

No. 138

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 42. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1931.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 2007 of the 18th December, 1930, regarding the attitude of Zionists in the United States and of the United States Government towards the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine.

2. I approve the language which you held to Mr. Cotton, as reported in paragraph 4 of your despatch. I leave any further action to your Excellency's discretion, but it might be as well if you were to take any favourable opportunity that may present itself of impressing on Mr. Cotton the disastrous effect on Anglo-American relations which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, would be produced by any attempt at official representations by the United States Government as a result of Zionist pressure.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 2963/1321/31]

No. 139.

High Commissioner for Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies.
—(Received in Foreign Office, June 6.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, April 28, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch Confidential B of the 27th March, 1931, on the subject of his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury's visit to Palestine.

2. The archbishop arrived at Jerusalem by car from Tiberias on the afternoon of Wednesday, the 15th April, and was my guest at Government House throughout his stay.

In accordance with his Grace's express desire, his engagements were kept to the minimum.

3. On the morning following his arrival the archbishop visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, accompanied by the local Government officials and the Anglican bishop and clergy.

The three religious authorities resident in the Holy Places, namely, the Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchs and the Apostolic Delegate, were given formal notification of the hour his Grace would arrive at the church.

His Grace was received at the door by representatives of the Orthodox and Armenian Patriarchs, and was conducted by them to the Tomb and Calvary, the Armenian and Franciscan Chapels and the other commemorative shrines. Afterwards a short service was held in the Orthodox Katholicon, the part of the Church over which the Orthodox Eastern Church exercises complete internal control.

During this service an address of welcome to the archbishop was read in English by Timotheos, Archbishop of the Jordan, who had attended the Lambeth Conference last year as the delegate of the Orthodox Eastern Patriarch of Jerusalem.

4. Following his visit to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, his Grace, accompanied only by the Anglican bishop and clergy and my personal staff, paid calls on the heads of the three principal religious communities. Mgr. Valeri, the Apostolic Delegate, was absent in Egypt; and his Beatitude the Latin Patriarch, Mgr. Barlassina, received his Grace on behalf of the Apostolic Delegate. Mgr. Barlassina gave a cordial welcome to his Grace.

At the Orthodox Patriarchate there was a large gathering of the Orthodox clergy, headed by the Patriarchal representative, Evdoros, Archbishop of Philadelphia, and including representatives of the Russian, Serbian and Roumanian Orthodox Churches.

His Grace gave a short address in which he touched on the question of the reunion movement between the Anglican and the Orthodox Eastern Churches.

At the Armenian Patriarchate his Grace was received by the *locum tenens* of the patriarchate, Bishop Nishanian, and a number of the patriarchate clergy.

During the morning Archdeacon Stewart left cards on his Grace's behalf on the heads of the minor religious communities that are represented in Jerusalem.

5. In the afternoon of the 16th April his Grace received the return calls of the religious representatives at Government House between the hours of 3 and 4 p.m. Notification that his Grace would be at Government House at that hour to receive any of the religious representatives who might desire to return his call had previously been given to the three principal religious authorities by my private secretary and to the minor religious representatives by Archdeacon Stewart.

The Latin Patriarch returned his Grace's visit in person, and the Apostolic Delegate's secretary came to express Mgr. Valeri's regret that he was unable to be present in Jerusalem to receive the archbishop.

The Orthodox Patriarchal representative, the *locum tenens* of the Armenian patriarchate, the Russian archbishop, the Syrian Orthodox Metropolitan and the Coptic Superior, with their attendant clergy, and representatives of the Greek Catholic and Armenian Catholic convents attended as well.

In the evening his Grace, accompanied by Bishop MacInnes, drove up to the Mount of Olives and visited his Beatitude Damianos, the Orthodox Eastern Patriarch. Despite his infirmity, his Beatitude was able to receive his Grace, and remained in converse with him for some length of time.

6. On Saturday morning his Grace visited the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, where he was received by the Orthodox and Armenian representatives in a similar manner as at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and visited the Grotto of the Nativity and the Latin Grotto of St. Jerome. Another address of welcome was read, to which his Grace replied and gave his blessing.

On Saturday afternoon his Grace, in company with the rest of Mr. Pierpont Morgan's party, visited the Harem-esh-Sherif, being received by the president of the Supreme Moslem Council.

His Grace's cards were left by the member of the Chapter of St. George's Cathedral on Rabbi Meir, Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic Jews; Rabbi Kook, Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazic Jews; and Rabbi Sonnenfeld, Chief Rabbi of the Agudath Israel; these calls were duly acknowledged.

During his stay his Grace also visited Hebron and various places of interest in Jerusalem, including Gethsemane and the tomb of the Grand Duchess Elizabeth.

7. No unusual interest was taken locally in the archbishop's visit to Jerusalem; and certainly no serious consideration appeared to be given to the report that his visit had some ulterior political or religious motive.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,

High Commissioner for Palestine.

CHAPTER IV.—IRAQ.

[E 1454/5/93]

No. 140.

Mr. Morgan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Angora, March 18, 1931.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 142 of the 6th March, regarding oil in Iraq, I have the honour to report that the Turkish press has recently been displaying some quite pardonable curiosity as to the date when Turkey may expect to derive pecuniary profit from the exploitation of the Iraq oil-fields.

2. The "Vakit" of the 13th March asks in one of its headlines "Why do not the English exploit Mosul oil?" and, underneath, states that the Turkish Government, some time ago, urged the Iraqi Government to take measures for the prompt exploitation of the oil-fields. It goes on to allege that the completion of the pipeline or pipe-lines to the Mediterranean cannot be expected before 1935, and that consequently exploitation of the Iraq oil-fields cannot be looked for before that date. Even then exploitation may be indefinitely delayed, as the oil company (55 per cent. of which is under British control) is interested in oil-fields elsewhere, and will find it more profitable to delay exploitation of the Mosul fields in order to prevent a drop in oil prices. Turkey will suffer as she will not receive her share of royalties until the fields are exploited. The Iraqi Government would suffer more, and it was in that Government's interest to adopt Turkey's suggestion of early exploitation.

3. On the following day the "Vakit" published a leading article on Turkey's share in Mosul oil royalties. In its article the "Vakit" stated that the Iraqi Government were in negotiations with the Anglo-Franco-American Company formed to exploit the Mosul oil-fields with a view to securing a yearly advance in respect of its share in the oil-fields, and that the company had proposed to advance £400,000 sterling per annum to the Iraqi Government. The Government were inclined to accept the proposal on condition that exploitation should begin within the next five years, but the company wished to make it a condition of the advance that no date should be fixed for beginning exploitation. Turkey must not be left out of consideration in these negotiations. The amount of the advance now proposed makes it reasonable to suppose that, when exploitation begins, Iraq's income from the fields will be at least £500,000 sterling and possibly £1 million sterling per annum. It was important, therefore, that exploitation should begin soon and that the temporising policy of the British shareholders of the oil company should be checkmated. The article concluded by reminding the parties to the negotiations that, if an advance is made to the Iraqi Government by the company, one-tenth of the advance belongs to Turkey.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 1920/38/93]

No. 141.

Mr. A. Henderson to General Dances.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to Lord Monteagle's letter of the 18th February, 1929, to Mr. Atherton regarding the proposed new Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement and the position of United States nationals in Iraq in judicial matters.

2. As your Excellency is aware, the position of the nationals of the United States in judicial matters in Iraq is regulated by the convention between the United Kingdom, Iraq and the United States, signed on the 9th January, 1930,

under article 1 of which the application of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, is extended to United States nationals. Article 6 of the convention further lays down that no modification of the special relations existing between His Britannic Majesty and the King of Iraq, as defined in article 1 (other than the termination of such special relations as contemplated in article 7 of the convention) shall make any change in the rights of the United States as defined in the convention, unless such change has been assented to by the Government of the United States.

3. It was explained in Lord Monteagle's letter of the 18th February, 1929, that His Majesty's Government for the reasons set forth in that letter and in the memorandum which accompanied it, had decided in February 1929 to approach the Council of the League of Nations with a request that they should approve in principle the abolition of the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and the institution of a uniform system of justice in its place; and that they should authorise His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to prepare, for submission to the Council at a later session, detailed proposals in collaboration with the Iraqi Government. The Council, at its meeting on the 9th March, 1929, granted to His Majesty's Government the general authorisation required. The draft of a new Judicial Agreement to replace the Agreement of 1924 was accordingly negotiated with the Iraqi Government and was eventually initialled at Bagdad on the 30th June by the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government, and submitted to the Council of the League at its session of September 1930. The Council referred this draft agreement to the Permanent Mandates Commission for examination at its November session, and that body reported to the Council that it had come to the conclusion that the new agreement, while abolishing the special privileges granted to the nationals of certain foreign States under the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, seemed to offer to all foreigners in Iraq the essential guarantees for the proper dispensation of justice, and also an improvement in criminal procedure in favour of all persons in the country subject to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction. On the 22nd January last the Council of the League approved the new Judicial Agreement in a resolution in the following terms:—

"The Council, considering the opinion submitted to it by the Mandates Commission to the effect that it sees no objection to the approval, subject to the consent of the Powers concerned, of the draft of a new Judicial Agreement between the British Government and the Government of Iraq, initialled at Bagdad on the 30th June, 1930, approves the terms of the agreement of the 30th June, 1930, subject to the consent of the Powers whose nationals enjoyed privileges under the agreement of the 25th March, 1924."

4. The fourteen Powers concerned have now all signified their willingness to accept the new régime, and the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was accordingly informed on the 21st March last that His Majesty's Government proposed forthwith to bring the new agreement, which was signed in Bagdad by the High Commissioner for Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister on the 4th March, into force as soon as possible. A copy of the new agreement is enclosed herein.⁽¹⁾

5. I now have the honour to request that your Excellency will inform your Government that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland desire to obtain the assent of the United States Government under article 6 of the convention between the United Kingdom, Iraq and the United States, signed on the 9th January, 1930, and of which ratifications were exchanged on the 24th February, 1931, to the substitution of the Judicial Agreement signed on the 4th March, 1931, for the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and to the application of the former to United States nationals in Iraq in the place of the existing régime.

6. In making this request to you, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of an explanatory note in which the extent to which the position of foreigners in judicial matters in Iraq will be affected by the new agreement is explained,⁽¹⁾ together with an extract from a draft law amending the Bagdad Criminal Procedure Regulations,⁽¹⁾ which gives effect to certain provisions in the new agreement and in the note annexed thereto. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the new agreement will establish the position of nationals of all

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

foreign States in Iraq in judicial matters, not only on an equal, but also on a firmer and more equitable, basis. I desire, in particular, to draw your attention to the fact that, as will be seen from the contents of the explanatory note enclosed herein,⁽¹⁾ no United States national will, in practice, suffer on account of the withdrawal of existing judicial privileges.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 2164/5/93]

No. 142.

General Dawes to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 25.)

*United States Embassy,
London, April 23, 1931.*

My dear Henderson,

I HAVE just received a cablegram from my Government stating that it is informed unofficially that the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company have signed an agreement by which the company obtains a petroleum concession of approximately 36,000 square miles to the east of the Tigris River. According to information received it appears that the Iraq Government is to commence negotiations on the 1st May with the British Oil Development Company, which presumably will seek a concession for all or a part of the remaining oil bearing lands in Iraq.

In this relation I am desired to say to you that in view of the provisions of article 2 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, and the provisions of paragraph No. 1 of the protocol signed on the same date, the Government of the United States is confident that the Iraq Government will not grant the concession covering any of the oil lands in question before affording individuals and corporations of American nationality an equal opportunity to bid thereon. In the event that the Iraq Government should attempt to grant a concession without affording American nationals an equal opportunity to bid, the Government of the United States would, of course, rely upon the British Government to intervene to protect American treaty rights.

The views of my Government in this matter are being brought to the attention of the Iraq Government through the American consul at Bagdad.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES G. DAWES.

[E 3276/38/93]

No. 143.

Mr. Atherton to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 23.)

*United States Embassy,
London, June 19, 1931.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your note of the 22nd April last, a copy of which was transmitted to my Government, regarding the new Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement.

In compliance with the reply which has just been received, I am pleased to inform you, with respect to the specific request contained in paragraph 5 of the note under reference, that under the terms of article 6 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, the Government of the United States consents to the substitution of the Judicial Agreement signed on the 4th March, 1931, between the British and Iraqi authorities at Bagdad, for the agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and to the application of the former to nationals of the United States in Iraq upon its entry into force in accordance with its terms.

I have, &c.

RAY ATHERTON,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

[E 3155/1/93]

No. 144.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 801. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 27, 1931.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the Italian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 15th June and discussed with a member of this Department the question of the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

2. M. Bordonaro said that his Government had certain misgivings with regard to the procedure to be adopted for the termination of the mandate and the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. He stated at the outset that his Government were not troubled about the particular case of Iraq, but they felt that the proceedings in connexion with Iraq would create a precedent, which might be followed in the case of other countries where Italian interests were more directly concerned.

3. His Excellency said that the point on which his Government desired to lay particular emphasis was that the League itself should have every means of satisfying itself that the conditions in Iraq permitted of the release of that country from the mandatory régime.

4. M. Bordonaro's attention was drawn, in reply, to the fact that the Council of the League of Nations would be advised in this matter by the Permanent Mandates Commission, a body which had always been found extremely scrupulous in the discharge of its duties. His Majesty's Government were submitting to the commission at its present session a special report covering the whole period of the mandatory régime in Iraq; they had requested the commission to examine this report at its present session, so that if any further information was required, the commission might be able to inform His Majesty's Government, who would endeavour to supply the information before the commission's next session—thus enabling it to present in good time to the Council its final conclusion in the matter.

5. His Excellency said that he was aware of this, but his Government still felt that the League should have some more direct means of informing itself as to the exact situation, and he eventually came out with it, that what he would suggest was the despatch of a commission to Iraq to investigate conditions on the spot. He said that the Italian Government would propose this course. He had seen in the press that the Italian member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Marquis Theodoli, would be prevented by illness from attending the present session in Geneva, and he did not therefore know whether an Italian member would be present, but at some stage his Government intended to make the proposal, and he enquired what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to any such proposal.

6. M. Bordonaro was informed that His Majesty's Government had anticipated that a proposal of this kind might be made in some quarter. His Majesty's Government had examined the matter carefully, but had come to the conclusion that they could not favour it. In the first place, it seemed doubtful whether a commission sent out for a necessarily short period to Iraq would be able really to reach any valuable or reliable conclusions, or whether it would be able usefully to supplement the information which had been applied to the Mandates Commission by His Majesty's Government, and which was subjected at Geneva to the closest scrutiny. In the second place, it was foreseen that the arrival of a commission in Iraq itself might give rise to certain difficulties. The Ambassador would readily understand that the arrival of a commission of that kind would be the signal for every malcontent in the country to produce to it his particular grievances. The commission would attract to itself all the discontented elements, and it might be extremely difficult for the commissioner, or commissioners, to form a just view of the situation. Moreover, the arrival of a commission might give rise to local difficulties. His Excellency was informed that if the proposal were made at the present session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the High Commissioner for Iraq, who would be present himself, would indicate the misgivings of His Majesty's Government on this point and would be bound to suggest to the commission the objections that His Majesty's Government felt might be entertained to a proposal of the kind.

7. The Ambassador raised one other point, by enquiring whether it would be to the advantage of the Italian Government to endeavour to negotiate with the Iraqi Government an agreement similar to that negotiated by the United States Government. His Excellency was informed in reply that the convention to which he referred between the United States, the United Kingdom and Iraq, regarding the rights of the United States and of its nationals in Iraq, had been designed merely to put the United States on a footing of equality with the members of the League of Nations, and that therefore it would be superfluous for the Italian Government to negotiate a similar instrument. His enquiry appeared to be dictated by anxiety in regard to the judicial régime that would exist after Iraq had been admitted to the League. It was explained to his Excellency that, so far as His Majesty's Government were aware, it would be for the members of the League themselves to lay down conditions safeguarding the interests of their nationals for the period when Iraq should become a member of the League. His Excellency was also told that there appeared to be some probability that the League would insist on the continuance, after Iraq's admission, of the judicial régime which had recently been instituted with the consent of the Italian Government.

8. I should be glad if your Excellency will take steps, in whatever manner appears most suitable to you, to discourage and deprecate the Italian Government's suggestion for the despatch of a commission to Iraq to investigate conditions on the spot.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 56/48/89]

No. 145.

Mr. A. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 49.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 7, 1931.

SINCE the receipt of Mr. Campbell's despatch No. 1046, of the 17th September, on the subject of the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Transjordan frontier, His Majesty's Government have had under consideration, in consultation with the Governments of Iraq and Transjordan, the various proposals for approaching the League Council with a view to reaching an equitable solution of this question.

2. I have now to request that your Lordship will approach the French Government, and invite their concurrence in the following brief formula, which, if acceptable to the French Government, would be addressed by each Government to the Secretary-General of the League, in order that the question may be placed on the agenda of the sixty-third session of the Council, to be held in May 1931:—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the French Republic, having failed to reach agreement in regard to the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan, have agreed to refer their differences on this subject to the Council of the League of Nations.

"The two Governments accordingly request that 'the question of the frontier between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Transjordan' may be placed on the agenda of the sixty-third session of the Council, to be held in May 1931. They propose before that date to submit to the Council separate statements indicating and explaining their respective views on this question."

3. The French Government and His Majesty's Government would accordingly submit to the Council separate statements indicating in detail their views regarding the differences which have arisen between them, and as to the procedure which they consider most likely to lead to an equitable and permanent solution.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 238/48/89]

No. 146.

Lord Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 43.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the delimitation of the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Transjordan frontiers.

Paris, January 15, 1931.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR une note en date du 9 de ce mois, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères qu'elle était chargée par son Gouvernement de proposer au Gouvernement français le texte d'une formule qui pourrait être adressée par les deux Gouvernements au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations en vue de soumettre au Conseil leur différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, de l'autre.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté que le Gouvernement de la République est tout disposé à adresser, le plus tôt possible, au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations et d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, une demande tendant à ce que la question de la frontière susvisée soit mise à l'ordre du jour de la 63^e session qui doit se tenir en mai 1931.

Toutefois, il ne lui paraît pas possible que la demande qui serait ainsi adressée au Secrétariat général ne fasse pas mention de la convention du 23 décembre 1920, qui a déterminé la frontière. Au demeurant, l'article 2 de cette convention, aux termes duquel les conflits qui pourraient résulter de la délimitation de la ligne frontière sur le terrain seraient portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, trouve son application au différend actuel qui est pendant depuis que la Commission d'Abornement a interrompu ses travaux.

D'autre part, les expressions employées dans le 1^{er} et le 2^{ème} paragraphes de la formule proposée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, à savoir "la frontière entre la Syrie et l'Irak et entre la Syrie et la Transjordanie," pourraient donner à penser que les deux Gouvernements sont disposés à délimiter séparément chacune de ces frontières. Or, ainsi que s'en souviendra l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a toujours maintenu, et en particulier dans sa note du 7 juin 1930, que la frontière devait être considérée dans son ensemble du Tigre à El-Hammé. L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté avait, d'ailleurs, accepté ce point de vue par son mémorandum du 25 juin dernier.

Dans la pensée du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, la formule suggérée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté devrait donc être modifiée de la manière suivante :

"Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement de la République française n'ayant pu arriver à se mettre d'accord sur la délimitation des frontières déterminées entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, d'autre part, par la convention du 23 décembre 1920, ont décidé, conformément à l'article 2 de ladite convention, de soumettre leur différend au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

"En conséquence, les deux Gouvernements demandent que la question de la frontière entre la Syrie, d'une part, l'Irak et la Transjordanie, d'autre part, soit placée à l'ordre du jour de la 63^e session du Conseil, qui doit avoir lieu en mai 1931. Ils proposent de soumettre au Conseil des mémoires séparés précisant et exposant leurs points de vue respectifs sur la question."

Le Ministère serait reconnaissant à l'Ambassade de lui faire savoir si cette formule rencontre l'assentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 14 janvier 1931.*

[E 134/134/31]

No. 147.

Mr. A. Henderson to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1931.

IN my note of the 28th October last, I had the honour to explain to you the reasons for which His Majesty's Government found it impossible to abandon any of the four conditions, set forth in my note of the 15th July, to which they had felt obliged to subject their consent to the reference to judicial decision of the claim of a French group in respect of an alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea. I further explained that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to accept the proposal of the French Government that this claim should be referred for arbitration to a tribunal other than the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

2. I have received no reply to my note of the 28th October, and your Excellency will, I feel sure, appreciate the fact that His Majesty's Government are unable to hold open for an indefinite period their offer to accept a reference of the claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In these circumstances, I shall be grateful if you will explain to the French Government that

if they cannot see their way to accept the proposals put forward in my note of the 15th July before the 1st May, the offer of His Majesty's Government to refer the claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice will have to be regarded as having lapsed, and that His Majesty's Government will then be unable to agree to the reference of this claim to any form of international decision.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 1921/134/31]

No. 148.

M. de Fleuriau to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 14.)

EN se référant à la lettre que son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique pour les Affaires étrangères a bien voulu lui adresser à la date du 12 février 1931, M. le Fleuriau a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-jointe à Mr. Arthur Henderson une note relative à la concession des sels de potasse de la mer Morte, que M. Briand l'a prié de transmettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Il saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 12 avril 1931.*

Enclosure in No. 148.

Note.

UN examen attentif de la communication que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire tenir, le 28 octobre 1930, au sujet de la concession des sels de la mer Morte, et d'une nouvelle communication en date du 12 février 1931, n'a pas permis au Gouvernement français de relever la moindre disposition du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté d'entrer dans les vues exposées par la note française du 4 septembre.

D'une part, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique maintient intégralement les quatre conditions auxquelles il avait subordonné l'acceptation d'un arbitrage par sa note du 15 juillet et il ajoute, pour les justifier, certains arguments de droit et de fait : d'autre part, il écarte la suggestion qu'avait présentée le Gouvernement français en vue d'une forme d'arbitrage permettant, à son avis, d'éviter les divergences qui ont surgi quant aux modalités de la procédure à suivre.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a pas entrepris de faire connaître, d'une manière détaillée, ses vues sur la forme d'arbitrage que lui a proposée en dernier lieu le Gouvernement français. Il a cependant, au paragraphe 16 de sa note, déclaré tenir pour une *pétition de principe* la formule de la proposition française visant une indemnité de dépossession au profit du groupe français. Le Gouvernement français estime que cette critique repose sur un malentendu, car il n'a pas voulu dire, et la formule proposée ne signifie pas, contrairement à ce que paraît croire le Gouvernement britannique, qu'une indemnité serait due au groupe français, même dans le cas où la concession originelle serait déclarée sans valeur par l'arbitre.

De même que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'a pas cru devoir exprimer en détail son opinion sur la proposition française, de même le Gouvernement français ne croit pas devoir discuter en détail les arguments de droit et de fait développés dans la note du 28 octobre. Il se bornera à observer que les considérations qui y sont énoncées et qui sont empruntées à des décisions rendues par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ont une tout autre valeur quand il s'agit pour la cour, saisie d'un litige, de prononcer sur sa propre compétence et quand il s'agit pour deux Gouvernements de s'entendre, en vue de déterminer quelle est la forme d'arbitrage la mieux appropriée pour le règlement d'un différend. Pour le surplus et en faisant toutes réserves à l'égard des arguments

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présentés par le Gouvernement britannique, le Gouvernement français ne croit pas utile d'en discuter la valeur, sa position à l'égard des conditions auxquelles ils se réfèrent ayant été préalablement définie d'une manière positive.

Le Gouvernement français serait dans la nécessité de constater que la divergence qui sépare les points de vue des deux Gouvernements rend impossible un règlement satisfaisant de cette affaire s'il n'avait trouvé, au paragraphe 16 de la note du 28 octobre, cette importante indication que le Gouvernement britannique conteste la validité de la concession originelle et déclare par conséquent que le groupe français n'a pu acquérir quelque droit que ce soit du groupe britannique. Le Gouvernement français estime—et il pense que le Gouvernement britannique sera de même opinion—que ce point domine toute la controverse : si la validité de la concession originelle était déniée par une décision faisant autorité, la réclamation française n'aurait plus d'objet : si cette validité était reconnue, le Gouvernement français ne doute pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique donnerait effet aux droits qui en découlent. Comme, d'autre part, il ne paraît y avoir aucun juge compétent en Angleterre pour connaître de ce point, le Gouvernement français suggère qu'il soit déféré à un tribunal devant lequel les réclamants français seraient admis à faire valoir leurs arguments. Cet arbitrage devant avoir une portée nettement définie et limitée, le Gouvernement français veut espérer que le Gouvernement britannique n'y ferait pas les mêmes objections qu'à la procédure précédemment envisagée.

En formulant cette suggestion, le Gouvernement français a d'autant plus de raisons de croire qu'elle devrait rencontrer l'agrément du Gouvernement britannique que, par une lettre du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères à l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres en date du 12 novembre 1930, au sujet de la réclamation de la Régie générale des Tabacs en Turquie, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, après avoir constaté l'échec des négociations entre les parties, a proposé de soumettre le différend à une procédure arbitrale.

Le 27 mars 1931.

[E 1921/134/31]

No. 149.

Mr. A. Henderson to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1931.

UNDER cover of a memorandum dated the 12th April, your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me the reply of the French Government to my notes of the 28th October, 1930, and the 12th February last, regarding the claim of a French group in respect of an alleged concession for the extraction of salts from the Dead Sea.

2. The claim is one which His Majesty's Government have refuted in the past and which they are not under any legal obligation to submit to arbitration. But in the desire for conciliation which animates them in all their relations with the French Government, they eventually declared themselves ready to agree to refer the question to the arbitration of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, subject to the four conditions which were enumerated in my note of the 15th July, 1930.

3. These conditions the French Government were reluctant to accept, and accordingly, in my note of the 28th October, 1930, a full and careful exposition was given of the reasons why His Majesty's Government felt obliged to maintain them, and why, also, they could only contemplate reference of the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague and could not agree to direct litigation with the private French interests concerned before some other tribunal.

4. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel some surprise that, in the note enclosed in your Excellency's memorandum under reply, the French Government should virtually ignore this full explanation, and should put forward a fresh proposal which is clearly incompatible with it, namely, that the question of the

validity of the original concession should be referred to an unspecified tribunal before which the French claimants, and not the French Government, would appear as parties to the dispute.

5. Nor can His Majesty's Government conceal their disappointment that the French Government's note should be entirely silent on the subject of the settlement of the British claims arising out of the disturbances in Syria in 1925 and 1926. The history of the attempts to settle these claims was described at length in the latter part of my note of the 28th October, 1930; and it was the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the French Government would in consequence give the matter their serious consideration, and would be able either to put forward some acceptable offer of settlement or to agree to arbitration without further delay.

6. In short, His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to find in the note under reply anything to cause them to depart from the attitude taken up in my notes of the 15th July and the 28th October, 1930. They are still prepared to refer the French claim to the arbitration of the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions enumerated in the earlier of those notes; but, unless the French Government are able to indicate before the 1st May their acceptance of those conditions, His Majesty's Government regret that, as indicated in my note of the 12th February, they will have no alternative but to regard their offer as having lapsed, and will thereafter be unable to agree to the reference of this claim to any form of international decision, or, in fact, to give it further consideration.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 2380/250/65]

No. 150.

*High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 6.)*

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

April 11, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your Lordship's telegram No. 36, dated the 10th March, 1931, on the subject of the Treaty of Friendship between Transjordan and Iraq, and to forward herewith a copy and translation of the Transjordan-Iraq Treaty, which was signed at Amman by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries on the 26th March, 1931.

2. In the copy retained by the Iraq representative His Majesty King Feisal and Iraq are mentioned first throughout, while in the copy retained by the Transjordan Government His Highness the Emir and Transjordan are mentioned first.

3. There is a variation in the preamble which was only brought to the notice of the British Resident after the treaty was signed, viz., the word "Kings" had been substituted for the word "Rulers" in the phrase "Arab Kings and Governments."

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,

High Commissioner for Transjordan.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Transjordan-Iraq Treaty.

(Translation.)

HIS Highness the Emir Abdullah, Amir of Transjordan, and His Majesty King Feisal I, King of Iraq, being desirous of establishing firm and amicable relations between their two countries, and of offering a practical example of the good understanding which it is earnestly desired should exist between Arab

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Kings and Governments, have resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Highness the Amir of Transjordan:

His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah Effendi Siraj, Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government;

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Excellency Nuri Pasha-es-Said, Chief Minister of the Iraq Government;

who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

His Highness the Amir of Transjordan recognises the Kingdom of Iraq and His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises the Amirate of Transjordan.

ARTICLE 2.

The relations between the two Governments of Transjordan and Iraq shall be established on the basis of firm co-operation and intimate friendship.

ARTICLE 3.

The Governments of Transjordan and Iraq shall conclude between them, with the least possible delay, commercial, postal, customs, residential, travelling and extradition agreements.

ARTICLE 4.

Both the Transjordan and Iraq Governments shall co-operate in the control of public order at the boundaries and shall prevent transgressions, and will take reciprocal sanitary measures between the two countries.

This treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutions of the two countries and shall come into force upon the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place as soon as possible.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have thereunto affixed their seals.

[For texts of (a) Treaty of Friendship and "Bon-Voisinage" between Iraq and Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, and Protocol on Arbitration of the 7th April, 1931, and (b) Extradition Treaty between Iraq and Nejd and Hejaz of the 8th April, 1931, see under Arabia, No. , page .]

[E 2627/294/89]

No. 151.

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 18.)

(Secret "E.")

My Lord,

Bagdad, May 1, 1931.

WITH your Lordship's approval I arranged to pay a visit to M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner in Syria, whose acquaintance I had not previously had the pleasure of making, in order to discuss a number of questions which affected the mutual interests of Syria and Iraq.

2. I left Bagdad early on the morning of the 19th April, accompanied by my private secretary, Flight-Lieutenant Hawtrey, in my own "Puss Moth" aeroplane, escorted by two machines of the Royal Air Force, which carried as passengers Mr. Sturges, my political secretary, and a wireless operator. The journey of about 500 miles to Damascus was completed in five hours, and we were escorted for the last 20 miles by twelve French military aeroplanes flying in close

formation. I was received on the aerodrome by M. Solomiac, the délégué of the French High Commissioner; the General Officer Commanding the French Forces in Damascus; Colonel Antoinat, commanding the 39th Regiment of Aviation; Mr. Hole, His Majesty's consul; and a guard of honour. After lunching at the house of M. Solomiac, I proceeded by car to the Residency at Beirut, where I was received by M. Ponsot and his staff and a picturesque guard of honour, which was formed of Bedouin camel sowars. Before dinner I conversed for an hour with Mr. Satow, His Majesty's consul-general in Beirut, who was kind enough to give me much valuable information on the subject of M. Ponsot's views on current questions affecting Iraq. At an official banquet the same evening I was introduced to the principal French civil and military officers in Beirut. The morning of the 20th was spent in conversation with M. Ponsot, and in the afternoon we motored together to the ruins of Baalbek, and also visited the headquarters of aviation at Rayak and the interesting town of Zahli. At a dinner at the Residency that evening I met M. Debbas, the President of the Lebanese Republic, who seemed to be principally interested in the boycott of the Belgian Tramway and Electricity Company at Beirut, which had been in progress for three weeks, and had been carefully organised in order to force the company to reduce its charges.

3. At 6 o'clock on the following morning M. Ponsot accompanied me by car to Tripoli, a distance of rather more than 60 miles, along a very good road which skirted the coast of the Lebanon. M. Ponsot showed a marked preference for Tripoli, and it was evident that he looked forward to a time when it would become the principal centre of French activity in the Lebanon. He told me that the town, with its suburb of El Mina, already had a population of about 200,000, and enjoyed a superior climate and far greater facilities for expansion than Beirut. Its favourable situation at the northern extremity of the Lebanon range affords easy access to the interior of the country by the standard gauge railway to Homs. This railway, M. Ponsot informed me, would eventually be extended to Palmyra and Deir-ez-Zor on the Euphrates, at an estimated cost of 230 million francs, but since it had recently been found that a railway was not necessary to assist the construction of the oil pipe-line, he thought that the extension would have to be deferred for some years. We then motored to Ras-el-Lodas, an insignificant cape 6 kilom. to the north-east of Tripoli, where he informed me that it had been decided that the pipe-line from Iraq should enter the sea. From this point the oil would be carried by a sea pipe to an anchorage 1 mile from the shore, where the oil tankers would load. In order to facilitate this operation, it had been decided to build a breakwater connecting the small islands which lay off the promontory of El Mina, which would protect the anchorage from the prevailing south-westerly gales. This would ensure that the tankers would load in safety at all times, with the exception of about fifteen days in the year when northerly winds prevailed. The breakwater would at the same time provide a smooth area of 1,200 metres square, where hydroplanes could safely land in all weathers. At present there was a service of French flying-boats, which flew once a week, both ways, between Tripoli and Marseilles via Athens in two days, and it was proposed to eliminate Athens and reduce the period to one day. M. Ponsot told me that the scheme for constructing a harbour at Tripoli for ships of 30 feet draught had been definitely abandoned, partly owing to the large expense involved, but chiefly owing to the fact that satisfactory arrangements for the oil tankers to load had been put in hand as described above. M. Ponsot was at pains to impress on me the natural advantages of Ras-el-Lodas as a terminal for a pipe-line.

4. We motored back at mid-day to Beirut, where I took leave of M. Ponsot and proceeded by car to Rayak. Here I was joined by my escort, and we were entertained to a complimentary luncheon by Colonel Antoinat and the officers of the 39th Regiment of Aviation. In the afternoon we flew from Rayak to Ramleh in one and a half hours, escorted by twelve French machines up to the Palestine frontier, and I spent the night of the 21st and 22nd at Jerusalem as the guest of Sir John Chancellor. At Jerusalem various questions connected with the Haifa-Bagdad Railway were discussed with the High Commissioner and Sir Frederick Palmer, who had arrived from England to inspect the alignment. On the 23rd we flew from Palestine to Bagdad in six and a half hours. The whole journey of 1,500 miles occupied about fourteen hours in the air instead of several days of motor travel by indifferent road tracks.

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5. During my visit to Beirut I was enabled to have many hours' conversation with M. Ponsot quite alone, while Mr. Sturges held discussions with his secretariat. We exchanged views with great frankness and cordiality, and M. Ponsot professed to take me into his confidence on the question of the future attitude of his Government towards the Syrian mandate. He told me that when he read the Anglo-Iraq Treaty concluded in June 1930 his first impression was that it had established a close British protectorate over Iraq. When he read between the lines, however, it dawned on him that the treaty, while carefully safeguarding British interests, represented a generous and statesmanlike endeavour to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Iraqis towards independence. When he came to Syria five years ago he formed the opinion that the British Government was proceeding too hastily in Iraq, and that a longer period of preparation would be required before this infant State could be reasonably expected to stand on its own feet. Recent experience, however, had caused him to alter his opinion. He was now convinced that the British policy was right in principle and should be generally followed in Syria, though there were doubtless questions of detail which might demand different treatment. In any case, there was no doubt left in his mind that the policy of holding down a mandated territory by sheer force of arms was a negative policy which held out no promise of a satisfactory *dénouement*. He fully realised my difficulties in Iraq in dealing with inexperienced and conceited politicians, who were always attempting to run before they had learnt to walk, but he was impressed by the comparative success of the British experiment. The Iraqis were being gradually led, possibly, as some critics averred, at too fast a pace, towards a definite goal, and the results, so far as he was able to judge them, seemed to him to justify the sacrifices we had made and the risks which we were undoubtedly taking. For what was the alternative in Syria? To hold down with an overwhelming force a sullen population which was ready to revolt and claim its rights whenever a favourable opportunity should present itself. He believed that it was far preferable to grant these rights peaceably and ungrudgingly, as the British were doing, than to allow them to be eventually extracted by threats and disorders. This was the personal conclusion that he had reached after our conversation and a close study of the problem. The difficulty, however, was to bring the Quai d'Orsay to the same way of thinking. He proposed to proceed on leave to Paris about the middle of May, and would probably stay there for five months. During this period he hoped to work out with the French Foreign Office the details of an agreement with Syria which he would suggest should be based roughly on the principles of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930. At present, there was no one with whom he could negotiate. It would, therefore, probably be necessary to hold elections on his return to Syria in the autumn and enter into negotiations with the Government which would thereupon emerge. When I enquired what elements the new State of Syria would be likely to comprise, M. Ponsot informed me that a beginning would probably have to be made with a single independent State formed of the districts of Aleppo and Damascus, leaving the Jebel Druse and the Alouites outside as independent minorities free to amalgamate with Syria whenever they wished to do so. The form which the Government of Syria might take, whether a republic or a monarchy, would probably be left for the people to decide. At present, the Constitution provided for a republic, but he did not believe that any French Government would raise objection to the creation of a monarchy, if the Syrians expressed their preference for this form of government. In that case the Syrians would, he hoped, be left free to choose their own King, whether from the Hashimite family, or from the sons of Ibn Saud, or from elsewhere, he could not say. He explained that the suggestion for King Ali's recent visit to Beirut came from King Ali himself. The invitation was prompted merely by a desire to show courtesy to a member of King Feisal's family and had no connexion, as some newspapers had surmised, with any proposal that the Throne of Syria should be offered to King Ali. As regards the Lebanon, M. Ponsot held strongly that this country, in view both of its history since 1860 and of the special position of the former Christian subjects of Turkey, would have to be established as a permanent Christian enclave. It was impossible, in his opinion, that it should again become an appanage of a predominantly Moslem State. On the other hand, the French Government would be prepared to grant the Lebanese Republic a full measure of independence. I thanked M. Ponsot for this interesting forecast, but told him that, if experience of the political mentality of the Iraqis could be said to form

any useful guide, I thought that the Syrians would take strong objection to the lopping off of the Jebel Druse and the Alouites from the parent State, though it was possible that they might be reconciled to a separation from the Lebanon. M. Ponsot emphasised that the Alouites and Jebel Druse were at present administered by French Governors, and it was most unlikely that they would consent in the near future to come under the control of Damascus. He agreed, however, that they should be encouraged to join the State of Syria as soon as might be practicable.

6. In the course of our conversation on the subject of oil, M. Ponsot said that he had no complaint to make about the terms of the new convention as reported to him, but he expressed apprehension that the agreement might not be ratified by the Iraqi Parliament and that the old state of uncertainty and delay in bringing the oil to production might continue indefinitely. I reassured him on this point. He told me that Syria had no interest in the building of railways towards the Iraq frontier in the zone south and east of a line drawn from Palmyra to Deir-*ez-Zor*, and it was therefore no hardship for her to subscribe for twenty-five years to a self-denying ordinance in respect of this zone. He realised that the Iraqi Government regarded the early construction of a Haifa-Bagdad railway as vital to the interests of the country, and he assured me that Syria could take no legitimate objection to such a railway. He gave me to understand, however, that it was his ambition to link up Tripoli with Mosul and Northern Persia by the Palmyra-Deir-*ez-Zor* route. He said that the Nisibin railway to Alexandretta was so exposed to attack from Turkey that it seemed hardly worth developing as an important trade route.

7. After a long discussion on the subject of the frontier, M. Ponsot agreed that a commission from the League of Nations should make a local enquiry, preferably next autumn, and should report first of all as to the interpretation of the 1920 Convention line accepted by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot at San Remo and, at the same time, should recommend, on the principle of equal concessions on both sides, what divergencies from this line would, in the opinion of the commission, be advisable on geographical, tribal and administrative considerations. He suggested that these recommendations, which should cover the Syrian frontier with Transjordan (and therefore part of the Jebel Druse country) as well as with Iraq, should be presented to the Council of the League, whose decision should be final. Great Britain and France would have ample opportunity of representing their point of view before the Council gave its decision. I am reporting on this subject separately by telegram.

8. I explained to M. Ponsot that the Iraqi Government were anxious to establish a consulate at Beirut, and he told me that he was willing to agree to this proposal for the sake of improvement of relations. I promised that I would do my best to induce King Feisal to select for this post a suitable Iraqi who would not be likely to indulge in improper activities. M. Ponsot suggested that this question should now be formally placed before the Quai d'Orsay by the London Foreign Office. As regards Sultan Atrash, the rebel chief of the Jebel Druse, M. Ponsot was quite content that he should remain in his present refuge with King Ibn Saud. He would have no objection, however, to his residence in Iraq, provided that he was not permitted to live close to the Syrian frontier, and he suggested his removal to some place east of the Tigris.

9. Other matters, such as the case of the Amarat camels, which M. Ponsot promised to settle to the satisfaction of Iraq, the economic conference at Bagdad, the tribal conference at Albu Kamal, and the collection of widi, were amicably discussed and disposed of, and I feel that the personal contact which this visit has enabled me to establish with M. Ponsot will be of valuable assistance to me in dealing with any future problems which may arise.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,
High Commissioner for Iraq.

[E 2735/5/93]

No. 152.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir J. Shuckburgh (Colonial Office).—(Received in Foreign Office, May 25.)

(Secret.)

My dear Shuckburgh,

Bagdad, May 1, 1931.

I SEE that we have not yet sent you the enclosed letter from the French Chargé d'Affaires here, which gives the guarantee on the subject of railways in East Syria, without which the revised agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company could not have been concluded. I have not yet had a copy communicated to me officially by the Iraqi Government, the reason being that they are most anxious for it to be kept absolutely secret for the present, but you will see from my report on my visit to Syria that Ponsot had no objection to this self-denying ordinance.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 152.

French Chargé d'Affaires to Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Consulat de France,

Baghdad, le 22 mars 1931.

JE me fais un plaisir de faire part à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République française m'a autorisé et spécialement chargé de signer en son nom ainsi qu'au nom du Gouvernement syrien l'engagement—engagement que j'ai l'honneur de donner officiellement à votre Excellence par cette présente lettre—de ne pas construire pendant vingt-cinq ans, sans accord préalable et formel avec le Gouvernement de l'Irak, de voies ferrées de Palmyre à Rutbah ou en direction de Rutbah, de Palmyre à Abou-Kemal ou en direction d'Abou-Kemal, de Deir-ez-Zor à Abou-Kemal ou en direction d'Abou-Kemal.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France en Irak,
PAUL LEPISSIER.

[E 2861/48/89]

No. 153.

Sir F. Humphrys to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 1.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 15, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for information, a copy of a note addressed to the French High Commissioner, Beirut, on the subject of the Syrio-Iraqi frontier.

2. Copies have also been sent to the Acting High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 153.

Sir F. Humphrys to French High Commissioner, Beirut.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Bagdad, May 15, 1931.

AS a result of conversations that took place during my recent visit to Beirut, I have formed the impression that the correspondence that has passed between the British and French Governments on the subject of the reference of the Syrio-Iraqi frontier question to the League of Nations has been attended with a certain amount of misunderstanding. Whereas it appears that the French

Government were under the mistaken impression that the British Government were anxious that the frontier question should be settled by the League without reference to the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, the British Government had been led to believe that the French Government were not prepared to agree that the League should be authorised to consider any modification of the boundary defined in the convention. It is easy to see how this misunderstanding prevented agreement being reached on a combined draft formula referring the question to the League of Nations. I understood, however, from what passed at Beirut, that your Excellency did not, in fact, object to the frontier defined in the convention being modified in accordance with geographical, tribal and administrative consideration; your Excellency stipulated only that, in order to ensure that such modifications should be made as far as possible on a reciprocal basis, it was necessary to provide that any commission sent to conduct investigations on the spot should first come to some conclusion regarding the interpretation of article 1 of the convention. If the foregoing is a correct interpretation of your Excellency's attitude, I feel sure that it would not be a difficult matter for your Excellency and myself to agree on a draft combined formula referring the question to the League, which we could recommend to our respective Governments, and, with this object in view, the enclosed draft has been prepared.

2. It will be seen that the draft is based on the draft prepared by the Quai d'Orsay last September, amended in such a way as to make it clear that the difficulties which have arisen are connected both with the interpretation of article 1 of the convention and with the reconciliation of the frontier defined in that article with local conditions, and that the British Government have no objection to the frontier recommended by the commission being based upon the conclusions reached by them regarding the interpretation of article 1, provided that the French Government, for their part, agree that the commission should be empowered to incorporate in the frontier recommended by them such modifications of the convention frontier as they consider that local geographical, tribal and administrative conditions require. An attempt has been made in the enclosed draft to present both these aspects of the problem without emphasising either at the expense of the other, and I hope that your Excellency will find it possible to accept it.

3. I have, therefore, taken the opportunity of the visit of a party of the Royal Air Force to Rayak to send the draft by my political secretary, Mr. Sturges, in the hope that your Excellency will agree that it should be discussed at the Residency, with the object of agreement being reached in time for the combined reference to be represented to the Council of the League of Nations before the September session.

I avail, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

[E 3129/48/89]

No. 154.

Sir F. Humphrys to the Colonial Office.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 15.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

The Residency, Bagdad, May 26, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, for information, a copy of a note addressed to the Iraqi Prime Minister on the subject of the Syrio-Iraqi frontier.

2. Copies have also been sent to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner, Jerusalem, and His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut.

I have, &c.

F. M. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 154.

Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha.

My dear Prime Minister,

The Residency, Bagdad, May 24, 1931.

YOUR Excellency will remember that on the evening of the 15th May, I showed your Excellency a draft of a combined communication by the British and French Governments to the Council of the League referring the Syrio-Iraqi frontier question to the Council for a decision. Your Excellency stated that the draft correctly reflected the views of the Iraqi Government and that your Excellency welcomed the suggestion that I should attempt to secure M. Ponsot's acceptance of a combined communication drafted on these lines.

I am glad to be able to inform your Excellency as a result of negotiations undertaken with the French High Commission by Mr. Sturges who visited Beirut specially for the purpose, the draft has been accepted by M. Ponsot with certain minor amendments which do not affect its essential features. I enclose a copy of the draft in the form finally agreed upon, and I should be glad to receive at the earliest possible moment your Excellency's formal approval of the action that has been taken.

The renewed prospect of this question being referred to the League of Nations raises once more the question of the survey referred to in Mr. Sturges's letter dated the 27th August, 1930, to his Excellency Ja'far Pasha. I understand that the French authorities in Syria agree that arrangements should now be made to carry out a joint survey of the frontier zone as soon as possible, and I should, therefore, be obliged if your Excellency would consider the question raised in Mr. Sturges's letter without delay and acquaint me with the views of the Iraqi Government.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Rais of the Royal Diwan.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to the Political Secretary to the High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

Bagdad, May 27, 1931.

REFERENCE his Excellency the High Commissioner's letter dated the 24th May, 1931, regarding the Iraqi-Syrian frontier.

I am directed to inform you that the Iraqi Government agree to the draft combined communication proposed for submission by the British and French Governments to the Council of the League of Nations regarding the reference of the Syrio-Iraqi frontier question to the said Council for a decision.

In regard to the question of carrying out combined arrangements for the survey of the frontier zone, you will be addressed later in this connexion.

'ABDUL QADIR RASHID,

Secretary to the Council of Ministers.

[E 3209/134/31]

No. 155.

Memorandum communicated by the French Embassy, June 17, 1931.

PAR sa lettre du 22 avril dernier, son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères avait bien voulu faire savoir à l'Ambassadeur de France que le Gouvernement britannique, estimant n'être pas légalement dans l'obligation de soumettre à l'arbitrage les réclamations du groupe français intéressé à la concession accordée avant la guerre pour l'exploitation des gisements de sels de potasse de la mer Morte, maintenait entièrement les conditions auxquelles il a antérieurement subordonné son consentement à porter ces réclamations devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale; cette communication ajoutait que, si les conditions énumérées dans la note britannique du 15 juillet 1930 n'étaient pas acceptées par le Gouvernement français avant le 1^{er} mai, le Gouvernement

britannique serait dans l'impossibilité de donner son accord à la soumission de cette affaire à une forme quelconque de décision internationale ou même de la prendre en considération.

Le Gouvernement français a éprouvé la plus grande surprise à apprendre que le Gouvernement britannique entendait mettre fin aussi sommairement à cette affaire. Des Français prétendent avoir des droits dans une concession dont la validité est contestée, et ils en sont évincés. Que leur prétention soit ou non fondée, ils ont à tout le moins droit à trouver un juge. Le Gouvernement français a le devoir de protéger ses nationaux. Il ne peut donc admettre qu'à la date du 1^{er} mai, son droit d'intervention ait pris fin.

Le Gouvernement français n'avait pas manqué d'examiner avec le plus grand soin les explications contenues dans la note britannique du 12 février; n'y trouvant pas de motifs déterminants pour accepter les conditions énoncées par le Gouvernement britannique, il n'avait pas cru nécessaire d'entrer à ce sujet dans les détails d'une controverse juridique. Il avait, cependant, pris soin de dire, pour répondre aux considérations que la note britannique empruntait à des décisions de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, que ces considérations ont une tout autre valeur pour une cour statuant sur sa propre compétence que pour deux Gouvernements qui cherchent à s'entendre sur la forme d'arbitrage le mieux appropriée au règlement d'un différend.

Ces explications ayant été jugées trop brèves, le Gouvernement français ajoute que, de toutes les décisions de la cour auxquelles la note britannique s'est référée, une seule, celle concernant les emprunts serbes, concerne une affaire qui ait été portée devant la cour par voie de compromis: c'est également par voie de compromis que l'affaire des potasses de la mer Morte pourrait être portée soit devant la cour, soit devant un tribunal spécial. Or, dans l'affaire des emprunts serbes, la cour n'a pas eu à dire si tel acte de la Serbie était ou non contraire au droit international, mais uniquement à dire quel mode de paiement était conforme aux engagements pris par la Serbie envers les porteurs. De même, aujourd'hui, il s'agit essentiellement de déterminer si le groupe français a bien les droits qu'il prétend avoir à l'exploitation des sels de la mer Morte et s'il a été porté injustement atteinte à ces droits.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement français s'estime fondé à ne pas accepter des conditions qui enlèveraient au litige sa véritable physionomie et qui, en présentant au juge le litige dans des termes ne correspondant pas à la réalité, risqueraient d'entraîner ce juge vers une solution qui ne serait conforme ni à la justice ni à l'équité.

Le Gouvernement de la République, en présence des conditions posées par le Gouvernement britannique et qu'il jugeait ne pouvoir adopter, avait cherché une issue pratique en suggérant une autre forme d'arbitrage que celle qui avait été tout d'abord considérée. Cette forme, comme il l'a indiqué dans sa note du 28 octobre 1930, aurait rendu admissible la disposition relative au paiement des frais par la partie perdante qu'a proposée le Gouvernement britannique. Le Gouvernement de la République a eu le regret de constater que ses suggestions à cet égard, formulées en octobre 1930 et, sous une forme modifiée, en avril 1931, n'avaient pas reçu un accueil favorable.

Quant à la question des réclamations britanniques se rattachant aux désordres de Syrie en 1925 et 1926, si le mémorandum du 12 avril 1930 l'a passée sous silence, c'est que la position du Gouvernement français à cet égard avait été très nettement énoncée au mois d'octobre précédent. Il n'y a aucun rapport entre l'affaire des sels de potasse de la mer Morte et les réclamations relatives aux troubles de Syrie; le Gouvernement de la République ne peut donc admettre qu'elles soient liées l'une à l'autre.

Le Gouvernement français se refuse à penser que les divergences qui se sont affirmées touchant les modalités d'un règlement arbitral du présent litige doivent conduire à laisser celui-ci sans solution et il est persuadé que le désir de conciliation qui, comme l'a rappelé le Gouvernement britannique, anime ce dernier dans ses relations avec le Gouvernement français, lui fera partager ce sentiment. Il suggère, dans ces conditions, d'utiliser la voie qu'offre aux deux Gouvernements l'article 52, alinéa 1, de la Convention de La Haye, du 18 octobre 1907, pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Conformément à ce texte, les deux Gouvernements pourraient charger un tribunal arbitral, composé de trois membres de la Cour permanente d'Arbitrage de La Haye, d'établir un compromis par lequel seraient déférées à ce tribunal les questions

litigieuses relatives à la concession pour l'extraction du sel de la mer Morte; il pourrait d'ailleurs être préalablement entendu que ce tribunal aurait à suivre la procédure sommaire réglée par le titre IV, chapitre IV, de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt, quant à lui, à entrer dans cette voie et il attend avec confiance que le Gouvernement britannique veuille bien lui faire connaître s'il lui paraît possible de se rallier à cette suggestion.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 juin 1931.*

[E 3220/5/93]

No. 156.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 64.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 10, 1931.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the supplement to the Lebanese "Official Journal," No. 2509, of the 5th June, containing the Lebanese law of the 23rd May ratifying the Transit Convention of the 25th March, 1931, between the Lebanese Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited). I am sending copies of this to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Palestine and Iraq.

2. The supplement also contains an agreement between the Lebanese Government and the Government of Lattakia regarding the modification of their common frontier. Reference is made in article 4 of the agreement and in its preamble to the projected construction of the pipe-line in the vicinity of this frontier.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 156.

"Journal officiel," Supplément du No. 2509 du Vendredi 5 Juin 1931

(1)

Loi portant Approbation d'une Convention conclue entre la République libanaise et l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited).

LA Chambre des Députés a voté,

Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :

Article 1^{er}. Est approuvée la convention conclue à Beyrouth, le 25 mars 1931, entre le représentant de la République libanaise et M. John Skliros, agissant pour le compte de l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), au sujet du transit des pétroles de cette compagnie à travers l'Etat du Liban.

Art. 2. Est approuvé l'accord conclu à Beyrouth, le 12 mai 1931, entre la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh au sujet de la fixation de leur commune frontière et de l'établissement d'un régime spécial en ce qui touche les grandes voies de communication qui longent ou traversent cette frontière.

CHARLES DEBBAS.

Beyrouth, le 23 mai 1931.

Par le Président de la République :

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des
Finances et de l'Agriculture,
AUGUSTE ADIB.

(2)

Convention de Transit des Pétroles de l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), à travers l'Etat du Liban.

Cette Convention passée le 25 mars 1931 entre les soussignés son Excellence Auguste Pacha Adib, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République libanaise, agissant pour le compte du Gouvernement libanais (ci-après désigné "le Gouvernement"), d'une part, et John Skliros, agissant pour le compte de

l'Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited), dont le siège social se trouve à Londres, King William Street House, Arthur Street, ci-après dénommée "la compagnie" (expression qui comportera partout où elle sera employée, non seulement la compagnie elle-même, mais ses mandataires ou toute compagnie filiale ou associée dûment constituée, ou toute autre société qui serait reconnue conformément aux dispositions de l'article 26 ci-après comme étant constituée ou utilisée par la compagnie dans le but de construire, entretenir ou exploiter les conduites, les raffineries et les travaux y afférents aux termes de cette convention), d'autre part,

Il a été exposé ce qui suit :

Attendu que la compagnie a été constituée le 31 janvier 1911 sous le régime de la Loi sur les Sociétés, Compagnies (Consolidation Act) de 1908, sous la raison sociale "African and Eastern Concessions (Limited)," et qu'à la date du 23 octobre 1912, cette raison sociale a été modifiée et est devenue "Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited)," et qu'à la date du 8 juin 1929, cette raison sociale a été modifiée et est devenue "Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited)," et

Attendu qu'en date du 14 mars 1925, un acte de concession (ci-après désigné "Concession d'Irak," expression qui comportera toute prolongation ou modification qui pourrait y être apportée) est intervenu entre le Gouvernement d'Irak d'une part et la compagnie d'autre part, aux termes duquel le Gouvernement a accordé à la compagnie le droit exclusif d'explorer, prospecter, forer, extraire et préparer pour le commerce: pétrole, naphte, gaz naturel, ozokérite, et le droit d'enlever et de vendre lesdits produits et leurs dérivés, aux termes, conditions et prescriptions contenus et énumérés dans ladite Concession d'Irak, et

Attendu que la compagnie, en vue de l'exploitation de la Concession d'Irak, désire construire une ou plusieurs conduites de l'Irak à un point terminus situé sur la Méditerranée, la conduite traversant de ce fait le territoire de la République libanaise (ci-après désigné "le territoire de l'Etat"), et construire et entretenir dans ce territoire des bureaux, stations de pompage, ateliers, entrepôts, réservoirs pour le pétrole et pour l'eau, ponts, maisons pour les employés, lignes de chemin de fer et de tramways, câbles ou transporteurs aériens ou souterrains, bacs, transports par route, par eau ou par air, aérodromes, câbles électriques aériens et souterrains, lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques, installations de radio-télégraphie et radiotéléphonie, raffineries, parcs de réservoirs, hôpitaux, stations de force motrice, conduites de pétroles, gaz et eau posées, enterrées ou immergées et autres travaux (qu'ils soient de la nature de ceux qui sont énumérés ci-dessus ou non) connexes ou similaires y afférents (toutes ces opérations sont ci-après collectivement incluses dans l'expression "l'entreprise"), et

Attendu que le Gouvernement, en vue des avantages que le pays en retirera, désire faciliter, par les moyens prévus par la présente convention, les opérations de la compagnie se rapportant à l'entreprise,

Il a été convenu et arrêté entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Droits accordés à la Compagnie.

Le Gouvernement, par ces présentes, concède à la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat le droit (ci-après désigné "la concession") de construire, entretenir et exploiter une ou plusieurs conduites et tous travaux auxiliaires y afférents et de faire tout ce qui pourrait être nécessaire pour l'entreprise, aux conditions suivantes :

ARTICLE 2.

Durée de la Concession.

La durée de la concession sera de soixante-dix ans à partir de la date de la signature de la présente convention.

Soumission des Plans.

Avant de commencer la pose de la conduite, la compagnie soumettra au Gouvernement des plans indiquant les terrains dans lesquels la conduite sera posée, et les terrains sur lesquels des stations de pompage, raffineries ou autres

ouvrages de l'entreprise seront érigés, ces plans devant être de nature à permettre au Gouvernement de vérifier les droits de propriété portant sur ces terrains.

Aboutissement de la Conduite à Tripoli.

La conduite aboutira à Tripoli, sous la réserve que, si l'aboutissement de la conduite dans la localité précitée s'avère impraticable, elle aboutira à tel point de la côte du Liban déterminé par un accord entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie.

Contiguïté des Conduites.

Si la compagnie désire poser plus d'une conduite, les conduites de la compagnie seront contiguës, sous cette réserve que la compagnie, au cas où il serait nécessaire de poser des conduites qui ne soient pas contiguës, pourra poser ces conduites après avoir préalablement soumis les plans susvisés et obtenu le consentement du Gouvernement de poser des conduites conformément à ces plans, ce consentement ne devant pas être retardé ni refusé sans motif raisonnable.

Prolongation ou Renouvellement de la Concession.

Si la compagnie prévoit qu'à l'expiration de ladite période, elle disposera encore de pétroles de l'Irak ou d'une autre provenance à transporter en transit à travers le territoire de l'Etat, et si elle présente une demande de renouvellement de la présente convention dans un délai minimum de six mois avant la date d'expiration de ladite convention, le Gouvernement s'engage à examiner cette demande avec la plus grande bienveillance et avec le désir d'accorder à la compagnie le renouvellement de sa concession dans les conditions les plus raisonnables à cette époque.

Abandon.

Avant même l'expiration de ladite période, la compagnie aura le droit de faire abandon définitif au Gouvernement de tous les droits que lui accordent les présentes, en lui donnant seulement notification écrite de son intention trois mois d'avance; cette convention prendra fin définitivement à la date fixée dans ladite notification. Si cette notification est donnée avant vingt-cinq ans à partir de la présente convention, la compagnie sera en droit d'enlever, quitte de tous droits et taxes, toutes les installations, constructions, magasins, matériel et tous autres [sic] constituant sa propriété, étant entendu que pendant une période de trois mois, à dater de la réception de ladite notification, le Gouvernement aura le droit d'acheter les installations, matériel et propriétés cités plus haut, à leur prix de remplacement à la date en question, déduction faite de leur dépréciation; ce prix sera fixé par entente amiable ou, faute d'accord, réglé dans les conditions prévues à l'article 25 ci-après.

Remise au Gouvernement des Biens immeubles de la Compagnie à l'Expiration de la Concession.

A l'expiration de ladite période de soixante-dix ans, ou dans le cas où notification d'abandon est donnée après l'expiration des vingt-cinq ans à partir de la date de la signature de la présente convention, les droits accordés à la compagnie par cette convention seront périmés et toute la partie de la conduite, des stations de pompage, des parcs de réservoirs et autres immeubles situés dans le territoire de l'Etat et utilisés pour les opérations de la compagnie, deviendront la propriété du Gouvernement sans aucun dédommagement.

ARTICLE 3.

Lieux réservés à l'Exercice des Cultes.

Aucune construction de l'entreprise ne pourra être érigée dans les limites des cimetières, des lieux réservés à l'exercice des cultes ou des lieux renfermant des antiquités tels qu'ils sont énumérés et décrits dans les Lois et Règlements concernant les Antiquités.

Les objets d'art et les antiquités découverts pendant la construction seront assujettis aux règlements qui les concernent.

ARTICLE 4.

Exemption de Charges fiscales sur les Pétroles.

Aucune taxe d'importation, de transit, d'exportation ou autre, aucune charge fiscale quelconque, ne seront prélevées sur les pétroles, naphte, ozokérite, gaz naturels, soit à l'état brut, soit sous n'importe quelle forme dérivée, qu'ils soient destinés au transit ou utilisés pour le fonctionnement industriel de l'entreprise.

Livraison des Pétroles à la Consommation locale.

Lesdits produits, bruts ou raffinés, s'ils sont livrés à la consommation locale dans le territoire de l'Etat, ou utilisés pour des besoins autres que ceux de l'entreprise, sont soumis aux mêmes droits et charges fiscales, y compris les droits d'importation, qui sont imposables aux produits similaires sur le territoire de l'Etat.

Les conditions de vente de ces produits sur le marché local feront l'objet d'un arrangement entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie.

ARTICLE 5.

Droits d'Importation.

La compagnie aura le droit d'importer sur le territoire de l'Etat en franchise de droits de douane ou d'importation—lesquels droits sont collectivement ci-après désignés sous le nom de "droits d'importation"—tous approvisionnements, fournitures, matériaux et objets quelconques qui pourront être nécessaires aux travaux de l'entreprise et à ses transports, y compris tout matériel pour bureaux, maisons, hôpitaux ou autres bâtiments qui seront la propriété de la compagnie et utilisés pour son exploitation (lesdits approvisionnements, fournitures, matériaux et objets quelconques seront collectivement ci-après désignés sous le nom de "matériaux").

Les matériaux importés en franchise de droits d'importation, au cas où ils seraient vendus par la compagnie pour être employés dans le territoire de l'Etat, seront assujettis aux droits d'importation applicables au moment de la vente aux matériaux similaires. La compagnie aura la faculté de réexporter en franchise de droits les matériaux importés en franchise.

Vu la nature exceptionnelle de l'entreprise, le Gouvernement consent à accorder à la compagnie, en cas de besoin, des facilités particulières pour l'importation des matériaux en des lieux commodes pour la compagnie, et, sous réserve des règlements internationaux régissant les ports maritimes, de permettre le chargement et déchargement de navires, l'importation et l'exportation de cargaisons à tous moments, de jour ou de nuit, et pendant les jours fériés. La compagnie, de son côté, s'engage à construire et à entretenir tous bâtiments spéciaux qui pourront être nécessaires à cette fin et à payer les frais supplémentaires des employés de douane, prescrits par les règlements.

Tous objets et matériaux importés ou exportés par les employés de la compagnie pour leurs besoins personnels, ou qui seront importés par la compagnie pour être vendus à ses employés, seront assujettis aux droits d'importation en vigueur.

Le Gouvernement ne sera pas tenu de rembourser les droits payés sur les matériaux achetés dans le pays par la compagnie, mais les commandes passées par la compagnie aux négociants du pays pour des matériaux qui, d'après les termes de cette convention, sont exempts de droits d'importation seront, au moment de l'importation, également exemptées de droits d'importation. Toutes commandes de cette nature devront être notifiées au Gouvernement et appuyées par un certificat signé du nom de la compagnie et approuvé par le Gouvernement attestant que ces commandes ont bien été passées pour le compte de la compagnie et pour les besoins de l'entreprise.

ARTICLE 6.

Droits de Port.

Le Gouvernement fera les démarches nécessaires pour que les autorités du port et les autorités municipales donnent effectivement à la compagnie et à ses entrepreneurs toutes facilités pour le déchargement et la manipulation des cargaisons.

Sous réserve des droits existants et sans pouvoir s'opposer à l'octroi par le Gouvernement de nouvelles concessions de port, la compagnie aura la faculté d'utiliser dans le port ses propres allèges, chaloupes et autres bateaux pour les besoins de ses propres affaires et d'emmagasiner ses cargaisons dans ses propres magasins et hangars.

Tous bateaux appartenant à la compagnie, ou spécialement affrétés par elle, seront tenus de payer les droits de port suivant un barème de prix à établir entre les autorités du port et de la compagnie; mais ces droits de port ne seront, en aucun cas, supérieurs aux droits payables par d'autres personnes utilisant le port et ils seront établis en partant du coût des services rendus.

La compagnie paiera les taxes pour l'emploi des appareils de levage, la mise à quai, l'allègement et les autres droits de port, d'après un barème de prix à établir entre les autorités compétentes et la compagnie, mais ces droits ne seront, en aucun cas, supérieurs aux droits payables par d'autres personnes utilisant les mêmes services et seront de même fixés en partant du coût des services rendus.

ARTICLE 7.

Construction d'un Port par la Compagnie.

Dans la zone d'aboutissement de la conduite et pour les besoins de l'entreprise à l'exclusion de ceux du commerce général, le Gouvernement accordera toutes facilités pour la construction et l'entretien par la compagnie, si elle le désire, en un ou plusieurs points fixés d'accord avec le Gouvernement, de tous ports ou ports nécessaires à son exploitation et au chargement des bateaux-citernes.

Dans la limite du port ou des ports, qui seraient construits conformément à ces prévisions, la compagnie pourra d'accord avec le Gouvernement, placer des bouées d'amarrage, de balisage et d'éclairage, établir des feux et signaux d'atterrissage, des brise-lames, des jetées, des quais, des conduites de chargement sous-marines, et, d'une manière générale, pourra entreprendre tous travaux de dragage et tous travaux d'aménagement, de conservation, d'assainissement et d'entretien que la compagnie pourra estimer nécessaires pour l'exploitation efficace de ce port ou de ces ports, de jour ou de nuit.

Les plans pour la construction de ce port ou de ces ports seront soumis à l'approbation du Gouvernement; cette approbation ne devra pas être retardée ou refusée sans motif raisonnable.

Le droit d'entrée ou d'accès à ce ou ces ports sera à la discrétion de la compagnie.

Les bateaux utilisant les installations maritimes de la compagnie ne seront soumis de ce fait à aucune taxation gouvernementale.

Le barème des taxes que la compagnie percevra du fait de l'utilisation de ses installations maritimes ferait éventuellement l'objet d'un accord entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie.

Rien dans cet article n'exempte des droits de phare les bateaux qui entreraient dans le ou les ports de la compagnie ou en sortiraient.

Les services compétents du Gouvernement, suivant des modalités déterminées d'accord avec la compagnie, assureront les services de douane, de quarantaine, d'immigration et de surveillance de police. Pour ces services et tous autres services spéciaux rendus par le Gouvernement, la compagnie ou les bateaux qui utiliseront les ports de la compagnie paieront suivant un tarif à débattre, établi en partant du coût des services rendus.

L'amarrage dans le voisinage des pontons de la compagnie et des conduites de chargement sous-marines, ainsi qu'au voisinage des conduites immergées au point de traversée des rivières, sera interdit par les soins du Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 8.

Tarif des Chemins de Fer.

Pour les besoins de la construction et de l'exploitation de l'entreprise, la compagnie pourra utiliser le chemin de fer de Tripoli à Homs et prolongement vers l'est, suivant un tarif à fixer entre la compagnie et les autorités des chemins de fer. Le Gouvernement usera de son influence pour que la compagnie puisse

obtenir des autorités des chemins de fer, à des termes et à des conditions à fixer d'accord avec ces autorités, et en tenant compte des obligations internationales existantes, des tarifs spéciaux réduits, en raison de l'importance considérable du tonnage des marchandises et du trafic de voyageurs de la compagnie, et le droit pour la compagnie pendant les périodes de construction de fournir son propre matériel de transport si l'Administration des Chemins de fer n'est pas en mesure de fournir du matériel roulant convenable ou d'assurer les transports de la compagnie sans délais excessifs.

ARTICLE 9.

Construction de Chemin de Fer par la Compagnie.

Le Gouvernement accordera à la compagnie le droit de construire toute voie ferrée nécessaire pour le service de l'entreprise, au cas où les chemins de fer existants ou en projet ne satisferaient pas aux besoins de la compagnie.

La compagnie s'engage, avant de procéder à toute construction de cette nature autre que la construction d'une voie de chantier, à soumettre à l'approbation du Gouvernement un plan de construction, d'entretien et d'exploitation du chemin de fer; cette ligne ne sera pas utilisée pour le transport public de passagers, d'animaux ou de marchandises et la compagnie ne jouira pas des droits ni ne sera soumise aux obligations d'une entreprise de transports publics en ce qui concerne le chemin de fer, mais les marchandises et le personnel du Gouvernement pourront être transportés suivant des dispositions et aux termes et conditions à fixer d'accord avec le Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement aura le droit, si l'intérêt public l'exige, d'acheter, à un prix à convenir d'un commun accord, ou, à défaut d'accord, à fixer, suivant les termes de l'article 25 de la présente convention, toute voie ferrée construite par la compagnie dont la largeur entre les rails excédera 0.762 mètre, mais, en cas d'achat par le Gouvernement d'une voie ferrée, le Gouvernement aura l'obligation de transporter les marchandises et les voyageurs de la compagnie à des conditions à fixer en partant du coût des services rendus.

ARTICLE 10.

Utilisation des Routes par la Compagnie.

La compagnie aura les mêmes droits que le public en ce qui concerne l'usage du réseau routier construit.

Construction de Routes par la Compagnie.

La compagnie ne pourra prétendre à aucune contribution de revenus publics au coût d'établissement ou d'entretien de routes construites par la compagnie pour les besoins de l'entreprise.

ARTICLE 11.

Main d'Œuvre.

La compagnie s'engage à utiliser la main d'œuvre locale pour les besoins de l'entreprise sur le territoire de l'Etat.

En cas d'insuffisance de main d'œuvre locale appropriée, le Gouvernement s'engage à accorder les facilités spéciales qui seraient nécessaires à l'entrée sur le territoire de l'Etat de main d'œuvre étrangère pour les besoins de l'entreprise.

Au cas où les importations de main d'œuvre répondraient à un besoin temporaire de la compagnie pour une tâche déterminée, la compagnie s'engage, cette tâche accomplie, à rapatrier toute personne admise dans ces conditions et qui ne serait pas autorisée par le Gouvernement à demeurer sur le territoire de l'Etat.

La compagnie aura le droit d'organiser ses équipes de travail de telle sorte que la construction, l'entretien et l'exploitation de l'entreprise puissent se poursuivre sans interruption de jour, de nuit et pendant les jours fériés, sous réserve des conventions internationales relatives à la réglementation du travail.

Pendant tous travaux spéciaux de construction ou de réparation qui exigeraient temporairement une main d'œuvre abondante, le Gouvernement

accordera des facilités spéciales pour la libre et facile circulation des employés de la compagnie, de ses véhicules et matériaux, de jour et de nuit, à certains points de frontière à fixer d'accord.

Passages de Frontière.

Tenant compte des besoins spéciaux de l'entreprise qui exigent un travail ininterrompu, le Gouvernement accordera à tout moment toutes facilités pour la circulation du personnel dirigeant de la compagnie, de ses employés et ses matériaux aux points convenus pour la traversée de la frontière et accueillera favorablement et, si possible, adoptera toutes mesures de réciprocité à cet égard que la compagnie pourra obtenir avec les Gouvernements des territoires voisins.

Tous frais exceptionnellement encourus par le Gouvernement en facilitant ainsi la circulation aux points de passage convenus des frontières seront d'abord convenus entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie, et seront supportés par la compagnie.

Restrictions.

Le Gouvernement pourra interdire, dans l'intérêt de la sécurité publique, à toute personne employée par la compagnie, de pénétrer ou de séjourner dans une région déterminée.

ARTICLE 12.

Taxation.

Pour les opérations de l'entreprise, la compagnie ne sera soumise à aucun impôt foncier, aucun impôt sur le revenu, ni à aucune perception ou charge fiscale de quelque nature que ce soit, que ces taxes s'appliquent sur ses biens, son revenu, son chiffre d'affaires ou sur l'importance de son personnel.

La compagnie restera soumise au droit commun pour ce qui concerne son activité sur le marché local, comme pour les dividendes qui seraient distribués à des contribuables dans le pays ou les salaires payés aux ouvriers et employés, pour autant qu'ils seront imposables dans le territoire de l'Etat.

Aucun droit de timbre ne sera prélevé sur la présente convention, ni sur les documents y annexés, ni sur aucune autre convention complémentaire, plans, spécifications, ou pièces semblables exécutées pour le Gouvernement et soumis à son approbation; cette exemption ne s'étend pas aux transactions autres que celles qui sont spécifiées dans le présent article.

Au cas où dans la mesure où la compagnie assurerait à ses frais, dans les limites des terrains acquis pour ses ports, raffineries, stations de stockage, stations de pompage, &c., des services appropriés se rattachant ou destinés à l'éducation, à la police, à l'hygiène, à l'alimentation en eau, à l'éclairage et à d'autres services de caractère municipal, la compagnie serait dégagée de l'obligation de payer les taxes se rapportant aux services ainsi organisés, mais rien, dans les présentes, n'impose à la compagnie une obligation quelconque d'organiser de tels services, ni ne l'autorise à les étendre au delà de ses besoins exclusifs.

Par contre, toutes les installations de la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat ou toutes les opérations qu'elle effectuera dans le territoire de l'Etat qui ne seraient pas destinées au fonctionnement de l'entreprise ou ne seraient pas justifiées par l'exploitation de cette entreprise, entreront dans le droit commun et seront passibles de toutes les taxes applicables suivant les lois en vigueur.

ARTICLE 13.

Communications.

La compagnie aura le droit d'installer, d'entretenir et d'utiliser, pour les seuls besoins de l'entreprise et sous la surveillance du Gouvernement, des lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques aériennes ou souterraines, ainsi que toutes installations de radiotélégraphie ou radiotéléphonie, en se conformant à la réglementation locale et internationale en vigueur, de manière à ne pas entraver les services officiels ou autres qui pourraient exister.

En cas de besoin, il sera permis aux fonctionnaires du Gouvernement chargés de la sécurité publique de faire un emploi raisonnable de ces installations.

La compagnie aura le droit d'utiliser pour l'entreprise tous services publics qui pourront exister dans le territoire de l'Etat, même non spécialement mentionnés dans la présente convention, moyennant le paiement éventuel des sommes qui seraient imposées à d'autres entreprises industrielles pour l'utilisation de ces mêmes services.

ARTICLE 14.

Transports.

La compagnie aura le droit d'utiliser tout moyen de transport par terre, par eau ou par air pour la circulation de ses employés ou de ses matériaux, tout en observant les lois et règlements régissant l'utilisation de ces moyens de transport.

ARTICLE 15.

Matériel de Construction.

La compagnie aura le droit, sous réserve des droits existants, d'employer pour les besoins de l'entreprise toute terre, argile, ballast, chaux, gypse, pierre et autres matériaux appartenant au Gouvernement et sans autre charge que le paiement des droits de licence en vigueur pour l'exploitation des carrières.

Les arbres, bois et broussailles nécessaires à l'entreprise pourront être coupés dans les forêts du Gouvernement, sous réserve des droits existants et compte tenu de la nécessité de préserver les forêts, aux termes et conditions des règlements y afférents.

ARTICLE 16.

En accord avec le Gouvernement, la compagnie aura le droit, sous réserve des droits existants, de creuser des puits, de construire des barrages, de capter et d'emmagasiner les eaux de surface et de prendre toutes mesures utiles pour se procurer l'eau nécessaire aux besoins de l'entreprise, sans autre redevance ni charge que le prix du terrain acquis à cet effet conformément aux dispositions de l'article 17 ci-après.

La compagnie aura le droit, avec le consentement du Gouvernement, de prélever sur les rivières et les lacs telles quantités d'eau qui seraient d'un commun accord considérées comme nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, sous réserve que les droits acquis ou préalablement accordés seront d'abord satisfaits et que la compagnie ne privera en aucun cas la population locale d'une quantité d'eau raisonnable et qui serait nécessaire à cette population pour ses besoins domestiques, industriels et agricoles et pour l'abreuvement des troupeaux et l'irrigation des terres.

Les eaux sur lesquelles des droits d'usage spéciaux ont été acquis ou accordés seront, si le Gouvernement estime que ces eaux sont nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, expropriées dans les formes prévues par la loi et aux frais de la compagnie, étant entendu qu'une expropriation de cette nature ne privera en aucun cas la population locale d'une quantité d'eau raisonnable et qui lui serait nécessaire pour ses besoins domestiques, industriels et agricoles et pour l'abreuvement des troupeaux et l'irrigation des terres.

La compagnie prendra toutes mesures raisonnables pour rendre disponible pour l'utilisation locale l'eau usée provenant de ses établissements industriels.

Aucune disposition de la présente convention n'exempte la compagnie du paiement de redevances pour l'eau qui serait fournie à la compagnie par les autorités locales.

ARTICLE 17.

Terrains d'Etat.

Le Gouvernement accordera à la compagnie pour une durée qui ne sera pas supérieure à la durée de la présente convention, moyennant un loyer nominal, les locations des terrains d'Etat qui seront nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise. En ce qui concerne les propriétés d'Etat qui seraient cultivées ou bâties situées à l'intérieur ou à proximité des villes et qui seraient nécessaires pour les besoins de l'entreprise, la compagnie paiera au Gouvernement un loyer annuel équitable et calculé sur la base de la valeur locative de ces propriétés.

Il sera payé une compensation raisonnable aux occupants des terrains cultivés en cas d'éviction.

Terrains privés.

Les terrains nécessaires à l'entreprise qui n'appartiennent pas au Gouvernement seront acquis à l'amiable entre la compagnie et le propriétaire intéressé. A défaut d'accord, si le Gouvernement considère l'acquisition de ces terrains comme nécessaire pour les besoins de l'entreprise, il les acquerra aux termes de la loi d'expropriation en vigueur à ce moment, mais tous les frais resteront à la charge de la compagnie.

Toutefois, il est entendu que, dans l'estimation de la valeur de ces terrains, l'emploi auquel la compagnie les destine ne sera pas pris en considération et qu'il ne sera tenu compte que du prix moyen des terrains de même nature dans le voisinage immédiat et que les terrains ainsi acquis par le Gouvernement et enregistrés à son nom seront mis, moyennant un loyer nominal, à la disposition de la compagnie pour une durée qui ne sera pas supérieure à la durée de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 18.

Sécurité.

Le Gouvernement prendra les mesures appropriées pour assurer la protection normale de l'entreprise et les employés de la compagnie.

La compagnie s'engage à construire à ses propres frais les logements nécessaires pour la police dans les localités où le Gouvernement et la compagnie s'accorderaient à reconnaître que de telles constructions constituent une mesure nécessaire de protection en raison de l'absence ou de l'insuffisance des forces de police en ces points.

Pendant les périodes de construction, le Gouvernement prendra, d'accord avec la compagnie et avec son concours, les mesures exceptionnelles de protection qui apparaîtraient nécessaires.

ARTICLE 19.

Participation en Actions.

Lorsqu'une émission en actions sera offerte au public par la compagnie pour les besoins de l'entreprise, des listes de souscription seront ouvertes sur le territoire de l'Etat en même temps que les listes seront ouvertes ailleurs.

ARTICLE 20.

La compagnie devra, dans les trois mois à partir de la date de cette convention, ouvrir un bureau à Beyrouth et désigner un représentant local ayant pouvoir de traiter toutes questions relatives à l'exploitation de l'entreprise et à l'exécution de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 21.

Exécution de la Convention.

La compagnie prendra toutes mesures raisonnables en vue de l'exécution des objets de la présente convention.

Si, à l'expiration d'un délai de trois ans à partir de la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention, la compagnie n'est pas en situation d'assurer cette exécution, ou si, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 23 ci-après (Force majeure) la compagnie n'a pas achevé, à l'expiration d'un délai de huit ans à partir de cette même date, la pose de la ou des conduites portées sur les plans soumis au Gouvernement conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement aura toute liberté et pouvoir de résilier la présente convention.

Protection accordée par le Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement prendra toutes mesures raisonnables pour faciliter l'exécution des objets de la présente convention et lorsque, dans la sphère d'action de l'entreprise, le Gouvernement accordera un contrat, une licence ou une concession autre que celle-ci, il sera tenu de sauvegarder les droits acquis par la compagnie en vertu de la présente convention.

La compagnie s'engage à prendre toutes précautions nécessaires pour éviter la pollution des éléments (air, eau, &c.) au voisinage de ses installations. Mais le Gouvernement reconnaît que des circonstances existent où certaine pollution des éléments est inévitable du fait des opérations de l'industrie du pétrole et il ne demandera pas à la compagnie, pour éviter cet inconvénient, des mesures qui ne soient pas raisonnables.

ARTICLE 22.

Droit de Réquisition des Propriétés de la Compagnie par le Gouvernement.

Au cas où le Gouvernement se trouverait en état de guerre avec un autre pays, le Gouvernement aura le droit de réquisitionner et d'utiliser les chemins de fer, les ponts, les quais, les télégraphes et les téléphones de la compagnie dans le territoire de l'Etat moyennant paiement d'une compensation suivant les lois en vigueur.

ARTICLE 23.

Dommages-intérêts.

La sanction, en cas de rupture de cette convention, sera établie sous forme de dommages-intérêts, dont le montant sera fixé d'un commun accord ou d'après les termes de l'article 25.

ARTICLE 24.

Force majeure.

Aucun manquement ou omission, soit de la part de la compagnie, soit de la part du Gouvernement, d'observer ou de remplir quelque stipulation, accord ou condition contenus dans la présente convention, et dont l'observation et l'exécution incombent soit à la compagnie, soit au Gouvernement, ne donnera lieu à une plainte ou réclamation contre l'une des parties, ne déterminera un préjudice quelconque pour cette partie, ni ne sera considéré comme une rupture de la présente convention, s'il est démontré à la satisfaction raisonnable de l'autre partie que la faute provient de l'une des causes suivantes : force majeure, révoltes, émeutes, guerres, grèves, machinations ou lock-out de la main d'œuvre, ou autres circonstances exceptionnelles ou imprévues qui devraient être considérées comme étant en dehors du contrôle de la compagnie ou du Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 25.

Au cas où, pendant la durée de cette convention ou après, un doute, un différend ou une contestation viendraient à s'élever entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution de la présente convention, ou sur un autre point y contenu ou y afférent, ou au sujet des droits et obligations de l'une ou l'autre des parties, le différend, à défaut d'accord réalisé entre les parties d'une autre manière, sera soumis à deux arbitres choisis chacun par l'une des parties et à un tiers arbitre qui sera choisi par les deux premiers arbitres eux-mêmes avant de procéder à l'arbitrage. Chaque partie nommera l'arbitre de son choix dans les trente jours qui suivront la requête écrite qu'elle en aura reçue de l'autre partie. Si les arbitres ne peuvent se mettre d'accord sur le choix du tiers arbitre, le Gouvernement et la compagnie, en accord mutuel, nommeront un tiers arbitre et, au cas où ils ne réussiraient pas à se mettre d'accord, ils demanderont au président de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de nommer le tiers arbitre. La décision des arbitres, ou, s'il se produit un désaccord entre eux, la décision du tiers arbitre, sera décisive. L'arbitrage aura lieu à tel endroit que les parties pourront décider; en cas de désaccord, il aura lieu à Paris.

ARTICLE 26.

Réserve relative aux Actes internationaux, Privilèges ou Accords existants.

La présente convention ne peut être interprétée comme imposant au Gouvernement aucune obligation contraire à toute autre obligation qui lui incomberait du fait d'un acte international.

La présente convention, non plus qu'aucune des dispositions qui y sont inscrites, ne peut être interprétée comme portant atteinte ou dérogation à aucun droit ou privilège établi par une concession existante ou par un accord engageant le Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 27.

Délégation par la Compagnie des Droits qui lui sont conférés par la Convention.

La compagnie pourra confier à un mandataire le soin d'exécuter la présente convention ou autrement disposer de la présente convention ou de tous intérêts ou pouvoirs qu'elle tient de la présente convention, sous la réserve de l'obtention préalable du consentement du Gouvernement donné par écrit. Ce consentement ne pourra être refusé ou retardé sans motif raisonnable.

ARTICLE 28.

Les annotations portées en marge de la présente convention n'y sont portées que pour faciliter les références, et ne peuvent affecter le sens et l'interprétation de la convention.

ARTICLE 29.

Pour tout ce qui touche à l'exécution de la présente convention, les rapports entre le Gouvernement et la compagnie s'établiront, pendant la durée du mandat, par l'entremise du Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban.

ARTICLE 30.

La présente convention deviendra exécutoire par l'accomplissement des formalités prévues par les textes constitutionnels en vigueur à la date de la signature de la présente convention, et après approbation du Haut-Commissaire de la République française en Syrie et au Liban.

ARTICLE 31.

Le Texte français fait foi.

En cas de divergence entre les interprétations des textes français et arabe, le texte français fera seul foi.

Fait à Beyrouth, le 25 mars 1931.

Pour le Gouvernement :
Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
AUG. ADIB.

En présence de :

A. POUPON,
*Délégué p. i. du Haut-Commissaire
auprès de la République libanaise.*

Pour la Compagnie :
J. SKLIROS.

En présence de :

JOHN S. ROGERS,
Iraq Petroleum Company (Limited).

(3)

Accord entre la République du Liban et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh relatif à la Fixation de leur commune Frontière et à l'Etablissement d'un Régime spécial en ce qui touche les grandes Voies de Communication qui longent ou traversent cette Frontière.

PRÉAMBULE.

Le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh,

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 3007 du 29 décembre 1925, qui fixe leurs frontières respectives;

Désireux de procéder à la clôture définitive des travaux destinés à fixer sur le terrain cette frontière en tenant compte des conditions économiques spéciales à cette région;

Désireux, en particulier, d'éviter les complications et les difficultés d'ordres divers qui résultent de ce que les grandes voies de communication entre Homs et Tripoli se trouvent à plusieurs reprises sectionnées par la ligne frontière;

Désireux enfin de faciliter l'établissement, l'exploitation et la surveillance des canalisations de pétrole qui doivent traverser cette même zone,

Ont convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Entre le pont d'Aridah et le pont de Djisr-el-Akmar, la frontière suivra le lit du Nahr-el-Kébir, tel qu'il a été déterminé par la Commission mixte de Délimitation le 25 août 1930, dont les conclusions sont consignées au procès-verbal annexé au présent accord.

ARTICLE 2.

Le Gouvernement libanais aura la charge exclusive de l'exploitation et de l'entretien de la grande route depuis la frontière de Syrie jusqu'à Tripoli.

Toutes dépenses afférentes à cet objet seront supportées par l'Etat du Liban.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement libanais sera, dans les mêmes conditions, substitué au Gouvernement de Lattaquieh dans l'application de la convention de réadaptation des actes concessionnels de la Société D. H. P. en date du 12 octobre 1925 et de son annexe.

ARTICLE 4.

En prévision de la construction de canalisations de pétrole dans la zone frontière, le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh délègue au Gouvernement de la République libanaise l'exercice des droits et la responsabilité des obligations définies par la convention relative au transit du pétrole d'Irak conclue le 25 mars 1931 entre le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et l'Iraq Petroleum Company.

ARTICLE 5.

En considération des droits et obligations résultant pour lui des trois articles qui précèdent, le Gouvernement libanais concède dans les mêmes conditions au Gouvernement de Lattaquieh le droit d'administration générale sur la zone située dans la boucle du Nahr-el-Kébir au nord de la grande route de Tripoli à Homs entre Djisr-el-Aridah et Djisr-el-Akmar, avec les avantages fiscaux qu'il comporte.

Le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh s'engage à verser chaque année au Gouvernement libanais, par prélèvement sur les recettes fiscales effectuées dans cette zone, une somme forfaitaire de mille livres libano-syriennes.

ARTICLE 6.

Dans la zone dont l'administration lui est concédée en vertu des articles qui précèdent, chacun des deux Gouvernements est délégué par l'autre pour toute la durée du présent accord dans l'exercice de tous les attributs de la souveraineté.

Le périmètre municipal de Tell Kala est excepté de ces dispositions.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la République libanaise et le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh se font réciproquement abandon, chacun pour ce qui le concerne, des réclamations pour impôts perçus ou dépenses effectuées antérieurement à la signature du présent accord dans les zones affectées par cet accord.

ARTICLE 8.

Le présent accord est conclu pour une durée de soixante-douze ans à compter de sa signature.

ARTICLE 9.

Une carte annexe précise les divers points mentionnés dans cet accord.

ARTICLE 10.

Toute difficulté surgissant à l'occasion de l'interprétation et de l'application du présent accord, et sur le règlement de laquelle les deux Gouvernements intéressés n'auraient pu se mettre d'accord, sera obligatoirement soumise à l'arbitrage d'une commission composée de deux membres désignés par chacun des Gouvernements et d'un président désigné par le représentant du Gouvernement français.

Fait à Beyrouth, en trois exemplaires, le 12 mai 1931.

Pour le Gouvernement de la République libanaise :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
AUGUSTE ADIB.

Pour le Gouvernement de Lattaquieh :

Le Gouverneur,
SHEFFLER.

[E 3288/59/25]

No. 157.

Sir J. Chancellor to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, June 22.)

(Confidential.)
My Lord,

High Commissioner for Palestine,
Jerusalem, June 11, 1931.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 51 of the 4th June, I have the honour to inform your lordship that King Hussein died at Amman at 3 A.M. on the 4th June.

During his stay at Amman King Hussein had been visited from time to time by his sons King Faisal, King Aly, the Amir Zeid and other members of his family.

2. As soon as it was known that King Hussein's condition was desperate, King Aly informed Haj Amin Effendi-al-Husseini, the President of the Supreme Moslem Council, who was then at Amman, that it had been the wish of the family that King Hussein should be buried at Mecca, but that since the difficulties in the way of realising that wish were insuperable they desired that he should be buried in the Haram-esh-Sherif at Jerusalem.

3. Haj Amin Effendi welcomed the suggestion, and, on the eve of King Hussein's death, reported the fact to Government with the request that facilities should be accorded by the Palestine Government for the burial of King Hussein with all the honours due to the Arab ruler who had persuaded the Arabs to throw in their lot with the Allied Forces during the Great War.

I caused Haj Amin Effendi to be informed that all proper facilities would be granted for the ceremony.

4. On the 4th June, at 10 A.M., the body of King Hussein left Amman by motor-car.

The cortège was formed of the sons and relatives of King Hussein, including King Aly, the Amir Abdullah, the Amirs Zeid, Shakir and Talal. The British Resident, Amman, the Officer Commanding the Arab Legion and many Arab notables were also present. Along the route from Amman to Jerusalem frequent halts were made to enable delegations of villagers to pay their respects to the dead King.

The Amir Abdullah and King Aly were met at the Allenby Bridge on my behalf by Ruhi Bey Abdullahi, assistant secretary, accompanied by a British police officer. The party was there joined by several delegations of Palestinian Arabs, representing different towns and bodies.

5. At 2-20 P.M. the cortège reached Jerusalem and stopped at Herod's Gate, where Government representatives, members of the consular corps, ecclesiastical dignitaries, Arab notables awaited it. Representatives of the Chief Rabbinate and of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, although they had not been invited, were also in attendance. The Italian consul-general, who was also omitted from the list of invitations, was not present.

6. At Herod's Gate a procession was formed, headed by the band of the Arab Legion. The procession included the mayors of Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and other towns, the consular body, delegations representing various Moslem and Christian societies from many parts of Palestine with their banners, and parties of boy scouts and schoolboys. The procession approached the Haram-esh-Sherif by the Damascus Gate and the old city. The streets and buildings along which it passed were crowded with interested spectators.

I was represented in the procession by my private secretary and aide-de-camp. The acting chief justice, the chief secretary, the Officer Commanding, Transjordan Frontier Force and Heads of Departments were in attendance. Major Hubert Young, counsellor of the High Commission for Iraq, who happened to be in Jerusalem, was also present.

A guard of honour was furnished by the Royal Warwickshire Regiment and saluted the coffin as it entered the old city at the Damascus Gate.

7. At 4 P.M. the coffin was carried into the Dome of the Rock, and immediately afterwards the Amir Abdullah and King Aly received the Government representatives, consuls and other non-Moslem notables, who, after expressing their sympathy with the Hashimite family, left the Haram Area.

At 4-30 P.M. the coffin was carried to the Mosque of Al Aqsa where, after the usual religious ceremonies, funeral orations were delivered by the president of the Supreme Moslem Council, Sheikh Abdul Kader-al-Muzaffar, Issaf Effendi-al-Nashashibi and Dr. Khalid-al-Hakin.

At about 5 P.M. the burial took place in a small and beautiful old mosque which abuts on the Haram Area a few yards from the tomb of Mohammad Ali and on its northern side.

A window has been specially opened in the wall of the Haram to connect the tomb with the Haram Area.

8. No untoward incident of any kind occurred during the funeral; and the Amir Abdullah and King Aly expressed to me their deep appreciation of the arrangements made by the Government for the funeral of their father.

Flags were flown at half-mast on Government buildings and at the Royal Air Force and military stations and on the consular offices on the day of the funeral.

9. I invited King Aly and Amir Abdullah to dine and to spend the night at Government House. The King and the Amir expressed their gratitude for this invitation which they accepted.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR,

High Commissioner for Palestine.